Radhe Krishna 03-09-2016

BRAHMA SUTRAS - PART 1 (அத்தியாயம் 1 & 2 )

INTRODUCTION

ॐ
॥ श्रिगणेशय नमः ॥
॥ श्रिसद् गुरुपरमात्मने नमः ॥

Hari Om! Salutations to Sri Vyasa, the Avatara of Vishnu, the wise Badarayana and Sri Krishna Dvaipayana.
Vedas consist of three portions viz., the Karma Kanda which deals with sacrifices or ceremonial rites, the Upasana Kanda which treats of Upasana (worship) and the Jnana Kanda which deals with knowledge of Brahman. Karma Kanda represents the feet of a man, Upasana Kanda the heart, and the Jnana Kanda the head. Just as the head is the most important portion of a man, so also the Upanishads which treat of the knowledge portion of the Vedas is the head of the Vedas. Hence it is said to be the Siras (head) of Vedas.
Mimamsa means the investigation or enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts. Of this Mimamsa two branches have been recognised, the Purva Mimamsa (earlier) and the Uttara Mimamsa (the latter). The former systematises the Karma Kanda-the portion of the Veda which pertains to action and sacrifices and which comprises Samhitas and the Brahmanas; the latter systematises the Jnana Kanda i.e., that part of the Vedas which includes the Aranyaka portion of the Brahmanas and the Upanishads. Jaimini is the author of the Purva Mimamsa. Sri Vyasa (Badarayana or Krishna Dvaipayana) the Guru of Jaimini is the author of the Brahma Sutras otherwise known as Vedanta Sutras. The study of Brahma Sutras is a synthetic study of the Upanishads. It treats of the Vedanta philosophy.
The Vedas are eternal. They were not written by any individual. They came out from the breath of Hiranyagarbha (Lord Brahma). Vedanta is the end or gist of the Vedas. It deals with the knowledge portion. Vedanta is not mere speculation. It is the authentic record of transcendental experiences or direct and actual realisation of the great Hindu Rishis or seers. Brahma Sutras is the Science of the Soul.
Sutras are concise aphorisms. They give the essence of the arguments on a topic. Maximum of thought is compressed or condensed into these Sutras in as few words as possible. It is easy to remember them. Great intellectual people only, with realisation, can compose Sutras. They are clues or aids to memory. They cannot be understood without a lucid commentary (Bhashya). The commentary also is in need of further elaborate explanation. Thus the interpretations of the Sutras gave rise to various kinds of literary writings such as Vrittis (gloss) and Karikas. The different Acharyas (founders of different schools of thought) have given their own interpretations of the Sutras to establish their own doctrines. The Bhashya of Sri Sankara on Brahma Sutras is known as Sariraka Bhashya. His school of thought is Kevala Advaita. The Bhashya of Sri Ramanuja who founded the Visishtadvaita School is called Sri Bhashya. The commentary of Sri Nimbarkacharya is known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha. Sri Vallabhacharya expounded his system of philosophy of Suddhadvaita (pure monism) and his commentary on the Brahma Sutras is known as Anu Bhashya.
Sanskrit is very elastic. It is like Kamadhenu or Kalpataru. You can milk out of it various kinds of Rasas according to your intellectual calibre and spiritual experiences. Therefore different Acharyas have built different systems of thought or cults by interpreting the Sutras in their own ways and became founders of sects. Madhva founded his own system of Dvaita. The cults of Vishnu known as Bhagavata or Pancharatra and those of Siva, Pasupata or Mahesvara have interpreted Brahma Sutras in accordance with their own tenets. Nimbarkacharya interpreted the Vedanta system from the standpoint of Bhedabheda-Dvaitadvaita. He was largely influenced by the teachings of Bhaskara who flourished in the first half of the ninth century. The theory held by Bhaskara and Nimbarka was held by the ancient teacher Audulomi. Badarayana himself refers to this theory in his Brahma Sutras.
There are more than fourteen commentaries on the Brahma Sutras. Sri Appaya Dikshita rendered the commentary of Sri Sankara more clear by his Parimala, Sri Vachaspati Misra by his work Bhamati and Sri Amalananda Sarasvati by his Kalpataru.
The erroneous identification of the body with the pure Atman is the root cause for human sufferings and miseries and for births and deaths. You identify yourself with the body and say, 'I am fair, dark, stout or thin. I am a Brahmin, I am a Kshatriya, I am a doctor'. You identify yourself with the senses and say, 'I am blind, I am dumb'. You identify yourself with the mind and say, 'I know nothing. I know everything. I became angry. I enjoyed a good meal. I am suffering from this disease'. The entire object of the Brahma Sutras is to remove this erroneous identification of the Soul with the body which is the root cause of your sufferings and miseries, which is the product of Avidya (ignorance) and help you in the attainment of the final emancipation through knowledge of Brahman.
The Upanishads seem to be full of contradictions at first. They do not contain consistent system of thought. Sri Vyasa systematised the thoughts or philosophy of the Upanishads in his Brahma Sutras. The Sutras reconcile the conflicting statements of the Upanishads. In reality there are no conflicts for the thinker. Audulomi and Asmarathya also did this work in their own way and founded their own schools of thought.
Those who wish to study the philosophy of Vedanta should study the Ten Classical Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras. All Acharyas have commented on Brahma Sutras. This is a great authority for every philosophical school in India. If any Acharya wishes to establish his own cult or sect or school of thought he will have to write a commentary of his own on Brahma Sutras. Then only it will be recognised.
The five great Acharyas: Sri Sankara the exponent of Kevala Advaita or uncompromising monism, Sri Ramanuja the exponent of Visishtadvaita or qualified monism, Sri Nimbarka the exponent of Bhedabheda-vada, Sri Madhva the exponent of strict Dvaitism or Dvaita-vada and Sri Vallabha the exponent of Suddhadvaita-vada or pure monism agree that Brahman is the cause of this world and that knowledge of Brahman leads to Moksha or the final emancipation, which is the goal of life. They also emphatically declared that Brahman can be known only through the scriptures and not through mere reasoning. But they differ amongst themselves as to the nature of this Brahman, the relation of the individual soul to Brahman, the state of the soul in the state of final emancipation, the means of attaining It and Its causality with reference to this universe.
According to Sri Sankara, there is one Absolute Brahman who is Sat-chit-ananda, who is of an absolutely homogeneous nature. The appearance of this world is due to Maya-the illusory power of Brahman which is neither Sat nor Asat. This world is unreal. This world is a Vivarta or apparent modification through Maya. Brahman appears as this universe through Maya. Brahman is the only reality. The individual soul has limited himself through Avidya and identification with the body and other vehicles. Through his selfish actions he enjoys the fruits of his actions. He becomes the actor and enjoyer. He regards himself as atomic and as an agent on account of Avidya or the limiting Antahkarana. The individual soul becomes identical with Brahman when his Avidya is destroyed. In reality Jiva is all-pervading and identical with Brahman. Isvara or Saguna Brahman is a product of Maya. Worship of Isvara leads to Krama Mukti. The pious devotees (the knowers of Saguna Brahman) go to Brahmaloka and attain final release through highest knowledge. They do not return to this world. They attain the Nirguna Brahman at the end of the cycle. Knowledge of Nirguna Brahman is the only means of liberation. The knowers of Nirguna Brahman attain immediate final release or Sadyomukti. They need not go by the path of gods or the path of Devayana. They merge themselves in Para Brahman. They do not go to any Loka or world. Sri Sankara's Brahman is Nirvisesha Brahman (Impersonal Absolute) without attributes.
According to Sri Ramanuja, Brahman is with attributes (Savisesha). Me is endowed with all auspicious qualities. He is not intelligence itself. Intelligence is his chief attribute. He contains within Himself whatever exists. World and individual souls are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter (Achit) and soul (Chit) form the body of the Lord, Lord Narayana who is the Inner Ruler (Antaryamin). Matter and souls are called modes of Him (Prakara). The individual souls will never be entirely resolved in Brahman. According to Ramanuja, Brahman is not absolutely one and homogeneous. The individual souls undergo a state of Sankocha (contraction) during Pralaya. They expand (Vikasa) during creation. Sri Ramanuja's Brahman is a Personal God with attributes. The individual soul of Ramanuja is really individual. It will remain a personality for ever. The soul remains in Vaikuntha for ever in a state of bliss and enjoys the divine Aisvarya of Lord Narayana. Bhakti is the chief means to final emancipation and not Jnana. Sri Ramanuja follows in his Bhashya the authority of Bodhayana.
According to Sri Nimbarkacharya, Brahman is considered as both the efficient and material cause of the world. Brahman is both Nirguna and Saguna. The universe is not unreal or illusory but is a true manifestation or Parinama of Brahman. (Sri Ramanuja also holds this view. He says "Just as milk is transformed into curd, so also Brahman has transformed Himself as this universe"). This world is identical with and at the same time different from Brahman just as the wave or bubble is the same and at the same time different from water. The individual souls are parts of the Supreme Self. They are controlled by the Supreme Being. The final salvation lies in realising the true nature of one's own soul. This can be achieved by Bhakti (devotion). The individuality of the finite self (Jivatman) is not dissolved even in the state of final emancipation. Sri Ramanuja also holds that the Jiva assumes the divine body of Sri Narayana with four hands and enjoys in Vaikuntha the divine Aisvarya of the Lord.
You may ask why do such great realised souls hold different views, why have they started different cults or systems. The highest philosophy of Sri Sankara which bespeaks of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul cannot be understood by the vast majority of persons. Therefore Sri Madhva and Sri Ramanuja started their Bhakti cult. The different schools are different rungs in the ladder of Yoga. The student must place his foot step by step and finally reach the highest peak of perfection-the Kevaladvaita realisation of Sri Sankara. As temperaments are different, different schools are also necessary to suit the taste, capacity, and stage of evolution of the aspirant. Therefore all schools and cults are necessary. They have got their own place and scope.
The views of various Acharyas are all true in respect of the particular aspect of Brahman dealt with by them each in his own way. Sankara has taken Brahman in His transcendental aspect, while Sri Ramanuja has taken Him chiefly in His immanent aspect. People were following blindly the rituals during the time of Sri Sankara. When he was preparing his commentary he had in view the purpose of combating the baneful effects which blind ritualism produced. He never condemned selfless service or Nishkama Karma Yoga. He condemned the performance of rituals with selfish motives.
Sankara Bhashya is the oldest of all commentaries. It upholds Suddha-Para-Brahman or the Supreme Self of the Upanishads as something superior to other divine beings. It propounds a very bold philosophy and declares emphatically that the individual soul is identical with the Supreme Self. Sankara's philosophical view accurately represents the meaning of Badarayana. His explanations only faithfully render the intended meaning of Sri Vyasa. This is beyond doubt and dispute.
Students of Kevaladvaita School of Philosophy should study the Sariraka Bhashya of Sri Sankara which is profound, subtle and unique. It is an authority which leads to the right understanding of the Brahma Sutras. The best thinkers of India, Germany, America and England belong to this school. It occupies a high rank in books on philosophy. Advaita philosophy is the most sublime and the grandest philosophy of the Hindus.
You can understand the Brahma Sutras if you have a knowledge of the twelve classical Upanishads. You can understand the second chapter if you have a knowledge of Sankhya, Nyaya, Yoga, Mimamsa, Vaiseshika Darsana and Buddhistic school, too. All these schools are refuted here by Sri Sankara. Sri Sankara's commentary is the best commentary. Dr. Thibaut has translated this commentary into English. "Brahma Sutras" is one of the books of Prasthanatraya. This is an authoritative book on Hindu Philosophy. The work consists of 4 Adhyayas (chapters), 16 Padas (sections), 223 Adhikaranas (topics) and 555 Sutras (aphorisms). The first chapter (Samanvayadhyaya) unifies Brahman, the second (Avirodhadhyaya) refutes other philosophies, the third (Sadhanadhyaya) deals with practice (Sadhana) to attain Brahman and the fourth (Phaladhyaya) treats of fruits of Self-realisation. Each chapter contains four Padas. Each Pada contains Adhikaranas. Each Adhikarana has separate question to discuss. The first five Adhikaranas of the first chapter are very, very important.
Glory to Sri Vyasa Bhagavan, son of Parasara, the mighty sage, a Chiranjivi who has written all Puranas and also divided the Vedas. May his blessings be upon you all!

Chapter I, Section 1

Introduction

The Vedanta Sutras are called Sariraka Mimamsa because they deal with Para Brahman, the Sarira (the embodied).

In the first chapter the author shows that all the Vedic texts uniformly refer to Brahman and find their Samanvaya (reconciliation) in Him. In the second chapter, it has been proved that there is no conflict between Vedanta and other Sastras. In the third chapter the means of attaining Brahman are described. In the fourth chapter is described the result of attaining Brahman.

The Adhikarin (one who is competent to understand and study the Sastra) is one who is of tranquil mind and has the attributes of Sama (quietude), Dama (self-control), etc., is full of faith, is constantly engaged in good thoughts and associates with the knowers of Truth, whose heart is purified by the due discharge of all duties, religious and secular, and without any idea of reward. The Sambandha is the description of Brahman by this Sastra. The Vishaya or the subject matter of this Sastra is the Supreme Brahman who is all pure. The Prayojana (necessity) of this Sastra is to obtain realisation of the Supreme Brahman, by the removal of all false notions that prevent that realisation.

This Sastra consists of several Adhikaranas or topics or propositions. Every proposition consists of five parts:(1) Thesis or Vishaya, (2) Doubt or Samsaya, (3) Anti-thesis or Purvapaksha, (4) Synthesis or right conclusion or Siddhanta and (5) Sangati or agreement of the proposition with the other parts of the Sastra.

In the whole book of the Vedanta Sutras Brahman is the main theme or the subject matter of discussion. An interpretation of any passage must not go away from the subject matter of Brahman. Each chapter has a particular topic of its own. A passage must be interpreted consistently with the topic of that chapter. There is a certain relation between Adhikaranas or topics themselves. One Adhikarana leads to another through some particular association of ideas. In a Pada or section there are many Adhikaranas and they are not put together in a haphazard manner.

Synopsis

This section gives a bird's-eye view of the subject dealt with in the Brahma Sutras namely the nature of the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self, of the individual soul and the universe and their inter-relations and gives hints on meditation on Brahman.

Adhikarana I: Sutra 1 gives a hint that the book is meant for those who are endowed with a real desire for attaining the knowledge of Brahman.

Adhikarana II: Sutra 2 defines Brahman as that whence the world originates etc.

Adhikarana III: Sutra 3 declares that Brahman is the source of the Vedas and that Brahman is known only by the study of Sruti and by no other means of knowledge.

Adhikarana IV: Sutra 4 proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedanta texts.

Adhikarana V: Sutras 5 to 11 show that none but Brahman is admitted by Sruti to be the cause of the world. They prove by various cogent and convincing arguments that the Brahman which the Vedantic texts proclaim as the cause of the universe is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent or insentient Pradhana from which the world originates, as declared by the Sankhyas.

Adhikarana VI: Sutras 12 to 19 raise the question whether the `Anandamaya' in Taittiriya Upanishad II-5 is merely the individual soul or the Supreme Self. The Sutras show that Brahman is All-Bliss and that by the term `Anandamaya' in Sruti is meant neither the individual soul, nor the Pradhana of Sankhyas. The Sutras prove that they all describe none but Brahman.

Adhikarana VII: Sutras 20 and 21, show that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye mentioned in Chh. Up. I-6 are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the highest Brahman or the Supreme Self.

Adhikarana VIII: Sutra 22 shows that the ether (Akasa) from which according to Chh. Up. I-9 all beings originate, is not the elemental ether but the Supreme Brahman.

Adhikarana IX: Sutra 23 shows that Prana, also mentioned in Chh. Up. I-11-15 is the Supreme Brahman.

Adhikarana X: Sutras 24 to 27 teach that the light spoken of in Chh. Up. III-13-7 is not the ordinary physical light but the Supreme Brahman.

Adhikarana XI: Sutras 28 to 31 decide that the Prana mentioned in Kau. Up. III-2 is Brahman.

Chapter I

SAMANVAYA ADHYAYA

Section 1

Jijnasadhikaranam: Topic 1

The enquiry into Brahman and its pre-requisites

Athato Brahmajijnasa I.1.1 (1)

Now, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman.

Atha: now, then, afterwards; Atah: therefore; Brahmajijnasa: a desire for the knowledge of Brahman (the enquiry into the real nature of Brahman).

Sutra literally means a string. It serves the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedanta passages.

The word Atha is not used to introduce a new subject that is going to be taken up. It is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution.

The enquiry of Brahman specially depends upon some antecedent conditions. The enquirer should be endowed with certain spiritual requisites or qualifications. Then only the enquiry is possible.

Atha i.e., after the attainment of certain preliminary qualifications such as the four means of salvation viz., (1) Nitya-anitya-vastu-viveka (discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal); (2) Ihamutrarthaphalabhogaviraga (indifference to the enjoyment in this life or in heaven, and of the fruits of one's actions); (3) Shatsampat (sixfold virtues viz., Samacontrol of mind, Damacontrol of the external senses, Uparati cessation from worldly enjoyments or not thinking of objects of senses or discontinuance of religious ceremonies, Titiksha endurance of pleasure and pain, heat and cold, Sraddhafaith in the words of the preceptor and of the Upanishads and Samadhanadeep concentration); (4) Mumukshutva (desire for liberation).

Those who have got an earnest desire for the knowledge of Brahman only are fit for the study of Vedanta Philosophy or Brahma Sutras. Even without possessing the knowledge of Karma Kanda which deals with religious ceremonies or sacrifices, a desire for attaining the knowledge of Brahman will arise direct from the study of the Srutis. The enquiry of Brahman does not depend on the performance of any acts.

You must know and realise the eternal Brahman. Then only you will attain eternal bliss, freedom, perfection and immortality. You must have certain preliminary qualifications for your search. Why should you enquire about Brahman? Because the fruits obtained by sacrifices etc., are ephemeral, whereas the knowledge of Brahman is eternal. Life in this earth and the life in heaven which you will attain on account of your virtuous deeds is transient. If you know Brahman, you will enjoy everlasting bliss and immortality. That is the reason why you must start the quest of Brahman or the Truth or the Ultimate Reality.

A time comes when a person becomes indifferent to Karmas. He knows that Karmas cannot give him everlasting, unalloyed happiness which is not mixed with pain, sorrow and fear. Therefore, naturally, a desire arises in him for the knowledge of Brahman or the all-pervading, eternal Soul which is above Karmas, which is the source of eternal happiness.

Charvakas or Lokayatikas think that the body is the soul. Some think that the senses are the soul. Some others think that the mind is the soul. Some think that the intellect is the soul. Some think that the soul is a mere momentary idea.

Some think that nothing exists in reality. Some think that there is a soul which is different from the body which is both agent and enjoyer of the fruits of action. Others hold that he is not a doer but is only an enjoyer. Some think that the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul. Vedantins maintain that the individual soul is identical with the Supreme Soul. Different schools of philosophy hold different views. Therefore it is necessary to examine the truth of things very carefully.

Knowledge of Brahman destroys Avidya or ignorance which is the root of all evil, or the seed of this formidable Samsara or worldly life. Hence you must entertain the desire of knowing Brahman. Knowledge of Brahman leads to the attainment of the final emancipation. Hence an enquiry about Brahman through the study of the Srutis which treats of Brahman is worthwhile and should be undertaken.

The question now arises: What are the characteristics of that Brahman? The nature of the Brahman is described in the following Sutra or aphorism.

JANMADYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 2

DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

janmadyasya yatah

(Brahman is that) from which the origin etc., (i.e. the origin, sustenance and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

Janmadi: origin etc.; Asya: of this (world); Yatah: from which.

Answer to the enquiry of Brahman is briefly given in this Sutra. It is stated that Brahman who is eternally pure, wise and free (Nitya, Buddha, Mukta Svabhava) is the only cause, stay and final resort of this world. Brahman who is the originator, preserver and absorber of this vast world must have unlimited powers and characteristics. Hence He is Omnipotent and Omniscient. Who but the Omnipotent and Omniscient Brahman could create, rule and destroy it? Certainly mere atoms or chance cannot do this work. Existence cannot come out of non-existence (Ex nihilo nihil fit). The origin of the world cannot proceed from a non-intelligent Pradhana or Prakriti. It cannot proceed from its own nature or Svabhava spontaneously without a cause, because special places, times and causes are needed for the production of effects.

Brahman must have some characteristics. You can attain knowledge of Brahman through reflection on its attributes. Otherwise it is not possible to have such knowledge. Inference or reasoning is an instrument of right knowledge if it does not contradict the Vedanta texts.

In the ascertainment of Truth or the Ultimate Reality or the first cause the scriptures alone are authoritative because they are infallible, they contain the direct intuitive experiences of Rishis or Seers who attained Brahma Sakshatkara or Self-realisation. You cannot depend on intellect or reasons because a man of strong intellect can overthrow a man of weak intellect. Brahman is not an object of the senses. It is beyond the reach of the senses and the intellect.

The second Sutra does not propound here that inference serves as the means of knowing Brahman. It points to a Vedantic text which gives a description of the characteristics of Brahman. What then, is that Vedanta text? It is the passage of Taittiriya Upanishad III-i: Bhrigu Varuni went to his father Varuna sayingSir, teach me Brahman. That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know That. That is Brahman.

You will attain Self-realisation through meditation on Brahman or the truths declared by Vedantic texts and not through mere reasoning. Pure reason (Suddha Buddhi) is a help in Self-realisation. It investigates and reveals the truths of the Scriptures. It has a place also in the means of Self-realisation. But perverted intellect (Viparita Buddhi) is a great hindrance. It keeps one far away from the Truth.

That which is the cause of the world is Brahman. This is Tatastha Lakshana. The origin, sustenance and dissolution of the world are characteristics of the world. They do not pertain to the eternal unchanging Brahman. Yet these indicate Brahman which is the cause for this universe. Srutis give another definition of Brahman. This is a description of its true, essential nature Satyam Jnanam Anantam BrahmaTruth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman. This is Svarupa Lakshana.

The knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man but only on the thing itself. The knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i.e., Brahman itself. Action depends entirely on your will but perception is not an effect of volition. It depends on the object perceived. You cannot convert a tree into a man by an act of will. A tree will remain a tree always. Similarly Realisation of Brahman is Vastu Tantra. It depends on the reality of the object. It is not Purusha Tantra. It does not depend on volition. It is not something to be accomplished by action. Brahman is not an object of the senses. It has no connection with other means of knowledge. The senses are finite and dependent. They have only external things for their objects, not Brahman. They are characterised by outgoing tendencies on account of the force of Rajas. They are in their nature so constituted that they run towards external objects. They cannot cognise Brahman.

Knowledge of Brahman cannot come through mere reasoning. You can attain this knowledge through intuition or revelation. Intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman. The object of enquiry is an existing substance. You will have to know this only through intuition or direct cognition (Aparakosha- anubhuti or Anubhavaexperience). Sravana (hearing of the Srutis), Manana (reflection on what you have heard), Nididhyasana (profound meditation) on Brahman leads to intuition. The Brahmakara Vritti is generated from the Sattvic Antahkarana which is equipped with the four means of salvation, and the instructions of the Guru, who has understood the real significance of `Tat Tvam Asi' Mahavakya. This Brahmakara Vritti destroys the Mula-Avidya or primitive ignorance, the root cause of all bondage, births and deaths. When the ignorance or veil is removed, Brahman which is self-effulgent reveals Itself or shines by Itself in Its pristine glory and ineffable splendour. In ordinary perception of objects the mind assumes the form of the object. The Vritti or ray of the mind removes the veil (Avarana-bhanga) that envelops the object and Vritti-sahita-chaitanya or intelligence reflected in the modification of the mind reveals the object. Then only you cognise the object. There is Vritti-vyapti and there is Phala-vyapti also in the perception of an object. You want a Vritti and intelligence (Chaitanya) associated with the Vritti. But in the case of cognition of Brahman there is no Phala-vyapti. There is only Vritti-vyapti as Brahman is self-luminous. If there is a cup in a pot, you want a lamp and the eyes to see the cup in the dark, when the pot is broken: but if there is a lamp within the pot, you want the eyes only to see the lamp when the pot is broken. You do not want a lamp.

SASTRAYONITVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 3

BRAHMAN IS REALISABLE ONLY THROUGH THE SCRIPTURES

SASTRAYONITVAT I.1.3 (3)

The scripture being the source of right knowledge.

Sastra: the scripture; Yonitvat: being the source of or the means of the right knowledge.

The Omniscience of Brahman follows from His being the source of scripture. The aphorism clearly points out that the Srutis alone are proof about Brahman.

As Brahman is the cause of the world we have to infer that Brahman or the Absolute is Omniscient. As the scripture alone is the means of right knowledge with reference to Brahman the proposition laid in Sutra 2 becomes confirmed. Brahman is not merely the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of the world, He is the source or womb of scriptures and is revealed by scriptures. As Brahman is beyond the reach of the senses and the intellect, He can be apprehended only on the authority of the Srutis which are infallible and contain the spiritual experiences of realised seers or sages. The Srutis declare that Brahman Himself breathed forth the Vedas. Therefore He who has brought forth the Srutis or the Vedas which contain such wonderful divine knowledge must be all-knowledge and all-powerful.

The scriptures illumine all things like a search light. Scripture is the source or the means of right knowledge through which you have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of Brahman. Srutis furnish information about what is not known from other sources. It cannot be known by other means of knowledge independently of the Srutis. Brahman is formless, colourless, attributeless. Hence it cannot be grasped by the senses by direct perception. You can infer the existence of fire by its accompanying smoke but Brahman cannot be established by inference or analogy, because it is attributeless and there cannot be a second thing which is similar to Brahman. Brahman is Infinite and secondless. He who is ignorant of the Srutis cannot know that Supreme Being. There are other means of knowledge also which have got a place but they are not independent. They supplement after Brahman is established by the Srutis.

SAMANVAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 4

BRAHMAN THE MAIN PURPORT OF ALL VEDANTIC TEXTS

TATTU SAMANVAYAT I.1.4 (4)

But that (Brahman is to be known only from the Scriptures and not independently by any other means is established), because it is the main purpose (of all Vedantic texts).

Tat: that; Tu: but; Samanvayat: on account of agreement or harmony, because it is the main purpose.

The argument in support of Sutra 2 is continued. Brahman or the Absolute can be known only from the scriptures because all the scriptural passages can be harmonised only by such a doctrine. The Vedantic texts refer to Brahman only, because they have Brahman for their main topic. The proposition that Brahman is the only cause of the world is established: because this is the authoritative saying of the scriptures. All the Vedantic texts agree in this respect.

The word `tu' (but) is employed to rebut the above Purvapaksha or the prima facie view as urged above. It is proper to say that Brahman is the uniform topic taught in all the Vedantic texts. Why? Samanvayat. Anvaya means construing a passage according to the six characteristics or Shad Lingas viz., (1) Upakrama-Upasamhara Ekavakyataagreement in beginning and conclusion; (2) Abhyasarepetition; (3) ApurvataUniqueness of subject matter; (4) Phalafruit; (5) Arthavadapraise and (6) Yuktireasoning. These six marks help to arrive at the real purport of any work. In chapter six of the Chhandogya Upanishad Brahman is the main purport of all passages. In the beginning you will find This world, my child, was but the Real (Sat) in the beginning. It concludes, In it all that exists has its Self. It is true. It is the Self. There is agreement in the opening and concluding passages. This is Upakrama-Upasamhara. Uddalaka the preceptor, repeats `Tat Tvam Asi' nine times to his disciple Svetaketu. This is repetition (Abhyasa). Brahman is doubtless unique, as He is Infinite and secondless. When you attain knowledge of Brahman everything else is known. This is Phala or fruit.

There is reasoning in the scriptures. Just as pots are nothing but clay, ornaments are nothing but gold, so also this world of names and forms is nothing but Brahman. If you know the nature of clay, you will know all that is made out of clay. Even so if you know Brahman, everything else will be known to you. Brahman is the source of the creation, preservation and dissolution of the universe. This is Artha-vada or Stuti-vada by way of praise. All these six marks or Shad Lingas denote that the chief topic or main purport of the Vedantic texts is Brahman.

All the Vedanta-texts have for their purport Brahman, for example, Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second (Chh. Up. VI-2-1) In the beginning all this was Atman or self only (Ait. Ara. II-4-I-1). This is Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside; this self is Brahman perceiving everything (Bri. Up. II-5-19) That Immortal Brahman is before (Mun. Up. II-2-11) and similar passages. It is not right to think that these passages have a different sense. The passages cannot refer to agents, divinities connected with acts of religious duty. You will find in Bri. Up. II-4-14, Then by what should he see and Whom? This clearly shows that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.

Brahman cannot become an object of perception and other means of knowledge, because It is extremely subtle, abstract, infinite and all-pervading. How can a finite insentient instrument know the Infinite? The senses and the mind derive their power and light from Brahman the source. Brahman is Self-luminous, Self-existent, Self-knowledge, Self-delight, and Self-contained. Brahman cannot be realised without the aid of Vedantic passage Tat Tvam AsiThou art That (Chh. Up. VI-8-7).

When one realises Brahman, he is totally freed from all sorts of miseries and pains. He attains the goal of life or the summum bonum. The conception of duality as agent, action and the like is destroyed. Self-realisation is not a fruit of action. It is not a result of your willing or doing. It is the result of realising one's identity with Brahman. Scripture aims only at removing the veil of ignorance or Avidya. Then the self-effulgent Brahman shines by Itself in Its pristine glory. The state of Moksha or the final emancipation is eternal. It is not transient like the fruits attained through action. Action depends upon the will and is independent of the object. Knowledge depends on the nature of the object and is independent of the will of the knower.

A proper understanding of the Vedantic texts leads to the final emancipation of man. It is not necessary for him to exert or do any superhuman feat or action. It is only mere understanding that it is a rope and not a snake that helps to destroy one's fear. Scripture does not speak only of ethical and ceremonial duties. It reveals the soul and helps one to attain Self-realisation. The sage who has learnt by the help of Vedantic texts to remove the erroneous identification with the body will not experience pain. It is only the ignorant worldly minded man who experiences pain on account of his identification with the body.

The attainment of heaven, procuring a son, getting rain, etc., are taught in the Vedas as incitement to the acquirement of knowledge of Brahman by baby souls and to produce faith in man. When he finds that the Vedic Mantras have the power to produce rain he gets faith in them and has an inclination to study them. He gradually gets disgust for the mundane objects and develops discrimination between the real and the transitory and burning yearning for liberation. He develops love for Brahman. Therefore all Vedas teach Brahman. Sacrifices give mundane fruits only when they are done with selfish motives, only when Kama or strong desire is at the back of the Mantras. When they are performed with Nishkamya Bhava without selfish motives they purify the heart and help to attain knowledge of the Self. Hence Karma Kanda itself, by teaching the worship of various deities, becomes part of Brahma Jnana. It is really the worship of Brahman, when the element of desire or selfishness is removed. Such a worship purifies the heart and produces a taste for enquiry of Brahman. It does not produce any other earthly desire.

The object of enquiry in the Karma Kanda is something to be accomplished viz., duty. The object of enquiry in Vedanta texts is the already existent, absolutely accomplished Brahman. The fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be different from the fruit of knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of action.

You will find in the Upanishads Verily the Self (Atman) is to be seen Bri. Up. II-4-5. The Atman which is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand Chh. Up VIII-7-1. Let a man worship him as Atman or the SelfBri. Up I-4-7; Let a man worship the Atman only as his true stateBri. Up. I-4-15; He who knows Brahman becomes BrahmanMun. Up. III-2-9. These texts rouse in you a desire to know what that Brahman is. The Vedantic texts give a beautiful description of the nature of Brahman. They teach that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss, self-luminous and indivisible. One attains final emancipation as the fruit of meditation on Brahman.

The Vedantic texts declare, The wise who knows the Atman as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve (Katha Up. II-22). He is without breath, without mind, pure (Mun. Up. II-1-2). That person is not attached to anything (Bri. Up. IV-3-15). All these texts establish the fact that the final emancipation differs from all the fruits of action and is an eternally and essentially bodiless state. Moksha is Kutastha Nitya, i.e., eternal, without undergoing any change. Brahman is omnipresent like ether (Akasavat Sarvagata) free from all modifications (Nirvikara), absolutely Self-sufficient, Self-contained (Nirapeksha), indivisible (Akhanda). He is not composed of parts (Nishkala). He is Self-luminous (Svayam Prakasa, Svayam Jyoti).

You will find in Katha Upanishad, Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and future is that Brahman (I-2-14). Moksha is the same as Brahman. Moksha or Brahman cannot be the effect of actions. It cannot be supplementary to actions. If it is so it would be non-eternal.

To know Brahman is to become Brahman. Mundaka Upanishad says, He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. As Brahman is an already existing entity, knowing Brahman does not involve an act like a ritualistic act. When Avidya or nescience is destroyed through knowledge of the Self, Brahman manifests Itself, just as the rope manifests itself when the illusion of snake is removed. As Brahman is your Inner Self you cannot attain It by any action. It is realised as one's own Atman when the ignorance is annihilated. Texts like The Atman is to be realised etc., is not an injunction. It is intended to withdraw the mind of the aspirant from external objects and turn it inwards.

Brahman is not an object of the action of knowing. It is different from the Known and again it is beyond the Unknown (Kena Up. I-3) How should he know him by whom He knows all this (Bri. Up. II-4-14). Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of an act of devout worship (Upasana). Know that alone to be Brahman, not that which people adore here (Kena Up. I-5).

The scripture never describes Brahman as this or that. Its purpose is to show that Brahman as the eternal subject, Pratyagatman, the inner Self is never an object. It cannot be maintained that Moksha or Brahman is something to be ceremonially purified. There is no room for a purificatory ceremony in the eternally pure Brahman.

Brahman is the Self or Atman of all. It can neither be striven nor avoided. All objects perish because they are mere modifications of the five elements. But the Soul or Brahman is immortal and unchanging. It is in its essence eternally pure and free.

He who identifies himself with his body experiences pain. A sage who has removed Dehadhyasa or identification of the body by identifying himself with the pure, all-pervading Brahman will not experience pain. A rich man who is puffed up by the conceit of his wealth is affected with grief when he loses his wealth. But he is not affected by the loss of wealth after he has once retired from the world and has become an ascetic. A sage who has attained knowledge of Brahman cannot be a merely worldly doer as before. He does not belong to this world as he did before. A worldly man also can become a sage of Self-realisation with the Bhava of non-doer (Akarta), non-agent (Abhokta). The Srutis declare When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him (Chh. Up. VIII-12-1). The objector may say The state of being free from the body follows only when a man dies. This is entirely wrong because the cause of man being joined to the body is erroneous knowledge. The sage who has attained knowledge of Brahman, and who identifies himself with Brahman is free from his body even while still alive. The Sruti also declares Just as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, so also lies this body. That bodiless immortal Soul is Brahman only, is only light. (Bri. Up. IV-4-7). With eyes, He is without eyes as it were; with ears, without ears as it were; with speech, without speech as it were; with a mind, without mind as it were; with Prana, without Prana as it were; The sage is no longer connected with action of any kind.

The Sankhyas say that the Vedantic texts about creation do not refer to Brahman but to the Pradhana which is made up of the three GunasSattva, Rajas and Tamasas the First Cause. They maintain that all the Vedanta texts which treat of the creation of the world clearly point out that the cause of the world has to be concluded from the effect by inference and the cause which is to be inferred is the connection of the Pradhana or Prakriti with the Souls or Purushas. The followers of Kanada (the School of Vaiseshika philosophy) infer from the very same passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe and the atoms are its material cause.

The Sankhyas say Omnipotence can be attributed to the Pradhana as it has all its effects for its objects. Omniscience also can be ascribed to it. Knowledge is really an attribute of Sattva Guna. Sattva is one of the components of Pradhana. Therefore Pradhana can be said to be omniscient. You cannot ascribe Omniscience or limited knowledge to the Soul or Purusha which is isolated and pure intelligence itself. Therefore the Vedanta texts ascribe Omniscience to the Pradhana although it is in itself non-intelligent.

Brahman is without any instruments of action. As Pradhana has three components it seems reasonable that it alone is capable of undergoing modifications like clay into various objects and may act as a material cause, while the uncompounded, homogeneous and unchangeable Brahman is unable to do so. Therefore the Vedantic texts which treat of creation clearly refer to Pradhana only and therefore it is the First Cause referred to by the scriptures. To these conclusions Sri Vyasa gives an answer in the following Sutra.

IKSHATYADYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 5 (SUTRAS 5-11)

Brahman (the intelligent principle) is the First Cause

IKSHATERNASABDAM I.1.5 (5)

On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the First Cause, the Pradhana) is not (the first cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it (Pradhana) is not based on the scriptures.

Ikshateh: on account of seeing (thinking); Na:is not; Asabdam:not based on the scriptures.

Sutras 5 to 11 refute the arguments of the Sankhyas and establish Brahman alone as the First Cause.

It is not possible to find room in the Vedanta texts for the non-intelligent Pradhana, because it is not based on scripture. Why? Because seeing or thinking is ascribed to the cause in the scripture. In the scripture it is said that the First Cause willed or thought before creation. You will find in the Chhandogya Upanishad VI-2, Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only without a second. It thought `May I be many, may I grow forth.' It projected fire. Aitareya Upanishad says, The Atman willed: `Let me project worlds'. So it projected these worlds (I-1-1.2). In Prasna Upanishad VI-3 it is said of the person of sixteen parts. He thought. He sent forth Prana... There cannot be any thinking or willing in the insentient Pradhana. It is possible only if the First Cause is an intelligent being like Brahman.

If it is said that such a quality can be attributed to Prakriti in a secondary sense, just as red-hot iron can be called fire because it can burn, we reply, why should we ascribe creative power and Omniscience to such Prakriti which we invest with will and Omniscience in a secondary sense when we can ascribe creative power and Omniscience to Brahman Himself to whom Will and Omniscience can be ascribed in a primary sense.

Brahman's knowledge is permanent. He is not in need of any instruments of knowledge. He is not in need of a body. His knowledge is without any obstructions. Svetasvatara Upanishad says, He grasps without hands, moves without feet, sees without eyes, hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows Him. They call Him the first, the Great person (VI-8, III-19).

You cannot attribute sentiency (Chetanatva) to Pradhana even in a figurative sense, because it is said that the Creator became the soul and entered the body. How can the insentient matter (Achetana) become the sentient soul (Chetana)? Vedantic texts emphatically declare that by knowing Brahman everything else can be known. How can we know the souls by knowing matter?

Pradhana or matter cannot be the Sat which is described as the cause of the world, because that would be opposed to the scripture which uses the word Ikshateh. You will find in Svetasvatara Upanishad, He, the God of all souls, is the Creator of the world. Therefore it is quite clear that Brahman and not Pradhana is the cause of this world.

In all Vedantic texts there is a uniform declaration that Chetana (consciousness) is the cause of the world. Pradhana potentially contains all forms in a seed state. The whole world exists in it in a subtle seed state in Pralaya and yet it cannot be regarded as the Creator because it is non-sentient. Vedanta texts emphatically declare that an Intelligent Being willed and created this universe. You will find in Chhandogya Upanishad, The Sat existed in the beginning. It was one without a second. It willed to become many. It created fire.

The argumentation of the Sankhyas that the Pradhana is all-knowing because of its Sattva is inadmissible, because Sattva is not preponderant in the Pradhana as the three Gunas are in a state of equipoise. If the Pradhana is all-knowing even in the condition of equilibrium (Gunasamyavastha) on account of the power of knowledge residing in Sattva, it must be little-knowing also on account of the power of retarding knowledge which resides in Rajas and Tamas. Therefore while Sattva will make it all-knowing, Rajas and Tamas will make it little-knowing. This is actually a contradiction. Further a modification of Sattva which is not connected with a witnessing principle or silent Sakshi is not called knowledge. The non-intelligent Pradhana is devoid of such a principle. Hence all-knowingness cannot be ascribed to Pradhana.

The case of the Yogins does not apply to the point under consideration here. They attain Omniscience on account of excess of Sattva in them. There is an intelligent principle (Sakshi) in him independent of Sattva. When a Yogi attains knowledge of the past and the future on account of the grace of the Lord, you cannot deny the Eternity and Infinity of Brahman's knowledge.

Brahman is pure Intelligence itself, Unchangeable. All- knowingness and creation are not possible for Brahman. To this objection it can be replied that Brahman can be All-knowing and creative through His illusory power, Maya.

Just as in the case of ether we talk of ether inside a jar and ether in the sky but it is all really one ether, so also the differentiation of Jiva and Isvara is only an apparent differentiation on account of limiting adjuncts or Upadhis, viz., body and mind.

The Sankhyas raise another objection. They say that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. The fire thought `May I be many, May I grow' and it projected water. Water thought `May I be many, May I grow,' it projected earth Chh. Up. 6-2-3-4. Here water and fire are insentient objects, and yet thinking is attributed to them. Even so the thinking by the Sat in the text originally quoted can also be taken figuratively in the case of Pradhana also. Hence, though Pradhana is insentient, it can yet be the First Cause.

The following Sutra refutes this argument.

Gaunaschet na Atmasabdat I.1.6 (6)

If it be said that (the word `seeing' or thinking) is used in a secondary sense, (we say) not so, because of the word Atman being applied to the cause of the world.

Gaunah: indirect, secondary, figurative; Chet: if; Na: not; Atmasabdat: because of the word Atman, i.e., soul.

You say that the term `Sat' denotes the non-intelligent Pradhana or Prakriti and that `thinking' is attributed to it in a secondary or figurative sense only as it is to fire and water. You may argue that inert things are sometimes described as living beings. Therefore Pradhana can well be accepted as the efficient cause of the world. This cannot stand. This is certainly untenable. Why so? Because of the terms `Atman' (soul) being applied subsequently in the Sruti to that which is the cause of the world vide the Sruti All this universe is in essence That; That is the Truth. That is Atman (Soul). That thou art O Svetaketu. Chh. Up. VI-8-7. (Instruction by Uddalaka to his son, Svetaketu).

The passage in Chh. Up. VI-2 begins, Being (Sat) only, my dear, this was in the beginning. After creating fire, water, earth, It thought `let me now enter into these three as this living self (Jiva) and evolve names and forms' Chh. Up. VI-3-2. The Sat, the First Cause, refers to the intelligent principle, the Jiva as its Self. By the term Jiva we must understand the intelligent principle which rules over the body and supports the Prana. How could such a principle be the self of the non-intelligent Pradhana? By Self or Atman we understand a being's own nature. Therefore it is quite obvious that the intelligent Jiva cannot form the nature of the non-intelligent Pradhana. The thinking on the part of the fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. Hence it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word `thinking'.

Now the Sankhya comes with a new objection. He says that the word `Atman' (Self) may be applied to the Pradhana, although it is non-intelligent, on account of its being figuratively used in the sense of `that which serves all purposes of another', as for example, a king uses the word `self' to some servant who carries out his wishes `Govinda is my (other) self'. Similarly it applies to Pradhana also because the Pradhana works for the enjoyment and the final salvation of the soul and serves the soul just in the same manner as the minister serves his king. Or else the word Atman (Self) may refer to non-intelligent things, as well as to intelligent beings, as for instance, in expressions like Bhutatma (the Self of the elements), Indriyatma (the Self of the senses) just as the one word `light' (Jyoti) denotes a certain sacrifice (the Jyotistoma) as well as a flame. Therefore the word Self (Atman) can be used with reference to the Pradhana also. How then does it follow from the word `Self' that the `thinking' attributed to the cause of the universe is not to be taken in a figurative sense?

The next Sutra refutes the argument.

Tannishthasya mokshopadesat I.1.7 (7)

(The Pradhana cannot be designated by the term Self) because Salvation is declared to one who is devoted to that Sat.

Tat: to that; Nishthasya: of the devoted; Mokshopadesat: from the statement of salvation.

Further reason is given in this Sutra to prove that Pradhana is not the cause of this world.

The non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be denoted by the term `Self' because Chhandogya Upanishad declares: O Svetaketu! That (the subtle Sat) is the Self. `Thou art That'. An intelligent man like Svetaketu cannot be identified with the non-intelligent Pradhana. If the non-intelligent Pradhana were denoted by the term `Sat', the meaning of the Mahavakya Tat Tvam Asi would be `Thou art non-intelligent'. The teaching will come to this. You are an Achetana or non-intelligence and emancipation is attaining such a state of insentiency. Then the Srutis would be a source of evil. The scriptures would make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man and would thus not become a means of right knowledge. It is not right to destroy the authority of the faultless Srutis. If you assume that the infallible Sruti is not the means of right knowledge this will be certainly quite unreasonable.

The final emancipation is declared in the Srutis to him who is devoted to the Sat, who has his being in Sat. It cannot be attained by meditation on the non-intelligent Pradhana vide Sruti: `He waits only till he is released and therefrom unites with Brahman' (Chh. Up. VI-14-2).

If the scripture which is regarded as a means of right knowledge should point out a man who is desirous of emancipation but who is ignorant of the way to it, an insentient self as the true Self he would, like the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail to reach his village, never be able to attain the final release or the true Self.

Therefore the word `Self' is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. It refers to what is intelligent only in its primary meaning. The `Sat', the first cause, does not refer to the Pradhana but to an intelligent principle. It is declared in the Sruti that he, who is absolutely devoted to the Creator or cause of the world, attains the final emancipation. It is not reasonable to say that one attains his release by devotion to blind matter, Pradhana. Hence Pradhana cannot be the Creator of the world.

Heyatvavachanaccha I.1.8 (8)

And (the Pradhana cannot be denoted by the word `Self'), because it is not stated (by the scriptures) that It (Sat) has to be discarded.

Heyatva: fitness to be discarded; Avachanat: not being stated (by the scriptures); Cha: and.

Another reason is given in this Sutra to prove that Pradhana is not the Creator of the universe.

If you want to point out to a man the small star Arundhati, you direct his attention at first to a big neighbouring star and say `That is Arundhati' although it is really not so. Then you point out to him the real Arundhati. Even so if the preceptor intended to make his disciple understand the Self step by step from grosser to subtler truths through the non-self he would definitely state in the end that the Self is not of the nature of the Pradhana and that the Pradhana must be discarded. But no such statement is made. The whole chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad deals with the Self as nothing but that Sat.

An aspirant has been taught to fix his mind on the cause and meditate on it. Certainly he cannot attain the final emancipation by meditating on the inert Pradhana. If the Sruti here meant the Pradhana to be the cause of the world, it would have surely asked the aspirant to abandon such a cause and find out something higher for his final emancipation. Hence Pradhana cannot be the end and aim of spiritual quest.

The word `and' signifies that the contradiction of a previous statement is an additional reason for the rejection.

Further this chapter begins with the question, What is that which being known everything is known? Have you ever asked, my child, for that instruction by which you hear what cannot be heard, by which you perceive what cannot be perceived, by which you know what cannot be known. Now if the term `Sat' denoted the Pradhana, if the Pradhana were the first cause, then by knowing Pradhana everything must be known, which is not a fact. The enjoyer (soul) which is different from Pradhana, which is not an effect of the Pradhana cannot be known by knowing the Pradhana. If `that' or Sat means Pradhana (matter) the Srutis should teach us to turn away from it. But it is not the case. It gives a definite assurance that by knowing that everything can be known. How can we know the soul by knowing matter? How can we know the enjoyer by knowing the enjoyed? Hence the Pradhana is not denoted by the term `Sat'. It is not the first cause, knowing which everything is known, according to the Sruti.

For this the Sutrakara gives another reason.

Svapyayat I.1.9 (9)

On account of (the individual) merging in its own Self (the Self cannot be the Pradhana).

Svapyayat: on account of merging in one's own self.

The argument to prove that Pradhana is not the cause of the universe or the Self is continued.

The waking state is that where the mind, the senses and the body act in concert to know the objects. The individual soul identifies himself with the gross body. In the dreaming state the body and the senses are at rest and the mind plays with the impressions which the external objects have left. The mind weaves its web of Vasanas. In deep sleep the individual soul is free from the limitation of mind. He rests in his own Self though in a state of ignorance.

With reference to the cause denoted by the word `Sat' the Sruti says, When a man sleeps here, then my child, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own self. Therefore they say of him `he sleeps' (Svapiti) because he is gone to his own (Svam Apita) Chh. Up. VI-8-1. From the fact that the individual soul merges in the universal soul in deep sleep, it is understood that the Self, which is described in the Sruti as the ultimate Reality, the cause of the world is not Pradhana.

In the Chhandogya text it is clearly said that the individual soul merges or resolves in the Sat. The intelligent Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent Pradhana. Hence, the Pradhana cannot be the First Cause denoted by the term `Sat' in the text. That into which all intelligent souls are merged in an intelligent cause of the universe is denoted by the term Sat and not the Pradhana.

A further reason for the Pradhana not being the cause is given in the next Sutra.

Gatisamanyat I.1.10 (10)

On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta texts, Brahman is to be taken as that cause).

Gati: view; Samanyat: on account of the uniformity.

The argument to prove that Pradhana is not the cause of the universe is continued.

All the Vedanta texts uniformly refer to an intelligent principle as the First Cause. Therefore Brahman is to be considered as the cause. All the Vedanta texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. The Srutis declare thus, As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the Pranas proceed each towards its place, from the Pranas the gods, from the gods the worlds (Kau. Up. III-3). From that Brahman sprang ether (Tait. Up. II-1). All this springs from the Self (Chh. Up. VII-2-6). This Prana is born from the Self (Pra. Up. III-3). All these passages declare the Self to be the cause. The term `Self' denotes an intelligent being. Therefore the all-knowing Brahman is to be taken as the cause of the world because of the uniformity of view of the Vedanta-texts.

A further reason for this conclusion is given in the following Sutra.

Srutatvaccha I.1.11 (11)

And because it is directly stated in the Sruti (therefore the all-knowing Brahman alone is the cause of the universe).

Srutatvat: being declared by the Sruti; Cha: also, and.

The argument that Pradhana is not the cause of the world is continued.

The All-knowing Lord is the cause of the universe. This is stated in a passage of the Svetasvatara Upanishad VI-9, He is the cause, the Lord of the Lords of the organs. He has neither parent nor Lord. `He' refers to the all-knowing Lord described in the chapter. Therefore it is finally established that the All-knowing, All-powerful Brahman is the First Cause and not the insentient or non-intelligent Pradhana or anybody else.

Thus the Vedanta texts contained in Sutra I-1-11 have clearly shown that the Omniscient, Omnipotent Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. It is already shown on account of the uniformity of view (I-1-10) that all Vedanta texts hold an intelligent cause.

From Sutra 12 onwards till the end of the first chapter a new topic is taken up for discussion. The Upanishads speak of two types of Brahman, viz., the Nirguna or Brahman without attributes and the Saguna or Brahman with attributes.

The Upanishads declare, For where there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another? Bri. Up. IV-5-15. Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest (Infinite, Bhuma). Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the little (finite). The greatest is immortal; the little is mortal Chh. Up. VII-24-1. The wise one, who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names Tait. Ar. III-12-7.

Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel Svet. Up. VI-19. Not so, not so Bri. Up. II-3-6. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long; defective in one place, perfect in the other Bri. Up. III-1-8.

All these texts declare Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either of nescience or knowledge. Brahman with attributes (Saguna) is within the domain of nescience. It is the object of Upasana which is of different kinds giving different results, some to exaltations, some to gradual emancipation (Krama-Mukti), some to success in works. When it is the object of nescience, categories of devotee, object of devotion, worship are applied to it. The kinds of Upasana are distinct owing to the distinction of the different qualities and limiting adjuncts. The fruits of devotion are distinct according as the worship refers to different qualities. The Srutis say According as man worships him, that he becomes. According to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has left this life Chh. Up. III-14-1. Meditation on the Saguna Brahman cannot lead to immediate emancipation (Sadyo-Mukti). It can only help one to attain gradual emancipation (Krama-Mukti).

Nirguna Brahman of Vedantins or Jnanis is free from all attributes and limiting adjuncts. It is Nirupadhika, i.e., free from Upadhi or Maya. It is the object of knowledge. The Knowledge of the Nirguna Brahman alone leads to immediate emancipation.

The Vedantic passages have a doubtful import. You will have to find out the true significance of the texts through reasoning. You will have to make a proper enquiry into the meaning of the texts in order to arrive at a settled conclusion regarding the knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous emancipation. A doubt may arise whether the knowledge has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object as in the case of Sutra I-1-2.

You will find in many places in the Upanishads that Brahman is described apparently with qualifying adjuncts. The Srutis say that the knowledge of that Brahman leads to instantaneous release (Sadyo-Mukti). Worship of Brahman as limited by those adjuncts cannot lead to immediate emancipation. But if these qualifying adjuncts are considered as not being ultimately arrived at by the passages but used merely as indicative of Brahman then these passages would refer to the Nirguna Brahman and the final emancipation would result from knowing that Brahman. Therefore you will have to find out the true significance of the passages through careful enquiry and reasoning.

In some places you will have to find out whether the text refers to Saguna Brahman or the individual soul. You will have to arrive at a proper conclusion as to the true significance of these passages which evidently have a doubtful import through careful enquiry and reasoning. There will be no difficulty in understanding for the intelligent aspirant who is endowed with a sharp, subtle and pure intellect. The help of the teacher is always necessary.

Here ends the commentary of the eleven Sutras which form a sub-section by itself.

ANANDAMAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 6 (SUTRAS 12-19)

ANANDAMAYA IS PARA BRAHMAN

ANANDAMAYO'BHYASAT I.1.12 (12)

Anandamaya means Para Brahman on account of the repetition (of the word `bliss' as denoting the Highest Self).

Anandamayah: full of bliss; Abhyasat: because of repetition.

Now the author Badarayana takes up the topic of Samanvaya. He clearly shows that several words of the Srutis which are apparently ambiguous really apply to Brahman. He begins with the word `Anandamaya' and takes up other words one after another till the end of the chapter.

Taittiriya Upanishad says, Different from this Vijnanamaya is another inner Self which consists of bliss (Anandamaya). The former is filled by this. Joy (Priya) is its head. Satisfaction (Moda) is its right wing or arm. Great satisfaction (Pramoda) is its left wing or arm. Bliss (Ananda) is its trunk. Brahman is the tail, the support. II-5

Now a doubt arises as to whether this Anandamaya is Jiva (human soul) or Para Brahman. The Purvapakshin or opponent holds that the Self consisting of bliss (Anandamaya) is a secondary self and not the principal Self, which is something different from Brahman, as it forms a link in a series of selfs beginning with the self consisting of food (Annamaya), all of which are not the principal Self. Even though the blissful Self, Anandamaya Purusha, is stated to be the innermost of all it cannot be the primary Self, because it is stated to have joy, etc., for its limits and to be embodied. It also has the shape of man. Like the human shape of the former is the human shape of the latter. If it were identical with the primary Self, joy, satisfaction, etc., would not affect it; but the text clearly says, `Joy is its head'. The text also says, `Of that former one this one is the embodied Self' Tait. Up. II-6. Of that former Self of bliss (Anandamaya) is the embodied Self. That which has a body will be certainly affected by joy and pain. The term Anandamaya signifies a modification. Therefore it cannot refer to Brahman which is changeless. Further five different parts such as head, right arm, left arm, trunk and tail are mentioned of this Anandamaya Self. But Brahman is without parts. Therefore the Anandamaya Self is only Jiva or the individual soul.

Here is the answer of the Siddhantin. This Sutra shows that Brahman is Bliss. By the Anandamaya Self we have to understand the Highest Self, `on account of repetition'. Abhyasa or repetition means uttering a word again without any qualifications. It is one of the Shad Lingas or six characteristics or marks by which the subject matter of a passage is ascertained.

The word `Bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest Self. Taittiriya Upanishad says: `Raso vai sah. Rasam hyevayam labdhvanandi bhavati'`He the Highest Self is Bliss in itself. The individual soul becomes blissful after attaining that Bliss' II-7. `Who could breathe forth if that Bliss did not exist in the ether of the heart? Because He alone causes Bliss. He attains that Self consisting of Bliss' II-7. He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing II-9. And again He (Bhrigu, having taken recourse to meditation), realised or understood that Bliss is Brahman Anandam Brahmeti vyajanat III-6.

Varuna teaches his son Bhrigu what is Brahman. He first defines Brahman as the cause of the creation, etc., of the universe and then teaches him that all material objects are Brahman. Such as, food is Brahman, Prana is Brahman, mind is Brahman, etc. He says this in order to teach that they are the materials of which the world is made. Finally he concludes his teaching with `Ananda' declaring that `Ananda is Brahman'. Here he stops and concludes that `the doctrine taught by me is based on Brahman, the Supreme' Taitt. Up. III-6-1.

Knowledge and Bliss is Brahman Bri. Up. III-9-27. As the word `Bliss' is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also.

It is objected that the blissful Self denotes the individual soul as it forms a link in a series of secondary selfs beginning with the Annamaya Self. This cannot stand because the Anandamaya Self is the innermost of all. The Sruti teaches step by step, from the grosser to the subtler, and more and more interior and finer for the sake of easy comprehension by men of small intellect. The first refers to the physical body as the Self, because worldly minded people take this body as the Self. It then proceeds from the body to another self, the Pranamaya self, then again to another one. It represents the non-self as the Self for the purpose of easy understanding. It finally teaches that the innermost Self which consists of bliss is the real Self, just as a man points out at first to another man several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati and finally points out in the end the real Arundhati. Therefore here also the Anandamaya Self is the real Self as it is the innermost or the last.

`Tail' does not mean the limb. It means that Brahman is the support of the individual soul as He is the substratum of the Jiva.

The possession of a body having parts and joy and so on as head, etc., are also attributed to It, on account of the preceding limiting condition viz., the self consisting of understanding, the so-called Vijnanamaya Kosha. They do not really belong to the real Self. The possession of a body is ascribed to the Self of Bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain of bodies which begins with the self consisting of food. It is not attributed to it in the same sense in which it is predicated of the individual soul or the secondary self (the Samsarin). Therefore the Self consisting of Bliss is the highest Brahman.

Thus, the Sutra establishes that Anandamaya is Brahman. But the commentator Sankara has a new orientation of outlook in this regard. The Acharya says that Anandamaya cannot be Brahman because Anandamaya is one of the five sheaths or Koshas of the individual, the other four being Annamaya (physical body), Pranamaya (vital body), Manomaya (mental body), and Vijnanamaya (intellectual body). The Anandamaya is actually the causal body which determines the functions of the other sheaths. The individual enters into the Anandamaya sheath in deep sleep and enjoys bliss there, which is the reason why this sheath is called Anandamaya (bliss-filled). A coverage of individuality cannot be regarded as Brahman. Further, if Anandamaya had been Brahman itself, the individual in deep sleep will be united with Brahman in that condition. But this does not happen since one who goes to sleep returns to ordinary waking experience. Hence the Anandamaya is not Brahman.

Vikarasabdanneti chet na prachuryat I.1.13 (13)

If (it be objected that the term Anandamaya consisting of bliss can) not (denote the supreme Self) because of its being a word denoting a modification or transformation or product (we say that the objection is) not (valid) on account of abundance, (which is denoted by the suffix `maya').

Vikara sabdat: from the word `Anandamaya' with the suffix `mayat' denoting modification; Na: is not; Iti: this; thus; Chet: if; Na: not so; Prachuryat: because of abundance.

An objection against Sutra 12 is refuted in this Sutra.

If the objector says that `maya' means modification, it cannot be. We cannot predicate such a modification with regard to Brahman who is changeless. We reply that `maya' means fulness or abundance and Anandamaya means not a derivative from Ananda or Bliss but fulness or abundance of bliss.

The word `Anandamaya' has been certainly applied to denote the Supreme Soul or the Highest Self and not the individual soul. In the Tait. Up. II-8 the Bliss of Brahman is finally declared to be absolutely Supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance or fulness.

Anandamaya does not mean absence of pain or sorrow. It is a positive attribute of Brahman and not a mere negation of pain. Anandamaya means `He whose essential nature or Svarupa is Ananda or Bliss'. When we say: `the sun has abundance of light', it really means, the sun, whose essential nature is light is called Jyotirmaya. Therefore Anandamaya is not Jiva but Brahman. `Anandamaya', is equal to `Ananda-svarupa'He whose essential nature is bliss. `Maya' has not the force of Vikara or modification here.

The word `Ananda' or Bliss is used repeatedly in the Srutis only with reference to Brahman. `Maya' does not mean that Brahman is a modification or effect of Bliss. `Maya' means pervasion.

The phrase `The sacrifice is Annamaya' means `the sacrifice is abounding in food', not `is some modification or product of food!' Therefore here also Brahman, as abounding in Bliss, is called Anandamaya.

Taddhetuvyapadesaccha I.1.14. (14)

And because he is declared to be the cause of it (i.e. of bliss; therefore `maya' denotes abundance or fulness).

Tad+Hetu: the cause of that, namely the cause of Ananda; Vyapadesat: because of the statement of declaration; Cha: and.

Another argument in support of Sutra 12 is given.

The Srutis declare that it is Brahman who is the cause of bliss of all. Esha hyevanandayatiFor he alone causes bliss Tait. Up. II-7. He who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss, just as a man who enriches others must himself be in possession of abundant wealth. The giver of bliss to all is Bliss itself. As `Maya' may be understood to denote abundance, the Self consisting of bliss, Anandamaya, is the Supreme Self or Brahman.

The Sruti declares that Brahman is the source of bliss to the individual soul. The donor and the donee cannot be one and the same. Therefore it is understood that `Anandamaya' as stated in Sutra 12 is Brahman.

Mantravarnikameva cha giyate I.1.15 (15)

Moreover that very Brahman which has been re-referred to in the Mantra portion is sung (i.e. proclaimed in the Brahmana passage as the Anandamaya).

Mantra-varnikam: He who is described in the Mantra portion; Eva: the very same; Cha: and also, moreover; Giyate: is sung.

The argument in support of Sutra 12 is continued. The previous proofs were founded on Lingas. The argument which is now given is based on Prakarana.

The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman for the following reason also. The second chapter of the Taittiriya Upanishad begins, He who knows Brahman attains the Highest Brahmavidapnoti Param. Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinity (Satyam, Jnanam, Anantam Brahma) (Tait. Up. II-1). Then it is said that from Brahman sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things. The Brahman entering into the beings stays in the recess, inmost of all. Then the series of the different self are enumerated. Then for easy understanding it is said that different from this is the inner Self. Finally the same Brahman which the Mantra had proclaimed is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, different from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss. The Brahmanas only explain what the Mantras declare. There cannot be a contradiction between the Mantra and Brahmana portions.

A further inner Self different from the Self consisting of bliss is not mentioned. On the same i.e. the Self consisting of bliss is founded. This same knowledge of Bhrigu and Varuna, he understood that bliss is Brahman Tait. Up. III-6. Therefore the Self consisting of Bliss is the Supreme Self.

Brahmavidapnoti ParamThe knower of Brahman obtains the Highest. This shows that the worshipper Jiva obtains the worshipped Brahman. Therefore Brahman who is the object attained must be considered as different from the Jiva who obtains, because the obtained and the obtainer cannot be one and the same. Hence the Anandamaya is not Jiva. The Brahman which is described in the Mantras (Satyam Jnanam Anantam Brahma) is described later on in the Brahmanas as Anandamaya. It is our duty to realise the identity of the teaching in the Mantras and the Brahmanas which form the Vedas.

Netaro'nupapatteh I.1.16 (16)

(Brahman and) not the other (i.e. the individual soul is meant here) on account of the impossibility (of the latter assumption).

Na: not; Itarah: the other i.e. the Jiva; Anupapatteh: because of the impossibility, non-reasonableness.

The argument in support of Sutra 12 is continued.

The Jiva is not the being referred to in the Mantra Satyam Jnanam Anantam Brahma because of the impossibility of such a construction.

The individual soul cannot be denoted by the term the one consisting of bliss. Why? On account of the impossibility. Because the scripture says with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, He wished `May I be many, may I grow forth.' He reflected. After he had thus reflected, he sent forth whatever there is.

He who is referred to in the passage, The Self consisting of bliss etc. is said to be creator of everything. He projected all this whatever is Tait. Up. II-6. The Jiva or the individual soul cannot certainly do this. Therefore he is not referred to in the passage The Self consisting of bliss etc.

Bhedavyapadesaccha I.1.17 (17)

And on account of the declaration of the difference (between the two i.e. the one referred to in the passage `The Self consisting of bliss' etc. and the individual soul, the latter cannot be the one referred to in the passage).

Bheda: difference; Vyapadesat: because of the declaration; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 12 is continued.

The Sruti makes a distinction between the two. It describes that one is the giver of bliss and the other as the receiver of bliss. The Jiva or the individual soul, who is the receiver, cannot be the Anandamaya, who is the giver of bliss.

The Self consisting of bliss is of the essence of flavour attaining which the individual soul is blissful: Raso vai sah (Brahma) Rasam hyeva'yam (Jiva) labdhva'nandi bhavati. Tait. Up. II-7.

That which is attained and the attainer cannot be the same.

Hence the individual soul is not referred to in the passage which is under discussion.

Kamachcha Nanumanapeksha I.1.18 (18)

Because of wishing or willing in the scriptural passage we cannot say even inferentially that Anandamaya means Pradhana.

Kamat: because of desire or willing; Cha: and; Na: not; Anumana: the inferred one, i. e. the Pradhana; Apeksha: necessity.

The argument in support of Sutra 12 is continued.

The word `Akamyata' (willed) in the scriptural text shows that the Anandamaya cannot be Pradhana (primordial matter), because will cannot be ascribed to non-sentient (Jada) matter. Prakriti is non-sentient and can have no Kamana or wish. Therefore the Anandamaya with regard to which the word Kama is used cannot be Prakriti or Pradhana. That which is inferred i.e. the non-intelligent Pradhana assumed by the Sankhyas cannot be regarded as being the Self of bliss (Anandamaya) and the cause of the world.

Asminnasya cha tadyogam sasti I.1.19 (19)

And moreover it, i e., the scripture, teaches the joining of this, i.e., the individual soul, with that, i.e., consisting of bliss (Anandamaya) when knowledge is attained.

Asmin: in him; in the person called Anandamaya; Asya: his, of the Jiva; Cha: and, also; Tat: that; Yogam: union; Sasti: (Sruti) teaches.

The argument in support of Sutra 12 is concluded in this Sutra.

Scripture teaches that the Jiva or the individual soul obtains the final emancipation when he attains knowledge, when he is joined or identified with the Self of bliss under discussion. The Sruti declares, When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is invisible, bodiless, indefinable and supportless, then he has attained the fearless (Brahman). If he has the smallest distinction in it there is fear (of Samsara) for him Tait. Up. 11-7.

Perfect rest is possible only when we understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the Supreme Self and not either the Pradhana or the individual soul. Therefore it is proved that the Self consisting of bliss (Anandamaya) is the Supreme Self or Para Brahman.

ANTARADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 7 (SUTRAS 20-21)

THE BEING OR PERSON IN THE SUN AND THE EYE IS BRAHMAN

ANTASTADDHARMOPADESAT I.1.20 (20)

The being within (the Sun and the eye) is Brahman, because His attributes are taught therein.

Antah: (Antaratma, the being within the sun and the eye); Tat Dharma: His essential attribute; Upadesat: because of the teaching, as Sruti teaches.

The wonderful Purusha of Chhandogya Upanishad described in chapters 1, 6 and 7 is Brahman.

From the description in the Chhandogya Upanishad of the essential qualities belonging to the Indwelling Spirit residing in the Sun and in the human eye, it is to be understood that he is Brahman and not the individual soul. You will find in Chhandogya Upanishad I-6-6, Now that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus. His name is `Ut' because he has risen (Udita) above all evil. He transcends all limitations. He also who knows this rises above all evil. So much with reference to the Devas.

With reference to the body, Now the person who is seen in the eye is Rik. He is Sama. He is Uktha. He is Yajus. He is Brahman. His form is the same as that of the former i.e. of the Being in the Sun. The joints of the one are the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of the other Chh. Up. I-7-5.

Do these texts refer to some special individual soul who by means of knowledge and pious deeds has raised himself to an exalted state; or do they refer to the eternally perfect supreme Brahman? The Purvapakshin says that the reference is to an individual soul only, as the scripture speaks of a definite shape, particular abode. Special features are attributed to the person in the Sun, such as the possession of beard as bright as gold and so on. The same characteristics belong to the being in the eye also.

On the contrary no shape can be attributed to the Supreme Lord, That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay Kau. Up. I-3-15.

Further a definite abode is stated, He who is in the Sun. He who is in the eye. This shows that an individual soul is meant. As regards the Supreme Lord, he has no special abode, Where does he rest? In his own glory Chh. Up. VII-24-1. Like the ether he is Omnipresent, Eternal.

The power of the being in question is said to be limited. He is the Lord of the worlds beyond that and of the wishes of the Devas, shows that the power of the being in the Sun is limited. He is the Lord of the worlds beneath that and of the wishes of men, shows that the power of the person in the eye is limited. Whereas the power of the Supreme Lord is unlimited. He is the Lord of all, the King of all things, the Protector of all things. This indicates that the Lord is free from all limitations. Therefore the being in the Sun and in the eye cannot be the Supreme Lord.

This Sutra refutes the above objection of the Purvapakshin. The being within the Sun and within the eye is not the individual soul, but the Supreme Lord only. Why? Because His essential attributes are declared.

At first the name of the being within the Sun is stated, His name is `Ut'. Then it is declared, He has risen above all evil. The same name is then transferred to the being in the eye, the name of the one is the name of the other. Perfect freedom from sins is ascribed to the Supreme Self only, the Self which is free from sin etc., Apahatapapma Chh. Up. VIII-7. There is the passage, He is Rik. He is Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman, which declares the being in the eye to be the Self, Saman and so on. This is possible only if the being is the Lord, who as being the cause of all, is to be regarded as the Self of all.

Further it is declared, Rik and Saman are his joints with reference to the Devas, and the joints of the one are the joints of the other with reference to the body. This statement can be made only with reference to that which is the Self of all.

The mention of a particular abode, viz., the Sun and the eye, of form with a beard bright as gold and of a limitation of powers is only for the purpose of meditation or Upasana. The Supreme Lord may assume through Maya any form He likes in order to please thereby his devout worshippers to save and bless them. Smriti also says, That thou seest me O Narada, is the Maya emitted by me. Do not then look on me endowed with the qualities of all beings. The limitation of Brahman's powers which is due to the distinction of what belongs to the Devas and what to the body, has reference to devout meditation only. It is for the convenience of meditation that these limitations are imagined in Brahman. In His essential or true nature He is beyond them. It follows, therefore, that the Being which scripture states to be within the eye and the Sun is the Supreme Lord.

Bhedavyapadesachchanyah I.1.21 (21)

And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the Sun etc.) on account of the declaration of distinction.

Bheda: difference; Vyapadesat: because of declaration; Cha: and, also; Anyah: is different, another, other than the Jiva or the individual soul.

An argument in support of Sutra 20 is adduced.

Anyah: (Sarirat anyah: other than the embodied individual soul). Moreover there is one who is distinct from the individual souls which animate the Sun and other bodies, viz., the Lord who rules within. The distinction between the Lord and the individual souls is declared in the following passage of the Srutis, He who dwells in the Sun and is within the Sun, whom the Sun does not know, whose body the Sun is and who rules the Sun from within, is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal (Bri. Up. III-7-9). Here the expression He within the Sun whom the Sun does not know clearly shows that the Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. The text clearly indicates that the Supreme Lord is within the Sun and yet different from the individual soul identifying itself with the Sun. This confirms the view expressed in the previous Sutra. It is an established conclusion that the passage under discussion gives a description of the Supreme Lord only but not of any exalted Jiva.

AKASADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 8

THE WORD AKASA MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS BRAHMAN

AKASASTALLINGAT I.1.22 (22)

The word Akasa i.e., ether here is Brahman on account of characteristic marks (of that i.e. Brahman being mentioned).

Akasah:the word Akasa as used here; Tad: His, of Brahman; Lingat: because of characteristic mark.

Brahman is shown to be Akasa in this Sutra. The Akasa of Chh. Up. I-9 is Brahman.

In the Chhandogya Upanishad I-9 the following passage comes in. What is the origin of this world? `Ether' he replied. Because all these beings take their origin from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is their ultimate resort (Dialogue between Silak and Prabahana). Here the doubt arisesDoes the word `ether' denote the Highest Brahman or the Supreme Self or the elemental ether?

Here Akasa refers to the Highest Brahman and not to the elemental ether, because the characteristics of Brahman, namely the origin of the entire creation from it and its return to it at dissolution are mentioned. These marks may also refer to Akasa as the scriptures say from the Akasa sprang air, from air fire, and so on and they return to the Akasa at the end of a cycle. But the sentence All these beings take their origin from the Akasa only clearly indicates the highest Brahman, as all Vedanta-texts agree in proclaiming definitely that all beings take their origin from the Highest Brahman.

But the Purvapakshin or the opponent may say that the elemental Akasa also may be taken as the cause viz., of air, fire and the other elements. But then the force of the words all these and only in the text quoted would be lost. To keep it, the text should be taken to refer to the fundamental cause of all, including Akasa also, which is Brahman alone.

The word Akasa is also used for Brahman in other texts: That which is called Akasa is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names are, that is Brahman Chh. Up. VIII-14-1. The clause They return into the ether again points to Brahman and so also the phrase `Akasa is greater than these, Akasa is their final resort', because the scripture ascribes to the Supreme Self only absolute superiority. Chh. Up. III-14-3.

Brahman alone can be greater than all and their ultimate goal as mentioned in the text. The qualities of being greater and the ultimate goal of everything are mentioned in the following texts: He is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds Chh. Up. III-14-3. Brahman is Knowledge and Bliss. He is the Ultimate Goal of him who makes gifts Bri. Up. III-9-28.

The text says that all things have been born from Akasa. Such a causation can apply only to Brahman. The text says that Akasa is greater than everything else, that Akasa is the Supreme Goal and that it is Infinite. These indications show that Akasa means Brahman only.

Various synonyms of Akasa are used to denote Brahman. In which the Vedas are in the Imperishable One (Brahman) the Highest, the ether (Vyoman) Tait. Up. III-6. Again OM, Ka is Brahman, ether (Kha) is Brahman Chh. Up IV-10-5 and the old ether (Bri. Up. V-1.)

Therefore we are justified in deciding that the word Akasa, though it occurs in the beginning of the passage refers to Brahman, it is similar to that of the phrase Agni (the fire) studies a chapter, where the word Agni, though it occurs in the beginning denotes a boy. Therefore it is settled that the word Akasa denotes Brahman only.

PRANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 9

THE WORD `PRANA' MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS BRAHMAN

ATA EVA PRANAH I.1.23 (23)

For the same reason the breath also refers to Brahman.

Ata eva: for the same reason; Pranah: the breath (also refers to Brahman).

As Prana is described as the cause of the world, such a description can apply to Brahman alone.

Which then is that deity? `Prana' he said. Regarding the Udgitha it is said (Chh. Up. I-10-9), `Prastotri' that deity which belongs to the Prastava etc.

For all the beings merge in Prana alone and from Prana they arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prastava Chh. Up. I-11-4. Now the doubt arises whether Prana is vital force or Brahman. The Purvapakshin or opponent says that the word Prana denotes the fivefold breath. The Siddhantin says: No. Just as in the case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is meant on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also a complementary passage makes us to understand that all beings spring from and merge into Prana. This can occur only in connection with the Supreme Lord.

The opponent says The scripture makes the following statement: when man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind; when he wakes up then they spring again from breath alone. What the Veda here states is a matter of daily observation, because during sleep when the breathing goes on uninterruptedly the functioning of the sense organs ceases and again becomes manifest when the man wakes up only. Hence the sense organs are the essence of all beings. The complementary passage which speaks of the merging and emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the chief vital air also.

This cannot be. Prana is used in the sense of Brahman in passages like `the Prana of Prana' (Bri. Up. IV-4-18) and `Prana indeed is Brahman' Kau. Up. III-3. The Sruti declares All these beings merge in Prana and from Prana they arise Chh. Up. I-11-5. This is possible only if Prana is Brahman and not the vital force in which the senses only get merged in deep sleep.

JYOTISCHARANANDHIKARANAM: TOPIC 10 (SUTRAS24-27)

THE LIGHT IS BRAHMAN

JYOTISCHARANABHIDHANAT I.1.24 (24)

The `light' is Brahman, on account of the mention of feet in a passage which is connected with the passage about the light.

Jyotih: the light; Charana: feet; Abhidhanat: because of the mention.

The expression `Jyotih' (light) is next taken up for discussion. The Jyotis of Chhandogya Upanishad III-13-7 refers to Brahman and not to material light; because it is described as having four feet.

Sruti declares, Now that light which shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worldsthat is the same light which is within man. Here the doubt arises whether the word light denotes the physical light of the sun and the like or the Supreme Self?

The Purvapakshin or the opponent holds that the word `light' denotes the light of the sun and the like as it is the ordinary well-established meaning of the term. Moreover the word `shines' ordinarily refers to the sun and similar sources of light. Brahman is colourless. It cannot be said in the primary sense of the word that it `shines'. Further the word `Jyotis' denotes light for it is said to be bounded by the sky (`that light which shines above this heaven'); the sky cannot become the boundary of Brahman which is the Self of all, which is all-pervading and infinite, and is the source of all things movable or immovable. The sky can form the boundary of light which is mere product and which is therefore united.

The word Jyoti does not mean physical light of the sun which helps vision. It denotes Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned in a preceding text: Such is its greatness, greater than this is the Purusha. One foot of It is all beings, while its remaining three feet are the Immortal in heaven Chh. Up. III-12-6. That which in this text forms the three quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven of Brahman which altogether constitutes four quarters, this very same entity is again referred to in the passage under discussion, for there also it is said to be connected with heaven.

Brahman is the subject matter of not only the previous texts, but also of the subsequent section, Sandilya Vidya (Chh. Up. III-14). If we interpret `light' as ordinary light, we will commit the error of dropping the topic started and introduce a new subject. Brahman is the main topic in the section immediately following that which contains the passage under discussion (Chh. Up. III-14). Therefore it is quite reasonable to say that the intervening section also (Chh. Up. III-13) treats of Brahman only. Hence we conclude that in the passage the word `light' must denote Brahman only.

The word `Jyoti' here does not at all denote that light on which the function of the eye depends. It has different meaning, for instance with speech only as light man sits (Bri. Up. IV-3-5); whatever illumines something else may be considered as `light'. Therefore the term `light' may be applied to Brahman also whose nature is intelligence because It gives light to the whole universe. The Srutis declare Him the shining one, everything shines after; by His light all this is illumined (Kau. Up. II-5-15) and Him the gods worship as the Light of lights, as the Immortal (Bri. Up. IV-4-16).

The mention of limiting adjuncts with respect to Brahman, denoted by the word `light' `bounded by heaven' and the assignment of a special locality serves the purpose of devout meditation. The Srutis speak of different kinds of meditation on Brahman as specially connected with certain localities such as the sun, the eye, the heart.

Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the word `light' here denotes Brahman.

Chhando'bhidhanannet chet na tatha

cheto'rpananigadat tatha hi darsanam I.1.25 (25)

If it be said that Brahman is not denoted on account of the metre Gayatri being denoted, we reply not so, because thus i.e. by means of the metre the application of the mind on Brahman is declared; because thus it is seen (in other passages also).

Chhandas: the metre known as Gayatri; Abhidhanat: because of the description; Na: not; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Tatha: thus, like that; Chet'orpana: application of the mind; Nigadat: because of the teaching; Tatha hi: like that; Darsanam: it is seen (in other texts).

An objection raised against Sutra 24 is refuted in this Sutra.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says In the passage, `One foot of It is all beings', Brahman is not referred to but the metre Gayatri, because the first paragraph of the preceding section of the same Upanishad begins with Gayatri is everything, whatsoever here exists. Hence the feet referred to in the text mentioned in the previous Sutra refer to this metre and not to Brahman.

In reply we say, not so; because the Brahmana passage Gayatri indeed is all this teaches that one should meditate on the Brahman which is connected with this metre, for Brahman being the cause of everything is connected with that Gayatri also and it is that Brahman which is to be meditated upon.

Brahman is meditated upon as Gayatri. By this explanation all become consistent. If Gayatri meant metre then it would be impossible to say of it that Gayatri is everything whatsoever here exists because certainly the metre is not everything. Therefore the Sutra says Tatha hi darsanamSo we see. By such an explanation only the above passage gives a consistent meaning. Otherwise we will have to hold a metre to be everything which is absurd. Therefore through Gayatri the meditation on Brahman is shown.

The direction of the mind is declared in the text `Gayatri is all this'. The passage instructs that by means of the metre Gayatri the mind is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that metre.

This interpretation is in accordance with the other texts in the same section e.g. All this indeed is Brahman Chh. Up. III-14-1 where Brahman is the chief topic.

Devout meditation on Brahman through its modifications or effects is mentioned in other passages also; for instance, Ait. Ar. III-2-3.12 it is the Supreme Being under the name of Gayatri, whom the Bahvrichas worship as Mahat-Uktha i.e. Maha Prana, the Adhvaryu priests as Agni (fire), and the Chandoga priests as Maha Vrata (the greatest rite).

Therefore Brahman is meant here and not the metre Gayatri.

Bhutadipadavyapadesopapatteschaivam I.1.26 (26)

And thus also (we must conclude, viz., that Brahman is the subject or topic of the previous passage, where Gayatri occurs) because (thus only) the declaration as to the beings etc. being the feet is possible.

Bhutadi: the elements etc. i.e. the elements, the earth, the body and the heart; Pada: (of) foot, part; Vyapadesa: (of) mention (of) declaration or expression; Upapatteh: because of the possibility or proof, reasonableness, as it is rightly deduced from the above reasons; Cha: also; Evam: thus, so.

An argument in support of Sutra 24 is adduced.

The beings, earth, body and heart can be felt only of Brahman and not of Gayatri, the metre, a mere collection of syllables. The previous passage has only Brahman for its topic or subject, because the text designates the beings and so on as the feet of Gayatri. The text at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body and the heart and then goes on describing that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold. If Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for the verse such is the greatness etc.

Hence by Gayatri is here meant Brahman as connected with the metre Gayatri. It is this Brahman particularised by Gayatri that is said to be the Self of everything in the passage Gayatri is everything etc.

Therefore Brahman is to be regarded as the subject matter of the previous passage also. This same Brahman is again recognised as light in Chh. Up. III-12-7.

The elements, the earth, the body and the heart cannot be represented as the four verses of Gayatri. They can be understood only to mean the fourfold manifestations of the Supreme Being. The word heaven is a significant word. Its use in connection with `light' reminds us of its use in connection with the `Gayatri' also. Therefore the `light' shining above heaven is the same as the `Gayatri' that has three of its feet in heaven.

Upadesabhedanneti chet na

ubhayasminnapyavirodhat I.1.27 (27)

If it be said (that Brahman of the Gayatri passage cannot be recognised in the passage treating of `light') on account of the difference of designation or the specification (we reply) no, because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to the recognition).

Upadesa: of teaching of grammatical construction or cases; Bhedat: because of the difference; Na: not; Iti chet: if it be said; Na: no; Ubhayasmin: in both, (whether in the ablative case or in the locative case); Api: even; Avirodhat: because there is no contradiction.

Another objection against Sutra 24 is raised and refuted. If it be argued that there is a difference of expression consisting in case-ending in the Gayatri-Sruti and in the Jyoti Sruti regarding the word `Div' (heaven) then the reply is `No'; the argument is not tenable, as there is no material contradiction between the two expressions.

In the Gayatri passage three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven, heaven is designated as the abode of Brahman; while in the latter passage that light which shines above this heaven, Brahman is described as existing above heaven. One may object that the subject matter of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter. The objector may say how then can one and the same Brahman be referred to in both the texts? It can; there can be no contradiction here. Just as in ordinary language a bird, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree, but also above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to as being beyond heaven as well.

The locative Divi in heaven and the ablative `Divah' above heaven are not contrary. The difference in the case-ending of the word Div is no contradiction as the locative case (the seventh case-ending) is often used in the scriptural texts to express secondarily the meaning of the ablative (the fifth case-ending).

Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the former passage can be recognised in the latter also. It is a settled conclusion that the word light denotes Brahman.

Though the grammatical cases used in the scriptural passage are not identical, the object of the reference is clearly recognised as being identical.

PRATARDANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 11 (SUTRAS 28-31)

PRANA IS BRAHMAN

PRANASTATHANUGAMAT I.1.28 (28)

Prana is Brahman, that being so understood from a connected consideration (of the passage referring to Prana).

Pranah: the breath or life-energy; Tatha: thus, so, likewise like that stated before; like that stated in the Sruti quoted before in connection therewith; Anugamat: because of being understood (from the texts).

The expression `Prana' is again taken up for discussion.

In the Kaushitaki Upanishad there occurs the conversation between Indra and Pratardana. Pratardana, the son of Divodasa, came by means of fighting and strength to the abode of Indra. Pratardana said to Indra, You yourself choose for me that boon which you think is most beneficial to man. Indra replied, Know me only. This is what I think most beneficial to man. I am Prana, the intelligent Self (Prajnatman). Meditate on me as life, as immortality III-2. That Prana is indeed the intelligent Self, bliss, undecaying, immortal III-8.

Here the doubt arises whether the word Prana denotes merely breath, the modification of air or the God Indra, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman.

The word `Prana' in the passage refers to Brahman, because it is described as the most conducive to human welfare. Nothing is more conducive to human welfare than the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover Prana is described as Prajnatma. The air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self.

Those characteristic marks which are mentioned in the concluding passage, viz., `bliss' (Ananda), undecaying (Ajara), immortal (Amrita) can be true only of Brahman. Further knowledge of Prana absolves one from all sins. He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed, neither by matricide nor by patricide Kau. Up. III-1.

All this can be properly understood only if the Supreme Self or the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject matter of the passages, and not if the vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word `Prana' denotes Brahman only.

Na vakturatmopadesaditi chet

adhyatmasambandhabhuma hyasmin I.1.29 (29)

If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted or referred in these passages on account of) the speaker's instruction about himself, we reply not so, because there is abundance of reference to the Inner Self in this (chapter or Upanishad).

Na: not; Vaktuh: of the speaker (Indra); Atma: of the Self; Upadesat: on account of instruction; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Adhyatma sambandha bhuma: abundance of reference to the Inner Self; Hi: because; Asmin: in this (chapter or Upanishad).

An objection to Sutra 28 is refuted.

An objection is raised against the assertion that Prana denotes Brahman. The opponent or Purvapakshin says, The word Prana does not denote the Supreme Brahman, because the speaker Indra designates himself. Indra speaks to Pratardana, Know me only. I am Prana, the intelligent Self. How can the Prana which refers to a personality be Brahman to which the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed. The Sruti declares, Brahman is without speech, without mind Bri. Up. III-8-8.

Further on, also Indra, the speaker glorifies himself, I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri. I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees to the wolves (Salavrika). I killed the people of Prahlada and so on. Indra may be called Prana owing to his strength. Hence Prana does not denote Brahman.

This objection is not valid because there are found abundant references to Brahman or the Inner Self in that chapter. They are Prana, the intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave; thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the Prana. And that Prana indeed is the Self of Prajna, blessed (Ananda), undecaying (Ajara) and immortal (Amrita). He is my Self, thus let it be known. This Self is Brahman, Omniscient Bri. Up. II-5-19.

Indra said to Pratardana, Worship me as Prana. This can only refer to Brahman. For the worship of Brahman alone can give Mukti or the final emancipation which is most beneficial to man (Hitatma). It is said of this Prana, For he (Prana) makes him, whom he wishes to lead out from these worlds, do a good deed. This shows that the Prana is the great cause that makes every activity possible. This also is consistent with Brahman and not with breath or Indra. Hence `Prana' here denotes Brahman only.

The chapter contains information regarding Brahman only owing to plenty of references to the Inner Self, not regarding the self of some deity.

But if Indra really meant to teach the worship of Brahman, why does he say worship me? It is really misleading. To this the following Sutra gives the proper answer.

Sastradrishtya tupadeso vamadevavat 1.1.30 (30)

The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz., that he is and with Brahman) is possible through intuition as attested by Sruti, as in the case of Vamadeva.

Sastradrishtya: through insight based on scripture or as attested by Sruti; Tu: but; Upadesah: instruction; Vamadevavat: like that of Vamadeva.

The objection raised in Sutra 29 is further refuted.

The word `tu' (but) removes the doubt. Indra's describing himself as Prana is quite suitable as he identifies himself with Brahman in that instruction to Pratardana like the sage Vamadeva.

Sage Vamadeva realised Brahman and said I was Manu and Surya which is in accordance with the passage Whatever Deva knew Brahman became That (Bri. Up. I-4-10). Indra's instruction also is like that. Having realised Brahman by means of Rishi-like intuition, Indra identifies himself in the instruction with the Supreme Brahman and instructs Pratardana about the Highest Brahman by means of the words `Know me only'.

Indra praises the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore it is not his own glorification when he says `I killed Tvashtri's son' etc. The meaning of the passage is `Although I do such cruel actions, yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman. Therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his. Indra says in a subsequent passage `I am Prana, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the whole chapter refers to Brahman only.

Jivamukhyapranalinganneti chet na upasatraividhyat

asritatvadiha tadyogat I.1.31 (31)

If it be said that (Brahman is) not (meant) on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, because (such an interpretation) would enjoin threefold meditation (Upasana), because Prana has been accepted (elsewhere in the Sruti in the sense of Brahman) and because here also (words denoting Brahman) are mentioned with reference to Prana.

Jivamukhyapranalingat: on account of the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; Na: not; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Upasana: worship, meditation; Traividhyat: because of the three ways; Asritatvat: on account of Prana being accepted (elsewhere in Sruti in the sense of Brahman); Iha: in the Kaushitaki passage; Tadyogat: because of its appropriateness; as they have been applied; because words denoting Brahman are mentioned with reference to Prana.

But another objection is raised. What is the necessity of this Adhikarana again, meditation of Prana and identifying Prana with Brahman, when in the preceding Sutra, I-1-23 it has been shown that Prana means Brahman?

To this we answer: this Adhikarana is not a redundancy. In the Sutra I-1-23, the doubt was only with regard to the meaning of the single word Prana. In this Adhikarana the doubt was not about the meaning of the word Prana, but about the whole passage, in which there are words, and marks or indications that would have led a person meditating, to think that there also Jiva and breath meant to be meditated upon. To remove this doubt, it is declared that Brahman alone is the topic of discussion in this Kaushitaki Upanishad and not Jiva or vital breath.

Therefore this Adhikarana has been separately stated by the author.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent holds that Prana does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both. He says that the chapter mentions the characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand.

The passage `One should know the speaker and not enquire into speech' (Kau. Up. III-4) mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul. The passage Prana, laying hold of his body, makes it rise up Kau. Up. III. 3 points to the chief vital air because the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Then there is another passage, `Then Prana said to the organs: be not deceived. I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it' Prasna Up. II-3. Then again you will find `What is Prana, that is Prajna; what is Prajna, that is Prana.'

This Sutra refutes such a view and says, that Brahman alone is referred to by `Prana', because the above interpretation would involve a threefold Upasana, viz., of the individual soul, of the chief vital air, and of Brahman. Which is certainly against the accepted rules of interpretation of the scriptures. It is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence enjoins three kinds of worship or meditation.

Further in the beginning we have know me only followed by I am Prana, intelligent Self, meditate on me as life, as immortality; and in the end again we read And that Prana indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed (Ananda), undecaying (Ajara) and immortal (Amrita). The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar. Therefore we must conclude that they refer to one and the same subject and that the same subject-matter is kept up throughout.

Therefore `Prana' must denote Brahman only. In the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word `Prana' is taken in the sense of Brahman. It is a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic or subject matter of the whole chapter.

Thus ends the first Pada (Section 1) of the first Adhyaya (Chapter I) of the Brahma Sutras; or the Vedanta Philosophy.

Chapter I, Section 2

Introduction
In the First Pada or Section Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the whole universe. It has been taught that the Supreme Brahman should be enquired into. Certain attributes such as Eternity, Omniscience, All-pervadingness, the Self of all and so on have been declared of the Brahman.

In the latter part of Section I certain terms in the Sruti such as Anandamaya, Jyoti, Prana, Akasa, etc., used in a different sense have been shown through reasoning to refer to Brahman. Certain passages of the scriptures about whose sense doubts are entertained and which contain clear characteristics of Brahman (Spashta-Brahmalinga) have been shown to refer to Brahman.

Now in this and the next Section some more passages of doubtful import wherein the characteristic marks of Brahman are not so apparent (Aspashta-Brahmalinga) are taken up for discussion. Doubts may arise as to the exact meaning of certain expressions of Sruti, whether they indicate Brahman or something else. Those expressions are taken up for discussion in this and the next Sections.

In the Second and Third Padas will be shown that certain other words and sentences in which there is only obscure or indistinct indication of Brahman apply also to Brahman as in those of the First Pada.

Synopsis

Doubts may arise as to the exact meaning of certain expressions of Sruti, whether they indicate Brahman or something else. These expressions are taken up for discussion in this and the next sections.

It is proved in this section that the different expressions used in different Srutis for Divine contemplation indicate the same Infinite Brahman.

In the Sandilya Vidya of the Chhandogya Upanishad it is said that as the form and the character of a person in his next life are determined by his desires and thoughts of the present one, he should constantly desire for and meditate upon Brahman who is perfect, who is Sat-Chit-Ananda, who is immortal, who is Self-luminous, who is eternal, pure, birthless, deathless, Infinite etc., so that he may become identical with Him.

Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1 to 8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath etc., mentioned in Chhandogya Upanishad III-14 is not the individual soul, but Brahman.

Adhikarana II: (Sutras 9 and 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmanas and Kshatriyas are but food (Katha Up. I-2-25) is the Supreme Self or Brahman.

Adhikarana III: (Sutras 11 and 12) shows that the two which entered into the cave (Katha Up. I-3-1) are Brahman and the individual soul.

Adhikarana IV: (Sutras 13 to 17) states that the person within the eye mentioned in Chh. Up. IV-15-1 indicates neither a reflected image nor any individual soul, but Brahman.

Adhikarana V: (Sutras 18 to 20) shows that the Inner Ruler within (Antaryamin) described in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad III-7-3 as pervading and guiding the five elements (earth, water, fire, air, ether) and also heaven, sun, moon, stars etc., is no other than Brahman.

Adhikarana VI: (Sutras 21 to 23) proves that which cannot be seen, etc., mentioned in Mundaka Upanishad I-1-6 is Brahman.

Adhikarana VII: (Sutras 24 to 32) shows that the Atman, the Vaisvanara of Chhandogya Upanishad V-11-6 is Brahman.

The opinions of different sages namely Jaimini, Asmarathya and Badari have also been given here to show that the Infinite Brahman is sometimes conceived as finite and as possessing head, trunk, feet and other limbs and organs in order to facilitate divine contemplation according to the capacity of the meditator.

SARVATRA PRASIDDHYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 1 (SUTRAS 1-8)

THE MANOMAYA IS BRAHMAN

SARVATRA PRASIDDHOPADESAT I.2.1 (32)

(That which consists of the mind `Manomaya' is Brahman) because there is taught (in this text) (that Brahman which is) well-known (as the cause of the world) in the Upanishads.

Sarvatra: everywhere, in every Vedantic passage i.e., in all Upanishads; Prasiddha: the well-known; Upadesat: because of the teaching.

Sruti declares, All this indeed is Brahman, emanating from Him, living and moving in Him, and ultimately dissolving in Him; thus knowing let a man meditate with a calm mind. A man in his present life is the outcome of his previous thoughts and desires. He becomes that in after-life what he now resolves to be. Therefore he should meditate on Brahman who is ideally perfect, who functions through his very life-energy and who is all-light. He who consists of the mind, whose body is Prana (the subtle body) etc. Chh. Up. III-14.

Now a doubt arises whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, etc., is the individual soul or the Supreme Brahman.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: the passage refers to the individual soul only. Why? Because the embodied self only is connected with the mind. This is a well-known fact, while the Supreme Brahman is not. It is said in the Mundaka Upanishad II-1-2 `He is without breath, without mind, pure.'

The passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman. It aims only at enjoining calmness of mind. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text He to whom all works, all desires belong refer to the individual soul.

The Srutis declare He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley. This refers to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the infinite or unlimited Brahman.

We reply: The Supreme Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on. Because the text begins with All this indeed is Brahman. That Brahman which is considered as the cause of the world in all scriptural passages is taught here also in the formula Tajjalan. As the beginning refers to Brahman, the latter passage where He who consists of the mind (Manomaya) occurs, should also refer to Brahman as distinguished by certain qualities. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and unnecessarily introducing a fresh topic. Further the text speaks of Upasana, meditation. Therefore it is but proper that Brahman which is described in all other passages as an object of meditation is also taught here and not the individual soul. The individual soul is not spoken of anywhere as an object of meditation or Upasana.

Moreover you can attain serenity by meditating on Brahman which is an embodiment of peace. Manomaya refers to Brahman in Mun. Up. II-2-7, Tait. Up. I-6-1 and Katha Up. VII-9. The well-known Manomaya, applied in all the above passages to Brahman, is referred to here in the Chhandogya also. Therefore Manomaya refers to the Supreme Brahman only.

Vivakshitagunopapattescha I.2.2 (33)

Moreover the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

Vivakshita: desired to be expressed; Guna: qualities; Upapatteh: because of the reasonableness, for the justification; Cha: and, moreover.

An argument in support of Sutra 1 is adduced. And because the attributes, sought to be applied by the Sruti quoted above, justly belong to Brahman, it must be admitted that the passage refers to Brahman.

He who consists of the mind, whose body is Prana (the subtle body), whose form is light, resolve is true, whose nature is like that of ether (Omnipresent and invisible), from whom proceed all actions, all desires, all scents, all tastes; who is All-embracing, who is voiceless and unattached Chh. Up. III-14-2. These attributes mentioned in this text as topics of meditation are possible in Brahman only.

The qualities of having true desires (Sat Kama) and true purposes (Sat Sankalpa) are attributed to the Supreme Self in another passage viz., `The Self which is free from sin etc.' Chh. Up. VIII-7-1, He whose Self is the ether; this is possible as Brahman which as the cause of the entire universe is the Self of everything and is also the Self of the ether. Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman.

Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the Supreme Brahman alone is represented as the object of meditation.

Anupapattestu na saarirah I.2.3 (34)

On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it) the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by Manomaya etc.).

Anupapatteh: not being justifiable, because of the impossibility, because of the unreasonableness, because they are not appropriate; Tu: but on the other hand; Na: not; Saarirah: the embodied, the Jiva or the individual soul.

Such qualities cannot apply to the individual soul. The argument in support of the Sutra is continued. The preceding Sutra has stated that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman. The present Sutra declares that they are not possible in the Jiva or the embodied Soul. Brahman only is endowed with the qualities of `consisting of mind or Manomaya, and so on' but not the embodied Self.

Because the qualities such as `He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who is speechless, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth' cannot be ascribed to the individual soul. The term `Saarira' or embodied means `dwelling in a body.'

If the opponent says `The Lord also dwells in the body', we reply: true, He does abide in the body, but not in the body alone; because Sruti declares `The Lord is greater than the earth, greater than the heaven, Omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' On the contrary the individual soul resides in the body only.

The Jiva is like a glow-worm before the effulgence of the Brahman who is like a Sun when compared with it. The superior qualities described in the text are not certainly possible in Jiva.

The All-pervading is not the embodied self or the individual soul, as it is quite impossible to predicate Omnipresence of Him. It is impossible and against fact and reason also that one and the same individual could be in all the bodies at the same time.

Karmakartrivyapadesaccha I.2.4 (35)

Because of the declaration of the attainer and the object attained. He who consists of the mind (Manomaya) refers to Brahman and not to the individual soul.

Karma: object; Kartri: agent; Vyapadesat: because of the declaration or mention; Cha: and.

An argument in support of Sutra 3 is adduced.

A separate distinction is drawn between the object of activity and of the agent. Therefore the attributes of `consisting of mind' (Manomaya) cannot belong to the embodied self. The text says When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him Chh. Up. III-14-4. Here the word `Him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion. Who consists of the mind, the object of meditation viz., as something to be obtained; while the words `I shall obtain' represent the meditating individual soul as the agent i.e., the obtainer.

We must not assume that one and the same thing is spoken of as the attainer (agent) and the object attained at the same time. The attainer and the attained cannot be the same. The object meditated upon is different from the person who meditates, the individual soul referred to in the above text by the pronoun `I'.

Thus for the above reason also, that which is characterised by the attributes consisting of mind `Manomaya' and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

Sabdaviseshat I.2.5 (36)

Because of the difference of words.

Sabda: word; Viseshat: because of difference.

The argument in favour of Sutra 1 is continued. That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind and so on cannot be the individual soul, because there is a difference of words.

In the Satapatha Brahmana the same idea is expressed in similar words As is a grain of rice, or a grain of barley, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, so is that golden person in the Self (X. 6-3-2). Here one word i.e. the locative in the Self denotes the individual soul or the embodied self, and a different word, viz. the nominative `person' denotes the self distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind etc.

We, therefore, conclude that the two are different and that the individual self is not referred to in the text under discussion.

Smritescha I.2.6 (37)

From the Smriti also (we know the embodied self or the individual soul is different from the one referred to in the text under discussion).

Smriteh: from the Smriti; Cha: and, also.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

It is so declared also in the Smriti (Bhagavad Gita). From the Smriti also it is evident that the individual soul is markedly different from the subject matter of the text under discussion.

Smriti also declares the difference of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul The Lord dwelleth in the hearts of all beings, O Arjuna, by His illusive power, causing all beings to revolve, as though mounted on a potter's wheel (Gita: XVIII-61).

The difference is only imaginary and not real. The difference exists only so long as Avidya or ignorance lasts and the significance of the Mahavakya or Great Sentence of the Upanishads `Tat Tvam Asi' (Thou art That) has not been realised. As soon as you grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to Samsara or phenomenal life with its distinction of bondage, final emancipation and the like.

Arbhakaukastvattadvyapadesaccha neti chet na

nichayyatvadevam vyomavaccha I.2.7 (38)

If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned i.e. the heart) and also on account of the denotation of that (i.e. of minuteness) we say, No; because (Brahman) has thus to be meditated and because the case is similar to that of ether.

Arbhakaukastvat: because of the smallness of the abode; Tadvyapadesat: because of the description or denotation as such i.e. minuteness; Cha: and also; Na: not; Iti: not so; Chet: if; Na: not; Nichayyatvat: because of meditation (in the heart); Evam: thus, so; Vyomavat: like the ether; Cha: and.

An objection to Sutra 1 is raised and refuted.

Now an objection is raised, that the Manomaya of the Chhandogya Upanishad cannot be Brahman, but is Jiva, because the description there is more applicable to an individual soul than to Brahman. The text says He is my self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a mustard seed Chh. Up. III-14-3. This shows that the Manomaya occupies very little space, in fact it is atomic and so cannot be Brahman.

This Sutra refutes it. Though a man is the king of the whole earth, he could at the same time be called the king of Ayodhya as well. The Infinite is called the atomic because He can be realised in the minute space of the chamber of the heart, just as Lord Vishnu can be realised in the sacred stone called Saligrama.

Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as abiding in the heart. The case is similar to that of the eye of the needle. The ether, though all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, with reference to its connection with the eye of the needle. So it is said of Brahman also.

The attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness are ascribed to Brahman only for the convenience of conception and meditation, because it is difficult to meditate on the all-pervading, infinite Brahman. This will certainly not go against His Omnipresence. These limitations are simply imagined in Brahman. They are not at all real.

In the very passage Brahman is declared to be infinite like space, and all pervading like ether, `Greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.' Though Brahman is all-pervading, yet He becomes atomic through His mysterious inconceivable power to please His devotees. He appears simultaneously everywhere, wherever His devotees are. This simultaneous appearance of the atomic Brahman everywhere establishes His all-pervadingness even in His manifested form. Gopis saw Lord Krishna everywhere.

The opponent says: If Brahman has His abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow, that He is attended by all the imperfections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages viz., want of unity being made up of parts, non-permanency, etc. He would be subject to experiences originating from connection with bodies. To this the author gives a suitable reply in the following Sutra.

Sambhogapraptiriti chet na vaiseshyat I.2.8 (39)

If it be said that (being connected with the hearts of all individual souls to) Its (Brahman's) Omnipresence, it would also have experience (of pleasure and pain) (we say) not so, on account of the difference in the nature (of the two).

Sambhogaprapti: that it has experience of pleasure and pain; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Vaiseshyat: because of the difference in nature.

Another objection is raised and refuted here.

The word `Sambhoga' denotes mutual experience or common experience. The force of `Sam' in `Sambhoga' is that of `Saha'. The mere dwelling within a body is not a cause always of experiencing the pleasures or pains connected with that body. The experience is subject to the influence of the good and evil actions. Brahman has no such Karma. He is actionless (Nishkriya, Akarta). In the Gita the Lord says, The Karmas do not touch Me and I have no attachment to the fruit of KarmasNa mam karmani limpanti na me karmaphale spriha.

There is no equality in experience between Brahman and the individual soul, because Brahman is all-pervading, of absolute power; the individual soul is of little power and absolutely dependent.

Though Brahman is all-pervading and connected with hearts of all individual souls and is also intelligent like them, He is not subject to pleasure and pain. Because the individual soul is an agent, he is the doer of good and bad actions. Therefore he experiences pleasure and pain. Brahman is not the doer. He is the eternal Satchidananda. He is free from all evil.

The opponent says: The individual soul is in essence identical with Brahman. Therefore Brahman is also subject to the pleasure and pain experienced by the Jiva or the individual soul. This is a foolish argument. This is a fallacy. In reality there is neither the individual soul nor pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are mental creations only. When the individual soul is under the influence of ignorance or Avidya, he foolishly thinks that he is subject to pleasure and pain.

Proximity will not cause the clinging of pain and pleasure to Brahman. When something in space is affected by fire, the space itself cannot be affected by fire. Is ether blue because boys call it so? Not even the slightest trace of experience of pleasure and pain can be attributed to Brahman.

Sruti declares Two birds are living together as friends on the same tree i.e. body. One of them, i.e. the individual soul, eats the tasteful fruit i.e. enjoys the fruit of his actions: and the other i.e. the Supreme Soul witnesses without eating anything, i.e. without partaking of fruit Mun. Up. III-1-1.

Sutras 1 to 8 have established that the subject of discussion in the quoted portion of the Chhandogya Upanishad Chapter III-14 is Brahman and not the individual soul.

ATTRADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 2 (SUTRAS 9-10)

THE EATER IS BRAHMAN

ATTA CHARACHARAGRAHANAT I.2.9 (40)

The Eater (is Brahman), because both the movable and immovable (i.e. the whole world) is taken (as His food).

Atta: the Eater; Characharagrahanat: because the movable and immovable (i.e. the whole universe) is taken (as His food).

A passage from the Kathopanishad is now taken up for discussion. We read in Kathopanishad I.2.25 Who then knows where He is, to Whom the Brahmanas and Kshatriyas are (as it were) but food, and death itself a condiment? This text shows by means of the words `food' and `condiment' that there is some eater.

Who is this eater? Is it the fire referred to in as eater: Soma indeed is food, and fire eater Bri. Up. I-4-6, or is it individual soul referred to as eater One of them eats the sweet fruit Mun. Up. III-I-I, or the Supreme Self?

We reply that the eater must be the Supreme Self because it is mentioned what is movable and what is immovable. The entire universe is re-absorbed in Brahman. All things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food of Brahman while Death itself is the condiment. The eater of the whole world, the consumer of all these things in their totality can be Brahman alone and none else.

The Brahmanas and the Kshatriyas are mentioned as mere examples as they are foremost of created beings and as they hold a pre-eminent position. The words are merely illustrative.

The whole universe sprinkled over by Death is referred to here as the food. Condiment is a thing which renders other things more palatable and causes other things to be eaten with great relish. Therefore the Death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were, it makes other things palatable. Therefore the Eater of the entire world made palatable by Death, can mean only Brahman in His aspect of Destroyer. He withdraws the whole universe within Himself at the time of Pralaya or dissolution. Therefore the Supreme Self must be taken here as the Eater.

The opponent says: Brahman cannot be an eater. The Sruti declares The other looks on without eating. We say that this has no validity. The passage aims at denying the fruition of the results of works. It is not meant to deny the re-absorption of the world into Brahman; because it is well-established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, sustenance and re-absorption of the world. Therefore the Eater can here be Brahman only.

Prakaranaccha I.2.10 (41)

And on account of the context also the (eater is Brahman).

Prakaranat: from the context; Cha: also, and.

An argument in support of Sutra 9 is given.

Brahman is the subject of the discussion. In the beginning Nachiketas asks Yama, Tell me of that which is above good and evil, which is beyond cause and effect and which is other than the past and future Katha Up. I-2-14. Yama replies, I will tell you in brief. It is OM Katha Up. I-2-15. This Atman is neither born nor does it die Katha Up. I-2-18. He finally includes of whom the Brahmana and the Kshatriya classes are, as it were, food and Death itself a condiment or pickle, how can one thus know where that Atman is?

All this obviously shows that Brahman is the general topic. To adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Hence the Eater is Brahman. Further the clause Who then knows where he is, shows that realisation is very difficult. This again points to the Supreme Self.

The force of the word `Cha' (and) in the Sutra is to indicate that the Smriti is also to the same effect, as says the Gita.

Thou art the Eater of the worlds, of all that moves and stands; worthier of reverence than the Guru's self, there is none like Thee.

GUHAPRAVISHTADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 3 (SUTRAS 11-12)

THE DWELLERS IN THE CAVE OF THE HEART ARE

THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND BRAHMAN

Guham pravistavatmanau hi taddarsanat I.2.11 (42)

The two who have entered into the cavity (of the heart) are indeed the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, because it is so seen.

Guham: in the cavity (of the heart) Pravishtau: the two who have entered; Atmanau: are the two selfs (individual soul and the Supreme Soul); Hi: indeed, because; Taddarsanat: because it is so seen.

Another passage of the Kathopanishad is taken up for discussion. In the same Kathopanishad I-3-1 we read, Having entered the cavity of the heart, the two enjoy the reward of their works in the body. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light: likewise those householders who perform the Trinachiketa sacrifice.

The doubt arises here whether the couple referred to are the individual soul and Buddhi (intellect).

In the passage under discussion, the couple referred to are the individual soul and the Supreme Self, for these two, being both intelligent selfs, are of the same nature. We see that in ordinary life also whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant. When a bull is brought to us, we say `bring another, look out for a second'. It means another bull, not a horse or a man. So, if with an intelligent self, the individual soul, another is said to enter the cavity of the heart, it must refer to another of the same class i.e. to another intelligent being and not to the intellect (Buddhi) which is insentient.

Sruti and Smriti speak of the Supreme Self as placed in the cave. We read in Kathopanishad I-2-12 The ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss. We also find in Taittiriya Upanishad II-1 He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether and search for the self who entered into the cave. A special abode for the all-pervading Brahman is given for the purpose of conception and meditation. This is not contrary to reason.

Sometimes the characteristics of one in a group are indirectly applied to the whole group as when we say The men with an umbrella where only one has an umbrella and not the whole group. Similarly here also, though it is only one who is enjoying the fruits of actions both are spoken of as eating the fruits.

The word `pibantau' is in the dual number meaning `the two drink while as a matter of fact, the Jiva only drinks the fruit of his works and not the Supreme Self. We may explain the passage by saying that while the individual soul drinks, the Supreme Self also is said to drink because he makes the soul to drink. The individual soul is the direct agent, the Supreme Self is the causal agent that is to say the individual self directly drinks while the Supreme Self causes the individual soul to drink.

The phrases `shade' and `light' show the difference between the Infinite Knowledge of the Supreme Self and the finite knowledge of the Jiva, or that the Jiva is bound down to the chain of Samsara, while the Supreme Self is above Samsara.

We, therefore, understand by the `two entered into the cave', the individual soul and the Supreme Self.

Another reason for this interpretation is given in the following Sutra.

Viseshanaccha I.2.12 (43)

And on account of the distinctive qualities (of the two mentioned in subsequent texts).

Viseshanat: on account of distinctive qualities; Cha: and.

An argument in support of Sutra 11 is given.

This is clear also from the description in other portions of the same scripture viz. Kathopanishad.

Further the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. Because in a subsequent passage (I-3-3) the characteristics of the two that have entered the cavity of the heart are given. They indicate that the two are the individual soul and Brahman. Know that the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot. The individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through the transmigratory existence and final emancipation. Further it is said He attains the end of his journey, that highest place of Vishnu Katha Up. I-3-9. Here it is represented that the Supreme Self is the goal of the driver's course. The two are mentioned here as the attainer and the goal attained i.e. the individual soul or Jiva and the Supreme Soul or Brahman.

In the preceding passage (I-2-12) also it is said The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave of the heart, who abides in the abyss as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind. Here the two are spoken of as the meditator and the object of meditation.

Moreover the Supreme Self is the general topic. It is therefore obvious that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the Supreme Self.

ANTARADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 4 (SUTRAS 13-17)

THE PERSON WITHIN THE EYE IS BRAHMAN

Antara upapatteh I.2.13 (44)

The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of (the attributes mentioned therein) being appropriate (only to Brahman).

Antara: inside (the eye), the being within the eye; Upapatteh: on account of the appropriateness of (attributes).

The being within the eye is Brahman, because it is reasonable to construe the passage as applying to the Supreme Self than to anything else.

The form of worship in another part of Chhandogya Upanishad (IV-15-1), taking the being within the eyes as the Supreme Self, is taken up as the subject for discussion.

In Chhandogya Upanishad IV-15-1 we read, This person that is seen in the eye is the Self. This is Immortal and fearless, this is Brahman. The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected self which resides in the eye, or to the individual soul or to the self of some deity which presides over the organ of sight or to the Supreme Self.

The Sutra says that the person in the eye is Brahman only, because the attributes `Immortal', `fearless', etc., mentioned here accord with the nature of the Supreme Self only.

The attributes `being untouched by sin', being `Samyadvama' etc., are applicable to the Supreme Self only. The attributes of being `Vamani' or the leader of all and `Bhamani', the All-effulgent, applied to the person in the eye are appropriate in the case of Brahman also.

Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the Supreme Self or Brahman only.

Sthanadivyapadesaccha I.2.14 (46)

And on account of the statement of place and so on.

Sthanadi: the place and the rest; Vyapadesat: on account of the statement; Cha: and.

An argument in support of Sutra 13 is given.

In other Srutis location etc., i.e., abode, name and form are attributed to Brahman Himself to facilitate meditation. But how can the all-pervading Brahman be in a limited space like the eye? Definite abode like the cavity of the heart, the eye, the earth, disc of the sun etc., is given to the all-pervading Brahman for the purpose of meditation (Upasana), just as Saligrama is prescribed for meditation on Vishnu. This is not contrary to reason.

The phrase `and so on' which forms part of the Sutra shows that not only abode is assigned to Brahman but also such things as name and form not appropriate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are ascribed to It for the sake of meditation, as Brahman without qualities cannot be an object of meditation. Vide Chh. Up. 1.6.6-7. His name is `Ut'. He with the golden beard.

Sukhavisishtabhidhanadeva cha I.2.15 (46)

And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by bliss (i.e. Brahman).

Sukha: bliss; Visishta: qualified by; Abhidhanat: because of the description; Eva: alone; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 13 is continued.

Because the text refers to the Supreme Self only and not to Jiva who is miserable.

The same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by bliss in the beginning of the chapter in the clauses Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman Kha is Brahman we must suppose It to be referred to in the present passage also, as it is proper to stick to the subject matter under discussion.

The fires taught to Upakosala about Brahman Breath is Brahman, bliss is Brahman, the ether is Brahman Chh. Up. IV-10-5. This same Brahman is further elucidated by his teacher as the being in the eye.

On hearing the speech of the fires viz., Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman, Upakosala says I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman. Therefore the fires reply What is Ka is Kha. What is Kha is Ka.

The word Ka in ordinary language denotes sensual pleasure. If the word Kha were not used to qualify the sense of Ka one would think that ordinary worldly pleasure was meant. But as the two words Ka and Kha occur together and qualify each other, they indicate Brahman whose Self is Bliss. Therefore the reference is to Supreme Bliss and such a description can apply only to Brahman.

If the word Brahman in the clause Ka is Brahman were not added and if the sentence would run Ka, Kha is Brahman, the word Ka would be only an adjective and thus pleasure being a mere quality cannot be a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words Ka as well as Kha are joined with the word Brahman. Ka is Brahman. Kha is Brahman. Qualities as well as persons having those qualities could be objects of meditation.

Srutopanishatkagatyabhidhanaccha I.2.16 (47)

And on account of the statement of the way of him who has known the Truth of the Upanishads.

Sruto: heard; Upanishatka: Upanishads; Gati: way; Abhidhanat: because of the statement; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 13 is continued.

The person in the eye is the Supreme Self for the following reason also. From Sruti we know of the way of the knower of Brahman. He travels after death through the Devayana path or the path of the Gods. That way is described in Prasna Up. 1-10. Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith and knowledge attain the Sun by the Northern Path or the path of Devayana. From thence they do not return. This is the immortal abode, free from fear, and the highest.

The knower of the person in the eye also goes by this path after death. From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman it is quite clear that the person within the eye is Brahman.

The following Sutra shows that it is not possible for the above text to mean either the reflected Self or the Jiva or the deity in the Sun.

Anavasthiterasamhhavaccha netarah I.2.17 (48)

(The person within the eye is the Supreme Self) and not any other (i.e. the individual soul etc.) as these do not exist always; and on account of the impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the being ascribed to any of these).

Anavasthiteh: not existing always; Asambhavat: on account of the impossibility; Cha: and; Na: not; Itarah: any other.

The argument in support of Sutra 13 is continued.

The reflected self does not permanently abide in the eye. When some person comes near the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye. When he moves away the reflection disappears.

Surely you do not propose to have some one near the eye at the time of meditation so that you may meditate on the image in the eye. Such a fleeting image cannot be the object of meditation. The individual soul is not meant by the passage, because he is subject to ignorance, desire and action, he has no perfection. Hence he cannot be the object of meditation. The qualities like immortality, fearlessness, immanence, eternity, perfection etc., cannot be appropriately attributed to the reflected self or the individual soul or the deity in the sun. Therefore no other self save the Supreme Self is here spoken of as the person in the eye. The person in the eye (Akshi Purusha) must be viewed as the Supreme Self only.

ANTARYAMYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 5 (SUTRAS 18-20)

THE INTERNAL RULER IS BRAHMAN

Antaryamyadhidaivadishu taddharmavyapadesat I.2.18 (49)

The internal ruler over the gods and so on (is Brahman) because the attributes of that (Brahman) are mentioned.

Antaryami: the ruler within; Adhidaivadishu: in the gods, etc.; Tat: His; Dharma: attributes; Vyapadesat: because of the statement.

A passage from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is now taken up for discussion. In Bri. Up. III-7-1 we read He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings and later on He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth from within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal etc., III-7-3.

Here a doubt arises whether the Inner Ruler (Antaryamin) denotes the individual soul or some Yogin endowed with extraordinary powers such as for instance, the power of making his body subtle or the presiding deity or Pradhana or Brahman (the Highest Self).

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: Some god presiding over the earth and so on must be the Antaryamin. He only is capable of ruling the earth as he is endowed with the organs of action. Rulership can rightly be ascribed to him only. Or else the ruler may be some Yogin who is able to enter within all things on account of his extraordinary Yogic powers. Certainly the supreme Self cannot be meant as He doesnot possess the organs of actions which are needed for ruling.

We give the following reply. The internal Ruler must be Brahman or the Supreme Self. Why so? Because His qualities are mentioned in the passage under discussion. Brahman is the cause of all created things. The universal rulership is an appropriate attribute of the Supreme Self only. Omnipotence, Selfhood, Immortality, etc., can be ascribed to Brahman only.

The passage He whom the earth does not know, shows that the Inner Ruler is not known by the earth-deity. Therefore it is obvious that the Inner Ruler is different from that deity. The attributes `unseen', `unheard', also refer to the Supreme Self only Which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.

He is also described in the section as being all-pervading, as He is inside and the Ruler within of everything viz., the earth, the sun, water, fire, sky, the ether, the senses, etc. This also can be true only of the Highest Self or Brahman. For all these reasons, the Inner Ruler is no other but the Supreme Self or Brahman.

Na cha smartamataddharmabhilapat I.2.19 (50)

And (the Internal Ruler is) not that which is taught in the Sankhya Smriti (viz., Pradhana) because qualities contrary to its nature are mentioned (here).

Na: neither; Cha: also, and; Smartam: that which is taught in (Sankhya) Smriti; Ataddharmabhilapat: because qualities contrary to its nature are mentioned.

An argument in support of Sutra 18 is given.

The word Antaryamin (Inner Ruler) cannot relate to Pradhana as it has not got Chaitanya (sentiency) and cannot be called Atman.

The Pradhana is not this `Internal Ruler' as the attributes He is the immortal, unseen Seer, unheard Hearer etc., There is no other seer but He, there is no other thinker but He, there is no other Knower but He. This is the Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal. Everything else is of evil (Bri. Up. III-7-23), cannot be ascribed to the non-intelligent blind Pradhana.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: Well then, if the term `Internal Ruler' cannot denote the Pradhana as it is neither a Self nor seer it can certainly denote the individual soul or Jiva who is intelligent and therefore sees, hears, thinks and knows, who is internal and therefore of the nature of Self. Further the individual soul is capable of ruling over the organs, as he is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the individual soul or Jiva.

The following Sutra gives a suitable answer to this.

Sariraschobhaye'pi hi bhedenainamadhiyate I.2.20 (51)

And the individual soul (is not the Internal Ruler) for both also (i.e. both recensions viz., the Kanva and Madhyandina Sakhas of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad) speak of it as different (from the Internal Ruler.)

Sarirah: the embodied, the individual soul; Cha: also, and; (Na: not); Ubhaye: the both namely the recentions Kanva and Madhyandinas; Api: even, also; Hi: because; Bhedena: by way of difference; Enam: this, the Jiva; Adhiyate: read, speak of, indicate.

The argument in support of Sutra 18 is continued. The word `not' is to be supplied from the preceding Sutra.

The followers of both Sakhas speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler. The Kanvas read He who dwells in KnowledgeYo vijnane tishthan Bri. Up. III-7-22. Here `knowledge' stands for the individual soul. The Madhyandinas read He who dwells in the Selfya atmani tishthan. Here `Self' stands for the individual soul. In either reading the individual soul is spoken of as different from the `Internal Ruler', for the Internal Ruler is the Ruler of the individual soul also.

The difference between the Jiva and Brahman is one of Upadhi (limitation). The difference between the Internal Ruler and the individual soul is merely the product of ignorance or Avidya. It has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by ignorance. The difference is not absolutely true. Because the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible. But on account of limiting adjuncts the one Self is practically treated as if it were two, just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether.

The scriptural text where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another intimates that the world exists only in the sphere of ignorance, while the subsequent text But when the Self only is all this how should one see another declares that the world disappears in the sphere of true knowledge.

ADRISYATVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 6 (SUTRAS 21-23)

THAT WHICH CANNOT BE SEEN IS BRAHMAN

Adrisyatvadigunako dharmokteh I.2.21 (52)

The possessor of qualities like indivisibility etc., (is Brahman) on account of the declaration of Its attributes.

Adrisyatva: invisibility; Adi: and the rest, beginning with; Gunakah: one who possesses the quality (Adrisyatvadigunakah: possessor of qualities like invisibility); Dharmokteh: because of the mention of qualities.

Some expressions from the Mundaka Upanishad are now taken up as the subject for discussion.

We read in the Mundaka Upanishad (I-1-5 & 6) The higher knowledge is this by which the indestructible is known or realised. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise consider as the source of all beings.

Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility etc., is Pradhana, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Self or the Highest Lord.

That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings (Bhutayoni) characterised by such attributes as invisibility and so on, can be the Supreme Self or Brahman only, nothing else, because qualities like He is all-knowing (Sarvajna), all-perceiving (Sarvavit) Mun. Up. I-1-9 are true only of Brahman and not of the Pradhana which is non-intelligent. Certainly it cannot refer to the Jiva or the embodied soul as he is narrowed by his limiting conditions. The section also, in which these passages occur relates to the Highest Knowledge or Para Vidya. Therefore it must refer to Brahman and not to Pradhana or Jiva.

Viseshanabhedavyapadesabhyam cha netarau I.2.22 (53)

The other two (viz. the individual soul and the Pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) for distinctive attributes and differences are stated.

Viseshanabhedavyapadesabhyam: on account of the mention of distinctive attributes and differences; Cha: and; Na: not; Itarau: the other two.

An argument in support of Sutra 21 is given.

The source of all beings is Brahman or the Supreme Self but not either of the two others viz., the individual soul for the following reason also.

We read in the Mundaka Upanishad II.1, 2 That the heavenly person is without a body. He is both without and within, is birthless, without breath, and without mind, pure, higher than the high, Imperishable. The distinctive attributes mentioned here such as being of a heavenly nature (Divya), `Birthless', `Pure', etc., can in no way belong to the individual soul who erroneously regards himself to be limited by name and form as presented by Avidya or ignorance and erroneously considers himself limited, impure, corporeal, etc. Therefore the passage obviously refers to the Supreme Self or Brahman who is the subject of all the Upanishads.

Higher than the high, Imperishable (Pradhana) intimates that the source of all beings spoken of in the last Sutra is not the Pradhana but something different from it. Here the term imperishable means the Avyaktam or Avyakrita (the unmanifested or the undifferentiated) which represents the potentiality or the seed of all names and forms, contains the subtle parts of the material elements and abides in the Lord. As it is no effect of anything, it is high when compared to all effects. Intellect, mind, egoism, the Tanmatras, the organs are all born from it. Aksharat paratah parahHigher than the high Imperishable, which expresses a difference clearly indicates that the Supreme Self or Brahman is meant here. Beyond Pradhana or Avyaktam is Para Brahman. It is a settled conclusion therefore that the source of all beings must mean the highest Self or Brahman only.

A further argument in favour of the same conclusion is given in the following Sutra.

Rupopanyasaccha I-2-23 (54)

And on account of its form being mentioned (the passage under discussion refers to Brahman).

Rupa: form; Upanyasat: because of the mention; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 21 is continued.

Further His form is described in the Mundaka Upanishad II-1-4 Fire is His head, His eyes the sun and the moon, the quarters His ears, His speech the Vedas, the wind His breath, His heart the universe; from His feet came the earth, He is indeed the inner Self of all beings.

This statement of form can refer only to the Supreme Lord or Brahman. Such a description is appropriate only in the case of Brahman, because the Jiva is of limited power and because Pradhana (matter) cannot be the Soul or inner Self of living beings.

As the source of all beings forms the general topic, the whole passage from From Him is born breath upto He is the inner Self of all beings refers to that same source.

The Person indeed is all this, sacrifice, knowledge etc. Mun. Up. II-1-10, intimates that the source of all beings referred to in the passage under discussion is none other than the Supreme Self or Brahman, for He is the inner Self of all beings.

VAISVANARADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 7 (SUTRAS 24-32)

VAISVANARA IS BRAHMAN

Vaisvanarah sadharanasabdaviseshat I.2.24 (55)

Vaisvanara (is Brahman) on account of the distinction qualifying the common terms (Vaisvanara and Self).

Vaisvanarah: Vaisvanara; Sadharana sabda: common word; Viseshat: because of the distinction.

This Sutra proves that the word Vaisvanara used in Sruti for worship indicates Brahman.

We read in Chh. Up. V.18.1-2 He who meditates on the Vaisvanara Self, extending from heaven to earth as identical with his own Self, eats food in all beings, in all selfs. Of that Vaisvanara Self Sutejas (heaven) is the head, the sun the eye, the feet the earth, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.

Here the doubt arises whether by the term Vaisvanara we have to understand the gastric fire or the elemental fire, or the god presiding over the elemental fire, or the individual soul or the Supreme Self (Brahman).

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says that Vaisvanara is the gastric fire because it is said in Bri. Up. V-9 Agni Vaisvanara is the fire within man by which the food that is eaten is digested. Or it may denote fire in general or the deity which presides over the elemental fire or the individual soul who being an enjoyer is in close vicinity to Vaisvanara fire.

The Siddhantin says here that the Supreme Self or Brahman only is referred to on account of the qualifying adjuncts to these words. The adjuncts are Heaven is the head of this Vaisvanara Self, the Sun its eyes, etc. This is possible only in the case of the Supreme Self.

Further in the passage He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all selfs. This is possible only if we take the term Vaisvanara to denote the Highest Self.

The fruit of meditation on this Vaisvanara Self is the attainment of all desires and destruction of all sins (Chh. Up. V.24.3). This can only be true if the Supreme Self is meant. Moreover the chapter begins with the enquiry What is our Self? What is Brahman? The words `Self' and `Brahman' are marks of Brahman and indicate the Supreme Self only. The word `Brahman' is used in its primary sense. Therefore it is proper to think that the whole chapter treats of Brahman only. Moreover, etymologically also the word Vaisvanara means Brahman; because it is composed of two words Visva meaning all and Nara meaning `men' namely He who contains all men within himself. Such a being is Brahman only.

It is a settled conclusion, therefore, that only Brahman can be meant by the term Vaisvanara.

Smaryamanamanumanam syaditi I.2.25 (56)

Because that (cosmic form of the Supreme Lord) which is described in the Smriti is an indicatory mark or inference (from which we infer the meaning of this Sruti text under discussion).

Smaryamanam: mentioned in the Smriti; Anumanam: indicatory mark, inference; Syat: may be; Iti: because thus.

An argument in support of Sutra 24 is given. The word `Iti' denotes a reason. It points to a corroborative statement which expresses the same thing as the Sruti. The Smritis interpret the passages of the Sruti. Therefore where a doubt arises as to the significance of a passage in the Sruti, the Smriti may be consulted in order to get more light on the subject matter. The Smriti gives a description of the cosmic form of the Highest Lord as He whose mouth is fire, whose head is heaven, whose navel the ether, whose eyes the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to Him, whose body is the world. This is in agreement with the description in the text under discussion. The same Lord who is spoken of in the Sruti is described in the Smriti also.

In the Bhagavad Gita XV-14 the word Vaisvanara is expressly applied to the LordI having become the fire of life, take possession of the bodies of breathing beings and united with the life-breaths, I digest the four kinds of food. Here a truth about the Lord is declared in a Smriti passage and from it we may infer that the Vaisvanara Vidya taught in the Chhandogya Upanishad also refers to this mystery of the Lord. Hence Vaisvanara is the Highest Lord. Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the Supreme Lord is referred to in the text.

In the following Sutra the author removes the doubt that the Vaisvanara may denote the gastric fire.

Sabdadibhyo'ntahpratisthanaccha neti chet na tatha

drishtyupadesat asambhavat purushamapi

chainamadhiyate I.2.26 (57)

If it be said that (Vaisvanara is) not (Brahman) or the Highest Lord on account of the term (viz., Vaisvanara which has a different settled meaning viz., gastric fire) etc., and on account of his abiding within (which is a characteristic of the gastric fire) (we say) no, because there is the instruction to conceive (Brahman) as such (as the gastric fire, because it is impossible for the gastric fire to have the heaven etc., for its head and other limbs) and also because they (the Vajasaneyins) describe him (viz. the Vaisvanara) as man (which term cannot apply to the gastric fire).

Sabdadibhyah: on account of the word; Antah: within; Pratishthanat: because of abiding; Cha: and; Na: not; Iti chet: if it be said; Na: not so; Tatha: thus, as such; Drishtyupadesat: on account of the instructions to conceive it; Asambhavat: because of impossibility; Purusham: as person; Api: also; Cha: and; Evam: him; Adhyate: (they) describe.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

The Purvapakshin raises the following objection. The ordinary meaning of Vaisvanara is fire. Moreover scripture speaks of the Vaisvanara as abiding within. He knows him abiding within man Sat. Br. 10-6-1-11 which applies to the gastric fire only. Therefore the gastric fire alone and not Brahman is referred to in the text under discussion.

This Sutra refutes this objection. The Siddhantin gives the following reply. The Sruti here teaches the worship of Brahman in the gastric fire by way of meditation (Upasana) analogously to such passages as Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman Chh. Up. III-18-1.

Moreover the gastric fire cannot have heaven for its head, and so on. Further the Vajasaneyins consider Vaisvanara as a man (Purusha). This Agni Vaisvanara is a man Sat. Br. 10.6.1-11.

Therefore Vaisvanara here refers to Brahman only. In the following Sutra the author sets aside the view that Vaisvanara of this passage means the Devata called Agni or the elemental fire.

Ata eva na devata bhutam cha I.2.27 (58)

For the same reasons (the Vaisvanara) cannot be the deity (fire) or the element (fire).

Ata eva: for the same reasons; Na: (is) not; Devata: the presiding deity of fire; Bhutam: the element of fire; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

The Purvapakshin says: the presiding deity of fire is a mighty being. He is endowed with great lordliness and power. Therefore heaven, etc., may very appropriately be its head and other members. Therefore the passage may very well apply to him.

For the same reasons stated in Sutra 26 Vaisvanara is neither the divinity of fire nor the element of fire. The elemental fire is mere heat and light. The heaven and so on cannot properly be ascribed as its head and so on, because an effect cannot be the Self of another effect. Again the heavenly world cannot be ascribed as head, etc., to the god of fire, because it is not the Supreme Cause but a mere effect and its power or glory depends on the Supreme Lord. To them the word Atman could not appropriately be applicable at all.

Sakshadapyavirodham Jaiminih I.2.28 (59)

Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even (if by Vaisvanara) (Brahman is) directly (taken as the object of worship).

Sakshat: directly; Api: also, even; Avirodham: no objection, no contradiction; Jaiminih: (so says) Jaimini.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

Jaimini says that it is not necessary to state that what is meant by Vaisvanara is fire as a symbol of God and that the view that it means Brahman directly and in a primary sense is quite consistent and appropriate. The very word `Vaisvanara' means the totality of life and applies to Brahman as he is the Soul of all (Sarvatmatvat).

This Sutra declares that `Vaisvanara' can be taken directly to mean Brahman as an object of meditation, because Vaisvanara also means the universal man i.e., the all-pervading Brahman Himself. As the word Vaisvanara literally means He to whom belong all men or who is the leader (Nara) of all (Visva) so the word Vaisvanara denotes etymologically the Supreme Brahman.

Abhivyakterityasmarathyah I.2.29 (60)

On account of the manifestation, so says Aasmarathya.

Abhivyakteh: because of manifestation; Iti: thus, so; Aasmarathyah: (says) Asmarathya.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

In the Chhandogya Upanishad under discussion Vaisvanara is described as having the size of a span. How can the Infinite Brahman be limited by the measure of a Pradesa or a span? To this objection the author gives his answer in the following Sutra.

The sage Aasmarathya says that for the benefit of the worshipper the Infinite Brahman manifests Himself in the finite individually being localised in limited places such as the body or the heart of the human being. Therefore there is no incongruity in using the word Vaisvanara (even standing for the gastric fire) to signify Brahman. Even though Brahman is all-pervading, yet He specially manifests Himself as extending from heaven to earth or in the heart for the sake of His devotees.

Asmarathya says that the Infinite is realised through His grace in the limited space of mental image in the mind or a physical image without. The devotees who meditate on Brahman in their heart as having the size of a span, see Him of that size, because He manifests Himself to them in that form.

This is the opinion of Aasmarathya.

Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher Aasmarathya the scriptural text which speaks of Him who is measured by a span may refer to the Supreme Self or the Highest Lord.

Anusmriterbadarih I.2.30 (61)

For the sake of meditation or constant remembranceso says the sage Badari.

Anusmriteh: for the sake of meditation or constant remembrance; Baadarih: (so says) the sage Baadari.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

The sage Baadari is of opinion that this measure of a span is a mental device to facilitate meditation.

He says that the size of the thumb refers to a mental image and not to the actual size.

The Supreme Lord may be called `measured by a span' because He is remembered or meditated, by means of the mind, which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span. The size of the heart is that of a span. As Brahman is meditated as abiding in the lotus of the heart, the aspirant involuntarily associates him with the size of a span. This mental association or Anusmriti is the cause why Brahman is called Pradesamatra, the measure of a span.

Therefore Vaisvanara may well stand for Brahman.

Sampatteriti jaiministatha hi darsayati I.2.31 (62)

Because of imaginary identity the Supreme Lord may be called Pradesamatra (span long). So says Jaimini because so (the Sruti) declares.

Sampatteh: because of imaginary identity; Iti: thus, so; Jaimini: (says) Jaimini; Tatha: in this way; Hi: because; Darsayati: (the Sruti) declares.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

Jaimini says that the description refers to a state of realisation of form between the crown of the head and the chin in your body. The cosmic being is worshipped through the identification of different parts of His with the different parts of the worshipper's body from the top of head to the chin. The head of the meditator or worshipper is heaven, the eyes the sun and the moon, and so on. In this meditation the cosmic being is limited to the size of a span, the distance from the crown of the head to the chin. Hence Jaimini says that the Highest Lord in the passage under discussion is considered as of the size of a span.

The Sruti also declares The teacher said, pointing to his own head. `This is the Highest Vaisvanara' i.e. the head of the VaisvanaraVajasaneyi Brahmana.

Amananti chainamasmin I.2.32 (63)

Moreover they (the Jabalas) teach that this (Supreme Lord is to be meditated upon) in this (the space between the head and the chin).

Amananti: (they) speak, teach, recite, declare; Cha: moreover, also, and; Enam: this; Asmin: in this.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is concluded.

Moreover the Jabalas speak in their text of the Supreme Lord in the intermediate space between the top of the head and the chin.

Jabala Sruti also says so. It says that He is to be realised Avimukta (full liberation) between Varana (sin preventor) and Nasi (sin destroyer).

Jabala Upanishad says What is the place? The place where the eye-brows and the nose join. That is the joining place of the heavenly world represented by the upper part of the head and of the other i.e. the earthly world represented by the chin.

Sutras 27 to 32 declare that the reference to the Supreme Lord by the term Pradesamatra as extending from heaven to the earth or as measured by a span is quite appropriate.

By all this it is proved that Vaisvanara is the Supreme Lord.

See Jabala Upanishad-1.

Thus ends the Second Pada (Section 2) of the First Adhyaya (Chapter I) of the Brahma-Sutras of the Vedanta Philosophy.

Chapter I, Section 3

Introduction

In the last Section texts of doubtful import were interpreted to refer to Brahman. Some other expressions prescribed for divine contemplation in different Srutis, not already discussed in Section 2 are now taken up for discussion to prove that they all indicate the same Infinite Brahman.

In the First Section of the First Chapter the author (Sutrakara) took up the terms which referred to the manifested world such as Akasa (ether), Prana (energy), Jyoti (light) and showed that they really refer to Brahman. In the Second Section the author took up the terms which referred to the human body and showed that they refer to Brahman. The Section referred to the Saguna aspect of Brahman. The Third Section refers to the Nirguna aspect of Brahman. Here the subject of discussion is to Para Brahman or the Supreme Nirguna Brahman.

Synopsis

Some other passages prescribed for meditation in different Srutis, not already discussed in Section-2 are now taken up for discussion to prove that they all indicate the same Infinite, Satchidananda, all-pervading, eternal, Immortal Brahman.

Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth etc., are woven (Mun. Up. II-2-5) is Brahman.

Adhikarana II: (Sutras 8-9) shows that the Bhuma referred to in Chh. Up. VII-23 is Brahman.

Adhikarana III: (Sutras 10-12) teaches that the Akshara (the Imperishable one) of Bri. Up. III-8-8 in which the ether is woven is Brahman.

Adhikarana IV: (Sutra 13) decides that the Highest Person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable OM according to Prasna Up. V-5 is not the lower but the higher Brahman.

Adhikarana V: (Sutras 14-21) shows that the small ether (Daharakasa) within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Chh. Up. VIII-1 is Brahman.

Adhikarana VI: (Sutras 22-23) proves that he after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lightedKatha Up. II-2-15is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.

Adhikarana VII: (Sutras 24-25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Katha Up. II-1-12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

Adhikarana VIII: (Sutras 26-33) The next two Adhikaranas are of the nature of a digression. They raise a side issue and decide that deities are equally entitled to practise Brahma Vidya as prescribed in the Vedas. Sutras 29 and 30 establish the conclusion that the Vedas are eternal.

Adhikarana IX: (Sutras 34-38) explains that Sudras are altogether not entitled for Brahma Vidya.

Adhikarana X: (Sutra 39) proves that the Prana in which everything trembles according to Katha Up. II-3-2 is Brahman.

Adhikarana XI: (Sutra 40) proves that the `light' (Jyoti) mentioned in Chh. Up. VIII-12-3 is the Highest Brahman.

Adhikarana XII: (Sutra 41) decides that the ether which reveals names and forms (Chh. Up. VIII-14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman.

Adhikarana XIII: (Sutras 42-43) teaches that the Vijnanamayahe who consists of knowledge of Bri. Up. IV-3-7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

DYUBHVADYADHIKARANAM : TOPIC 1 (SUTRAS 1-7)

THE ABODE OF HEAVEN, EARTH ETC. IS BRAHMAN

Dyubhvadyayatanam svasabdat I.3.1 (64)

The abode of heaven, earth, etc., (is Brahman) on account of the term, `own' i.e., `Self'.

Dyu: heaven; Bhu: earth; Adi: and the rest; Ayatanam: abode; Sva: own; Sabdat: from the word (Sva sabdat: on account of the word `Self').

An expression from the Mundaka Upanishad is taken up for discussion.

Para Brahman is the basis or resting place of heaven, earth etc., as the term Atman indicative of Him is found in the passage. We read in Mundaka Upanishad II-2-5 He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven, as also the mind with all the senses, know Him alone as the Self, and leave off other talk! He is the bridge of immortality.

Here the doubt arises whether the abode is the Supreme Brahman or something else.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent holds that the abode is something else on account of the expression He is the bridge of immortality. He says: it is known from daily experience that a bridge takes one to some further bank. It is impossible to assume something beyond the Supreme Brahman, because the Srutis declare, Brahman is endless without a shore Bri. Up. II-4-12. As the Pradhana is the general cause, it may be called the general abode. Or the Sutratman may be the abode. The Srutis say Air is that thread, O Gautama! By air as by a thread O Gautama! this world and the other world and all beings are strung together Bri. Up. III-7-2. So the air supports all things. Or else the Jiva may be the abode with reference to the objects of enjoyment as he is the enjoyer.

He who is spoken of as the abode, in whom the earth, heaven etc., are woven is Brahman only, on account of the term `Own' or `Self' which is appropriate only if Brahman is referred to in the text and not Pradhana or Sutratman. (We meet with the word `Self' in the passageKnow him alone as the Self).

Brahman is spoken of in the Sruti as the general abode by its own terms i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman as, for instance, All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the being (Chh. Up. VI-8-4).

In the texts preceding and following this one, i.e. in Mun. Up. II-1-10 and II-2-11 Brahman is spoken of. Therefore it is only proper to infer that Brahman only is referred to in the intervening texts which is under discussion. In the texts cited above mention is made of an abode and that which abides. In Mundaka Upanishad II-2-11 we read: Brahman indeed is all this. From this a doubt may arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of leaves, branches, stem, root etc. ln order to remove this doubt the text declares in the passage under discussion Know Him alone as the Self i.e. know the Self alone and not that which is merely a product of Avidya (ignorance) and is false or illusory. Another scriptural text reproves the man who thinks that this world is real. From death to death goes he who beholds any difference here (Katha Up. II-4-11).

The statement All is Brahman aims at dissolving the wrong conception of the reality of the world. It does not intimate that Brahman is of manifold, variegated nature. The homogeneous nature of Brahman is clearly stated in the Srutis. As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self (Brahman) neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge (Bri. Up. IV-5-13). For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth etc., is the Supreme Brahman.

The word Setu (bridge) in the words `Amritasyaisa Setuh' (He is the bridge of immortality) merely refers to His being the basis of every created object and the means of immortality. The word `bridge' is meant to intimate only that which is called a bridge that supports, not that it has a further bank. You should not think that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of wood or stone. Because the word `Setu' is derived from the root `Si' which means to bind. The word conveys the idea of holding together or supporting.

Muktopasripyavyapadesat I.3.2 (65)

Because of the declaration (in the scriptures) that that is to be attained by the liberated.

Mukta upasripya: to be attained by the liberated; Vyapadesat: because of declaration.

An argument in support of Sutra I is given.

The above word Dyubhvadyayatanam refers to Para Brahman, also because He is described as attained by the emancipated soul.

A further reason is given to intimate that Brahman is meant in the passage under discussion. Brahman is the goal of the emancipated. That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the liberated is known from other scriptural passages such as The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He who is the higher and the lower has been beheld Mun. Up. II-2-8. The wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great (Mun. Up. III.2-8). When all desires which once entered his heart are destroyed then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman (Bri. Up. IV-4-7).

Nowhere you will find that the Pradhana and similar entities are to be resorted to by the emancipated.

We read in the Bri. Up. IV-4-21, Let a wise Brahmana after he has discovered Him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many words, because that is mere weariness of the tongue. For this reason also the abode of heaven, earth, etc., is the Supreme Brahman.

Nanumanamatacchabdat I.3.3 (66)

(The abode of heaven etc.) is not that which is inferred i.e. Pradhana because there is no term indicating it.

Na: not; Anumanam: that which is inferred i.e. Pradhana; Atad sabdat: because there is no word denoting it.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

The abode referred to in Sutra 1 does not indicate Pradhana because there is no such expression in the said Mundaka Upanishad as can be construed to indicate Pradhana or matter. On the contrary such terms as He who knows all (Sarvajna) understands all (Sarvavit) (Mun. Up. I-1-9) intimate an intelligent being opposed to Pradhana in nature. For the same reason the air (Sutratman) cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth etc.

Pranabhriccha I.3.4 (67)

(Nor) also the individual soul.

Pranabhrit: the living or individual soul, supporter of Prana, i.e., Jiva; Cha: also; (Na: not).

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

The word `not' is understood here from the preceding Sutra.

Although the individual soul is an intelligent being and can therefore be denoted by the word `Self' yet omniscience and similar qualities do not belong to him, as his knowledge is limited by the adjuncts. He cannot become the resting place or abode of the entire world as he is limited and therefore not omnipresent.

The individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth etc., for the following reason also.

Bhedavyapadesat I .3.5 (68)

(Also) on account of the declaration of difference (between) individual soul and the abode of heaven etc.

Bhedavyapadesat: on account of difference being mentioned.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

In the text under discussion viz., Know him alone as the Self (Atman) (Mun. Up. II-2-5), there is a declaration of difference. The individual soul who is desirous of emancipation is the Knower and abode of heaven is the thing to be known. Brahman which is denoted by the word `Self' and represented as the object of knowledge is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth and so on.

For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth etc.

Prakaranat I .3.6 (69)

On account of the subject matter.

Prakaranat: On account of the subject matter, from the context.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

The Supreme Brahman is the subject matter of the entire chapter. You can understand this from the passage Sir, what is that through which when it is known, everything else becomes known? Mun. Up. I-1-3. Here the knowledge of everything is said to be dependent on the knowledge of one thing. Because all this i.e. the whole universe becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, but not if only the individual soul is known.

The Mundaka Upanishad begins with `what is that through which' and concludes by saying The knower of the Brahman becomes Brahman III-2-9. This clearly intimates that the subject matter of the whole Upanishad from the beginning to the end is Brahman only. Hence it is the same Brahman which is spoken of as the resting place of heaven, earth and so on.

Another reason against the individual soul is given in the following Sutra.

Sthityadanabhyam cha I. 3.7 (70)

And on account of the two conditions of remaining unattached and eating (of which the former is characteristic of the Supreme Self, the latter of the individual soul).

Sthiti: abiding, existence; Adanabhyam: eating; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is concluded.

We read in Mundakopanisad III-1-1. Two birds, inseparable friends cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on (remains as a witness). The passage refers to Brahman as Self-poised bliss and to the individual soul as eating the sweet and bitter fruits of actions. Here Brahman is described as the silent witness. The passage describes the condition of mere inactive presence of Brahman. The individual soul eats the fruits of his works viz. pleasure and pain and therefore he is different from Brahman. The two states viz. mere presence and the enjoyment indicate that Brahman and the individual soul are referred to. This description which distinguishes the two can be apt only if the abode of heaven etc. is Brahman. Otherwise there will be no continuity of topic.

It cannot be said that the passage merely describes the nature of the individual soul, because it is nowhere the purpose of the scripture to describe the individual soul. The individual soul is known to everyone as agent and enjoyer. Ordinary experience tells us nothing of Brahman. Brahman is the special topic of all scriptural texts. The purpose of the scriptures is always to describe and establish Brahman which is not well known.

BHUMADHIKARANAM: TOPIC (SUTRAS 8-9)

BHUMA IS BRAHMAN

Bhuma samprasadadadhyupadesat I.3.8 (71)

Bhuma (is Brahman) because it is taught after the state of deep sleep (i.e. after Prana or the vital air which remains awake even in that state).

Bhuma: the vast, the Infinite, the full; Samprasadat adhi: beyond the state of deep sleep (here the vital principle or Prana); Upadesat: because of the teaching.

The term `Bhuma' does not denote numerical largeness but pervasion in the shape of fulness. Samprasada means the undisturbed place or bliss hence the state of deep sleep, when that bliss is enjoyed. `Adhi' means above, beyond.

Bhuma denotes Brahman, because it is described in Sruti to be above Prana, which is here represented by the bliss enjoyed during deep sleep. Bhuma refers to Brahman as the passage teaches an entity higher than Samprasada i.e. Prana or vital air which is awake and active even in deep sleep.

An expression from the Chhandogya Upanishad is now taken up for discussion. In the seventh chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad Sanatkumara gives instructions to Narada. He begins with `name' and takes the student step by step. He goes higher and higher and ultimately teaches the highest truth which is Bhuma or the Infinite. Sanatkumara says to Narada Bhuma is Bliss. You should desire to understand where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is Bhuma. VIII-22-24.

Here the doubt arises whether Bhuma is the vital air or Brahman (the Supreme Self).

The Purvapakshin or the opponent maintains that the vital air is Bhuma. He says: Narada approaches Sanatkumara for initiation into the mysteries of Atman. We meet with a series of questions and answers such as Is there anything greater than a name? Speech is greater than name. Is there anything greater than speech? Mind is greater than speech which extends from name up to vital air. Then Narada does not ask whether there is any higher truth. But still Sanatkumara gives an exposition on Bhuma. This intimates that Bhuma is not different from the vital air taught already.

Further he calls the knower of the vital air an Ativadin i.e., one who makes a statement surpassing preceding statements. This clearly shows that the vital air is the highest Truth.

This Sutra refutes the argument and says that Bhuma is Brahman. Sanatkumara distinctly says to NaradaBut verily he is an Ativadin who declares the highest Being to be the True (Satya) Chh. Up. VII-16-1. This clearly indicates that it refers to something higher than Prana or the vital air. One can become truly an Ativadin by knowing this Supreme Truth only.

Though Narada does not ask Sanatkumara Is there anything greater than the vital air?, a new topic about Brahman (Bhuma) which is the Supreme Truth is begun. Narada said to Sanatkumara Sir, may I become an Ativadin through the Truth. Sanatkumara leads Narada step by step, stage by stage to the knowledge of Brahman or Bhuma and instructs him that this Bhuma is Brahman.

Narada at first listens to the instruction given by Sanatkumara on various matters, the last of which is Prana and then becomes silent. Thereupon the wise Sanatkumara explains to him spontaneously without being asked that he only is an Ativadin who has knowledge of the Highest Truth, and that the knowledge of vital air which is an unreal product is destitute of substance. By the term The True is meant the Supreme Brahman, because Brahman is the only Reality. Sanatkumara thereupon leads Narada by a series of steps beginning with understanding up to the knowledge of Bhuma. We, therefore, conclude that the Bhuma is the Supreme Brahman, and that it is different from Prana or the vital air.

If Prana or the vital air were the Bhuma then Sanatkumara would not have continued his instructions. He would have stopped his instructions after saying Prana is greater than hope (VII-15-1). But he gives a clear description of the nature of Bhuma in Sections 23, 24, 25 of the same chapter. Therefore Bhuma alone is Brahman or the Highest Truth.

Selfhood does not belong to Prana. Moreover one can free himself from grief only by knowledge of the Supreme Brahman. Brahman only is All Full. Bhuma means also fulness. The quality of the Bhuma agrees best with the Supreme Brahman which is the cause, source, support and substratum for everything. Bhuma is taught as the last of the series. It is Infinite Bliss. Therefore it is the highest of all.

The meditation on Prana is higher than meditation on Name up to hope. Therefore he who thus meditates on Prana is called an Ativadin. He is an Ativadin compared with those below him. But the meditation on the Supreme Brahman is superior even to that on Prana. Hence he who meditates on Brahman or the Bhuma is the real Ativadin.

Narada thought that the instruction about the Atman is now completed. Therefore he did not ask any further question. Sanatkumara knew that the knowledge of Prana is not the highest knowledge. Therefore he spontaneously continues his teaching to Narada and tells him that the knowledge of Brahman or the Bhuma is the highest knowledge. The Srutis say that Prana springs from Brahman. Therefore Prana is inferior to Brahman. Brahman alone is the Bhuma of the passage of the Chhandogya Upanishad under discussion.

Dharmopapattescha I.3.9 (72)

And because the attributes (declared in the scriptural passage to Bhuma) apply appropriately only to Para Brahman.

Dharma: qualities, attributes; Upapatteh: because of the suitability; Cha: and.

An argument in support of Sutra 8 is given.

The attributes which the scripture attributes to the Bhuma agree well with Brahman. In the Bhuman the ordinary activities of seeing etc. are absent. The Sruti declares where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Bhuma. We know from another text that this is the characteristic of the Supreme Self. But when the Atman only is all this, how could he see another? Bri. Up. IV-5-15.

The qualities of being the True, resting on its own greatness, non-duality, bliss, Infiniteness, the self of everything, Omnipresence, Immortality etc., mentioned in the text under discussion can belong to the Supreme only, not to Prana which is an effect and as such cannot possess any of these attributes.

By all this it is proved that the Bhuma is the Supreme Self or Brahman.

AKSHARADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 3 (SUTRAS 10-12)

AKSHARA IS BRAHMAN

Aksharamambarantadhriteh I.3.10 (73)

The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting everything up to Akasa (ether).

Aksharam: the Imperishable; Ambaranta dhriteh: because it supports all up to Akasa.

An expression from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is now taken up for discussion. We read in Bri. Up. III-8-7, In what then is the ether woven like warp and woof? Gargi put this question to sage Yajnavalkya. He replied: O Gargi, the Brahmanas call this Akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long etc. Bri. Up. III-8-8. Here the doubt arises whether the word `Akshara' means syllable `OM' or Brahman. The Purvapakshin or the opponent maintains that `Akshara' etymologically means a syllable and therefore generally represents the syllable OM, which is also an object of meditation. We have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word.

This Sutra refutes the above view and says that `Akshara here stands for Brahman only'. Why? Because the Akshara is said to support everything from earth up to ether. The text says In that Akshara, Gargi! is the ether woven like warp and woof Bri. UP. III-8-11. Now the attribute of supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but Brahman.

Moreover It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long etc., indicates that relative qualities are absent in it. Therefore the `Akshara' is Brahman. The objector says: But even Pradhana supports everything up to ether, because it is the cause of all the modified objects in the universe and so the Akshara or the Imperishable may be Pradhana. To this doubt the following Sutra gives an answer.

Sa cha prasasanat I.3.11 (74)

This (supporting) on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, can be the work of the Supreme Self only and not of the Pradhana).

Sa: this (the quality of supporting everything up to ether); Cha: and, also; Prasasanat: because of the command.

An argument in support of Sutra 10 is given.

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the Highest Self only. Why? On account of the command. The text speaks of a command By the command of that Akshara O Gargi! the sun and the moon stand apart Bri. Up. III-8-9.

This command or rulership can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent Pradhana. Because non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like cannot command their effects such as jars and the like. Therefore the Pradhana cannot be the `Akshara' which supports everything up to Akasa or ether.

Anyabhavavyavrittescha I.3.12 (75)

And on account of (the Sruti) separating (the Akshara) from that nature is different (from Brahman).

Anya: another; Bhava: nature; Vyavritteh: on account of the exclusion.

The argument in support of Sutra 10 is concluded.

The Imperishable (Akshara) is not Pradhana or Jiva, because in the same text we find description of attributes which would exclude another nature than Brahman. In a supplementary passage in the same Upanishad we find description of this Akshara which excludes Pradhana and Jiva, because they do not possess that nature.

The qualities referred to in the text namely, seeing, hearing, thinking, knowing etc., That Akshara, O Gargi! is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing. There is no other seer but He, no other hearer but He, no other thinker but He, no other knower but He. In that Imperishable O Gargi! the ether is woven warp and woof (Bri. Up. III-8-11), point to an intelligent being and therefore negate the Pradhana which is non-intelligent.

The word `Akshara' cannot denote the individual soul as he is not free from limiting adjuncts, from which Akshara is free. The Srutis say Akshara is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind etc. (Bri. Up. III-8-8).

Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the Akshara or the imperishable is the Supreme Brahman only.

IKSHATIKARMAVYAPADESADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 4

THE HIGHEST PERSON TO BE MEDITATED UPON IS THE HIGHEST BRAHMAN

Ikshatikarmavyapadesat sah I.3.13 (76)

Because of His being mentioned as the object of sight, He (who is to be meditated upon is Brahman).

Ikshati: seeing, realising; Karma: object; Vyapadesat: because of his being mentioned; Sah: he.

An expression from the Prasnopanishad is taken up now for discussion.

The Highest Brahman is described as He is stated to be the object of Ikshana (realisation by vision). The reference is clearly to the Supreme Self as the object of Ikshana.

We read in Prasna Upanishad V-2 O Satyakama, the syllable OM is the highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two. The text then goes on Again he who meditates with the syllable Om of three Matras (A-U-M) on the Highest Person Prasna Up. V-5. A doubt arises whether the object of meditation is the Highest Brahman or the lower Brahman, because in V-2 both are mentioned, and also because Brahmaloka is described as the fruit by the worship of this Highest Person.

The Sutra says: What is here taught as the object of meditation is the Highest Brahman and not Hiranyagarbha (the lower Brahman). Why? On account of its being spoken of as the object of sightHe sees the Highest Person. This intimates that he actually realises or gets himself identified with the Highest Person. Hiranyagarbha also is unreal from the highest or transcendental view point. He is within the realm of Maya. He is associated with Maya. Therefore the Highest Person means the Highest Brahman only which is the only Reality. This very Brahman is taught at the beginning of the passage as the object of meditation.

The Sruti declares that the release from evil is the fruit of meditation As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil. This clearly indicates that the Supreme constitutes the object of meditation.

The attainment of Brahmaloka by the worshipper should not be considered as an inappropriate or insignificant fruit of the worship of the Highest Person, because it is a step in gradual liberation or emancipation by degrees (Krama Mukti). He who meditates on the Supreme Self by means of the syllable OM as consisting of the Matras, obtains for his first reward Brahmaloka and after that Kaivalya Moksha or oneness with Supreme Brahman.

In Prasna Upanishad we read He arrives at this by means of the Omkara; the wise arrives at that which is at rest, free from decay, from death, from fear, the Highest. Free from decay, free from death, free from fear, the Highest can apply only to the Supreme Brahman and not to the lower Brahman.

The word Brahmaloka does not mean the Loka of Brahman but the Loka or condition which is Brahman Himself, just as we explain the compound word Nishadasthapati, not as the head-man of the Nishadas but a headman who at the same time is a Nishada. It is a Karmadharaya compound which does not mean the world of Brahman, but that world which is Brahman.

DAHARADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 5 (SUTRAS 14-21)

THE DAHARA OR THE `SMALL AKASA' IS BRAHMAN

Dahara uttarebhyah I.3.14 (77)

The small (ether, Akasa, is Brahman) on account of the subsequent arguments or expression).

Daharah: the small; Uttarebhyah: from subsequent texts or expressions or arguments.

Another expression from the Chhandogya Upanishad is taken up for discussion.

`Dahara' refers to Brahman, because the reason stated in the later portions of the passage show this clearly.

We read in Chhandogya Upanishad VIII-1-1 Now there is this city of Brahman (the body), and in it the place, the small lotus (the heart) and in it that small ether (Akasa). Now what exists within that small ether is to be sought, that is to be understood.

Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart, which the Sruti speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: By the small ether we have to understand the elemental ether which is the ordinary meaning of the word. It is here called small with reference to its small abode, the heart. Or else the `small one' may be taken to mean the individual soul on account of the term the city of Brahman (Brahmapuri). The body is here called the city of Brahman because the individual soul has his abode in the body, and has acquired this by his deeds. The individual soul is here called Brahman in a metaphorical sense. The Supreme Brahman cannot be meant, because He is not linked with the body as its Lord. The Lord of the city i.e., the individual soul resides in one spot of the city viz., the heart, just as a King dwells in one spot of his Kingdom. Further the mind, the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, abides in the heart. Only the individual soul is compared in the Sruti in size to the point of a goad.

Here the `small Akasa' is Brahman and does not mean elemental ether, although there is the qualification `small' which may indicate that he is a limited something. Why? Because the nature of Brahman is described later on in the text As large as this (external) ether is, so large is that Akasa within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it. Chh. Up. VIII 1-3. This clearly intimates that it is not actually small.

Akasa cannot be compared with itself. The finite individual soul also with its limiting adjuncts cannot be compared with the all-pervading Akasa or ether. The Sruti declares Both the earth and heaven are contained in it. This indicates that this Akasa is the support of the whole world. From this it is manifest that the ether is the Supreme Self.

We read in the Chhandogya Upanishad VIII-1-5 The Self or Atman is sinless, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from old age, hunger, thirst, with true desire (Satkama), true thought (Satsankalpa) that ever comes true. This cannot apply to mere physical ether. These are all distinct qualities of the Supreme Brahman. The description cannot refer to the individual soul, because the comparison to the infinite ether and the statement that heaven and earth are contained in it cannot apply to the finite individual soul.

The word `Brahma' in Brahmapuri shows the reference to Brahman only. Even if you take the word as referring to Jiva the teaching relates to Brahman who is realised in the heart which is the Brahmapuri (the city of soul or Brahman). Moreover the promise of Infinite Bliss to the knower of Dahara Akasa intimates that the reference is only to the Supreme Brahman.

For all the reasons explained, that ether is the Highest Self or Supreme Brahman.

Gatisabdabhyam tatha hi drishtam lingam cha I.3.15 (78)

The small Akasa (ether) is Brahman on account of the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word (Brahmaloka); because thus it is seen (i.e. the individual souls go into Brahman) is seen elsewhere in other Sruti texts; and this daily going of the souls into Brahman (during deep sleep) is an inferential sign by means of which we may properly interpret the word `Brahmaloka').

Gatisabdabhyam: on account of the going and of the word; Tatha hi: thus, like; Drishtam: it is seen; Lingam: mark, sign from which something may be inferred; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is given.

It has been said in the preceding Sutra that the small ether is Brahman on account of the reasons given in the subsequent passages. These subsequent passages are now described.

The mention of `going' and a `word' refers to Brahman. We read in Chhandogya Upanishad VIII-3-2. All these creatures day after day go into this Brahmaloka (i.e. they are merged in Brahman during deep sleep) and yet do not discover it etc. This passage shows that all Jivas or individual souls go daily into the `small Akasa' called here Brahmaloka. This intimates that the `small Akasa' is Brahman.

This going of the individual souls into Brahman which occurs daily in the deep sleep is mentioned in the other Sruti text: He becomes united with the true (Sat), he is merged in his own Self Chh. Up. VI-8-1.

In common parlance or ordinary life also we say of a man who is in deep sleep He has become Brahman. He is gone into the state of Brahman.

The word `Brahmaloka' is to be interpreted as Brahman Himself, and not as the world of Brahman (Satya Loka) because there is the indicatory sign in the passage. What is that indicatory sign or Lingam? It is said in the text that the soul goes to this world daily. It is certainly impossible for the Jiva to go to the world of Brahman daily. Hence the term `Brahmaloka' means here Brahman Himself.

Dhritescha mahimno'syasminnupalabdheh I.3.16 (79)

Moreover on account of the supporting also (attributed to it) the small ether must be Brahman, because this greatness is observed in this (Brahman only according to other scriptural passages).

Dhriteh: on account of supporting (of the world by the Akasa or ether); Cha: and, moreover, also; Asya mahimnah: this greatness; Asmin: in Brahman; Upalabdheh: on account of being observed or found.

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is continued.

Daharakasa or the small ether referred to in Sutra 14 indicates Brahman, as the glory of supporting all the worlds can be reasonably true only in respect of Brahman. And also on account of the `supporting' the small ether can be the Supreme Brahman only. How? To begin with the text introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage In it is that small ether. Then the small ether is to be compared with the universal ether. Everything is contained in it. Then the term Self is applied to it. Then it is stated that it is free from sin etc. Finally it is said That Self is a bank, a limiting support (Vidhriti) so that these worlds may not be confounded (Chh. Up. VIII-4-1). In this passage the glory of small ether by way of supporting the worlds is seen. Just as a dam stores the water so that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so also that Self serves like a dam in order that the world and all the different castes and Asramas may not be confounded.

Other texts declare that this greatness of supporting belongs to Brahman alone By the command of that Imperishable (Akshara) O Gargi, the sun and moon are held in their positions Bri. Up. III-8-9. He is the lord of all, the king of all kings, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a limiting support, so that these worlds may not be confounded Bri. Up. IV-4-22. This also shows that to be a boundary and support of the worlds is the distinctive attribute of Brahman only. Therefore, on account of the `supporting' also, the small (ether) is nothing else but Brahman.

Prasiddhescha I.3.17 (80)

Also because of the well-known meaning (of Akasa as Brahman the small Akasa is Brahman).

Prasiddheh: of the well-known (meaning); Cha: also

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is continued.

Akasa has the settled meaning of Brahman. It is a well-known fact in Sruti that Brahman is indicated by the term Akasa. Therefore `Daharakasa' also stands for Brahman.

We read in Chh. Up. VIII-14-1 Akasa is the revealer of all names and forms. All these beings take their origin from Akasa alone Chh. Up. I-9-1. For who could breathe if that Akasa (ether) were not bliss Tait. Up. II-7. In all these texts `Akasa' stands for Brahman.

Itaraparamarsat sa iti chen nasambhavat I.3.18 (81)

If it is said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) is meant on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary passage) (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

Itara: the other one, that is the Jiva; Paramarsat: on account of reference; Sa: he (the individual soul); Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Asambhavat: on account of impossibility.

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is continued. We read in the Chhandogya UpanishadNow that serene being, the individual soul (Jiva) indeed which having risen above this earthly body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is the Self: thus he spoke.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: As in the complementary passage the individual soul is referred to, the small Akasa of Chh. Up. VIII-1-1 is also the individual soul. The word `serenity' (Samprasada) which denotes the state of deep sleep conveys the idea of the individual soul only. The `rising from the body' also can be spoken of the individual soul only whose abode is therefore `the small Akasa'; this denotes in the passage under discussion only the individual soul, on account of reference to the ether.

This cannot be. In the first place the individual soul which is limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the all-pervading ether.

In the second place, the attributes like `freedom from evil' and the likes of this Akasa, referred to in the passage under discussion, cannot be true of the individual soul. Hence Brahman is meant in that passage.

Uttaracchedavirbhutasvarupastu I.3.19 (82)

If it be said that for subsequent texts (it appears that the individual soul is meant, we say that what is there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its real nature has become manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

Uttarat: from the subsequent texts of the Sruti; Chet: if; Avirbhuta-svarupat: with its true nature made manifest; Tu: but.

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is continued.

An objection is again raised by the Purvapakshin to justify that the `small Akasa' (Dahara) refers to the individual soul. Prajapati at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like is that which we must try to understand Chh. Up. VIII-7-1. After that he points out that the seer within the eye i.e. `the individual soul is the Self', Chh. Up. VIII-7-3. He again explains the nature of the same individual soul in its different states. He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self Chh. Up. VIII-10-1. When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is the Self Chh. Up. VIII-1l-1. The qualifying terms `Immortal, fearless' used in each of these descriptions of the self show that the individual soul is free from sin or evil and the like. Obviously the individual soul is meant here because Brahman is free from the three states viz. waking, dream and deep sleep. It is also said to be free from evil. Therefore `small Akasa' refers to the individual soul or Jiva and not to Brahman.

The Sutra refutes this. The Sutra uses the expression He whose nature has become manifest. Prajapati finally explains the individual soul in its true nature as identical with Brahman. The reference is to the individual soul in its true nature as identical with Brahman or, in other words, who has realised his oneness with Brahman and not to the individual soul as such. As soon as it has approached the highest light it appears in its own form. Then It is the Highest Purusha Chh. Up. VIII-12-3. The individual soul is free from evil etc., when it becomes identical with Brahman and not when it is enveloped by limiting adjuncts and remains as the finite Jiva or embodied soul. Agency (Kartritva), enjoying (Bhoktritva), like and dislike (Raga-dvesha) indicate Jivahood. If these are removed the individual soul shines as Brahman.

As long as the individual soul does not free itself from Avidya (ignorance) in the form of duality and does not rise to the knowledge of the Self or Brahman, whose nature is unchangeable and Satchidananda which expresses itself in the form `I am Brahman', so long it remains as an individual soul. The ignorance of the Jiva may be compared to the mistake of a man who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man, a rope for a serpent.

When it gives up the identification with the body, sense organs and mind, when it realises its identity with the Supreme Brahman it becomes Brahman itself whose nature is unchangeable and Satchidananda, as is declared in Mun. Up. III-2-9. He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman. This is the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in its own real form.

Why a reference has at all been made to Jiva in this Section treating of Dahara, you will find an answer in the following Sutra.

Anyarthascha paramarsah I.3.20 (83)

And the reference (to the individual soul) is for a different purpose.

Anyarthah: for a different purpose; Cha: and; Paramarsah: reference.

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is continued.

The reference to the individual soul has a different meaning. The reference to the individual soul is not meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the Supreme Brahman. The reference to the three states of the individual soul is meant not to establish the nature of Jiva as such, but to show finally its real nature (Svarupa) which is not different from Brahman.

Another objection is raised. The text describes this `Dahara' as occupying a very small space in the heart, and because `Dahara' is so small and Jiva is also small, therefore, `Dahara' must be Jiva mentioned subsequently. The following Sutra gives a suitable answer.

Alpasruteriti chet taduktam I.3.21 (84)

If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Brahman cannot be meant) (we say that) that has already been explained.

Alpasruteh: because of the Sruti declaring its smallness; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Tat: that; Uktam: has already been explained.

The argument in support of Sutra 14 is concluded.

The Purvapakshin or the objector has stated that the smallness of the ether stated by the Sruti In it is that small ether does not agree with Brahman, that it may however refer to the Jiva or the individual soul which is compared to the point of a goad. This has already been refuted. It has already been shown under I.2.7 that smallness may be attributed to Brahman for the purpose of meditation (Upasana). The same refutation is to be applied here also. That smallness is contradicted by that Sruti text which compares the ether within the heart with the universal ether As large as is this ether so large is the ether within the heart.

ANUKRITYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 6 (SUTRAS 22-23)

EVERYTHING SHINES AFTER BRAHMAN

Anukritestasya cha I.3.22 (85)

On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after) (that after which sun, moon, etc. are said to shine is the Supreme Self) and (because by the light) of Him (everything else is lighted).

Anukriteh: because of the acting after, from imitation, from the following; Tasya: its; Cha: and.

A passage from the Mundaka Upanishad is taken now for discussion.

We read in Mundaka Upanishad II-2-10 and Kathopanisad II-ii-15 The Sun does not shine there nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less the fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him all this is lighted.

Now a doubt arises whether he after whom when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is lighted is some effulgent substance, or the Supreme Self.

The `shining after' mentioned in the text After him when he shines everything shines is possible only if the Supreme Self or Brahman is understood. Another Sruti declares of that Supreme Self, His form is light, his thoughts are true Chh. Up. III-14-2. Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time Bri. Up. IV-4-16.

The clause On account of the acting after points to the `shining after' mentioned in the text under discussion.

That the light of the Sun etc., should shine by some other material light is not known. It is absurd to say that one light is lighted by another. We do not know of any physical light, except the sun, that can light Brahman.

The manifestation of this whole universe has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman, just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colours. Brahman is self-luminous. It remains in Its own glory. It illumines the sun, the moon, the stars, the lightning, the fire, the senses, the mind and the intellect and all objects. It does not need any other light to illumine it. Sruti texts like Brahman is the light of lights (Jyotisham Jyotih) clearly intimate that Brahman is Self-effulgent. It is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon etc., with reference to Brahman, because whatever is seen is seen by the light of Brahman only. As Brahman is Self-effulgent, it is not seen by means of any other light.

Brahman manifests everything else but is not manifested by anything else. We read in Bri. Up. By the Self alone as his light man sits IV-3-6. The word `Sarvam' denotes that the entire world of names and forms is dependent on the glory of Brahman. The word `anu' intimates that the reference is to Brahman because it is from Him that all effulgence is derived.

Api cha smaryate I.3.23 (86)

Moreover the Smriti also speaks of him i.e. Brahman to be the universal light.

Api cha: moreover, also; Smaryate: the Smriti states.

An argument insupport of Sutra 22 is given.

The Smriti or Gita also says so. In Gita, Chapter XV-6 we read Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that, having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat. And The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine XV-12.

PRAMITADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 7 (SUTRAS 24-25)

THE PERSON OF THE SIZE OF A THUMB IS BRAHMAN

Sabdedeva pramitah I.3.24 (87)

From the very word (viz., the term Lord applied to it) the (person) measured (by the size of the thumb) (is Brahman).

Sabdat: from the very word; Eva: even, only, itself; Pramitah: measured, i.e., described as having the size of the thumb.

An expression from the Kathopanishad is taken up for discussion.

We read in Kathopanishad II-4-12, The person of the size of a thumb resides in the middle or centre of the body etc. and in II-4-13 That person, of the size of a thumb is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same today and tomorrow. Knowing Him one does not seek to hide oneself any more. This is That.

A doubt arises now whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the individual soul or the Supreme Self (Brahman).

The Purvapakshin or the opponent holds that on account of the statement of the person's size of thumb the individual soul is meant, because to the Supreme Self which is Infinite the Sruti text would not ascribe the measure of a thumb.

To this we reply that the person of the size of a thumb can only be Brahman. Why? On account of the term `Isana', `Lord of the past and of the future.' The highest Lord only is the absolute ruler of the past and the future. Further the clause This is that connects the passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. What had been enquired about by Nachiketas is Brahman. Nachiketas asks Lord Yama, That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that (Katha Up. I-2-14). Yama refers to this person of the size of a thumb thus That which you wanted to know is this.

Brahman is said to be of the size of a thumb, though He is all-pervading, because He is realisable in the limited chamber of the heart of a man.

The epithet `The Lord of the past and the future', cannot be applied to Jiva at all, whose past and the future is bound by his Karmas and who is not free to possess so much glory.

But how the all-pervading Lord can be said to be limited by the measure of a thumb? The following Sutra gives a suitable answer.

Hridyapekshaya tu manushyadhikaratvat I. 3 25 (88)

But with reference to the heart (the highest Brahman is said to be of the size of a thumb) as man alone is entitled (to the study of the Vedas, to practise meditation and attain Self-realisation).

Hridi: in the heart, with reference to the heart; Apekshaya: by reference to, in consideration of; Tu: but; Manushyadhikaratvat: because of the privilege of men.

A qualifying explanation of Sutra 24 is given, and the privilege for Upasana or meditation is discussed.

The measure of a thumb is ascribed to Brahman, although all-pervading, which with reference to his residing within the heart which is generally as big as the thumb. Brahman dwells within the heart of all living beings. The hearts differ according to the animals, some have larger hearts, some have smaller, some are more than a thumb, some are less than a thumb. Why is the `thumb' used as a standard? Why a man's heart only and not that of any other animal, also? The second half of the Sutra gives an answer`on account of man only being entitled'. Man only is entitled to the study of the Vedas and practice of meditation and different Upasanas of Brahman prescribed in them. Therefore the thumb is used as the standard of measurement with reference to him alone.

The aim here is to show the identity of individual soul with Brahman which is inside the body and is of the size of a thumb. The Vedanta passages have twofold purport. Some of them aim in giving a description of the nature of Brahman, some in teaching the unity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul or Brahman, not the size of anything. This point is rendered quite clear further on in the Upanishad. The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, always abides in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as `Bright as the Immortal'. Katha Up. II-6-17.

DEVATADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 8 (SUTRAS 26-33)

THE DEVAS ALSO ARE ENTITLED TO THE STUDY OF VEDAS

and to meditate on Brahman

Taduparyapi Baadarayanah sambhavat I.3.26 (89)

Also (beings) above them (viz., men) (are entitled for the study and practice of the Vedas) on account of the possibility (of it) according to Badarayana.

Tad upari: above them i.e. higher than men namely Devas; Api: also, even; Baadarayanah: the sage Baadarayana is of opinion; Sambhavat: because (it is) possible.

The description of the privilege of study of Vedas and meditation is continued.

There is a digression from the main topic in this Section in Sutras 26 to 38. The Purvapakshin or the opponent holds that such meditation is not possible in the case of the Devas, because they are not endowed with the sense organs. Hence they have got no capability to meditate. The Devas like Indra and the rest are mere thought forms created by the chanting of Mantras. They have no desire for the possession of Vairagya (dispassion), Viveka (discrimination) etc. To this the author gives a reply in this Sutra. A doubt may arise from the previous Sutra that as it is stated that men alone have the privilege to the study of the Vedas, the gods are thereby debarred. This Sutra removes this doubt.

The teacher Baadarayana thinks that the Sutra entitles gods also who are above men for the study of Vedas, practice of meditation and attainment of knowledge of Brahman. How? Because it is possible for them also as they too are corporeal beings. The Upanishads, the Mantra portion of the Vedas, the Itihasas and the Puranas all unanimously describe that the Devas have bodies. They may have the desire of final release caused by the reflection that all effects, objects and power are non-permanent. They may have the desire to possess the fourfold qualification which is necessary for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. The gods undergo discipleship in order to attain knowledge. We read in Chh. Up. VIII-7-11 Indra lived as a disciple with Prajapati for one hundred and one years; Bhrigu Varuni went to his father Varuna, saying, sir, teach me Brahman Tait. Up. III-1. The god Varuna possessed the knowledge of Brahman which he teaches to his son Bhrigu.

The gods also possess all the requisites for practising meditation. Therefore they are also entitled for the study of the Vedas and attaining Self-realisation. Even without Upanayana and study the Veda is manifest of itself to the gods.

The passage about that which is of the size of a thumb is equally valid when the right of the gods is accepted. In their case the Sruti describing the Lord of the size of a thumb refers to the size of their thumbs.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says if we admit that Devas have bodies, then there would arise difficulties with regard to sacrifices, because it is not possible for one finite corporeal being like Indra to be simultaneously present at many places of sacrifices, when he is invoked simultaneously by all his worshippers. Therefore sacrifices will become useless. To this objection the author gives a suitable reply in the following Sutra.

Virodhah karmaniti chet, na,

anekapratipatterdarsanat I.3.27 (90)

If it be said that (the corporeality of the gods involves) a contradiction to sacrifices; (we say) no, because we find (in the scriptures) the assumption (by the gods) of many (forms at one and the same time).

Virodhah: contradiction; Karmani: In the sacrifices; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Aneka: many (bodies); Pratipatteh: because of the assumption; Darsanat: because it is found (in the scriptures).

An objection against Sutra 26 is raised and refuted.

It is possible for a Devata to assume several forms at the same time. He can appear in sacrifices performed simultaneously at different places. Smriti also states A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may by his power multiply his self in many thousand forms and in them walk about on earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and finally he may again withdraw them all, just as the sun withdraws its many rays. If such Smriti passage declares that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body and the like may assume several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers. A god may divide himself into many forms and present himself in many sacrifices at the same time. He can remain all the while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to make himself invisible. Moreover, why cannot the same god be the object of many sacrifices, just as the same man can be the object of salutation of many persons?

Sabda iti chet, na, atah prabhavat

pratyakshanumanabhyam I.3.28 (91)

If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word (we say) no, because (the world) originates from the word, as is known from direct perception (Sruti) and inference (Smriti).

Sabda: regarding Vedic words; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: no; Atah: from this, from these words; Prabhavat: because of the creation; Pratyakshanumanabhyam: from direct perception (Sruti) and inference (Smriti).

Another objection against Sutra 26 (with respect to the corporeality of the gods) is raised and refuted.

The Purvapakshin maintains: The Vedic words have been proved in the Purvamimamsa philosophy to be permanent, i.e. without beginning or end. Now if gods are said to have bodies they must have births and deaths, which all embodied beings are subject to. Therefore the Vedic words for individual deities cannot exist before their birth, nor can those words signify any deities, when they have ceased to exist during dissolution. Hence the permanency of Vedic words fails.

To this objection the answer is that there cannot be any such incongruity with regard to Vedic words, because both Sruti and Smriti maintain that individual gods owe their origin to Vedic words.

The Vedic words exist from eternity. They have got their settled meaning. The Vedic names for gods signify their types and not the individuals. Therefore the births or deaths of individual gods cannot affect the types, much less the permanent character of Vedic words.

Cows are innumerable but it is with the type that the word `cow' is inseparably connected. The word `cow' is eternal. It does not depend on the birth and death of individuals belonging to that type. Words representing the gods have for their counterpart objects that are types and not individuals. Indra refers to a divine function like the office of the Viceroy and whoever is called to that function is called Indra. Therefore here is no non-eternality with reference to the Vedas.

The word, including even the gods, is created from scriptural words. The scriptural words are the source for the world and the gods. If you object to this and say that this conflicts with the Sutra I-1-2, which says that Brahman is the cause of the world, we reply: Brahman is the Upadanakarana (material cause). The Veda is not such material cause. The creator utters the Vedic words and creates. He says earth and creates the earth and so on.

The creation of every embodied being, whether Indra or a cow, proceeds from remembrance of the form and its characteristics by Lord Brahma. When he utters these words, which by association always suggest the particular form and the characteristics of that form. When a special individual of the class called Indra has perished, the creator, knowing from the Vedic word `Indra' which is present in his mind as the class characteristics of the being denoted by the word, creates another Indra possessing those very same characteristics, just as the potter fashions a new jar on the basis of the word `jar' which is revolving in his mind.

Every Vedic word always expresses a particular type form and does not express any individual. Brahman creates the world by remembering the particular type forms denoted by those words. Forms (Akritis) are eternal and exist in the archetypal plane from eternity before they become concrete in any individual form. Brahma, the creator created the Devas by reflecting on the word `etc.' (these). He created the men by the word `Asrigram'; the Pitris by the word `Indavah' (drops); the planets by the word `Tiras pavitram'; the songs by the word `Asuva'; the Mantras by the word `Visvani' and he created all other creatures by the word `Abhisaubhaga'.

The word `etad' (this) reminds Brahma the creator of the Devas presiding over the senses; the word `Asrigra' meaning blood, reminds him of those creatures in which blood is the chief life-element, namely men; the word`Indu' denoting moon, reminds him of the fathers, who live in the Chandraloka; the word `Tiras pavitram' meaning `holding of the pure ambrosia' reminds of the planets where the Soma fluid exists; the word `Asuva' (flowing) reminds him of the sweet flow of music; the word `Visva' reminds him of the hymns sacred to the Visvedevas; the word `Abhisubhaga', meaning `great prosperity', reminds him of all creatures. We read in Bri. Up. He with his mind united himself with speech i.e. the word of the Veda.

Every word has for its counterpart a form or an object which it denotes. Name and form are inseparable. Whenever you think of a form its name comes before your mind at once. Whenever you utter a name the object comes before your mind. The relation between a name or word and form (the object) is eternal.

The Veda is not the material cause of the universe. If you say that the Veda refers to Vasus, Rudras, Adityas and other gods who are born and are therefore non-eternal and, hence, the Vedas also must be non-eternal, we reply that what are born are the individual manifestations of Dravya (substance), Guna (quality) and Karma (actions) but not the Akritis, species. The origination of the universe from the `word' is not to be understood in the sense that the word constitutes the material cause of the world as Brahman does.

The several names, actions, and conditions of all things He shaped in the beginning from the words of the Vedas Manu I-21.

Thought first manifests as a word and then as the more concrete form. You cannot separate the thought from name and form. If you wish to do a thing you first remember the word denoting the thing and then you start the work. The Vedic words manifested in the mind of Prajapati, the creator before the creation. After that he created the things corresponding to those words. Uttering Bhur he created the earth etc. Taittiriya Brahmana II-2-4-2.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent maintains that the universe cannot be born of letters which are perishable, that there is an eternal Sphota (causal form of sound) of which uttered sounds are manifestations and that such Sphota is the cause of the universe. Sphota is that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (Arthadhiketu). Sphota is a supersensuous entity which is manifested by the letters of the word and if comprehended by the mind itself manifests the sense of the word.

This statement of the Purvapakshin is really untenable. This is certainly not our actual experience. The uttered sounds do not perish, for at the end of their utterance we realise their identity when we utter them again. It is said that there might be a difference of intonation when uttering the same word twice; this does not negate the identity, for the difference is only a difference of the instrument of manifestation. Albeit the letters are many, their group can be the subject of a conception (e.g. ten, hundred etc). The Sphota theory is therefore quite unnecessary.

It is therefore quite clear that the Vedic sounds are eternal and that there is no logical fallacy in the doctrine that through them has been created the entire universe including the gods.

Ata eva cha nityatvam I.3.29 (92)

From this very reason also there follows the eternity of the Vedas.

Ata eva: therefore, from this very reason; Cha: also; Nityatvam: The eternity of the Vedas.

A side issue is deduced from Sutra 28.

The eternal nature of Vedic words is also established from the same reasons adduced in Sutra 28 i.e. because those words signify permanent types.

This Sutra now confirms the already established eternity of the Vedas. The universe with its definite eternal types or spheres such as gods and so on originates from the word of the Veda. For this very reason the eternity of the word of the Veda must be accepted. As gods etc., as types are eternal, the Vedic words are also eternal.

The Vedas were not written by anybody. They are the very breath of the Lord. They are eternal. The Rishis were not the authors of the Vedas. They only discovered them. By means of their past good deeds the priests were able to understand the Vedas. They found them dwelling in the Rishis. The Mantra By means of sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the Rishis. in Rigveda Samhita X-71-3 shows that the speech found by the Rishis was permanent. Veda Vyasa also says Formerly the great Rishis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, obtained through their penance the Vedas together with the Itihasas, which had been hidden at the end of the Yuga.

Samananamarupatvat cha avrittavapyavirodho

darsanat smritescha I.3.30 (93)

And on account of the sameness of names and forms in every fresh cycle there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the words of the Vedas) even in the revolving of the world cycles, as is seen from the Sruti and Smriti.

Samananamarupatvat: on account of similar names and forms; Cha: and; Avrittau: in the cycles of creation; Api: even, also; Avirodhah: no inconsistency or contradiction; Darsanat: from the Sruti; Smriteh: from the Smriti, Cha: and.

An argument in favour of Sutra 29 is given in this Sutra.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: At the end of a cycle everything is totally annihilated. There is new creation at the beginning of the next cycle. There is a break in the continuity of existence. Hence even as types, the gods are not eternal and the eternal relation of Vedic words and the objects they denote does not remain. Consequently there is contradiction to the eternity and the authority of the Vedas.

We say it is not so. Just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep, so also the world is a latent or potential state (in seed form) in Pralaya or dissolution; it is again projected with all the previous variety of names and forms at the beginning of the next cycle. Therefore the eternity of the relation between Vedic words and their objects is not at all contradicted. Consequently the authoritativeness of the Vedas remains. This is supported by Sruti and Smriti. We read in Rigveda X-190-3 As formerly the Lord ordered the sun and the moon, heaven, earth, the sky etc. We read in the Smriti As the same signs of seasons appear again and again in their due course, so do beings appear and reappear in successive cycles.

The word `Cha' in the Sutra is used to remove the doubt raised. Even after a great Pralaya there is no contradiction with regard to the eternity of Vedic words, because the new creation proceeds on the sameness of names and forms etc., in the preceding creation. In a Mahapralaya the Vedas and the types denoted by the words of the Vedas merge in the Lord and become one with Him. They remain in Him in a state of latency. When the Lord desires to create they come out from Him again and become manifest. The creation of individuals is always preceded by a reflection on the words of the Vedas and the types denoted by them.

After the Mahapralaya the Lord creates the Vedas in exactly the same order and arrangements as they had been before. He reflects on the words and types and projects the whole universe. A subsequent creation is similar to the past creation. The Lord creates the world just as a potter who makes a pot by remembering the word `pot' and the form which the word calls up in his mind.

After a Mahapralaya the Lord Himself creates all elements from Mahat downwards up to Brahmanda. He projects Brahma from His body and teaches Him the Vedas mentally (not orally) and entrusts Him with the work of further creation. In minor Pralaya Brahma does not cease to exist, nor do the elements. Brahma Himself creates the world after every minor Pralaya.

It may be objected that when we sleep and then wake up we can recall the already experienced external universe and that such a thing is not possible in the case of the dissolution of the world. But our answer is that by the grace of the supreme Lord, Hiranyagarbha or Brahma can recollect the state of the world as it was before the dissolution. We read in the Svetasvatara Upanishad During Pralaya all forms vanish but Sakti remains. The next creation takes place through it alone. Otherwise you would have to postulate a creation out of nothing.

Madhvadishvasambhavadanadhikaram Jaiminih I.3.31 (94)

On account of the impossibility (of the gods being qualified) for Madhu Vidya etc., Jaimini (is of opinion that the gods) are not qualified (either for Upasana or for the Brahma Vidya or the knowledge of the Self).

Madhu adishu: in Madhu Vidya etc.; Asambhavat: on account of the impossibility; Anadhikaram: disqualification; Jaiminih: Jaimini is of opinion.

Another objection to Sutra 26 is raised.

For Madhu Vidya vide Chh. Up. III-1-11, the sage Jaimini, the author of Purvamimamsa, says that as the sun and the other gods are the deities to be worshipped in Madhu Vidya and the like, it is impossible that they should also be the worshippers. Hence they are not entitled for the Upasana prescribed in Sruti, because obviously they cannot worship themselves. In Madhu Vidya one is to meditate on the Sun as honey (beneficial). Such a meditation is not possible for Surya or the Sun-god because one and the same person cannot be both the object of meditation as well as the person meditating.

Further the Devas like Vasu etc., already belong to the class of Vasus etc. Therefore in their case the meditation is useless as the fruit is already accomplished. The Devas have nothing to gain by such meditation. So they have no desire for this meditation, because they already are in possession of that which is the fruit of such meditation.

Jyotishi bhavacca I.3.32 (95)

And (the gods are not qualified for Vidyas) because (the words `sun, moon' etc., spoken of as gods) are used in the sense of mere spheres of light.

Jyotishi: as mere spheres of light; Bhavat: because used in the sense; Cha: and.

An argument in support of the objection raised in Sutra 31 is given.

The Purvapakshin raises another objection: The luminous orbs cannot possibly do acts of meditation. Such and other luminary objects as Agni etc., cannot have a bodily form with hands, heart or intelligence. They are material inert objects. They cannot have wishes. We cannot place faith on Itihasas and Puranas, as they are of human origin and as they themselves stand in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The Mantras do not form an independent means of authoritative knowledge. The Arthavada passages cannot be regarded to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality of the gods. Consequently the gods are not qualified for any kind of Vidya or knowledge of Brahman.

Bhavam tu Baadarayano'sti hi I. 3.33 (96)

But Baadarayana, on the other hand (maintains) the existence (of qualification on the part of the gods for Brahma Vidya); for there are (passages indicatory of that; body, desires etc., which qualify one for such knowledge do exist in the case of the gods).

Bhavam: the existence (of the qualification to practise the meditation like Madhu Vidya etc.); Tu: but; Baadarayanah: the sage Baadarayana (maintains); Asti: does exist; Hi: because.

This Sutra refutes the arguments in the previous two Sutras and concludes the discussion.

But Baadarayana holds that the gods too have the right to practise Upasana as meditation and Brahma Vidya, because there are indications in Sruti to that effect. He maintains that each luminary orb has a presiding deity with body, intelligence, desires etc. The gods can assume any form at will. Indra assumed the form of a ram and carried off Medhatithi. Surya assumed the form of a man and came to Kunti. We read in Chh. Up. VIII-12-6 The gods indeed do worship the Atman. The sun-god may be disqualified for a particular form of meditationMadhu Vidya, as he cannot meditate on the sun himself, but that is no reason why he should be disqualified for other meditations or for Brahma Vidya or the knowledge of Brahman. Similar is the case with other gods.

The expression `Tu' (but, on the other hand) is meant to rebut the Purvapakshin.

Scripture declares that the Devas are qualified. Whatever Deva was awakened so to know Brahman he indeed became that Bri. Up. 1-4-10. Indra went to Prajapati saying well, let us search for that Self by which if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained Chh. Up. VIII-7.

The description of the forms of gods is real. How can unreal forms of gods be conceived by our minds for our offering sacrifices to them? Ordinary people are not able to behold their forms. But sages like Vyasa have seen them. They spoke to the gods. The Yoga Sutras say By Svadhyaya one can be in communion with the deity which we worship. How can you deny the powers of Yoga? Rishis had marvellous powers.

Therefore gods have forms and are eligible for Brahma Vidya.

Apasudradhikaranam: Topic 9 (Sutras 34-38)

The right of the Sudras to the study of Vedas discussed

Sugasya tadanadarasravanat

tadadravanat suchyate hi I.3.34 (97)

(King Janasruti) was in grief on hearing some contemptuous words used about him by the sage in the form of a swan; owing to his approaching Raikva, overwhelming with that grief, Raikva called him Sudra; for it (the grief) is pointed at by Raikva.

Suk: grief; Asya: his; Tat: that, namely that grief; Anadarasravanat: from hearing his (the Rishi's) disrespectful speech; Tada: then; Adravanat: because of going to him i.e, to Raikva; Suchyate: is referred to; Hi: because.

The discussion on the privilege of divine meditation begun in Sutra 25 is continued.

The whole of this Adhikarana about Sudras together with the preceding one about the Devas appears to be an interpolation of some later author.

In the previous Sutra it has been shown that the gods are entitled to the study of Vedas and Brahma Vidya. This Sutra discusses whether the Sudras are entitled to them or not.

The Purvapakshin says: The Sudras also have got bodies and desires. Hence they are also entitled. Raikva refers to Janasruti who wishes to learn from him by the name of Sudra. Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O Sudra, together with the cows Chh. Up. IV-2 & 3. But when he appears a second time, Raikva accepts his presents and teaches him. Smriti speaks of Vidura and others who were born from Sudra mothers as possessing highest knowledge. Therefore the Sudra has a claim to Brahma Vidya or knowledge of Brahman.

This Sutra refutes the view and denies the right to the study of the Vedas for Sudra. The word `Sudra' does not denote a Sudra by birth which is its conventional meaning, because Janasruti was a Kshatriya king. Here we will have to take the etymological meaning of the word which is, He rushed into grief (Sukam abhi dudrava) or as grief rushed on him or as he in his grief rushed to Raikva. The following Sutra also intimates that he was a Kshatriya.

Kshatriyatvavagateschottaratra chaitrarathena lingat I.3.35 (98)

And because the Kshatriyahood (of Janasruti) is known from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with Chaitraratha (who was a Kshatriya himself).

Kshatriyatva: the state of his being a Kshatriya; Avagateh: on account of being known or understood; Cha: and; Uttaratra: latter on in a subsequent part of the text; Chaitrarathena: with Chaitraratha; Lingat: because of the indicatory sign or the inferential mark.

An argument in support of Sutra 34 is given.

Janasruti is mentioned with the Kshatriya Chaitraratha Abhipratarin in connection with the same Vidya. Hence we can infer that Janasruti also was a Kshatriya because, as a rule, equals are mentioned together with equals. Hence the Sudras are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

Samskaraparamarsat tadabhavabhilapacca (I.3.36) (99)

Because purificatory ceremonies are mentioned (in the case of the twice-born) and their absence is declared (in the case of the Sudra).

Samskara: the purificatory ceremonies, the investiture with sacred thread; Paramarsat: because of the reference; Tat: that ceremony; Abhava: absence; Abhilapat: because of the declaration; Cha: and.

The discussion on the privilege of Brahma Vidya on the part of Sudras is continued.

In different places of the Vidyas the Upanayana ceremony is referred to. The Upanayana ceremony is declared by the scriptures to be a necessary condition for the study of all kinds of knowledge or Vidya. We read in Prasna Up. I-1 Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach them all that. Upanayana ceremony is meant for the higher castes. With reference to the Sudras on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned in the scriptures. In the Sudra there is not any sin by eating prohibited food, and he is not fit for any ceremony Manu X-12-6. A Sudra by birth cannot have Upanayana and other Samskaras without which the Vedas cannot be studied. Hence the Sudras are not entitled to the study of the Vedas.

The next Sutra further strengthens the view that a Sudra can have no Samskara.

Tadabhavanirdharane cha pravritteh I.3.37 (100)

And because the inclination (on the part of Gautama to impart knowledge is seen only) on the ascertainment of the absence of Sudrahood (in Jabala Satyakama).

Tad: that, namely the Sudrahood; Abhava: absence; Nirdharane: in ascertainment; Cha: and; Pravritteh: from inclination.

The same discussion on the Sudras' right is continued.

Gautama, having ascertained Jabala not to be a Sudra from his speaking the truth proceeded to initiate and instruct him. None who is not a Brahmana would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth Chh. Up. IV-4-5.

This scriptural text furnishes an inferential sign of the Sudras not being capable of initiation.

Sravanadhyayanarthapratishedhat smritescha I .3.38 (101)

And on account of the prohibition in Smriti of (the Sudras) hearing, studying and understanding (the Veda) and performing Vedic rites (they are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman).

Sravana: hearing; Adhyayana: studying; Artha: understanding; Pratishedhat: on account of the prohibition; Smriteh: in the Smriti; Cha: and.

The same discussion on the Sudras' right is concluded here.

The Smriti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying and understanding the Veda and their performing Vedic rites. The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac. For a Sudra is like a cemetery. Therefore the Veda is not to be read in the vicinity of a Sudra. His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it. Sudras like Vidura and the religious hunter Dharma Vyadha acquired knowledge owing to the after effects of former deeds in past births. It is possible for the Sudras to attain that knowledge through the Puranas, Gita and the epics, Ramayana and Mahabharata which contain the quintessence of the Vedas.

It is a settled point that the Sudras do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.

The digression begun from Sutra 26 ends here and the general topic is again taken up.

KAMPANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 10

THE PRANA IN WHICH EVERYTHING TREMBLES IS BRAHMAN

Kampanat I.3.39 (102)

(Prana is Brahman) on account of the vibration or trembling (spoken of the whole world).

Kampanat: on account of shaking or vibration.

After discussing the side issues in Sutra 25-38 the Sutrakara or the author of the Sutras resumes the examination of the main issue.

An argument in support of Sutra 24 is given here.

The discussion of qualification for Brahma Vidya or knowledge of Brahman is over. We return to our chief topic i.e., the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta texts.

We read in Kathopanishad II-3-2 Whatever there is in the whole world has come out of Prana and trembles in the Prana. The Prana is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal.

The Purvapakshin maintains that the term Prana denotes the air or the vital force with its five modifications. The Siddhantin says: Here Prana is Brahman and not the vital force, because Brahman only is spoken of in the preceding as well as in the subsequent part of the chapter. How then can it be supposed that all at once the vital force should be referred to in the intermediate part?

The whole world trembles in Prana. We find here a quality of Brahman viz., its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word `Prana' denotes the highest Self appears from such passages as `the Prana of Prana' Bri. Up. IV-4-18. The scripture declares No mortal lives by the Prana and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose (Katha Up. II-5-5.) In the passage subsequent to the one under discussion From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun shines, from terror Indra and Vayu and Death as the fifth run away. Brahman and not the vital force is spoken of as the subject of that passage, which is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the entire universe inclusive of the Prana itself. Brahman only is the cause of the life of the entire universe including the vital force.

Brahman is compared to a thunderbolt because he inspires fear in fire, air, sun, Indra and Yama. Further Immortality is declared to him who knows this Prana. A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go. (Svet. Up. VI-15). Prana is also often used to denote Brahman in the Sruti.

JYOTIRADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 11

THE `LIGHT' IS BRAHMAN

Jyotirdarsanat I.3.40 (103)

The light (is Brahman) on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).

Jyotih: light; Darsanat: on account of (Brahman) being seen.

The argument in support of Sutra 24 is continued.

We read in the Sruti Thus does that serene being arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the Highest Light (Chh. Up. VIII-12-3).

Here the doubt arises whether the word `light' denotes the physical light which is the object of sight and dispels darkness, or the Highest Brahman.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: The word light denotes the well-known physical light because that is the conventional sense of the word.

To this we have the following reply. The word `light' can denote the Highest Brahman only. Why? Because in the whole chapter Brahman is the topic of discussion. The Highest Light is also called the `Highest Person' in that text itself later on. Freedom from body is said to belong to that being which is one with this light. Sruti declares When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him (Chh. Up. VIII-12.1). Freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman. One can attain freedom or the bodiless state when he identifies himself with Brahman.

ARTHANTARATVADIVYAPADESADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 12

THE AKASA IS BRAHMAN

Akaso'rthantaratvadivyapadesat I.3.41 (104)

Akasa (is Brahman) because it is declared to be something different etc., (from names and forms).

Akasah: Akasa; Arthantaratvadi-vyapadesat: because it is declared to be something different; Artha: with a meaning; Antaratva: differentness. Adi: etc.; Vyapadesat: from statement on account of designation.

Another expression from the Chhandogya Upanishad is now taken up for discussion. We read in Chhandogya Upanishad VIII-14-1 That which is called Akasa is the revealer of all names and forms. That within which these names and forms are contained is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self.

Here a doubt arises whether that which here is called Akasa is the Highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether.

The Purvapakshin or the objector says that Akasa means here the elemental ether, because this is the conventional meaning of the word.

To this the Siddhantin gives the following reply. Here `Akasa' is Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing etc. Names and forms are said to be within this Akasa, which is therefore different from these.

The term Akasa signifies Brahman because it is stated to be the source of all names and forms, also because it is qualified by such epithets as `Infinite, Immortal' `Self'. The word Akasa, refers to Brahman because the description beyond name and form applies only to Brahman.

SUSHUPTYUTKRANTYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 13 (SUTRAS 42-43)

THE SELF CONSISTING OF KNOWLEDGE IS BRAHMAN

Sushuptyutkrantyorbhedena I.3.42 (105)

Because of the Highest Self being shown as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and death.

Sushupti utkrantyoh: In deep sleep and death; Bhedena: by the difference, as different; (Sushupti: deep sleep; Utkranti: departing at the time of death).

An expression from the sixth chapter of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is now taken up for discussion.

In the sixth Prapathaka or chapter of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, in reply to the questionWho is that Self? (IV-3-7), a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self is given. He who is within the heart, among the Pranas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge.

Here a doubt arises whether the Self is the Highest Self or the individual soul.

The Sutra declares that it is the Highest Self. Why? Because it is shown to be different from the individual soul in the state of deep sleep and at the time of death. This person embraced by the Highest intelligent Self knows nothing that is without or within Bri. Up. IV-3-21. This clearly indicates that in deep sleep the `person' or the individual soul is different from the Highest intelligent Self or Brahman.

Here the term the person must mean the Jiva or the embodied soul, because the absence of the knowledge of what is within and without in deep sleep can be predicated only of the individual soul. The Supreme intelligent Self is Brahman because such intelligence can be predicated of Brahman only. Brahman is never dissociated from all-embracing knowledge. Similarly the passage that treats of departure i.e. death (this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent self moves along groaning) refers to the Supreme Lord as different from the individual soul. The Jiva who casts off this mortal body is different from Supreme Self or Brahman. The Jiva alone passes through the stages of sound-sleep and death. Brahman has neither sleep nor death. He is wide awake always.

Therefore Brahman is the chief topic in this Section. The Chapter exclusively aims at describing the nature of Brahman. The lengthy discourse on the individual soul in this Section is to show that he is in essence identical with Brahman.

Patyadisabdebhyah I.3.43 (106)

(The Being referred to in Sutra 42 is Brahman) because of the words `Lord' etc., being applied to Him. He is the controller, the Ruler, the Lord of all. Bri. Up. IV-4-22.

Patyadi sabdebhyah: On account of words like `Lord' etc., (the self in the text under discussion is the Superme Self).

The argument in support of Sutra 42 is given.

These epithets are apt only in the case of Brahman, because these epithets intimate that the thing spoken of is absolutely free. Hence the word Self denotes the Highest Self or Brahman and not the Jiva or the embodied soul, from all of which we conclude that the Chapter refers to the Supreme Brahman.

Here ends the Third Pada of the First Adhyaya of the Brahma Sutras and of Sariraka Bhashya of Sri Sankaracharya.

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Chapter I, Section 4

Introduction

In Topic 5, Section 1, it has been shown that as the Pradhana of the Sankhyas is not based on the authority of the scriptures and that as all the Sruti texts refer to an intelligent principle as the first cause, Brahman is the first cause.

The nature of Brahman has been defined in I.1.2. It has been shown that the purport of all Vedanta texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman and not the Pradhana, is the cause of the world.

The Sankhyas say that it has not been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the Pradhana, because some Sakhas contain expression which seem to convey the idea of the Pradhana.

This Pada or Section proceeds to deal with the consideration of other Vedic texts which are asserted by the Sankhyas to declare that the Pradhana is the cause of the universe.

The whole of Section 4 gives suitable and cogent answers to all objections raised by the Sankhyas.

Synopsis

The fourth Pada or Section of the first Chapter is specially directed against the Sankhyas. This Section examines some passages from the Upanishads where terms occur which may be mistaken for the names of the insentient matter of Sankhyas. It declares authoritatively that the Vedanta texts lend no support whatsoever to the Sankhya theory of creation or the doctrine of Pradhana. This Section proves that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1-7) discusses the passage in Katha Upanishad I-3-10, 11 where mention is made of the great (Mahat) and the undeveloped (Avyaktam). Avyakta is a synonym for Pradhana in the Sankhya Sastra. `Mahat' means intellect in Sankhya philosophy. Sri Sankaracharya shows that the term Avyakta denotes the subtle body or Sukshma Sarira as well as the gross body also and the term Mahat Brahman or the Supreme Self.

Adhikarana II: (Sutras 8-10) shows that according to Sankara the tri-coloured `Aja' spoken of in the Svetasvatara Upanishad IV.5 is not the Pradhana of the Sankhyas but either that power of the Lord from which the world takes its origin or the primary causal matter first produced by that power.

Adhikarana IlI: (Sutras 11-13) shows that the `Pancha-pancha- janah' mentioned in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad IV-4-17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sankhyas.

Adhikarana IV: (Sutras 14-15) shows that although there is conflict as regards the order of creation, scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman i.e., a Being whose essence is intelligence, which is the cause of this universe.

Adhikarana V: (Sutras 16-18) proves that He who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work mentioned in Kau. Up. IV-1-19 is not either the Prana (the vital air) or the individual soul, but Brahman.

Adhikarana VI: (Sutras 19-22) decides that the Self to be seen, to be heard etc. (Bri. Up. II-4-5) is the Supreme Self, but not the individual soul. The views of Jaimini, Asmarathya, Audulomi and Kasakritsna are expressed.

Adhikarana VII: (Sutras 23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (Nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (Parinama Sutra 26).

Adhikarana VIII: (Sutra 28) shows that the refutation of the Sankhya views is applicable to other theories also such as the atomic theory which says that the world has originated from atoms, etc.

ANUMANIKADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 1 (SUTRAS 1-7)

THE MAHAT AND AVYAKTA OF THE KATHOPANISHAD

do not refer to the Sankhya Tattvas

Anumanikamapyekeshamiti chet na

sarirarupakavinyastagrihiter darsayati cha I.4.1 (107)

If it be said that in some (recensions of the Vedas) that which is inferred (i.e. the Pradhana) (is) also (mentioned), (we say) no, because (the word `Avyakta' occurring in the Katha Upanishad) is mentioned in a simile referred to the body (and means the body itself and not the Pradhana of the (Sankhyas); (the Sruti) also explains (it).

Anumanikam: that which is inferred (i.e., the Pradhana); Api: also; Ekesham: of some branches or school of Srutis or recensions of the text; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: No; Sarirarupa- kavinyastagrihiteh: because it is mentioned in a simile referring to the body (Sarira: body, Rupaka: simile, Vinyasta: contained, Grihiteh: because of the reference); Darsayati: (the Srutis) explain; Cha: also, too, and.

The Sankhyas again raise an objection. They say that the Pradhana is also based on scriptural authority, because some Sakhas like the Katha Sakha (school) contain expressions wherein the Pradhana seems to be referred to Beyond the Mahat there is the Avyakta (the unmanifested or the undeveloped), beyond the Avyakta is the Purusha (Being or Person) Katha Up. 1-3-11.

The Sankhyas say that the word `Avyakta' here refers to the Pradhana because the words `Mahat', `Avyakta' and `Purusha' which occur in the same order in the Sankhya philosophy, occur in the Sruti text. Hence they are recognised to be the same categories of the Sankhyas. The Pradhana is called `undeveloped' because it is destitute of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be said that there is no scriptural authority for the Pradhana. We declare that this Pradhana is the cause of the world on the strength of Sruti, Smriti and ratiocination.

This Sutra refutes it thus. The word `Avyakta' does not refer to the Pradhana. It is used in connection with a simile referring to the body. The immediately preceding part of the Chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the Lord of a chariot, a charioteer etc. Know the soul to be the Lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When the Self is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer Katha Up. I.3.3-4.

All these things that are referred to in these verses are found in the following: Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self (Mahat) is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great (Mahat) is the Avyakta (the undeveloped), beyond the Avyakta there is the Purusha. Beyond the Purusha there is nothingthis is the goal, the highest path Katha Up. I.3.10-11.

Now compare these two quotations. In this passage we recognise the senses etc. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on. The senses, the intellect and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects in the second passage are the objects which are in the former passage designated as the roads of the senses. The Mahat of the later text means the cosmic intellect. In the earlier passage intellect is the charioteer. It includes the individual and cosmic intellect. The Atman of the earlier text corresponds to the Purusha of the later text and body of the earlier text corresponds to Avyakta in the later text. Therefore Avyakta means the body here and not the Pradhana. There remains now the body only which had before been compared to the chariot in the earlier text.

Now an objection is raised. How can the body which is manifest, gross and visible (Vyakta) be said to be unmanifest and unevolved? The following Sutra gives a suitable answer.

Sukshmam tu tadarhatvat I.4.2 (108)

But the subtle (body is meant by the term Avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).

Sukshmam: the subtle, the permanent atoms, the causal body; Tu: but; Tad arhatvat: because it can be properly so termed.

An objection to Sutra 1 is refuted.

The Sutra replies that what the term `Avyakta' denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as `undeveloped' or `unmanifested'. The subtle parts of the elements, the causal substance, i.e., the five uncompounded elements out of which the body is formed may be called so. As they are subtle and not manifest, and as they also transcend sense perception, they can be properly designated by the term `Avyakta'.

It is also a matter of common occurrence to denote the effect by the cause. Therefore the gross body is referred to here indirectly. Compare for instance the phrase Mix the Soma with the cow (i.e., milk) Rigveda IX.40.4. Another scriptural passage also declares Now all this, i.e., this developed world with names and forms is capable of being designated `undeveloped' in so far as in a previous state it was in a merely seminal or potential state destitute of names and forms.

In Brihadaranyaka Upanishad I-4-7, the Karana Sarira is called by the term unevolved or Avyakta. Before the world came into manifestation it was in the form of a seed or causal body.

An objection is raised. If the Avyakta is taken to be matter in its subtle state consisting of the causal body, what objection is there to interpret it as the Pradhana of the Sankhya system, because there also Avyakta means matter in subtle state. The following Sutra gives a suitable answer to this objection.

Tadadhinatvat arthavat I.4.3 (109)

On account of its dependence (on the Lord, such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted, because such an admission is) reasonable.

Tad: its; Adhinatvat: on account of dependence; Arthavat: having a sense or a meaning subserving an end or purpose; is fitting.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

The opponent says. If a suitable causal state of the gross world is admitted it is as good as accepting the Pradhana, for we Sankhyas understand by the term Pradhana, nothing but the antecedent condition of the universe.

The Siddhantin gives the following reply. The Pradhana of the Sankhyas is an independent entity. The subtle causal state admitted here is dependent on the Highest Lord. A previous subtle stage of the universe must necessarily be admitted. It is quite reasonable. For without it the Lord cannot create. It is the potential power of Brahman. The whole Lila is kept up through this power. He could not become active if he were destitute of this potential power. It is the causal potentiality inherent in Brahman. That causal potentiality is of the nature of nescience.

The existence of such a causal potentiality renders it possible that the Jivanmuktas or liberated souls do not take further birth as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. It is rightly denoted by the term `undeveloped' (Avyakta). It has the Supreme Lord for its substratum. It is of the nature of an illusion. It is Anirvachaniya or indescribable. You can neither say that it is nor that it is not.

This undeveloped principle is sometimes denoted by the term `Akasa', ether. In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether is woven like warp and woof Bri. Up. III-8-11. Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term Akshara, the Imperishable. Higher than the high, Imperishable Mun. Up. II-1-2.

Just as the illusion of a snake in a rope is not possible merely through ignorance without the substratumrope, so also the world cannot be created merely by ignorance without the substratum, the Lord. Therefore the subtle causal condition is dependent on the Lord, and yet the Lord is not in the least affected by this ignorance, just as the snake is not affected by the poison. Know that the Prakriti is Maya and the great Lord the ruler of Maya Svet. Up. IV-10.

So the Avyakta is a helper (Sahakari) to the Lord in His creation. The Lord creates the universe using it as a means. It is dependent on the Lord. It is not like the Pradhana of the Sankhyas which is an independent entity.

The Lord looks on Maya and energises her. Then she has the power of producing the world. In her own nature she is Jada or insentient.

In the next Sutra the author gives another reason for holding that the `Avyakta' of the Katha Upanishad is not to be interpreted as Pradhana.

Jneyatvavachanaccha I.4.4 (110)

And because it is not mentioned (that the Avyakta) is to be known (it cannot be the Pradhana of the Sankhyas).

Jneyatva: that is the object to be known; Avachanat: because of non-mention; Cha: and.

The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.

According to the Sankhyas, emancipation results when the difference between the Purusha and the Avyakta (Prakriti) is known. For without a knowledge of the nature of the constitutive elements of Pradhana it is impossible to recognise the difference of the soul from them. Hence the Avyakta is to be known according to the Sankhyas. But here there is no question of knowing the Avyakta. Hence it cannot be the Pradhana of the Sankhyas.

It is impossible to hold that knowledge of things which is not taught in the text is of any use to man. For this reason also we hold that the word `Avyakta' cannot denote the Pradhana.

The Sankhyas call Avyakta or Pradhana the first cause. But the first cause has been stated in the Sruti as the object to be known. In the Sruti `Avyakta' is not stated to be an object of pursuit. Hence it is not the first cause and consequently, cannot be mistaken for the matter of Sankhyas.

According to the Sankhyas, liberation is attained by knowing that Purusha is different from Prakriti. The knowledge of Prakriti is thus an essential of release. But the Katha Upanishad nowhere mentions that the knowledge of `Avyakta' is necessary for the final emancipation. Therefore the Avyakta of the Katha Upanishad is not the Prakriti of the Sankhyas.

Nowhere does the scripture declare that Pradhana (Matter) is Jneya (to be known) or Upasya (to be worshipped). What is aimed at as the object of knowledge of adoration in the Srutis is the Supreme seat of Vishnu (Tad Vishnoh paramam padam).

Vadatiti chet na prajno hi prakaranat I.4.5 (111)

And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the Pradhana as an object of knowledge) we deny that; because the intelligent (supreme) Self is meant on account of the general subject matter.

Vadati: the verse or the text states; Iti: thus; Chet: if. Na: no; Prajnah: the intellect supreme; Hi: because; Prakaranat: from the context, because of the general subject-matter of the Chapter.

An objection to Sutra 4 is raised and refuted.

The Sruti says, He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great (Mahat) and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death Katha Up. II-3-15.

The Sankhyas says that the Pradhana has to be known to attain the final release, because the description given of the entity to be known agrees with the Pradhana, which is also beyond the Mahat (great). Hence we conclude that the Pradhana is denoted by the term `Avyaktam'.

This Sutra refutes this. It says that by Avyakta, the one beyond Mahat (great) etc., the intelligent Supreme Self is meant, as that is the subject-matter of that Section.

Further the highest Self is spoken of in all Vedantic texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above viz., absence of sound etc.

Hence it follows that the Pradhana in the text is neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term `Avyaktam'.

Even the propounders of the Sankhya philosophy do not state that liberation or release from death is the result of the knowledge of Pradhana. They state that it is due to the knowledge of the sentient Purusha.

The author gives another reason for holding that Pradhana is not meant in the passage of the Katha Upanishad.

Trayanameva chaivamupanyasah prasnascha I.4.6 (112)

And there is question and explanation relating to three things only (not to the Pradhana).

Trayanam: of the three, namely three boons asked by Nachiketas; Eva: only; Cha: and; Evam: thus; Upanyasah: mentioned, (presentation by way of answer); Prasnat: question; Cha: and.

The objection raised in Sutra 5 is further refuted.

In the Katha Upanishad Nachiketas asks Yama three questions only viz., about the fire sacrifice, the individual soul and the Supreme Self. These three things only Yama explains and to them only the questions of Nachiketas refer. Pradhana is not mentioned. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired about. There is no question relative to the Pradhana and hence no scope for any remarks on it. We cannot expect Yama to speak of the Pradhana which has not been enquired into. So Pradhana has no place in the discourse.

Mahadvaccha I.4.7 (113)

And (the case of the term Avyakta) is like that of the term Mahat.

Mahadvat: like the Mahat; Cha: and.

An argument in support of Sutra 1 is given. Just as in the case of Mahat, Avyakta also is used in the Vedas in a sense different from that attached to it in the Sankhya.

The Sankhyas use the term `Mahat' (the great one) to denote the first born entity, the intellect. The term has a different meaning in the Vedic texts. In the Vedic texts it is connected with the word Self. Thus we see in such passages as the followingThe great Self is beyond the intellect (Katha Up. I-3-10), The great Omnipresent Self (Katha Up. I-2-22), I know the great person (Svet. Up. III-8). We therefore, conclude that the term `Avyakta' also where it occurs in the Srutis, cannot denote the Pradhana. Though the Avyakta may mean the Pradhana or Prakriti in the Sankhya philosophy, it means something different in the Sruti texts. So the Pradhana is not based on scriptural authority, but is a mere conclusion of inference.

Mahat is the Buddhi of the Sankhyas. But in the Katha Upanishad the Mahat is said to be higher than Buddhi. Buddheratma mahan parah. So the Mahat of the Kathopanishad is different from the Mahat of the Sankhyas.

CHAMASADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 2 (SUTRAS 8-10)

THE AJA OF SVETASVATARA UPANISHAD DOES NOT MEAN PRADHANA

Chamasavadaviseshat I.4.8 (114)

(It cannot be maintained that `Aja' means the Pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated, as in the case of the cup.

Chamasavat: like a cup; Aviseshat: because there is no special characteristic.

An expression from the Svetasvatara Upanishad is now taken up for discussion in support of Sutra 1.

The author next refutes another wrong interpretation given by the Sankhyas of a verse from the Svetasvatara Upanishad.

We find in the Svetasvatara Upanishad IV-5, There is one `Aja' red, white and black in colour, producing manifold offspring of the same nature.

Here a doubt arises whether this `Aja' refers to the Pradhana of the Sankhyas or to the subtle elements fire, water, earth. The Sankhyas maintain that `Aja' here means the Pradhana, the unborn. The words red, white and black refer to its three constituents, the Gunas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. She is called `unborn'. She is not an effect. She is said to produce manifold offspring by her own unaided effort.

This Sutra refutes this. The Mantra taken by itself is not able to give assertion what the Sankhya doctrine is meant. There is no basis for such a special assertion in the absence of special characteristics. The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the Mantra, There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above Bri. Up. II-2-3. It is impossible to decide from the text itself what kind of cup is meant. Similarly it is not possible to fix the meaning of `Aja' from the text alone.

But in connection with the Mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant. What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is the skull. Similarly, here we have to refer this passage to supplementary texts to fix the meaning of Aja. We should not assert that it means the Pradhana.

Where can we learn what special being is meant by the word `Aja' of the Svetasvatara Upanishad? To this question the following Sutra gives a suitable answer.

Jyotirupakrama tu tatha hyadhiyata eke I.4.9 (115)

But (the elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term Aja), because some read so in their text.

This is explanatory to Sutra 8.

Jyotirupakrama: elements beginning with light; Tu: but; Tatha: thus; Hi: because; Adhiyate: some read, some recensions have a reading; Eke: some.

By the term `Aja' we have to understand the causal matter from which fire, water and earth have sprung. The matter begins with light i.e., comprises fire, water and earth. The word `tu' (but) gives emphasis to the assertion. One Sakha assigns to them red colour etc. The red colour is the colour of fire, white colour is the colour of water, black colour is the colour of earth Chh. Up. VI-2-4, 4-1.

This passage fixes the meaning of the word `Aja'. It refers to fire, earth and water from which the world has been created. It is not the Pradhana of the Sankhyas which consists of the three Gunas. The words red, white, black primarily denote special colours. They can be applied to the three Gunas of the Sankhyas in a secondary sense only. When doubtful passages have to be interpreted, the passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used. This is generally a recognised rule.

In the Svetasvatara Upanishad in Chapter I we find that Aja is used along with the word Devatma Saktithe divine power. Therefore Aja does not mean Pradhana.

The creative power is Brahman's inherent energy, which emanates from Him during the period of creation. Prakriti herself is born of Brahman. Therefore Aja in its literal sense of `unborn' cannot apply to Prakriti or Pradhana. Lord Krishna says, Mama yonir mahad BrahmaMy womb is the great Brahman, in that I place the germ thence cometh forth the birth of all beings, O Bharata. This shows that Prakriti herself is produced from the Lord.

Kalpanopadesaccha madhvadivadavirodhah I.4.10 (116)

And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in Aja denoting the causal matter) as in the case of honey (denoting the sun in Madhu Vidya for the sake of meditation) and similar cases.

Kalpana: the creative power of thought; Upadesat: from teaching; Cha: and; Madhvadivat: as in the case of honey etc.; Avirodhah: no incongruity.

The argument in support of Sutra 8 is continued.

The Purvapakshin says, The term Aja denotes something unborn. How can it refer to the three causal elements of the Chhandogya Upanishad, which are something created? This is contrary to reason.

The Sutra says: There is no incongruity. The source of all beings viz., fire, water and earth is compared to a she-goat by way of metaphor. Some she-goat might be partly red, partly white and partly black. She might have many young goats resembling her in colour. Some he-goat might love her and lie by her side, while some other he-goat might abandon her after having enjoyed her. Similarly the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured on account of its comprising fire, water and earth produces many inanimate and animate beings like unto itself and is enjoyed by the souls who are bound by Avidya or ignorance, while it is renounced by those souls who have attained true knowledge of the Brahman.

The words `like honey' in the Sutra mean that just as the sun although not being honey is represented as honey (Chh. Up. III.1), and speech as cow (Bri. Up. V-8), and the heavenly world etc., as the fires (Bri. Up. VI-2.9). So here the causal matter though not being a tri-coloured she-goat, is metaphorically or figuratively represented as one. Hence there is nothing incongruous in using the term `Aja' to denote the aggregate of fire, water and earth. `Aja' does not mean `unborn'. The description of Nature as an Aja is an imaginative way of teaching a Truth. The sun is the honey of the gods, though the sun is not mere honey.

SANKHYOPASANGRAHADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 3

THE FIVE-FOLD-FIVE (PANCHA-PANCHAJANAH) DOES NOT

refer to the twenty-five Sankhyan categories

Na sankhyopasangrahadapi nanabhavadatirekaccha I.4.11 (117)

Even from the statement of the number (five-fold-five i.e., twenty-five categories by the Sruti it is) not (to be understood that the Sruti refers to the Pradhana) on account of the differences (in the categories and the excess over the number of the Sankhyan categories).

Na: not; Sankhya: number; Upasangrahat: from statement; Api: even; Nanabhavat: on account of the differences; Atirekat: on account of excess; Cha: and.

This Sutra discusses whether the twenty-five principles of the Sankhyan philosophy are admitted by the Sruti.

The Sankhya or Purvapakshin failed in his attempt to base his doctrine on the text which speaks of the `Aja'. He again comes forward and points to another text. He in whom the five groups of five and the ether rest, Him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe Him to be Brahman (Bri. Up. IV-4-17). Now five-times-five makes twenty-five. This is exactly the number of the Sankhya Tattvas or principles. The doctrine of Pradhana rests on a scriptural basis. Here is the scriptural authority for our philosophy.

This Sutra refutes such an assumption. Panchapanchajanah, five-five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas. The Sankhya categories have each their individual difference. There are no attributes in common to each pentad. The Sankhya categories cannot be divided into groups of five of any basis of similarity, because all the twenty-five principles or Tattvas differ from each other.

This is further not possible `on account of the excess'. The ether is mentioned as a separate category. This will make the number twenty-six in all. This is not in accordance with the theory of the Sankhyas.

From the mere enumeration of the number 25 we cannot say that the reference is to the twenty-five Sankhya categories and that hence the Sankhya doctrine has the sanction of the Vedas.

The passage refers to Atma also. Then the total number will be twenty-seven. Atma is described as the basis of the others. Therefore it cannot be one of the twenty-five principles.

The principles of Sankhya philosophy are propounded as independent of Purusha. But here the categories are known to be entirely dependent on Brahman or Atma who is said to be the mainstay of them all. So they cannot be accepted as the independent principles of Sankhya.

The word Panchajanah is a group denoting term. It is the special name belonging to all the members of that group. The group consists of five members, each of whom is called a Panchajanah. Therefore the phrase `Pancha-panchajanah' does not mean five times five beings but five beings. Every one of whom is called a Panchajanah. It is just like the phrase Saptarshi, which denotes the constellation Ursa Major, consisting of seven stars. The word Saptarshi is a special name of everyone of these stars. When we say seven Saptarshis we do not mean seven times-seven stars but seven stars each one of whom is called a Saptarshi. Therefore `Pancha-pancha-janah' does not mean five times five products, but five people every one of whom is called a Panchajanah. The twenty-five Tattvas of the Sankhyas are these: 1,Prakriti; 2-8, seven modifications of Prakriti viz., Mahat etc., which are causal substances, as well as effects; 9-24 sixteen effects; the 25 is the soul which is neither a causal substance nor an effect.

Who then are these beings called Panchajanah? The following Sutra gives the reply.

Pranadayo vakyaseshat I.4.12 (118)

(The Panchajanah or the five people referred to are) the vital force etc., (as is seen) from the complementary passage.

Pranadayah: the Prana and the rest; Vakyaseshat: because of the complementary passage.

The Sutra is explanatory to Sutra 11.

The text in which the Panchajanah are mentioned is followed by another one in which the vital force and four other things are mentioned in order to describe the nature of Brahman. They who know the Prana of Prana (the breath of breath), the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food, the mind of mind etc. (Bri. Madhya. IV-4-21).

The five people refer to the Prana and the other four of the text and are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman.

The Sankhya asks how can the word `people' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear and so on? How we ask in return, can it be applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the term `people' is applied to the Pranas in the text, These are the five persons of Brahman (Chh. Up. III-13-6). Breath is father, breath is mother (Chh. Up. VII-15-1).

The objector says. This is possible only in the recension of the Madhyandinas, who read the additional word `Annasya Annam'. But in Kanva recension that phrase `annasya annam' is omitted. We have only four. This objection is answered by the author in the following Sutra.

Jyotishaikeshamasatyanne I.4.13 (119)

In the text of some (the Kanva recension) where food is not mentioned (the number five is made up) by `light' (mentioned in the previous verse).

Jyotisha: by light; Ekesham: of some texts or recensions, i.e., of the Kanvas; Asati: in the absence of; Anne: food.

The argument in support of Sutra 11 is continued.

The immortal light of lights the gods worship as longevity Bri. Up. IV-4-10. Although food is not mentioned in the text cited in the last Sutra, according to the Kanva recension of the Satapatha Brahmana, yet the four of that verse, together with `light' mentioned in the text quoted above, would make the five people.

We have proved herewith that scriptures offer no basis for the doctrine of the Pradhana. It will be shown later on that this doctrine cannot be proved either by Smriti or by ratiocination.

KARANATVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 4 (SUTRAS 14-15)

BRAHMAN IS THE FIRST CAUSE

Karanatvena chakasadishu yathavyapadishtokteh I.4.14 (120)

Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta texts as regards the things created such as ether and so on, there is no such conflict with respect to Brahman as the First Cause, on account of His being represented in one text as described in other texts.

Karanatvena: as the (First) cause; Cha: and; Akasadishu: with reference to Akasa and the rest; Yatha: as; Vyapadishta: taught in different Srutis; Ukteh: because of the statement.

The doubt that may arise from Sutra 13 that different Srutis may draw different conclusions as to the cause of the universe is removed by this Sutra.

In the preceding part of the work the proper definition of Brahman has been given. It has been shown that all the Vedanta texts have Brahman for their common topic. It has been proved also that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the Pradhana. But now the Sankhya raises a new objection.

He says: It is not possible to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin etc., of the universe or that all the Vedanta texts refer to Brahman; because the Vedanta passages contradict one another. All the Vedanta texts speak of the successive steps of the creation in different order. In reality they speak of different creations. Thus in Tait. Up. II-1-1 we find that creation proceeds from Self or Brahman From the Self sprang Akasa, from Akasa air etc. This passage shows that the cause of creation is Atman. In another place it is said that the creation began with fire (Chh. Up. VI-2-3). In another place, again, it is said The person created breath and from breath faith (Pras. Up. IV-4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water above the heaven, light, the mortal (earth) and the water below the earth (Aitareya Aranyaka II-4-1-2, 3). There no order is stated at all. Somewhere it is said that the creation originated from the non-existent (Asat). In the beginning there was the non-existent (Asat); from it was born what exists (Tait. Up. II-7). In the beginning there was the non-existent; it became existent; it grew (Chh. Up. III-19-1). In another place it is said Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is to be born of that which is not (Chh. Up. VI-2-1& 2).

In another place Sat is said to be the cause of the universe Sat alone was in the beginning Chh. Up. VI-2-1. In another place, again, the creation of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously. Again we find that Avyakta is said to be the cause of the world Now all this was then Avyakrita (undeveloped). It became developed by name and form Bri. Up. 1-4-7. Thus the Upanishads are not consistent, as regards the cause of the universe. Thus it is not possible to ascertain that Brahman alone is taught in the Upanishads as the cause of the world. As many discrepancies are observed, the Vedanta texts cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the universe. We must accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Sruti and reasoning.

It is possible to say that Pradhana alone is taught to be the cause of the world as we find from the passage of the Bri. Up. already quoted above. Further the words Sat, and Asat, Prana, Akasa and Avyakrita can very well be applied to Pradhana, because some of them such as Akasa, Prana are the effects of Pradhana, while others are the names of Pradhana itself. All these terms cannot be applied to Brahman.

In some passages we find that Atman and Brahman are also said to be the cause of the world; but these two terms can be applied to Pradhana also. The literal meaning of the word `Atman' is all-pervading. Pradhana is all-pervading. Brahman literally means that which is pre-eminently great (Brihat). Pradhana may be called Brahman also. Pradhana is called Asat in its aspect of modified things and it is called Sat or being in its causal or eternal aspect. Pradhana is called Prana as it is an element produced from it. Thinking etc., may also apply to Pradhana in a metaphorical sense, meaning the commencement of action. So when the Upanishad says It thought, let me become many, it means, that Pradhana started the action of multiplication. Therefore all the Upanishad passages relating to creation harmonise better with the theory of Pradhana being the creator than of Brahman.

The Siddhantin gives the following reply. Although the Vedanta texts may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created such as ether and so on, yet they uniformly declare that Brahman is the First Cause. The Vedantic passages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are in harmony throughout. It cannot be said that the conflict of statements regarding the universe affects the statements regarding the cause i.e., Brahman. It is not the main object of the Vedanta texts to teach about creation. Therefore it would not even matter greatly. The chief purpose of the Srutis is to teach that Brahman is the First Cause. There is no conflict regarding this.

The teacher will reconcile later on these conflicting passages also which refer to the universe.

Samakarshat I.4.15 (121)

On account of the connection (with passages treating of Brahman, non-existence does not mean absolute Non-existence)

Samakarshat: from its connection with a distant expression.

Some texts from the Taittiriya, the Chhandogya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishads are taken up for discussion.

The Sankhyas raise another objection. They say: There is a conflict with reference to the first cause, because some texts declare that the Self created these worlds (Ait. Ar. II-4-1-2-3). Some Vedanta passages declare that creation originated from non-existence (Tait. II-7). Again in some passages existence is taught as the First Cause (Chh. Up. VI-1-2). Some Srutis speak of spontaneous creation. It cannot be said that the Srutis refer to Brahman uniformly as the First Cause owing to the conflicting statements of the Vedanta texts.

The Siddhantin gives the following reply. We read in the Tait. Up. II-7 This was indeed non-existence in the beginning. Non-existence here does not mean absolute non-existence. It means undifferentiated existence. In the beginning existence was undifferentiated into name and form. Taittriya Upanishad says He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing Tait. Up. II-6. It is further elaborated by means of the series of sheaths viz., the sheath of food etc. represented as the inner self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause. He wished `May I be many'. This clearly intimates that Brahman created the whole universe.

The term `Being' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by means and forms. The term `Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation. Brahman is called `Non-being' previously to the origination of the world in a secondary sense.

We read in Chh. Up. VI-2-2 How can that which is created from non-existence be? This clearly denies such a possibility.

Now this was then undeveloped (Bri. Up. I-4-7) does not by any means assert that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler, because it is connected with another passage where it is said, He has entered here to the very tips of the finger-nails (Bri. Up. I-4-7). `He' refers to the Ruler. Therefore we have to take that the Lord, the Ruler, developed what was undeveloped.

Another scriptural text also describes that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a Ruler. Let me now enter these beings with this loving Self, and let me then evolve names and forms Chh. Up. VI-3-2.

Although there is a reaper it is said The corn-field reaps itself. It is said also The village is being approached. Here we have to supply by Devadatta or somebody else.

Brahman is described in one place as existence. In another place it is described as the Self of all. Therefore it is a settled conclusion that all Vedanta texts uniformly point to Brahman as the First Cause. Certainly there is no conflict on this point.

Even in the passage that declares Asat i.e. non-being to be the cause there is a reference to Sat i.e. Being. Even the text that describes Asat as the Causal force ends by referring to Sat.

The doubt about the meaning of a word or passage can be removed by reference to its connection with a distant passage in the same text, for such connection is found to exist in the different passages of Sruti. The exact meaning of such words as `Asat' which means non-entity, apparently, `Avyakrita' which means apparently non-manifest Pradhana of Sankhya, is thus ascertained to be Brahman. Compare the Srutis: meeskeƒeceele He desired, I will be many I will manifest myself Tait. Up. II-6-2. Demee Foce®e Deemeerled

This was at first Asatapparently a non-entity. Tait. II-7-1. The meaning of the word Asat of the second passage is ascertained to be Brahman by reference to the first passage where the same question namely the state of the universe before creation is answered in a clearer way.

The meaning of the word Avyakrita in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad I-4-7 in the passage ƒleceemeerled (thus therefore, that was the undifferentiated) is ascertained to be the Brahman as still undeveloped by a reference to the passage me S<
The Pradhana of the Sankhyas does not find a place anywhere in the passages which treat about the cause of the world. The words `Asat' `Avyakrita' also denote Brahman only.

The word `Asat' refers to Brahman which is the subject under discussion in the previous verse. Before the creation, the distinction of names and forms did not exist. Brahman also then did not exist in the sense that He was not connected with names and forms. As he has then no name and form, he is said to be Asat or non-existent.

The word `Asat' cannot mean matter or non-being, because in this very passage we find that the description given of it can apply only to Brahman.

Brahman is not `Asat' in the literal meaning of that word. The seer of the Upanishad uses it in a sense totally distinct from its ordinary denotation.

BALAKYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 5 (SUTRAS 16-18)

HE WHO IS THE MAKER OF THE SUN, MOON, ETC. IS BRAHMAN

and not Prana or the individual soul

Jagadvachitvat I.4.16 (122)

(He whose work is this is Brahman) because (the `work') denotes the world.

Jagat: the world; Vachitvat: because of the denotation.

A passage from the Kaushitaki Upanishad is now taken up for discussion.

In the Kaushitaki Brahmana the sage Balaki promises to teach Brahman by saying I shall tell you Brahman, and he goes on to describe sixteen things as Brahman, beginning with the Sun. All these are set aside by the King Ajatasatru who says, none of them is Brahman. When Balaki is silenced, Ajatasatru gives the teaching about Brahman in these words: O Balaki! He who is the maker of those persons whom you mentioned and whose work is the visible universeis alone to be known.

We read in the Kaushitaki Upanishad in the dialogue between Balaki and Ajatasatru O Balaki, He who is the maker of those persons whom you mentioned, and whose work is this (visible universe) is alone to be known (Kau. Up. IV-19).

A doubt arises now whether what is here said as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the Prana or Brahman, the Supreme Self. The Purvapakshin holds that the vital force or Prana is meant, because he says the clause of whom this is the work points to the activity of motion and that activity rests on Prana. Secondly, we meet with the term `Prana' in a complementary passage. Then he becomes one with the Prana alone Kau. Up. IV-20. The word `Prana' denotes the vital force. This is well known. Thirdly, Prana is the maker of all the persons, the person in the Sun, the person in the moon etc. We know from another scriptural text that the Sun and other deities are only differentiations of Prana, Who is that one God in whom all other gods are contained? Prana and he is Brahman, and they call him That' (Bri. Up. III-9-9).

Or the passage refers to the individual soul as the object of knowledge. A subsequent passage contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, As the master feeds with his people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the other selfs Kau. Up. IV-20. As the individual soul is the support of the Prana, it may itself be called Prana. We thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief Prana but not to the Lord of whom it does not contain any inferential marks whatsoever.

The Sutra refutes all these and says it is Brahman that is referred to the maker in the text; because Brahman is taught here I shall teach you Brahman. Again `this' which means the world, is his `work.' This clearly points out that the `he' is Brahman only.

The reference in the Kaushitaki Brahmana passage is to the Supreme Lord because of the reference to the world. The activity referred to is the world of which the Lord is the Creator.

Therefore the maker is neither Prana nor the individual soul, but the Highest Lord. It is affirmed in all Vedanta texts that the Maker of the world is the Supreme Lord.

Jivamukhyapranalinganneti chet tad vyakhyatam I.4.17 (123)

If it be said that on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief Prana (Brahman is) not (referred to by the word `matter' in the passage quoted), (we reply) that has already been explained.

Jiva: the individual soul; Mukhyaprana: the chief vital air; Lingat: because of the inferential marks; Na iti: not thus; Chet: if; Tat: that; Yyakhyatam: has already been explained.

An objection to Sutra 16 is raised and refuted. The objection has already been disposed of under I-1-31.

In the Sutra I-1-31 which dealt with the topic of the dialogue between Indra and Pratardana, this objection was raised and answered. All those arguments would apply here also. It was shown there that when a text is interpreted as referring to Brahman on the ground of a comprehensive survey of its initial and concluding clauses, all other inferential marks which point to other topics, such as Jiva or Prana etc., must be so interpreted that they may be in harmony with the main topic.

Here also the initial clause refers to Brahman in the sentence Shall I tell you Brahman? The concluding clause is Having overcome all evils, he obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy, yea, he who knows this. Thus the initial and concluding clauses here also refer to Brahman. If in the middle of this text we find any mark from which Jiva or any other topic may be inferred, we must so interpret the passage as to refer to Brahman, in order to avoid contradiction.

This topic is not redundant as it is already taught in Sutra I-1-31, because the chief point discussed here is the word `Karma' which is liable to misinterpretation. Therefore this Adhikarana certainly teaches something new.

The word Prana occurs in the sense of Brahman in the passage The mind settles down on Prana Chh. Up. VI-8-2.

Anyartham tu Jaiminih prasnavyakhyanabhyamapi

chaivameke I.4.18 (124)

But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul in the text) has another purpose on account of the question and the reply; moreover, thus some also (the Vajasaneyins) (read in their text or recension).

Anyartham: for another purpose; Tu: but; Jaiminih: Jaimini; Prasna-vyakhyanabhyam: from the question and the reply; Api: also; Cha: and; Evam: in this way; Eke: others, other Srutis

An argument in support of Sutra 16 is given.

Even the reference to the individual soul has a different purpose i.e. aims at intimating Brahman.

After Ajatasatru has taught Balaki by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is different from the Prana or the vital air, he asks the following question: Balaki, where did the person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back? Kau. Up. IV. 19. These questions clearly refer to something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does the answer (Kau. Up. IV.20) say that the individual soul is merged in Brahman in deep sleep.

When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that Prana alone, and `from that Self all Pranas proceed, each towards its place, from the Pranas the gods, from the gods the worlds.

This conversation occurs in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. It clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term the person consisting of cognition (Vijnanamaya) and distinguishes from it the Highest Self. Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did he thus come back? (Bri. Up. II-1-16) and later on, in the reply to the above question, declares that `the person consisting of cognition lies in the ether within the heart'. We already know that the word `ether' denotes the supreme seat for instance in the passage above the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Chh. Up. VIII-1-1).

VAKYANVAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 6 (SUTRAS 19-22)

THE ATMAN TO BE SEEN THROUGH HEARING ETC., OF THE

Bri. Up. II-4-5 is Brahman and not Jivatma

Vakyanvayat I.4.19 (125)

(The Self to be seen, to be heard etc., is the Supreme Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

Vakyanvayat: On account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

A passage from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is now taken up for discussion.

From the synthetic study of the context it is clear that the reference is to the Supreme Self.

We read in the Maitreyi-Brahmana of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad the following passage: Verily a husband is not dear that you may love the husband etc., but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected and to be meditated upon, O Maitreyi! When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected and realised or known, then all this is known Bri. Up. IV-5-6.

Here a doubt arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be heard and so on is the individual soul or the Supreme Self.

The Purvapakshin says: The Self is by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer. From this it appears that the text refers to the individual soul.

This Sutra refutes this and says that in this passage the highest Self is referred to, and not the individual soul. In the whole Section Brahman is treated. Maitreyi says to her husband Yajnavalkya: What should I do with the wealth by which I do not become immortal? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me. Thereupon Yajnavalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Scripture and Smriti declare that immortality can be attained only by the knowledge of the Supreme Self. Then Yajnavalkya teaches her the knowledge of the Self. Finally the Section concludes with Thus far goes immortality.

Immortality cannot be attained by the knowledge of the individual soul, but only by the knowledge of the Highest Self or Brahman. Therefore Brahman alone is the subject matter of the passage under discussion. Brahman alone is to be seen or realised through hearing, reflection and meditation.

Yajnavalkya declares that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge. It follows from all this that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the Supreme Self.

Further it is said in the text that by the knowledge of the Self everything is known. This clearly intimates that the Self is Brahman only because how can the knowledge of finite Jiva or individual soul give us knowledge of everything?

Pratijnasiddherlingamasmarathyah I.4.20 (126)

(The fact that the individual soul is taught as the object of realisation is an) indicatory mark which is proof of the proposition; so Asmarathya thinks.

Pratijnasiddheh: because of the proof of the proposition; Lingam: indicatory mark; Asmarathyah: the sage Asmarathya.

An argument in support of Sutra 19 is given. The indication is that the individual soul is not different from Brahman, the Ultimate Cause, of which it is a ray. Hence to know Brahman, the Cause, is to know all that.

If the individual were quite different from Brahman, then by the knowledge of Brahman everything else would not be known. The initial statement aims at representing the individual soul or Jiva and the Supreme Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made. The non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul establishes the proposition, When the Self is known all this is known, All this is that Self.

Asmarathya is of opinion that the passages `Atmani vijnate sarvamidam vijnatam bhavati' and `Idam sarvam yadayamatma' prove the aspect of identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Self, because only then can be attained what is promised i.e., that by the knowledge of Brahman everything can be attained. I-4-20.

The sparks that proceed from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire as they are of the nature of the fire. They are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other. Similarly the individual souls also, which are the effects of Brahman, are neither absolutely different from Brahman, because that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other; and because if they were identical with Brahman, and therefore Omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Therefore the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different. This doctrine of Asmarathya is known as Bhedabhedavada. This is the opinion of the sage Asmarathya.

Utkramishyata evambhavadityaudulomih I.4.21 (127)

The initial statement identifies the individual soul with Brahman or the Supreme Self because the soul, when it will depart (from the body), is such (i.e. one with the Supreme Self); thus Audulomi thinks.

Utkramishyata: of him who would pass away from the body; Evam bhavat: because of this condition; Iti: thus; Audulomih: the sage Audulomi.

The argument in support of Sutra 19 is continued.

Jiva or the individual soul which is associated with its different limiting adjuncts viz., body, senses and mind, attains freedom through meditation and knowledge. When it rises from the body i.e., when it is free and has no body-consciousness, it realises that it is identical with Brahman. Therefore it is represented as non-different from the Supreme Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Audulomi.

We read in the Srutis also that serene being arising from this body, appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the Highest Light Chh. Up. VIII-12-3. Mundakopanishad says As the flowing rivers vanish in the sea, having lost their name and form, so also the sage, freed from name and form, goes to the Divine Person who is greater than the great Mun. Up. III-2-8.

The individual soul is absolutely different from the Supreme Self. It is conditioned by the different limiting adjuncts viz., body, senses, mind and intellect. But it is spoken of in the Upanishads as non-different from the Supreme Self because it may pass out of the body and become one with the Supreme Self, after having purified itself by means of meditation and knowledge. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. This doctrine advocated by Audulomiwhich holds that difference between the individual soul and Brahman in the state of ignorance is a realityis a Satyabhedavada.

Avasthiteriti Kasakritsnah I.4.22 (128)

(The initial statement is made) because (the Supreme Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so the Sage Kasakritsna thinks.

Avasthiteh: because of the existence; Iti: thus (holds); Kasakritsnah: the sage Kasakritsna.

The argument in support of Sutra 19 is continued.

The individual soul or Jiva is quite different in nature from Brahman or the Supreme Self. It is not possible for the individual soul to be one with Brahman in the state of emancipation. Therefore the teacher Kasakritsna thinks that the Highest Self Itself exists as the individual soul. As the Supreme Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, the Sage Kasakritsna is of opinion that the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible.

Brahman of the Supreme Self and the individual soul are absolutely non-different. The apparent difference is due to Upadhis or limiting vehicles or adjuncts which are only products of Avidya or ignorance. The difference is illusory or unreal from the absolute or transcendental view point. Therefore it follows that everything else is known by the knowledge of the Self or Brahmajnana.

That the Supreme Self only is that which appears as the individual soul is obvious from the Brahmana-passage Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms.

Sutra 20 means that, the affirmation that by knowing It everything is known, shows the individual soul and the Supreme Self are non-different. Sutra 21 means the identity of the soul and the Supreme Self, refers to the state of attainment of the Supreme Self by the purified and perfected soul. Sutra 22 means that even now the Supreme Self is the individual soul. It is not that the individual soul is dissolved or merged in the Supreme Self. Our erroneous sense of diversity and separateness is lost or dissolved but the soul, which is in reality the Supreme Self (or the one Atman which alone exists), exists for ever.

Of these three opinions, the one held by Kasakritsna is in accordance with the Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta texts teach.

According to the statement of Asmarathya, the soul is not absolutely different from the Supreme Self. His declaration indicates by the expression Owing to the fulfilment of the promise, that there is a certain relation of cause and effect between the Supreme Self and the individual soul. The promise is made in the two passages when the Self is known, all this is known and all this is that Self. According to Asmarathya the individual soul is a product of the Highest Self. Therefore the knowledge of the cause gives rise to the knowledge of everything. If the Soul and the Supreme Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known can be fulfilled.

According to the view of Audulomi the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition; the individual soul is only a state of the highest Self or Brahman. The view of Asmarathya and Audulomi cannot stand.

Jivahood is an unreality. It is a creation of Avidya or nescience. The individual soul is identical with Brahman in essence. On account of ignorance we feel that we are conditioned or limited by the false, illusory Upadhis and that we are different from Brahman. Really the individual soul is neither created nor destroyed. If the Jivahood is a reality it can never be destroyed and liberation would be impossible. If the individual soul becomes one with Brahman or the Highest Self when it attains freedom or the final emancipation, then Jivahood is illusory. The origin of the souls from the Supreme Self like sparks from the fire is not real creation. It must be viewed only with reference to the limiting adjuncts.

The objector says: the passage, `Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge', indicates the final annihilation of the soul, but not its oneness with the Supreme Self.

We reply, this is incorrect. The passage means to say only that all sense perception ceases when the soul departs from the body, not that the Self is annihilated. The passage intimates that the eternally unchanging Self which is one mass of knowledge or consciousness cannot certainly perish but by means of true knowledge of the Self, disconnection with the elements and the sense organs, which are the products of ignorance, has taken place.

The individual soul and the Supreme Self differ in name only. It is a settled conclusion that perfect knowledge produces absolute oneness of the two. The Self is called by many different names but it is One only. Perfect knowledge is the door to Moksha or the final emancipation. Moksha is not something effected and non-eternal, It is eternal and is not different from the eternally unchanging, immortal, pure Brahman who is One without a second. Those who state that there is distinction between the individual and the Supreme Self are not in harmony with the true sense of the Vedanta texts.

PRAKRTYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC7 (SUTRA 23-27)

BRAHMAN IS BOTH THE EFFICIENT AND THE MATERIAL CAUSE

Prakritischa pratijna drishtantanuparodhat I.4.23 (129)

(Brahman is) the material cause also on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the proposition and the illustrations (quoted in the Sruti).

Prakritih: the material cause; Cha: also; Pratijna: the proposition; Drishtanta: illustrations; Anuparodhat: on account of this not being in conflict.

This Sutra states that Brahman is the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe.

Brahman has been defined as that from which proceed the origin, sustenance and dissolution of this universe. Now a doubt arises whether Brahman is the material cause like clay or gold, or the efficient or operative causality like potter or goldsmith.

The Purvapakshin or the objector holds that Brahman is the only operative or the efficient cause of the world, as in texts like, He reflected, he created Prana Pras. Up. VI.3&4. Observation and experience intimate that the action of operative causes only such as potters and the like is preceded by thinking or reflection. It is, therefore, quite correct that we should regard the creator also in the same light. The creator is declared as the `Lord'. Lords such as kings are known only as operative causes. The Supreme Lord must be regarded as an operative cause.

This Sutra refutes this prima facie view of the Purvapakshin. Brahman is also the material cause of this universe. The term `cha' (also) indicates that Brahman is the efficient cause as well. Only if Brahman is the material cause of the universe it is possible to know everything through the knowledge of Brahman. Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known? (Chh. Up. IV.1-2), which declare that the effects are not different from their efficient cause, because we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter is different from the house he has built.

The illustrations referred to here are My dear, as by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification i.e., the effect being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely etc. (Chh. Up. VI-14). These texts clearly indicate that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, otherwise they would be meaningless.

Promising statements are made in other places also. For instance What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known, Mun. Up. I.1.3. When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived and known then all this is known (Bri. Up. IV-5-6). All these promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedanta texts prove that Brahman is also the material cause.

There is no other guiding being than Brahman. We have to conclude from this that Brahman is the efficient cause at the same time. Lumps of clay and pieces of gold are dependent on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative or efficient cause to which the material cause could look, because the scripture says that Brahman was One without a second previous to creation. Who else could be an efficient or operative cause when there was nothing else?

If that were admitted that there is a guiding principle different from the material cause, in that case everything cannot be known through one thing. Consequently the promissory statements and the illustrations would be stultified.

Therefore Brahman is the efficient cause, because there is no other ruling principle. He is the material cause as well because there is no other substance from which the universe can take its origin.

For the sake of harmony between the proposition to be established and illustrations given therein, we conclude that Brahman is the material cause of the world. The text expressly declares Him to be the efficient or operative cause as well.

Abhidhyopadesacca I. 4.24 (130)

On account of the statement of will or reflection (to create on the part of the Supreme Self, It is the material cause).

Abidhya: will, reflection; Upadesat: on account of instruction or teaching or statement; Cha: also, and.

An argument in support of Sutra 23 is given He wished or thought may I be many, may I grow forth. In this text the desire and reflection indicate that Brahman is the efficient cause.

May I be many shows that Brahman Himself became many. Therefore He is the material cause as well.

He willed to manifest Himself as many i.e., as the universe.

He willed to evolve the universe out of Himself. This intimates that He is at once the material and the efficient cause of creation.

Sakshaccobhayamnanat I.4.25 (131)

And because the Sruti states that both (the origin and the dissolution of the universe) have Brahman for their material cause.

Sakshat: direct; Cha: also; Ubhayamnanat: because the Sruti states both.

The argument in support of Sutra 23 is continued.

This Sutra provides a further argument for Brahman's being the general material cause.

That from which a thing takes its origin and into which it is withdrawn, and absorbed is its material cause. This is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley and the like. All these things take their origin from the Akasa (Brahman) alone and return into the Akasa Chh. Up. I-9-1.

That from which these things are produced, by which, when produced they live, and into which they enter at their dissolutiontry to know that. That is Brahman Tait. Up. III.1. These Upanishadic passages indicate clearly that Brahman is the material cause also.

The word `Sakshat' (direct) in the Sutra shows that there is no other material cause, but that all this originated from the Akasa (Brahman) only. Observation and experience teach that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material cause.

Atmakriteh parinamat I.4.26 (132)

(Brahman is the material cause of the world) because it created Itself by undergoing modification.

Atmakriteh: created itself; Parinamat: by undergoing modification.

The argument in support of Sutra 23 is continued.

We read in the Tait. Up. II-7 That Itself manifested Itself. This intimates that Brahman alone created the world out of Itself, which is possible only by undergoing modification. This represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent. So He is the Karta (creator-agent) and Karma (creation). He becomes the creation by means of Parinama (evolution or modification).

The word `Itself' intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self. The modification is apparent (Vivarta), according to Sri Sankaracharya. It is real, according to Sri Ramanujacharya. The world is unreal in the sense that it is not permanent. It is an illusion in the sense it has only a phenomenal existence, it has no existence separate from Brahman.

Yonischa hi giyate I.4.27 (133)

And because (Brahman) is called the source.

Yoni: the womb, the source, the origin; Cha: and; Hi: because; Giyate: is called.

The argument in support of Sutra 23 is continued.

Brahman is the material cause of the universe, also because He is stated in Sruti to be the source of the universe.

We read in Mundaka Upanishad III-1-3, The Maker, the Lord, the Person, who has his source in Brahman and that which the wise regard as the Source of all beings Mun. Up. I- 1-6.

Achintyam-avyaktam-ananta rupam, sivam, prasantam amritam brahmayonim; Tamadimadhyantavihinam-ekam vibhum chid- anandam-arupam-adbhutamHe is incomprehensible, unspeak- able, infinite in form, all-good, all-peace, immortal, the parent of the universe, without beginning, middle and end, without rival, all-pervading, all-consciousness, all-bliss, invisible, and inscrutable this indicates that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

The word Yoni or womb always denotes the material cause, as in the sentence the earth is the Yoni or womb of herbs and trees.

It is thus proved or established that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

SARVAVYAKHYANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 8

THE ARGUMENTS WHICH REFUTE THE SANKHYAS REFUTE THE OTHERS ALSO

Etena sarve vyakhyata vyakhyatah I.4.28 (134)

By this all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta texts) are explained.

Etena: by this, by what has been said; Sarve: all; Vyakhyatah: are explained.

The argument is concluded in this Sutra.

By what has been said in the foregoing Sutras it is to be understood that the teaching of all the Srutis, even those that have not been discussed points to Brahman, the only cause of the world.

By thus disproving the doctrine of Pradhana being the cause of the world all have been refuted. By overthrowing the chief disputant others are overthrown just as by defeating the commander all the others are also defeated. Thus those who attribute creation to atoms and other theorists are all defeated.

All doctrines that speak of two separate causes are refuted. The atomic theory and other theories are not based on scriptural authority. They contradict many scriptural texts.

The Sankhya doctrine according to which the Pradhana is the cause of the universe, has in the Sutras beginning with I.1.5 been again and again brought forward and refuted.

The doctrine of Pradhana stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine as it admits the non-difference of cause and effect like the Vedanta doctrine. Further, it has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma Sutras such as Devala and others. Moreover the Vedanta texts contain some passages which to some people who are endowed with dull intellect may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. For all these reasons the commentator has taken special trouble to refute the Pradhana doctrine. He has not directed his special attention to the atomic and other theories.

The repetition of the phrase `are explained' shows that the Chapter ends here.

It is proved that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

Thus ends the Fourth Pada (Section 4) of the First Adhyaya (Chapter I) of the Brahma Sutras or the Vedanta Philosophy.

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CHAPTER II - AVIRODHA-ADHYAYA

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION
Smriti-nyaya-virodha-parihara forms the topic of the first Pada. The Smritivirodha is dealt with in Sutras 1-3 and 12 also. The Nyayavirodha is treated in the rest of the Sutras. Pada (Section) 2 attacks the various Darsanas or systems of philosophy on their own grounds. The Third and Fourth Padas aim at establishing a unity of purport in the apparently divergent and inconsistent cosmological and psychological thoughts of the several Vedanta passages. Thus the title Avirodha or absence of contradiction given to the chapter is quite appropriate.
It has been shown in the First Chapter that the Omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of the world just as clay is the material cause of pots etc., and gold of golden ornaments. It has been conclusively proved also in the First Chapter that all the Vedanta texts treat of Brahman as the First Cause and that Brahman is the import of all the Vedanta texts. This was established by the Samanvaya.
Just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion, so also Brahman is the cause of the subsistence of this universe by His Rulership. Just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth, so also, projected world is finally reabsorbed into His essence during Pralaya or dissolution.
It has been further proved also that the Lord is the Self of all beings.
The doctrine of Pradhana being the cause of the world has been refuted in the First Chapter as it is not based on the authority of the scriptures.
In this Section the arguments based on reasoning against the doctrine which speaks of Brahman as the First Cause are refuted. Further arguments which claim their authoritativeness from the Smritis to establish the doctrine of Pradhana and the theory of the atoms are refuted in this Section.
SYNOPSIS
Previously it has been proved on the authority of Sruti that the matter or Pradhana is not the cause of the world. The First Chapter has proved that all the Vedantic texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the universe, viz., Brahman, whose nature is intelligence. It has also been proved that there is no scriptural text which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more particularly the Sankhya system.
The first two Padas of the Second Chapter refute any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely speculative grounds apart from the authority of the Srutis. They also show that no system that cannot be reconciled with the Vedanta can be established in a satisfactory manner.
Section I (Pada) of the Second Chapter proves by arguments that Brahman is the cause of the world and removes all objections that may be levelled against such conclusion.
Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1-2) refutes the objection of the Sankhyas that the accepting of the system of Vedanta involves the rejection of the Sankhya doctrine which constitutes a part of Smriti and so has claims or consideration. The Vedanta replies that the acceptance of the Sankhya Smriti would force us to reject other Smritis such as the Manu Smriti which are opposed to the doctrine of the Sankhyas. The Veda does not confirm the Sankhya Smriti but only those Smritis which teach that the universe takes its origin from an intelligent creator or intelligent primary cause (Brahman).
Adhikarana II: (Sutra 3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-Smriti. It discards the theory of the Yoga philosophy of Patanjali regarding the cause of the world.
Adhikarana III: (Sutras 4-5) raises an objection that as Brahman and the world are not similar in nature and properties, one being sentient, etc., and the other insentient, etc., Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe.
Adhikarana III: (Sutras 6-7) refutes the objection by stating that there are instances in the world of generation of the inanimate from the animate as, for instance, the production of hair from the living body, also of the animate from the inanimate as, for instance, the birth of scorpions and other insects from cow-dung. They prove that it is not necessary that the cause and the caused should be similar in all respects.
Adhikarana III: (Sutra 8) raises an objection that at the time of general dissolution, when the effect (world) is merged in the cause (Brahman), the latter must be contaminated by the former.
Adhikarana III: (Sutra 9) refutes the objection by showing that there are direct instances to the contrary, just as the products of the earth such as jars etc., at the time of dissolution do not change earth into their own nature; but, on the contrary, they are themselves changed into the substance of earth.
Adhikarana III: (Sutras 10-11), Adhikarana IV: (Sutra 12), Adhikarana IX: (Sutra 29) show that arguments directed against the view that Brahman is the cause of the world may be levelled against the opponents as well, such as the Sankhyas and the Vaiseshikas, because in the Sankhya system, the nameless Pradhana produces all names and forms and in the Vaiseshika system invisible and formless atoms unite and form a visible world. The Sutras state that arguments may be prolonged without any conclusion being arrived at and that the conclusion of the Vedas only is to be respected. All the views which are antagonistic to the Vedas are ruthlessly refuted.
Adhikarana V: (Sutra 13) teaches that although the enjoying souls and the objects are in reality nothing but Brahman, yet they may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, the ripples and foam of the ocean although they are in essence identical and only sea water.
Adhikarana VI: (Sutras 14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, a doctrine of the Vedanta which is defended by the followers of the Vedanta against the Vaiseshikas. According to the Vaiseshikas, the effect is something different from the cause.
Adhikarana VII: (Sutras 21-22) refutes the objection that Brahman in the form of the individual soul is subject to pleasure and pain by showing that though Brahman assumes the form of the individual soul, yet He transcends the latter and remains untainted by any property of Jiva whom He controls from within. Though the individual soul or Jiva is no other than Brahman Himself, yet Brahman remains the absolute Lord and as such above pleasure and pain. Jiva is a slave of Avidya. Brahman is the controller of Maya. When Jiva is freed from Avidya, he becomes identical with Brahman.
Adhikarana VIII: (Sutras 23-25) shows that Brahman, although devoid of material and instruments of action, may yet create the world through His Sat-Sankalpa or will power, just as gods by their mere power of volition create palaces, animals and the like and milk by itself turns into curds.
Adhikarana IX: (Sutras 26-29) explains that Brahman does not entirely transform Himself into the universe though He is without parts. Although He projects the world from Himself, yet He remains one and undivided. The world is unreal. The change is only apparent like the snake is the rope but not real. Brahman is not exhausted in the creation.
Adhikarana X: (Sutras 30-31) teaches that Brahman, although devoid of instruments of action, is able to create the universe by means of the diverse powers He possesses.
Adhikarana XI: (Sutras 32-33) explains that Brahman has no motive in creating the world but projects the universe out of mere sporting impulse which is inherent in Him.
Adhikarana XII: (Sutras 34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which are brought against Him owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various persons and the universal suffering in the world. Brahman acts as a creator and dispenser with reference to the merit and demerit of the individual souls.
Adhikarana XIII: (Sutra 37) sums up the preceding arguments and states that all the attributes of Brahman, viz., Omniscience, Omnipotence and the like, are found appropriate in Brahman alone and none else and are such as to capacitate Him for the creation of the universe. Brahman is, therefore, the cause of the world.
Smrityadhikaranam: Topic 1 (Sutras 1-2)
Refutation of Smritis not based on Srutis
Smrityanavakasadoshaprasanga iti chet na
anyasmrityanavakasadoshaprasangat II.1.1 (135)
If it be objected that (from the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) there would result the defect of there being no room for certain Smritis (we say) no, because (by the rejection of that doctrine) there would result the defect of want of room for some other Smriti.
Smriti: the Sankhya philosophy; Anavakasa: no room; Dosha: defect; Prasangat: Result, chance; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Anyasmriti: other Smritis; Anavakasadoshaprasangat: because there would result the defect of want of room for other Smritis.
The conclusion arrived at in Chapter I-Section IV, that Brahman is the cause of the world is corroborated by Smritis other than Sankhya. The earliest and the most orthodox of these Smritis is the Smriti written by Manu.
If you say that one set of Smritis will be ignored if it is said that Pradhana is not the cause of the world, will not another set of Smritis like Manu Smriti which is based on the Srutis and therefore more authoritative be ignored if you say that Brahman is not the cause? We have shown that the Sruti declares Brahman to be the cause. Only such Smritis which are in full agreement with the Sruti are authoritative. What if Kapila and others are Siddhas? Siddhi (perfection) depends on Dharma and Dharma depends on the Vedas. No Siddha is authoritative if his view is contrary to that of the Sruti. Smritis which are opposed to the Vedas should be rejected ruthlessly.
Kapila acknowledges a plurality of selfs. He does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. The system of Kapila contradicts the Vedas, not only the assumption of an independent Pradhana but also by its hypothesis of a plurality of selfs. We cannot explain the Vedanta texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with Kapila Smriti. Kapila Smriti contradicts the Srutis. Hence it should be disregarded.
The verse V-2 of Svetasvatara Upanishad does not refer to Kapila the founder of Sankhya philosophy. It refers to a different being altogether. The verse really means "He who before the creation of the world produced the golden coloured Brahma (Kapila) in order to maintain the universe". The word Kapila means here ‘golden coloured' and is another name for Brahma called Hiranygarbha.
Itaresham chanupalabdheh    II.1.2 (136)
And there being no mention (in the scriptures) of others (i.e., the effects of the Pradhana according to the Sankhya system), (the Sankhya system cannot be authoritative).
Itaresham: of others; Cha: and; Anupalabdheh: there being no mention.An argument in support of Sutra 1 is given.
Further such principles as Mahat etc., which are said to be products of Pradhana are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. On the other hand the elements and the senses are found in the Veda and in the world and hence may be referred to in the Smriti. Hence such words as Mahat etc., found in Smritis do not refer to products of Pradhana but to other categories revealed in the Sruti. See I.4.1.
There is no mention of the other categories of the Sankhyas anywhere in the Vedas. Therefore the Sankhya system cannot be authoritative.
Sankaracharya has proved that by the word Mahat we have to understand either the cosmic intellect or Hiranyagarbha or the individual soul, but in no case the Mahat of the Sankhya philosophy i.e., the first product of the Prakriti.
It is not only because Sankhya teaches that Pradhana is the author of creation which makes it unauthoritative, but it teaches other doctrines also which have no foundation in the Vedas. It teaches that souls are pure consciousness and all-pervading, that bondage and freedom is the work of Prakriti. It further teaches that there is no Supreme Self, the Lord of all. It also maintains that Pranas are merely forms of the functions of the five senses and have no separate existence of their own. All these heterodox doctrines are to be found there. Hence the Sankhya system cannot be authoritative.
Yogapratyuktyadhikaranam: Topic 2
Refutation of Yoga
Etena yogah pratyuktah          II.1.3 (137)
By this the Yoga philosophy is (also) refuted.
Etena: by this viz., by the refutation of the Sankhya Smriti;
Yogah: the Yoga philosophy; Pratyuktah: is (also) refuted.
The Yoga philosophy of Patanjali is refuted here. Yoga is called "Sesvara-Sankhya".
The Purvapakshin says: The Yoga system is given in the Upanishads also, like the Svetavatara Upanishad etc. "Holding his head, neck, trunk erect" etc. Svet. Up. II-8. "The Self is to be heard, to be thought of, to be meditated upon" Bri. Up. II-4-5. "This the firm holding back of the senses is what is called Yoga" Katha Up. II-3-11. "Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga" Katha. Up. II-3-18. Yoga is an aid to the concentration of mind. Without concentration one cannot have knowledge of Brahman. Hence Yoga is a means to knowledge. As the Yoga Smriti is based on the Srutis, it is authoritative. The Yoga Smriti acknowledges the Pradhana which is the First Cause.
For the same reason as adduced against the Sankhya system, the Yoga philosophy by Patanjali is also refuted as it also accepts the theory that Prakriti is the cause of the universe.
This Sutra remarks that by the refutation of the Sankhya Smriti the Yoga Smriti also is to be considered as refuted because the Yoga philosophy also recognises, in opposition to scripture, a Pradhana as the independent cause of the world and the great principle etc., as its effects although the Veda or common experience is not in favour of these views.
Though the Smriti is partly authoritative it should be rejected as it contradicts the Srutis on other topics.
Although there are many Smritis which treat of the soul, we have directed our attention to refute the Sankhya and Yoga, because they are widely known as offering the means for attaining the highest end of man. Moreover, they have obtained the appreciation of many great persons. Further their position is strengthened by Sruti "He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sankhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters" Svet. Up. VI-13.
We say that the highest goal of man cannot be attained by the knowledge of the Sankhya Smriti, or Yoga practice. Sruti clearly says that the final emancipation or the supreme beatitude can only be obtained by the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda. "Only the man who knows Brahman crosses over Death, there is no other path to go" Svet. Up. III-8.
The Sankhya and Yoga systems maintain duality. They do not discern the unity of the Self. In the text cited "That cause which is to be known by Sankhya and Yoga", the terms ‘Sankhya' and ‘Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation as these terms are used in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.
We certainly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. The Sankhyas say, "The soul is free from all qualities (Asanga)." This is in harmony with the Veda which declares that Purusha is essentially pure. "For that person is not attached to anything" Bri. Up. IV-3-16.
The Yoga prescribes retirement from the concerns of life (Nivritti) for the wandering Sannyasin. This is corroborated by the Sruti. "Then the Parivrajaka with orange robe, shaven, without any possession" etc. Jabala Upanishad. IV-7.
Their reasoning is acceptable to the extent to which it leads to Self-realisation.
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smritis. We hold that the truth can be realised nor known from the Vedanta texts only, "None who does not know the Veda perceives the great one" Taittiriya Brahmana III-12.9.7.
"I now ask thee that Person taught in the Upanishads" Bri. Up. III-9-2.
Na Vilakshanatvadhikaranam: Topic 3 (Sutras 4-11)
Brahman can be the cause of the universe, although
It is of a contrary nature from the universe
Na vilakshanatvadasya tathatvam cha sabdat            II.1.4 (138)
(The objector says that) Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, because this (the world) is of a different nature (from Brahman) and its being so (different from Brahman) (is known) from the scriptures.
Na: not (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world);
Vilakshanatvat: because of difference in nature; Asya: its (i.e. of this world); Tathatvam: its being so; Cha: and; Sabdat: from the word, from the Sruti.
There are eight Sutras in this Adhikarana. The first and the second express the Purvapaksha (objection) and the others express the true doctrine (Siddhanta).
The objections founded on Smriti against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of the universe have been refuted. We now proceed to refute those founded on reasoning.
Some plausible objections against Brahman being the cause of the world are raised in this Sutra and the subsequent one.
The objector says: Brahman is intelligence. Brahman is pure. But the universe is material, insentient and impure. Therefore, it is different from the nature of Brahman. Hence, Brahman cannot be the cause of this world.
The effect must be of the same nature as the cause. The effect is only cause in another form. The cause and effect cannot be entirely of a different nature. The intelligent and sentient Brahman cannot produce non-intelligent, insentient, material universe. If Brahman is taken to be the cause of the world, the nature of the two must be similar. But they appear to be quite different in essence or nature. Hence, Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The difference in nature is also known from the statements of Sruti, "Brahman became intelligence as well as non-intelligence (world)" (Taittiriya Upanishad, Brahmananda Valli, Sixth Anuvaka -Vijnanam cha avijnanam cha abhavat). Therefore, Brahman cannot be the cause of the material universe. Brahman, which is pure spirit, cannot be the cause of this universe, which is impure matter. The world which consists of pain, pleasure and illusion cannot be derived from Brahman.
Abhimanivyapadesastu viseshanugatibhyam II.1.5 (139)
But the reference is to the presiding deities (of the organs) on account of the special characterisation and also from the fact of a deity so presiding.
Abhimani: the presiding deity (of the organs and the elements);
Vyapadesah: an expression, an indication, pointing out of, denotation of; Tu: but; Visesha: specific adjunct, on account of distinction, because of so being qualified; Anugatibhyam: the act of pervading; Viseshanugatibhyam: from the specific adjunct as well as from the fact of pervading, on account of their entering.
This Sutra meets an objection to Sutra 4. The word ‘Tu' (but) discards the doubt raised.
Whenever an inanimate object is described in Smriti as behaving like animate beings, we are to understand that it is an indication of a deity presiding over it. In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural texts do not denote the mere material elements and organs but rather the intelligent deities which preside over each organ viz., speech, etc.
You will find in Kaushitaki Upanishad: "The deities contending with each other for who was the best." "All the deities recognised the pre-eminence in Prana" (Kau. Up. II-14). The Kaushitakins make express use of the word "deities" in order to exclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant. Aitareya Aranyaka (II-2-4) says, "Agni having become speech entered the mouth". This shows that each organ is connected with its own presiding deity.
There is a text in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (VI-I-7) which says, "These organs quarrelled over their respective greatness."
The texts of Chhandogya Upanishad also show the existence of such presiding deities. "The fire thought and produced water." This indicates that the inanimate object may be called God having reference to its presiding deity. The thought spoken of is that of the Highest Deity which is connected with the effects as a superintending principle. All these strengthen the hypothesis that the texts refer to the superintending deities.
From all this, we have to conclude that this universe is different in nature from Brahman. Therefore, the Universe cannot have Brahman for its material cause.
The next Sutra gives a very suitable reply to the objection raised by the Purvapakshin or the objector.
Drishyate tu    II.1.6 (140)
But it (such organisation of life from matter) is also seen.
Drishyate: is seen; Tu: but.
Objection raised in Sutras 4 and 5 are now refuted.
The word ‘but' discards the Purvapaksha. ‘But' refutes the Purvapakshin's or objector's views expressed in the last Sutra, viz., that this universe cannot have originated from Brahman, because it is different in character. For we see that from man who is intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that from non-intelligent matter such as cow-dung, scorpions etc., are produced. So the objections raised in Sutras 4 and 5 are not valid. Hence it is quite possible that this material universe could be produced by an intelligent Being, Brahman. Origination of insentient creation from the sentient Creator is not unreasonable.
The Mundaka Upanishad says "Just as the spider stretches forth and gathers together its threads, as herbs grow out of the earth, as from a living man comes out the hair, so also from the Imperishable comes out this universe" (I.1.7).
The objector may say that the body of a man is the cause of the hair and nails and not the man, and the cow-dung is the cause of the body of the scorpion, etc. Even then, there is difference in character between the cause, the dung and the effect, the body of the scorpion, in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the soul of the scorpion), which the other non-intelligent matter (the cow-dung) is not. They are not similar in all respects. If they were, then there would be nothing like cause and effect. If you expect to find all the aspects of Brahman in the world, then what is the difference between cause and effect?
The cause and its effects are not similar in all respects, but something in the cause is found in the effect also, just as clay in the lump is found in the jar also, though the shape, etc., of the two vary. The very relationship of cause and effect implies that there is some difference between the two. Some qualities of the cause, Brahman, such as existence and intelligence, are found in Its effect, the universe. All objects in the universe exist. The universe gets this quality from Brahman, which is Existence itself. Further the intelligence of Brahman illumines the entire world. The two qualities of Brahman, viz., existence and intelligence, are found in the universe. Hence it is quite proper to take Brahman as the cause of this universe, though there may be some difference in other respects between them.
Asaditi chet na pratishedhamatratvat II.1.7 (141)
If it be said (that the world, the effect, would then be) non-existent (before its origination or creation), (we say) no, because it is a mere negation (without any basis).
Asat: non-existence; Iti chet: if it be said; Na: no; Pratishedhamatratvat: because of denial, as it simply denies.
An objection to Sutra 6 is raised and refuted.
The opponent says that if Brahman which is intelligent, pure and devoid of qualities such as sound and so on, is the cause of the universe which is of an opposite nature, i.e., non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, etc., it follows that the effect, i.e., the world, was non-existent before its actual origination, because Brahman was then the only existence. This means that something which was non-existing is brought into existence, which is not accepted by the Vedantins who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.
The objection raised by the opponent is no real objection. It has no force on account of its being a mere negation.
This Sutra refutes the objection raised by the opponent. It declares that this negation is a mere statement without any objective validity. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without any object to be negatived. The effect certainly exists in the cause before its origination and also after it. The effect can never exist independently, apart from the cause either before or after creation. The Sruti says, "Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in Brahman is abandoned by everything" (Bri. Up. II-4-6).
Therefore, the universe exists in Brahman even before creation. It is not absolutely non-existent.
Apitau tadvatprasangadasamanjasam II.1.8 (142)
On account of the consequence that at the time of Pralaya or great dissolution (the cause becomes) like that (i.e., like the effect), the doctrine maintained hitherto (that Brahman is the cause of the universe) is absurd.
Apitau: at the time of Pralaya or the great dissolution; Tadvat: like that, like the effect; Prasangat: on account of the consequences; Asamanjasam: inconsistent, absurd.
A plausible objection against Brahman being the cause of the world is raised here.
The Purvapakshin or the opponent raises further objections.
During dissolution the effect, i.e., the world, is absorbed in the cause, the Brahman. Consequently, it follows that the cause becomes like the effect. The cause is affected by the nature of the effect. The evils of defects inherent in the effect will taint the cause. Brahman must be affected by the nature of the world, just as water is affected by the salt which is dissolved in it, just as the whole food is scented by the pungent smell of asafoetida when it is mixed with any condiment. He would become impure and would no more be the Omniscient cause of the universe as the Upanishads hold. He must become insentient, gross, limited, like the world, which is absurd. Brahman, therefore, cannot be the cause of the world.
There is another objection also. During dissolution all things have gone into a state of oneness with Brahman. All distinctions pass at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction. Then there would be no special cause left at the time of a new beginning of the universe. Consequently, the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed, etc. There will be no factor bringing about creation again.
The third objection is, if in spite of this a new creation is possible, then even the liberated souls or the Muktas who have become one with Brahman, will be dragged into rebirth.
It cannot be said that the universe remains distinct from the Highest Brahman even in the state of reabsorption or dissolution, because in that case it would be no dissolution at all. The effect existing separate from the cause is not possible.
Hence the Vedanta doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the universe is objectionable as it leads to all sorts of absurdities.
The next Sutra gives a suitable reply to this.
Na tu drishtantabhavat           II.1.9 (143)
But not (so) on account of the existence of illustrations.
Na: not; Tu: but; Drishtantabhavat: on account of illustrations.
The objection raised in Sutra 8 is refuted.
By the word ‘tu' (but) the possibility of the objection is set aside.
The objections have no force. Why should an effect which is resolved into the cause again affect the cause by introducing the defects of the effect? When the effect is involved in the cause, it does not at all taint the cause by its effects. There are innumerable instances. If a good ornament is melted into gold, how can the peculiarities of form of the ornament appear in the gold?
When a jar made up of clay is broken and reabsorbed into its original substance, i.e., clay, it does not impart to it its special features or qualities. It does not turn the earth into pots and pitchers but it is itself transformed as earth. The four-fold complex of organic beings which springs from the earth does not impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re-absorption.
Reabsorption cannot occur at all if the effect, when resolving back into its causal substance, continues to subsist there with all its individual properties.
Despite the non-difference of cause and effect, the effect has its self in the cause but not the cause in the effect. The effect is of the nature of the cause and not the cause the nature of the effect. Therefore the qualities of the effect cannot touch the cause.
Instead of Brahman being transformed into the world, the world is transformed into Brahman, being merged in Him at the time of its dissolution. Hence there cannot be any objection to Brahman being accepted as the cause of the world on the ground suggested in Sutra 8.
Though the world is full of misery, etc., yet Brahman is all pure, etc. He remains always untouched by evil. As youth, childhood and old age belong to the body only and not to the Self, as blindness and deafness etc., belong to the senses and not to the Self, so the defects of the world do not belong to Brahman and do not pervade the pure Brahman.
If cause and effect are separate as you say, there will be no involution at all. As cause and effect are one and the same, the objection that the defects of the effect will affect the cause is not peculiar to involution alone. If what the Purvapakshin says is correct, the defect will affect the cause even now. That the identity of cause and effect of Brahman and the universe, holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time, not only the time of involution or reabsorption is declared in many scriptural passages, as for instance-This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II.4.6). The Self is all this (Chh. Up. VII.25.2). The Immortal Brahman is this before (Mun. Up. II.2.11). All this is Brahman (Chh. Up. III.14.1).
If it is said that the defects are the effects of superimposition of Avidya or nescience and cannot affect the cause, this explanation will apply to involution also.
Cobra is not affected by the poison. A magician is not affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal. Even so Brahman is not affected by Maya. The world is only an illusion or appearance. Brahman appears as this universe, just as a rope appears as the snake. Therefore Brahman is unaffected by Maya or the world illusion. No one is affected by his dream-creations or the illusory visions of his dream, because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep. Similarly the Eternal Witness of all states of consciousness is not affected by the world or Maya.
Equally baseless is the second objection. There are parallel instances with reference to this also. In the state of deep sleep, you do not see anything. The soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction. There is no diversity, but as soon as you wake up you behold the world of diversity. The old stage of distinction comes again, as ignorance or Avidya is not destroyed. Chhandogya Upanishad says, "All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar or a worm or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become again" (Chh. Up. VI-9-2<|>&<|>3).
A similar phenomenon takes place during Pralaya or dissolution. The power of distinction remains in a potential state as Avidya or Nescience in the state of dissolution also. So long as the basic Avidya or ignorance is there, creation or evolution will follow involution just as a man wakes up after sleep.
The liberated souls will not be born again because in their case wrong knowledge or ignorance has been completely destroyed by perfect knowledge of Brahman.
The view held by the Purvapakshin that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman is not admitted by the Vedantins.
In conclusion it can be correctly said that the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
Svapakshadosacca      II.1.10 (144)
And because the objections (raised by the Sankhya against the Vedanta doctrine) apply to his (Sankhya) view also.
Svapakshadoshat: because of the objections, to his own view; Cha: and.
The objections raised in Sutras 4 and 8 are levelled against the opponents.
Now the tables are turned on the objector. The objections raised by him (the Sankhya) to the doctrines of Vedanta are applicable to his theory as well. In his doctrine of causation also, the world of forms and sounds takes its origin from Pradhana and Prakriti which has no form or sound. Thus the cause is different from the effect here also. In the state of reabsorption or dissolution, all objects merge into Pradhana and become one with it.
There is pervasion into the Pradhana of all the effects of the world. It is admitted by the Sankhyas also that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, and so the objection raised in Sutra 8 applies to Pradhana also. The Sankhya will have to admit that before the actual beginning, the effect was non-existent. Whatever objections that are raised against Vedanta in this respect are in fact true of the Sankhyas. That Brahman is the cause of the world, which is admitted by Sruti, cannot be thrown out by this sort of vain reasoning. Vedanta is based on the Srutis. Hence the doctrine of Vedanta is authoritative and infallible. Therefore it must be admitted. Further, the Vedantic view is preferable, because the objections have also been answered from the viewpoint of Vedanta. It is not possible to answer them from the viewpoint of the Sankhya.
Tarkapratishthanadapi anyathanumeyamiti chet
evamapyanirmoksha prasangah           II.1.11 (145)
If it be said that in consequence of the non-finality of reasoning we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.
Tarka: reasoning, argument; Apratishthanat: because of not having any fixity or finality; Api: also; Anyatha: otherwise; Anumeyam: to be inferred, to be ascertained, by arguing; Iti chet: if it be said, even thus in this way; Api: even; Anirmoksha: want of release, absence of the way out; Prasangah: consequence.
Objections raised in Sutras 4 and 8 are further refuted.
Great thinkers like Kapila and Kanada are seen to refute each other. Logic has no fixity or finality. The deductions of one reasoner are overthrown by another. What one man establishes through reason can be refuted by another man more intelligent and ingenious than he. Neither analogy nor syllogism can apply to the soul. Conclusions arrived at by mere argumentation, however well-reasoned, and not based on any authoritative statement, cannot be accepted as final as there still remains the chance of their being refuted by more expert sophists. Hence, the conclusion of Sruti alone must be accepted.
Without showing any regard to reasoning we must believe Brahman to be the material cause of the universe, because the Upanishad teaches so.
The conclusions of Vedanta are based on the Srutis which are infallible and authoritative. Reasoning which has no sure basis cannot overthrow the conclusions of Vedanta.
Reason has its own province and scope. It is useful in certain secular matters but in matters transcendental such as the existence of Brahman, final release, life beyond, the pronouncements of human intellect can never be perfectly free from doubt, because these are matters which are beyond the scope of intellect. Even if there is to be any finality of reasoning, it will not bring about any finality of doctrine with reference to the soul, because the soul cannot be experienced by the senses. Brahman cannot be an object of perception or of inference based on perception. Brahman is inconceivable and consequently unarguable. Kathopanishad says, "This knowledge is not to be obtained by argument, but it is easy to understand it, O Nachiketas, when taught by a teacher who beholds no difference" (I.2.9).
The opponent says: You cannot say that no reasoning whatever is well-founded because even the judgment about reasoning is arrived at through reasoning. You yourself can see that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only. Hence the statement that reasoning has never a sure basis is not correct. Further, if all reasoning were unfounded, human life would have to come to an end. You must reason correctly and properly.
We remark against this argument of the opponent that thus also then results "want of release". Although reasoning is well-founded with respect to certain things, with regard to the matter in hand there will result "want of release".
Those sages who teach about the final emancipation of the soul, declare that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge is always uniform. It depends upon the thing itself. Whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be the true thing. Knowledge that pertains to this is perfect or true knowledge. Mutual conflict of men's opinions is not possible in the case of true or perfect knowledge. But the conclusions of reasoning can never be uniform. The Sankhyas maintain through reasoning that Pradhana is the cause of the universe. The Naiyayikas arrive through reasoning that the Paramanus or atoms are the cause of the world. Which to accept? How, therefore, can knowledge which is based on reasoning, and whose object is not something always uniform, be true of perfect knowledge? We cannot come to a definite, positive conclusion through reasoning independent of the Srutis. The Veda is eternal. It is the source of knowledge. It has for its object firmly established things. Knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied at all by any of the logicians of the past, present or future. As the truth cannot be known through reasoning there will be no liberation.
We have thus established that perfection can be attained through knowledge of Brahman with the aid of Upanishads or the Srutis. Perfect knowledge is not possible without the help of the Srutis. Disregard of Srutis will lead to absence of final emancipation. Reasoning which goes against the scriptures is no proof of knowledge.
Our final position is that the intelligent Brahman must be regarded as the cause and substratum of the universe on the ground of scripture and of reasoning subordinate to scripture.
Sishtaparigrahadhikaranam: Topic 4
Kanada and Gautama Refuted
Etena sishtaparigraha api vyakhyatah II.1.12 (146)
By this (i.e. by the arguments against the Sankhyas) (those other theories) not accepted by the wise or competent persons are explained or refuted.
Etena: by this (by the above reasoning, by what has been said against Sankhya); Sishtaparigrahah: not accepted by the wise or competent persons; Api: also; Vyakhyatah: are explained or refuted.
Other views or theories not accepted by the Vedas are refuted.
Sishtah-the remaining systems like those of the "Atomists" trained, i.e., trained in the Vedas.
Sishtaparigrahah-all other views or systems of thought not accepted by those who are well instructed in the Vedas; all the different views or systems contrary to the Vedas.
Aparigrahah means those systems which do not acknowledge or accept (Parigraha) the Vedas as authority on these matters, but which rely on reason alone and which are not countenanced by the Veda.
All the different views or systems of thought which are contrary to the Vedas and which are not accepted by the disciplined and the wise are refuted by what is said against Sankhya, i.e., by the same arguments.
Like the theory of those who say that Pradhana or Prakriti is the cause of the world, the theories of those who postulate atoms as the cause are refuted by those who know the truths of scripture, like Manu or Vyasa, trained in the correct way of knowing them. The doctrine of the Pradhana deserves to be refuted first as it stands near to the Vedic system, and is supported by somewhat strong and weighty arguments. Further, it has to a certain extent been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda. If the most dangerous enemy is conquered, the minor enemies are already conquered. Even so, if the Sankhya doctrine is refuted, all other systems are already refuted also.
The Sutra teaches that by the demolition of the Sankhya doctrine given above, the remaining theories not comprised within the Vedas are also refuted, such as the theories of Kanada, Gautama, Akshapada, Buddhists, etc., because they are opposed to the Vedas on these points. The reasons are the same as in the case of Sankhya.
As regards the nature of the atom, there is no unanimity of opinion. Kanada and Gautama maintain it to be permanent, while the four schools of Buddhas hold it to be impermanent. The Vaibhashika Bauddhas hold that the atoms are momentary but have an objective existence (Kshanikam artha-bhutam). The Yogachara Bauddhas maintain it to be merely cognitional (Jnanarupam). The Madhyamikas hold it to be fundamentally void (Sunya-rupam). The Jains hold it to be real and unreal (Sad-asad-rupam).

Bhoktrapattyadhikaranam: Topic 5
The distinctions of enjoyer and enjoyed do not oppose unity
Bhoktrapatteravibhagaschet syallokavat    II.1.13 (147)
If it be said (that if Brahman be the cause then) on account of (the objects of enjoyment) turning into the enjoyer, non-distinction (between the enjoyer and the objects enjoyed) would result, we reply that such distinction may exist nevertheless as is experienced commonly in the world.
Bhoktri: one who enjoys and suffers; Apatteh: from the objections, if it be objected; Avibhagah: non-distinction; Chet: if it be said; Syat: may exist; Lokavat: as is experienced in the world.
Another objection based on reasoning is raised against Brahman being the cause and refuted.
The distinction between the enjoyer (the Jiva or the individual soul) and the objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience. The enjoyers are intelligent, embodied souls while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyemnt. Ramakrishna for instance, is an enjoyer while the mango which he eats is an object of enjoyment. If Brahman is the material cause of the universe, then the world, the effect would be non-different from Brahman. The Jiva and Brahman being identical, the difference between the subject and the object would be annihilated, as the one would pass over into the other. Consequently, Brahman cannot be held to be the material cause of the universe, as it would lead to the subiation of the well-established distinction between the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment.
If you say that the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world will lead to the enjoyer or spirit becoming one with the object of enjoyment (matter), we reply that such differentiation is appropriate in our case also, as instances are found in the universe in the case of ocean, its waves, foams and bubbles and of the Sun and its light. The ocean waves, foams and bubbles are one and yet diverse in the universe. Similarly, are the Brahman and the world. He created and entered into the creation. He is one with them, just as the ether in the sky and the ether in the pot are one although they appear to be separate.
Therefore it is possible to have difference and non-difference in things at the same time owing to the name and form. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other and yet they are not different from the Supreme Brahman. The enjoyers and objects of enjoyment are not different from the viewpoint of Brahman but they are different as enjoyers and objects enjoyed. There is not contradiction in this.
The conclusion is that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their Highest Cause, as the instnce of the ocean, and its waves, foams and bubbles demonstrates.
Arambhanadhikaranam: Topic 6 (Sutras 14-20)
The world (effect) is non-different from Brahman (the cause)
Tadananyatvamarambhanasabdadibhyah                11.1.14 (148)
The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.
Tat: (its, of the universe): Ananyatvam: non-difference; Arambhana sabdadibhyah: from words like 'origin', etc.
That the effect is not different from the cause is shown here.
In sutra 13, the Sutrakara spoke from the point of view of Parinamavada and refuted the objection raised by the opponent that Brahman cannot be the material cause as it contradicts perception. In Parinamavada, Brahman actually undergoes transformation or modification. Now the same objection is overthrown from the view point of Vivartavada. In Vivartavada there is only apparent modification. Rope appears as a snake. It is not transformed into an actual snake. This is the doctrine of Advaita of Sri Sankara.
In the previous Sutra the simile of the ocean and the waves was stated, accepting the apparent variety of objects. But in reality, cause and effect are one even now. This is clear from the word 'Arambhana' (beginning), just as by knowing a lump of clay, all clay will be known. Name is only a verbal modification. The true being is only clay. A pot is only clay even now. Similarly, the world is only Brahman even now. It is wrong to say that oneness and manifoldness are both true as in the case of ocean and waves, etc. The word 'eva' in 'Mrittiketyeva' shows that all diversity is unreal. The soul is declared to be one with Brahman.
The objector or Purvapakshin says: 'If there is only one Truth viz., Brahman, the diverse objects of perception will be negated. The ethical injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends does not really exist. Moreover, the science of liberation of the soul will have no reality, if the distinction of teacher and the student on which it depends is not real. There would be no bondage and hence no liberation. As the science of the soul itself is unreal, it cannot lead to the Reality. If the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self?
But these objects have no force because the whole phenomenal existence is regarded as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman has not arisen, just as the dream creatures are regarded to be true till the waking state arrives. When we wake up after dreams, we know the dream world to be false but the knowledge of dreams is not false. Moreover, even dreams sometimes forebode the imminent reality of death. The reality of realisation of Brahman cannot be said to be illusory because it destroys ignorance and leads to the cessation of illusion.

Bhave chopalabdheh                                               11.1.15(149)
And (because) only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is experienced.
Bhave: on the existence; Cha: and; Upalabdheh: is experienced effect (world) is inseparable from its material cause, Brahman, is continued.
The argument begun in Sutra 14 as to how it follows that the effect (world) is inseparable from its material cause, Brahman, is continued.
The effect is perceived only when the cause is present in it; otherwise not. A pot or cloth will exist even if the potter or the weaver isabsent, but it will not exist if the clay or thread is absent. This proves that the effect is not different from the cause. The Chhandogya Upanishad says, "All these created things, O my son, originate from Sat, i.e., Brahman, rest in Him and eventually dissolve in Him" (VI-8-4).
The objector says: There is no recognition of fire in the smoke. The smoke being the effect of fire, ought to show fire in it. To this we reply that smoke is really the effect of damp fuel. The damp fuel comes in contact with fire and throws off its earthly particles in the form of smoke. The smoke and the fuel are identical. We can recognise the fuel in the smoke. This is proved by the fact that the smoke has smell just as the fuel has. The smoke is generally of the same nature as that of the fuel.
The phenomena of the universe manifest only because Brahman exists. They cannot certainly appear without Brahman. Therefore the world (effect) is not different from Brahman, the cause.
Sattvacchavarasya                                               11.1.16 (150)
And on account of the posterior (i.e., the effect which comes after the cause) existing (as the cause before creation).
Sattvat: Because of the existence; Cha: and; Avarasya: of the posterior, i.e., of the effect as it comes after the cause, i.e., of the world.
The argument begun in Sutra 14 is continued.
The scripture says that the effect (the world) existed in its causal aspect (Brahman) before the creation.
"In the beginning, my dear, Sadeva somyedamagra asit, this was only existence" (Chh. Up.). "Atma va idam eka agra asit, verily in the beginning this was Self, one only" (Ait. Ar.2.4.1). "Brahma va idamagra asit. Before creation, this universe existed as Brahman" (Bri. Up. 1.4.10).
The Upanishads declare that the universe had its being in the cause, Brahman, before creation. It was one with Brahman. As the world was non-different from the cause before creation, it continues to be non-different after creation also.
The effect (world) is non-different from the cause (Brahman) because it is existent in the cause, identically even, prior to its manifestation, though in time it is posterior.
A thing which does not exist in another thing by the self of the latter is not produced from that other thing. For instance, oil is not produced from sand. We can get oil from the groundnut because it exists in the seed, though in latency, but not from sand, because it does notexist in it. The existence is the same both in the world and in Brahman. As everything exists in Brahman, so it can come out of it.
Brahman is in all time neither more nor less than that which is. So the effect also (the world) is in all time only that which is. That which is, is one only. Hence the effect is non-different from the cause.
Asadvyapadesanneti chet na dharmantarena
vakyaseshat                                                      11.1.17(151)
If it be said that on account of (the effect) being described as that which is not, (the effect does) not (exist before creation), we reply 'not so', because the term 'that which is not' denotes another characteristic or attribute (as is seen from the latter part of the text.
Asadvyapadesat: on account of its being described as non-existent; Na: not; Iti chet: if it be said; Na: no: Dharmantarena: by another attribute or characteristic; Vakyaseshat: from the latter part of the text or passage, because of the complementary passage.
The argument that the world had no existence before creation is refuted.
From the word 'Asat', literally meaning non-existence, in the Sruti, it may be argued that before creation the world had no existence. But that argument cannot stand as the latter part of the same text uses epithets other than "non-existent" to describe the condition of the world before creation. We understand from this that the world was existent before creation. This is established by reasoning also because something cannot come out of nothing and also by clear statements on other texts of Sruti. "Asad va idam agra asif-Asat was this verily in the beginning (Tait. Up. 11-7-1).
"Asat eva agre asif-This universe was at first but non-existent. Asat indeed was this in the beginning. From it verily proceeded the Sat (Chh. Up. III.19.1). The latter part of the passage is Tatsadasit" (That was existent). The word 'i i-existent' (Asat) universe does not certainly mean absolute non-existence, but that the universe did not exist in a gross, differentiated state. It existed in an extremely subtle unmanifested state. It was not differentiated. It had not yet developed name and form. The world was projected. Then it became gross, and developed name and form. You can get the meaning if you go through the latter part of the passage 'It became existent.' 'It grew'.
It is absurd to say that non-existence (Asat) existed. Therefore, Sat means manifest, i.e. having name and form, whereas Asat simply means fine, subtle and unmanifested. 'Asat' refers to another attribute of the effect, namely non-manifestation. The words Sat and Asat refer to two attributes of one and the same object, namely to its gross or manifested condition and subtle or unmanifested condition.
Asad va idamagra asit. Tato vai sadajayata. Tadatmanam svayamakuruta. Tasmat tatsukritamuchyata iti. Yadvai tatsukritam. Asat indeed was this in the beginning. From it verily proceeded the Sat. That made itself its Self. Therefore, it is said to be self-made.
The words "Asat made itself its Self clears up any doubt as to the real meaning of the word "that". If the word "Asat" meant absolute non-existence, then there will be a contradiction in terms, because non-existence can never make itself the Self of anything. The word "Asit" or "was" becomes absurd when applied to "Asat" because absolute non-existence can never be said to exist and 'was' means 'existed'. An absolute non-existence can have no relation with time past or present. Further, it cannot have any agency also as we find in the passage, "It made itself its Self." Hence the word 'Asat' should be explained as a subtle state of an object.
Yukteh sabdantaraccha                                           11.1.18(152)
From reasoning and from another Sruti text (the same is clear. This relation between cause and effect is established.)
Yukteh: from reasoning; Sabda-antarat: from another Sruti text; Cha: and.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause follows from reasoning and also from a further scriptural passage or another text of the Vedas.
The same fact is clear from logic or reasoning also. Otherwise, everything could have been produced from anything. If non-being is the cause, then why should there be an inevitable sequence? Why should curds be produced from milk and not from mud? It is impossible even within thousands of years to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. Particular causes produce particular effects only. The relation of cause and effect (e.g. the relation of mud and pot) is a relation of identity. The cause of our thinking and saying 'the pot exists' is the fact that the lump of clay assumes a particular form of a neck, hollow belly, etc., while the material remains as clay only. On the contrary we think and say 'the jar does not exist', when the clay pot is broken into piece. Hence existence and non-existence show only their different conditions. Non-existence in this connection does not mean absolute non-existence. This is reasoning or Yukti.
Just as an actor puts on many disguises and is yet the same man, so also the Ultimate Cause (Brahman) appears as these diverse objects and yet is the same.
Hence the cause exists before the effects and is non-different from the effect.
The effect exists in the cause in an unmanifested state. It is manifested during creation. That is all. An absolutely non-existent thing like the horns of a hare can never come into existence. The cause cannot produce altogether a new thing which was not existing in it already.
Further, we find from the well-known passage of the Chhandogya Upanishad, "In the beginning, my dear, there was only existence, one without a second" (Chh. Up. VI-2-1), that the effect exists even before creation and is non-different from its cause.
The author now gives some illustrations in order to confirm the doctrine that effect is identical with the cause.
Patavaccha                                                            11.1.19(153)
And like a piece of cloth.
Patavat: like a piece of cloth; Cha: and.
An example in support of Sutra 17 is presented.
Just as a rolled or folded piece of cloth is subsequently unrolled or unfolded, so also the world which rested unmanifested before creation becomes afterwards manifested. The world is like a folded cloth before creation. It is like a cloth that is spread out after creation. A folded cloth is not seen as a cloth till it is spread out. The threads are not seen as a cloth till they are woven. Even so, the effect is in the cause and is identical with the cause. In the folded state you cannot make out whether it is a cloth or anything else. But when it is spread out you can clearly know that is a cloth. In the state of dissolution (Pralaya) the world exists in a seed state or potential condition in Brahman.
There are no names and forms. The universe is in an undifferen-tiated or unmanifested state. It takes a gross form after creation. The names and forms are differentiated and manifested.
As a piece of cloth is not different from the threads, so the effect (world) is not different from its cause (Brahman).
The word "Cha" (and) of the Sutra shows that other illustrations like the seed and the tree may also be given here.
When the cloth is folded, you do not know of what definite length and width it is. But when it is unfolded you know all these particulars. You also know that the cloth is not different from the folded object. The effect, the piece of cloth, is unmanifested as long as it exists in its cause, i.e., the threads. It becomes manifest and is clearly seen on account of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, etc.
The conclusion is that the effect is not different from the cause.
Yatha cha pranadi                                                          11.1.20 (154)
And as in the case of the different Pranas or Vital airs. Yatha: as; Cha: and; Pranadi: in the case of Pranas or vital airs.
Another illustration in support of Sutra 17 is presented.
The word 'Cha' (and) in the Sutra shows that the last illustration of the piece of cloth and the present one of life functions should be read together as one illustration.
When the five different vital airs are controlled by the practice of Pranayama, they merge in the chief Prana, the cause which regulates breathing. Mere life only is maintained. All other functions such as bending and stretching of the limbs etc., are stopped. This shows that the various vital airs, the effects, are not different from their cause, the chief Prana. The different vital airs are only modifications of the chief or Mukhyaprana. So is the case with all effects. They are not different from the cause.
Thus it is established that the effect, the world, is identical with its cause, Brahman. Therefore, by knowing Brahman everything is known. As the whole world is an effect of Brahman and non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural text 'what is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (Chh. Up. VI.I.3) is fulfilled.
Itaravyapadesadhikaranam: Topic 7 (Sutras 21-23)
Brahman does not create evil
Itaravyapadesaddhitakaranadidoshaprasaktih          11.1.21 (155)
On account of the other (i.e., the individual soul) being stated (as non-different from Brahman) there would arise (in Brahman) the faults of not doing what is beneficial and the like.
Itaravyapadesat: on account of the other being stated (as non-different from Brahman); Hitakaranadidoshaprasaktih: defects of not doing what is beneficial and the like would arise. (Itara: other than being Brahman, i.e. the individual soul; Vyapadesat: from the designation, from the expression; Hita: good, beneficial; Akaranadi: not creating, etc.; Dosha: imperfection, defect, faults; Prasaktih: result, consequence.)
The discussions on the relation of the world to Brahman have been finished now. The question of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman is being raised by way of an objection in this Sutra.
In the previous Adhikarana, the oneness of the effect (world) with its cause (Brahman) has been established.
In this Sutra, the opponent or Purvapakshin raises an objection. He says, that if Brahman is the cause of the world, there is inappropri-ateness in that view because the scripture describes Jiva as being Brahman and, therefore, he will not cause harm to himself such as birth, death, old age, disease, by getting into the person of the body. A being which is itself absolutely pure, cannot take this altogether impure body as forming part of its Self.
The scripture declares the other, i.e., the embodied soul to be one with Brahman. "That is the Self. "Thou art That. O Svetaketu" (Chh. Up. VI.8.7.). By stating that the individual soul is one with Brahman, there arises room for finding out a fault in the wisdom of Brahman, that He is not doing good to Himself by creating suffering and pain on account of repeated births and deaths for Himself. Will any one do what is harmful and unpleasant to himself? Will he not remember that he created the world? Will he not destroy it as the cause of his suffering? Brahman would have created a very beautiful world where everything would have been pleasant for the individual soul without the least pain or suffering. That is not so. Hence, Brahman is not the cause of the world as Vedanta maintains. As we see that what would be beneficial is not done, the hypothesis of the world having come out of an Intelligent Cause (Brahman) is not acceptable.
Adhikam tu bhedanirdesat                                       11.1.22(156)
But (Brahman, the Creator, is) soemthing more (than the individual soul) on account of the statement in the Srutis (of difference) between the individual soul (and Brahman).
Adhikam: something more, greater than the Jiva; Tu: but; Bhedanirdesat: because of the pointing out of differences on account of the statement of difference. (Bheda: difference; Nirdesat: because of the pointing out).
The objection raised in Sutra 21 is refuted.
The word 'tu' (but) refutes the objection of the last Sutra. It discards the Purvapaksha.
The Creator of the world is Omnipotent. He is not the imprisoned, embodied soul. The defects mentioned in the previous Sutra such as doing what is not beneficial and the like do not attach to that Brahman because as eternal freedom is His characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by Him or non-beneficial to be avoided by Him. Moreover, there is no obstruction to His knowledge and power, because He is Omniscient and Omnipotent. He is a mere witness. He is conscious of the unreality of the world and Jiva. He has neither good nor evil. Hence the creation of a universe of good and evil by Him is unobjectionable.
The Jiva is of a different nature. The defects mentioned in the previous Sutra belong to the Jiva only, so long as he is in a state of ignorance. The Srutis clearly point out the difference between the individual soul and the Creator in texts like "Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected and to be meditated upon" (Bri. Up. 11.4.5). All these differences are imaginary or illusory on account of ignorance. When the individual soul attains knowledge of Brahman, he remembers his identity with Brahman. Then the whole phenomenon of plurality which springs from wrong knowledge disappears. There is neither the embodied soul nor the creator.
This Brahman is superior to the individual soul. The individual soul is not the creator of this universe. Hence the objection raised in Sutra 21 cannot stand. The possibility of faults clinging to Brahman is excluded.
Though Brahman assumes the form of the individual soul, yet He is not exhausted thereby. But He remains as something more, i.e., as the controller of the individual soul. This is obvious from the distinction pointed out in the Sruti. Hence there is no occasion for the fault spoken of in Sutra 21.
Asmadivaccha tadanupapattih                               11.1.23 (157)
And because the case is similar to that of stones, etc.,
(produced from the same earth), the objection raised is untenable.
Asmadivat: like stone, etc.; Cha: and; Tat anupapattih:   its untenability, unreasonableness, impossibility; (Tat: of that; Tasya: its, of the objection raised in Sutra 21).
The objection raised in Sutra 21 is further refuted.
The objector may say that Brahman which is Knowledge and Bliss and unchangeable cannot be the cause of a universe of diversity, of good and bad. This objection cannot stand, because we see that from the same material earth, stones of different values like diamonds, lapis lazuli, crystals and also ordinary stones are produced. From the seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring up, such as sandalwood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrance, juice, etc. One and the same food produces various effects such as blood, hair, nail, etc. So also, one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual selves and the highest Self and may produce various effects. So also from Brahman which is Bliss and Knowledge, a world of good and evil can be created.
Hence the objection imagined by others against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world cannot be maintained.
Moreover, the scripture declares that all effects have their origin in speech only. The dreaming man is one but the dream pictures are many. These are hinted at by the word 'Cha' of the Sutra.
Upasamharadarsanadhikaranam: Topic 8 (Sutras 24-25)
Brahman is the cause of the world
Upasamharadarsananneti chenna kshiravaddhi 11.1.24 (158)
If you object that Brahman without instruments cannot be the cause of the universe, because an agent is seen to collect materials for any construction, (we say) no, because (it is) like milk (turning into curds).
Upasamharadarsanat: because collection of materials is seen; Na: not; Iti chet: if it be said; Na: no; Kshiravat: like milk; Hi: because, as.
Darsanat: because of the seeing; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Vat: like, has the force of an instrumental case here. (See Sutra of Panini, Tena tulyam kriya etc.)
An objection that materials are necessary for the creation of the world is refuted.
Though Brahman is devoid of materials and instruments, He is yet the cause of the universe. If you object that an efficient cause like a potter is seen to use instruments and therefore Brahman cannot be the material cause as also the efficient cause, we reply that it is like milk turning into curds.
The objector, Purvapakshin, says: Workmen are found to collect materials to do their works. Brahman also must have required materials wherewith to create the world, but there was no other thing than Brahman before creation. He is one without a second. He could not have brought out His work of creation as there was no material, just as a potter could not have made his pots, if there had been no materials like earth, water, staffs, wheels, etc., before him.
This objection has no force. Materials are not required in every case. For instance, milk is itself transformed into curd. In milk no external agency is needed to change it into curds. If you say that in the case of milk heat is necessary for curdling the milk, we reply that heat merely accelerates the process of curdling. The curdling occurs through the inherent capacity of the milk. You cannot turn water into curds by the application of heat. The milk's capability of turning into curd is merely completed by the cooperation of auxiliary means.
Brahman manifests Himself in the form of the universe by His inscrutable power. He simply wills. The whole universe comes into being. Why cannot the Omnipotent Infinite Brahman create the world by His will-power (Sankalpa) alone without instruments and extraneous aids?
Brahman is Omnipotent and Infinite. Hence no extraneous aid or instrument is necessary for Him to create this world.
Thus Sruti also declares "There is no effect and no instrument known of Him, no one is seen like unto or better. His high power is revealed as manifold and inherent, acting as force and knowledge" (Svet. Up. VI. 8).
Therefore, Brahman, although one only, is able to transform Himself as this universe of diverse effects without any instrument or extraneous aid, on account of His infinite powers.
Devadivadapi loke                                                          11.1.25 (159)
(The case of Brahman creating the world is) like that of gods and other beings in the world (in ordinary experience).
Devadivat: like gods and others (saints); Api: even, also; Loke: in the world.
The word 'vat' has the force of sixth case here. Another reading is 'Iti' (thus), instead of 'Api1.
The argument in support of Sutra 24 is brought forward.
An objector (or Purvapakshin) says: 'The example of milk turning into curds is not appropriate as it is an insentient thing. Intelligent agents like potters begin to do their work after providing themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be said that Brahman, an intelligent Being, can do His work of creation without any auxiliary, without the aid of any constituent materials?' We reply, 'like gods and others.'
We see also that in the world gods and sages create particular things such as palaces, chariots, etc., by force of will, without external aid. Why cannot the Omnipotent Creator create the world by His will-power (Sat Sankalpa) or His infinite power of Maya?
Just as the spider projects out of itself the threads of its web, just as the female crane conceives without a male from hearing the sound of thunder, just as the lotus wanders from one lake to another without any means of conveyance so also the intelligent Brahman creates the world by itself without external instruments or aid.
The case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. No extraneous means is necessary for Brahman for creation. There is limitation in the creation of pots. The creation of Brahman cannot be limited by the conditions observed in the creation of pots. Brahman is Omnipotent.
Kritsnaprasaktyadhikaranam: Topic 9 (Sutras 26-29)
Brahman is the material cause of the universe, though He is without parts
Kritsnaprasaktimiravayavatvasabdakopo va           11.1.26 (160)
Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts (if Brahman is the material cause of the world).
Kritsnaprasaktih: possibility of the entire (Brahman being modified); Niravayavatvasabdakopat: contradiction of the scriptural statement that Brahman is without parts; Va: or, otherwise.
(Kritsna: entire, full, total; complete; Prasaktih: exigency, employment; activity; Niravayava: without parts, without form, without members, indivisible; Sabda: word, text, expressions in Sruti; Kopat: contradiction, violation, incongruity, stultification; Va: or.)
An objection that Brahman is not the material cause of the world, is raised in the Sutra.
The objector says that if the entire Brahman becomes the world, then no Brahman will remain distinct from the world and that if a part of Brahman becomes the world, the scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be without parts will be violated.
If Brahman is without parts and yet the material cause of the universe, then we have to admit that the entire Brahman becomes modified into the universe. Hence there will be no Brahman left but only the effect, the universe. Further, it will go against the declaration of the Sruti text that Brahman is unchangeable.
If on the contrary it is said that a portion of Brahman only becomes the universe, then we will have to accept that Brahman is made up of parts, which is denied by the scriptural texts. The passages are, niSkalaM niSkriyaM SantaM nirawadhyam niranjanaM-"He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint" (Svet. Up. VI. 19). Diwyo hyamUrtaH sa bahyabhyantaro hyajaH| -"That heavenly person is without body, He is both without and within, not produced" (Mun. Up. ll.1.2). edam mahadbhUtamanantamapaarM wigyanaghana ewa | -"That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but Knowledge" (Bit Up. ll.4.12). sa EShaNeti Neyamaatmaa | -"He is to be described by No, No" (Bri. Up. III.9.26). asthulamanaNu | -"It is neither coarse nor fine" (Bri. Up. III.8-8). All these passages deny the existence of parts or distinctions in Brahman.
Whatever has form is perishable and so Brahman also will become perishable or non-eternal.
Also if the universe is Brahman, where is the need for any command to see (Drastavya)? The texts which exhort us to strive to see Brahman become purposeless, because the effects of Brahman may be seen without any effort and apart from them no Brahman exists. Finally, the texts which declare Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.
Hence Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe. This objection is refuted in the next Sutra.
Srutestu sabdamulatvat                                        11.1.27 (161)
But (this is not so) on account of scriptural passages and on account of (Brahman) resting on scripture (only).
Sruteh: from Sruti, as it is stated in Sruti, on account of scriptural texts; Tu: but; Sabdamulatvat: on account of being based on the scripture, as Sruti is the foundation.
(Sabda: word, revelation, Sruti; Mula: foundation.)
The objection raised in Sutra 25 is refuted.
The entire Brahman does not become the world because the scripture declares so, and Brahman can be known only through the source of scripture.
The word 'tu' (but) discards the objection. It refutes the view of the previous Sutra. These objections have no force because we rely on the Sruti or scripture.
The entire Brahman does not undergo change, although the scriptures declare that the universe takes its origin from Brahman. Sruti says, "one foot (quarter) of Him is all beings, and three feet are what is immortal in heaven." (padohsya wiSwa BhUtaani tripaadasyaamrutam diwi)
Moreover, we are one with Brahman in deep sleep as stated by the scripture. How could that happen if the entire Brahman has become the world?
Further, the scripture declares that we can realise Brahman in the heart. How could that be if the entire Brahman has become the world?
Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived.
The scriptural texts declare Brahman to be without parts. Then how could a part become manifest? We reply that it is only the result of Avidya.
Are there two moons if on account of a defect of your vision you see two moons? You must rely on scriptures alone but not on logic for knowing what is beyond the mind.
Brahman rests exclusively on the Srutis or scriptures. The sacred scriptures alone, but not the senses, are authoritative regarding Brahman. Hence we will have to accept the declarations of the Srutis without the least hesitation.
The scriptural texts declare on the one hand that not the entire Brahman changes into its effects and on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, etc., possess powers which produce diverse opposite effects on account of difference of time, place, occasion and so on. No one is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, etc., without the help of instruction. When such is the case with ordinary things, how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought? The scripture declares "Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable."
Hence the Srutis or the scriptures alone are authority in matters supersensuous. We will have to accept that both these opposite views expressed by the scriptures are true, though it does not stand to reason. It must be remembered that the change in Brahman is only apparent and not real. Brahman somehow appears as this universe, just as rope appears as the snake. Brahman becomes the basis of the entire, apparent universe with its changes, but it remains at the same time unchanged in its true and real nature.
Atmani chaivam vichitrascha hi                             11.1.28 (162)
And because in the individual soul also (as in gods, magicians, in dreams) various (creation exists). Similarly (with Brahman also).
Atmani: in the individual soul; Cha: also, and; Evam: thus; Vichitrah: diverse, manifold, variegated; Cha: and, also; Hi: because.
The objection raised in Sutra 26 is further refuted by an illustration.
There is no reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self without destroying its character. In the dream state, we see such diverse and wonderful creation in ourselves. "There are no chariots in that dreaming state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads" (Bri. Up. IV.3.10), and yet the individual character of the self is not affected by it. This does not lessen or affect our integrity of being.
In ordinary life too multiple creations, elephants, horses and the like are seen to exist in gods, magicians, without any change in themselves, without interfering with the unity of their being. Similarly, a multiple creation may exist in Brahman also without divesting it of its character of unity. The diverse creation originates from Brahman through Its inscrutable power of Maya and Brahman Itself remains unchanged.
The second 'cha' (also, and) is in order to indicate that when such wonderful things are believed by us as the dreams, the powers of the gods and the magicians, why should we hesitate to believe in the mysterious powers of Brahman? The word 'hi' implies that the facts above mentioned are well known in the scriptures.
Svapakshadoshaccha                                           11.1.29(163)
And on account of the opponent's own view being subject to these very objections.
Svapaksha: in one's own view; Doshat: because of the defects; Cha: also, and.
The objection raised in Sutra 26 is further refuted.
The argument raised in Sutra 26 cannot stand, because the same charge can be levelled against the objector's side also.
The objection raised by you will equally apply to your doctrine that the formless (impartite) Infinite Pradhana or Prakriti void of sound and other qualities creates the world. The Sankhyas may say, "We do not mention that our Pradhana is without parts. Pradhana is only a state of equipoise of the three Gunas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Pradhana forms a whole containing the three Gunas as its parts. We reply that such a partiteness does not remove the objection in hand since Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are each of them equally impartite.
Each Guna by itself assisted by the two other Gunas, constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature. Hence, the objection lies against the Sankhya view likewise.
As reasoning is always unstable, if you are inclined to believe in the Pradhana's being in fact capable of partition, then it follows that the Pradhana cannot be eternal.
Let it then be said that the various powers of the Pradhana to which the variety of its effects are pointing are its parts. Well, we reply, those diverse potencies are admitted by us also as we see the cause of the world in Brahman. The same objection applies also to your atomic theory.
The same objections can be levelled against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. The atom is not made up of parts. When one atom combines with another atom, it must enter into combination with its whole extent with another. It cannot enter into partial contact with another. There will be entire interpenetration. Hence, there could be no further increase in the size. The compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom. The result of the conjunction would be a mere atom. But if you hold that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, that would go against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
If the Pradhana is taken to be the cause of the universe as the Sankhyas maintain, in that case also the view of the Sankhyas will be equally subject to the objections raised against the Vedantic view of Brahman as the cause of the universe, as the Pradhana, too, is without parts. As for the propounder of the Brahman-theory, he has already refuted the objection directed against his own view.
Sarvopetadhikaranam: Topic 10 (Sutras 30-31)
Fully-equipped Brahman
Sarvopeta cha taddarsanat                                    11.1.30 (164)
And (Brahman is) endowed with all (powers), because it is seen (from the scriptures).
Sarvopeta: endowed with all powers, all-powerful; Cha: also, and; Taddarsanat: because it is seen (from the scriptures).
(Sarva: all; Upeta: endowed with, possessed with; Tat: that, the possession of such powers.)
The objection in Sutra 26 is further refuted.
Brahman is Omnipotent as is clear from the scriptures. Hence it is perfectly within His powers to manifest Himself as the world and to be at the same time beyond it.
The objector (Purvapakshin) says: We see that men who have a physical body are endowed with powers. But Brahman has no body. Hence He cannot be in the possesssion of such powers.
This has no force. This Sutra gives proof of Brahman being endowed with Maya Sakti. Various scriptural texts declare that Brahman possesses all powers. "He to whom all actions, desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is never surprised" (Chh. Up. III.14.4). "He who desires what is true and imagines what is true" (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). "He who knows all in its totality and cognises all in its details" (Mun. Up. 1.1.9). "By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart" (Bri. Up. III.8.9). "The great Lord is the Mayin (the Ruler of Maya)" (Svet. Up. IV. 10) and other similar passages.
Vikaranatvanneti chet taduktam                               11.1.31 (165)
If it be said that because (Brahman) is devoid of organs, (it is) not (able to create), (we reply that) this has already been explained.
Vikaranatvat: because of want of organs of action and perception; Na: not; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Tat: that, that objection; Uktam: has been explained or answered.
Another objection to Brahman being the cause of the world is refuted.
The opponent says: "Brahman is destitute of organs. Hence, though He is all-powerful, He cannot create." Scripture declares, "He is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind" (Bri. Up. III.8.8). Further Srutis say, "Not this, Not this." This precludes all attributes. We know from Mantras and Arthavadas, etc., that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are able to create because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action.
The Sutra consists of an objection and its reply. The objection portion is 'Vikaranatvanneti chef and the reply portion is'Taduktam.'
Even though Brahman has no eyes or ears, or hands or feet, He is Omnipotent. That has been explained above in Sutras 11.1.4 and 11.1.25. He assumes different forms through Avidya or Maya. With respect to Brahman, the scripture alone is the authority, but not reason. The scripture declares that Brahman, though destitute of organs, possesses all capacities and powers, "Grasps without hands, moves swiftly without feet, sees without eyes and hears without ears" (Svet. Up. 111.19). Though Brahman is devoid of all attributes, yet He is endowed with all powers through Avidya or Maya.
Prayojanatvadhikaranam: Topic 11 (Sutras 32-33)
Final end of Creation
Na prayojanavattvat                                                11.1.32 (166)
(Brahman is) not (the creator of the universe) on account of (every activity) having a motive.
Na: not (i.e. Brahman cannot be the creator); Prayojana-vattvat: on account of having motive.
Another objection to Brahman being the cause of the world is raised.
The objector says: "In this world, everybody does a work with some motive. He does any work to satisfy his desire. There is also a scriptural passage that confirms this result of common experience, 'Verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything, but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear1 (Bri. Up. 11.4.5). But Brahman is all-full, self-sufficient and self-contained. He has nothing to gain by the creation. Therefore He cannot engage Himself in such a useless creation. Hence, Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe."
The undertaking of creating this world with all its details is indeed a weighty one. If Brahman desires creation to fulfil a wish, then He cannot be an eternally happy, perfect being with no unfulfilled desires. If He has no desire, then He will not wish to create and so there will be no creation. It cannot be said that He creates without purpose, like a senseless man in a state of frenzy. That would certainly contradict His Omniscience.
Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being (Brahman) is untenable.
Lokavattu lilakaivalyam                                           11.1.33 (167)
But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as is seen in the world (or ordinary life).
Lokavat: as in the world, as in ordinary life; Tu: but; Lilakaivalyam: mere pastime.
(Lila: sport, play; Kaivalyam: merely; Lilamatram: mere pastime.)
The objection raised in Sutra 32 is replied to.
The word 'tu' (but) removes the above obejction.
Brahman has created the world not out of any desire or motive. It is simply His pastime, proceeding from His own nature, which is inherent in and inseparable from Him, as it is seen also in the world that sometimes a rich man or a prince, does some action without any motive or purpose, simply out of a sportive impulse. Just as children play out of mere fun, or just as men breathe without any motive or purpose, because it is their very nature, just as a man full of cheerfulness when awakening from sound sleep, begins to dance about without any objective, but from mere exuberance of spirit, so also Brahman engages Himself in creating this world not out of any purpose or motive, but out of sporting or Lila or play proceeding from His own nature.
Although the creation of this universe appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is infinite or limitless.
If in ordinary life we may possibly by close scrutiny detect some subtle motive even for sportful action (playing at a game of balls is not altogether motiveless, because the prince gets some pleasure by the play), we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord. The scripture declares that all wishes are fulfilled in the Lord and that He is all-full, self-contained and self-sufficient.
It should not be forgotten however that there is no creation from the standpoint of the Absolute, because name and form are due to Avidya or ignorance and because Brahman and Atman are really one.
The opponent again raises an objection. The theory that Brahman is the creator is open to the objection that He is either partial or cruel, because some men enjoy happiness and others suffer misery. Hence this theory is not a congruous one. This objection is removed by the following Sutra.
Vaishamyanairghrinyadhikaranam: Topic 12 (Sutras 34-36)
Brahman is neither partial nor cruel
Vaishamyanairghrinye na sapekshatvat
tatha hi darsayati                                                 11.1.34(168)
Partiality and cruelty cannot (be ascribed to Brahman) on account of His taking into consideration (other reasons in that matter viz., merit and demerit of the souls), for so (scripture) declares.
Vaishamya: inequality, partiality; Nairghrinye: cruelty, unkindness; Na: not (cannot be ascribed to Brahman); Sapekshatvat: because of dependence upon, as it is dependent on something else, i.e., upon the Karma of the souls; Tatha: so; Hi: because; Oarsayati: the scripture declares.
The accusation that Brahman is partial and cruel in His creation of the world is removed.
Some are created poor, some rich. Therefore Brahman or the Lord is partial to some. He makes people suffer. Therefore He is cruel. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. This objection is untenable. The Lord cannot be accused of inequality and cruelty, because enjoyment and suffering of the individual soul are determined by his own previous good and bad actions. Sruti also declares. "A man becomes virtuous by his virtuous deeds and sinful by his sinful acts-Punyo vai punyena karmana bhavati, papah papena" (Bri. Up. 111.2.13).
The grace of the Lord is like rain which brings the potency of each seed to manifest itself according to its nature. The variety of pain and pleasure is due to variety of Karma.
The position of the Lord is to be regarded as similar to that of Parjanya, the giver of rain. Parjanya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley and other plants. The difference between the various species is due to the diverse potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds. Even so, the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc. The differences between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls.
Scripture also declares, "The Lord makes him whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good action. The Lord makes Him whom He wishes to lead down do a bad action" (Kau. Up. III.8). "A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work" (Bri. Up. 111.2.13). Smriti also declares that the Lord metes out rewards and punishments only in consideration of the specific actions of beings. 'I serve men in the way in which they approach Me.' (Bhagavad Gita IV.11).
Na karmavibhagaditi chet na anaditvat                   11.1.35 (169)
If it be objected that it (viz., the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is not possible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit before creation), (we say) no, because of (the world) being without a beginning.
Na: not; Karmavibhagat: because of the non-distinction of work (before creation); Iti chet: if it be said, if it be objected in this way; Na: no, the objection cannot stand; Anaditvat: because of beginninglessness.
An objection against Sutra 34 is raised and refuted.
The Sutra consists of two parts, viz., an objection and its reply. The objective portion is 'Na karmavibhagaditi chet and the reply portion is 'Na anaditvat.
An objection is raised now. The Sruti says, "Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second." There was no distinction of works before creation of the world. There was only the absolutely One Real Being or Brahman. The creation at the beginning of one man as rich and of another as poor and unhappy cannot certainly depend on the respective previous good or bad deeds. The first creation must have been free from inequalities.
This objection cannot stand. The creation of the world is also without a beginning. There was never a time that may be said to be an absolute beginning. The question of first creation cannot arise. Creation and destruction of the world following each other continually by rotation is without any beginning and end. The condition of individual souls in any particular cycle of creation is predetermined by their actions in the previous cycle.
It cannot be said that there could be no Karma prior to creation, which causes the diversity of creation, because Karma is Anadi (beginningless). Creation is only the shoot from a pre-existing seed of Karma.
As the world is without a beginning, merit and inequality are like seed and sprout. There is an unending chain of the relation of cause and effect as in the case of the seed and the sprout. Therefore, there is no contradiction present in the Lord's creative activity.
Upapadyate chapyupalabhyate cha                             11.1.36 (170)
And (that the world-and also Karma-is without a beginning) is reasonable and is also seen (from the scriptures). Upapadyate: is proved by reasoning, is reasonable that it should be so; Cha: and; Api: and, also, assuredly; Upalabhyate: is seen, is found in Sruti or Scriptures; Cha: also, and.
Karma is Anadi (beginningless). This is logical and is supported by scripture. By reasoning also it can be deduced that the world must be beginningless. Because, if the world did not exist in a potential or seed state, then an absolutely non-existing thing would be produced during creation. There is also the possibility of liberated persons being reborn again. Further, people would be enjoying and suffering without having done anything to deserve it. As there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to submit or assert to the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted without reference to previous virtues and vicious deeds. There will be effect without a cause. This is certainly absurd. When we assume effect without a cause, there could be no law at all with reference to the purpose or regularity of creation. The Sruti declares that creation is 'Anadi' (beginningless).
Moreover, mere Avidya (ignorance) which is homogeneous (Ekarupa), cannot cause the heterogeneity of creation. It is Avidya diversified by Vasanas due to Karma that can have such a result. Avidya needs the diversity of individual past work to produce varied results. Avidya may be the cause of inequality if it be considered as having regard to demerit accruing from action produced by the mental suppression of wrath, hatred and other afflicting passions.
The scriptures also posit the existence of the universe in former cycles or Kalpas in texts like, "The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as before" (Rig Veda Samhita, X-190-3). Hence partiality and cruelty cannot be ascribed to the Lord.
Sarvadharmopapattyadhikaranam: Topic 13
Saguna Brahman necessary for creation
Sarvadharmopapattescha                                            11.1.37(171)
And because all the qualities (required for the creation of the world) are reasonably found (only in Brahman) He must be admitted to be the cause of the universe. Sarva: all; Dharma: attributes, qualities; Upapatteh: because of the reasonableness, because of being proved; Cha: and, also.
Another reason to prove that Brahman is the cause of the world is brought forward.
The objector says: Material1 cause undergoes modification as the effect. Such a cause is endowed with the attributes. Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe as He is attributeless. This Sutra gives a suitable answer to this objection.
There is no real change in Brahman but there is an apparent modification in Brahman on account of His inscrutable power of Maya.
Brahman appears as this universe, just as rope appears as snake. All the attributes needed in the cause for the creation (such as Omnipotence, Omniscience) are possible in Brahman on account of the power of Maya. Hence, Brahman is the material cause of this universe through apparent change. He is also the efficient cause of this universe.
Therefore it is established that Brahman is the cause of the universe. The Vedantic system founded upon the Upanishads is not open to any objection. Thus it follows that the whole creation proceeds from Para Brahman.
In the Vedantic theory as hitherto demonstrated, viz., that Brahman is the material and the efficient cause of the world-the objection alleged by our opponents such as difference of character and the like have been refuted by the great Teacher. He brings to a conclusion the section principally devoted to strengthen his own theory. The chief aim of the next chapter will be to refute the opinions held by other teachers.
Thus ends the First Pada (Section 1) of the Second Adhyaya (Chapter II) of the Brahma Sutras or the Vedanta Philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION

In the First Section of the Second Chapter Brahman's creatorship of the world has been established on the authority of the scriptures supported by logic. All arguments against Brahman being the cause of the universe have been refuted.
In the present Section the Sutrakara or the framer of the Sutras examines the theories of creation advanced by other schools of thought in vogue in his time. All the doctrines of the other schools are taken up for refutation through reasoning alone without reference to the authority of the Vedas. Here he refutes by reasoning the Matter theory or the Pradhana theory of the Sankhya philosophy, the Atom theory of the Vaiseshika philosophy, the momentary and the Nihilistic view of the Buddhists, the Jain theory of simultaneous existence and non-existence, the Pasupata theory of coordinate duality and theory of energy unaided by intelligence.
It has been shown in the last Sutra of the First Section of the Second Chapter that Brahman is endowed with all the attributes through Maya, such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., for qualifying Him to be the cause of the world.
Now in Section 2 the question is taken up whether the Pradhana of the Sankhya philosophy can satisfy all those conditions.
SYNOPSIS - I
To put all things concisely in a nutshell, Sri Vyasa Bhagavan refutes in this section all the doctrines or theories prevalent in his time and inconsistent with the Vedanta theory; viz., (1) The Sankhya theory of the Pradhana as the first cause. (2) Refutation of the objection from the Vaiseshika stand point against the Brahman being the First Cause. (3) Refutation of the Atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas. (4) Refutation of the Bauddha idealists and Nihilists. (5) Refutation of the Bauddha Realists. (6) Refutation of the Jainas. (7) Refutation of the Pasupata doctrine, that God is only the efficient and not the material cause of the world. (8) Refutation of the Pancharatra or the Bhagavata doctrine that the soul originates from the Lord, etc.
In the First Section of the Second Chapter Brahman's authorship of the world has been established on the authority of the scriptures supported by logic. The task of the Second Pada or Section is to refute by arguments independent of Vedic passages the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the universe which are contrary to the Vedantic view.
Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1-10) is directed against the Sankhyas. It aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause such as the Pradhana of the Sankhyas is unable to create and dispose.
Adhikaranas II and III: (Sutras 11-17) refute the Vaiseshika doctrine that the world takes its origin from the atoms which are set in motion by the Adrishta.
Adhikaranas IV and V: are directed against various schools of Buddhistic philosophy.
Adhikarana IV: (Sutras 18-27) refutes the view of Buddhistic Realists who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world.
Adhikarana V: (Sutras 28-32) refutes the view of the Vijnanavadins or Buddhistic Idealists, according to whom Ideas are the only reality. The last Sutra of the Adhikarana refutes the view of the Madhyamikas or Sunyavadins (Nihilists) who teach that everything is void, i.e., that nothing whatsoever is real.
Adhikarana VI: (Sutras 33-36) refutes the doctrine of the Jainas.
Adhikarana VII: (Sutras 37-41) refutes the Pasupata school which teaches that the Lord is not the material but only the efficient or operative cause of the world.
Adhikarana VIII: (Sutras 42-45) refutes the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pancharatras.
SYNOPSIS - II
In Sutras 1 to 10 the principle of Sankhya philosophy is further refuted by reasoning. Pradhana or blind matter is inert. It is insentient or non-intelligent. There is methodical arrangement in the causation of this world. Hence it is not reasonable to suppose that blind matter can have any inclination for the creation of the world without the help of intelligence.
The Sankhya says that the inert Pradhana may become active of its own accord and spontaneously pass into the state of the world and undergo modification into intellect, egoism, mind, Tanmatras, etc., just as water flows in rivers spontaneously, rain from the clouds, or milk from the udder to the calf. This argument of the Sankhya is untenable, because the flowing of water or milk is directed by the intelligence of the Supreme Lord.
According to the Sankhyas, there is no external agent to urge Pradhana into activity or restraining from activity. Pradhana can work quite independently. Their Purusha is always inactive and indifferent. He is not an agent. Hence the contention that Pradhana in presence of Purusha or Spirit acquires a tendency towards action or creation cannot stand.
The Sankhya argues that Pradhana is by itself turned into the visible world, just as grass eaten by a cow is itself turned into milk. This argument is groundless as no such transformation is found on the part of the grass eaten by the bull. Hence, also, it is the will of the Supreme Lord that brings about the change, not because the cow has eaten it. Therefore Pradhana by itself cannot be said to be the cause of the world.
The Sankhya says that Purusha can direct the Pradhana or inspire activity in Pradhana though He has no activity, just as a lame man can move by sitting on the shoulders of a blind man and direct his movements. The independent and blind Pradhana, in conjunction with the passive but intelligent Purusha, originates the world. This argument also is untenable because the perfect inactivity and indifference of Purusha and the absolute independence of Pradhana cannot be reconciled with each other.
The Pradhana consists of three Gunas, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. They are in a state of equipoise before creation. No Guna is superior or inferior to the other. The Purusha is altogether indifferent. He has no interest in bringing about the disturbance of equilibrium of the Pradhana. Creation starts when the equipoise is upset and one Guna becomes more predominant than the other two. As there was in the beginning of creation no cause for the disturbance of the state of equipoise, it was not possible for Pradhana to be transformed into the world.
Sutras 11 to 17 refute the Atomic theory of the Vaiseshika philosophy where the indivisible minute atoms are stated to be the cause of the world. If an atom has any parts of an appreciable magnitude, then it cannot be an atom. Then it can be further divisible. If they are without parts of any appreciable magnitude, as they are so described in Vaiseshika philosophy, it is not possible for such two partless atoms to produce by their union a substance having any magnitude. Hence compound substances can never be formed by the combination of atoms. Therefore the Vaiseshika theory of origination of the world from indivisible atoms is untenable.
The inanimate atoms can have no tendency of themselves to unite together and cohere so as to form compounds. Vaiseshikas hold that the motion which is due to the unseen principle (Adrishta), joins the atoms in which it resides to another atom. Adrishta is a latent force of the sum total of previous deeds which waits to bear fruit in the future. Thus the whole world originates from atoms.
As Adrishta is insentient it cannot act. It cannot reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. If the latent force or Adrishta be an inherent property of atoms, the atoms will always remain united. Hence there will be no dissolution and no chance for fresh creation.
If the two atoms unite totally or perfectly the atomic state will continue as there will be no increase in bulk. If in part, then atoms will have parts. This is against the theory of the Vaiseshikas. Hence, the theory of the Vaiseshikas that the world is caused by combination of atoms is untenable.
The atomic theory involves another difficulty. If the atoms are by nature active, then creation would be permanent. No Pralaya or dissolution could take place. If they are by nature inactive, no creation could take place. The dissolution would be permanent. For this reason also, the atomic doctrine is untenable.
According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, the atoms are said to have colour etc. That which has form, colour etc., is gross, and impermanent. Consequently, the atoms must be gross and impermanent. This contradicts the theory of the Vaiseshikas that they are minute and permanent.
If the respective atoms of the elements also possess the same number of qualities as the gross elements, then the atom of air will have one quality, an atom of earth will have four qualities. Hence an atom of earth which possesses four qualities will be bigger in size. It would not be an atom any longer. Hence the Atom theory of the Vaiseshikas on the causation of the world does not stand to reason in any way. This Atom theory is not accepted by the Vedas.
Sutras 18 to 32 refute the Buddhistic theory of momentarism (Kshanikavada) and Nihilism (Sunyavada). The Vaiseshikas are the Realists (Sarvastitvavadins). They accept the reality of both the outside world and the inside world consisting respectively of external objects and consciousness and feelings. The Sautrantikas are the idealists (Vijnanavadins). They hold that thought alone is real. They maintain that ideas only exist and the external objects are inferred from the ideas. The Yogacharas hold that ideas alone are real and there is no external world corresponding to these ideas. The external objects are unreal like dreamy objects. The Madhymikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal and there is nothing that exists except the void (Sunyam). They are the Nihilists or Sunyavadins who hold that everything is void and unreal. All of them agree that everything is momentary. Things of the previous moment do not exist in the next moment.
According to the Buddhists, atoms and consciousness are both inanimate. There is no permanent intelligence which can bring about the aggregation or which can guide the atoms to unite into an external thing or to form a continuous mental phenomena. Hence the doctrine of this school of Bauddhas is untenable.
Nescience etc., stand in a causal relation to each other merely. They cannot be made to account for the existence of the aggregates. According to the Buddhistic theory, everything is momentary. A thing of the present moment vanishes in the next moment, when its successor manifests. At the time of the appearance of a subsequent thing, the previous thing already vanishes. Hence it is impossible for the previous thing to be the cause of the subsequent thing. Consequently the theory is untenable.
The Buddhists maintain that existence originates from non-existence because they hold that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause, the tree cannot appear until the seed is destroyed. We always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect as the thread subsists in the cloth. Hence the Buddhistic view is incorrect, unreasonable and inadmissible.
Even the passing of cause into effect in a series of successive states like nescience, etc., cannot take place unless there is a coordinating intelligence. The Buddhists say that everything has only a momentary existence. Their school cannot bring about the simultaneous existence of two successive moments. If the cause exists till it passes into the stage of effect, the theory of momentary existence (Kshanikavada) will vanish.
According to the Buddhistic view, salvation or freedom is attained when ignorance is destroyed. Ignorance is the false idea of permanency in things which are momentary.
The ignorance can be annihilated by the adoption of some means such as penance, knowledge, etc., (conscious destruction), or it may destroy itself (spontaneity). But both the alternatives are defective. Because this annihilation of ignorance cannot be attained by the adoption of penance or the like, because the means like every other thing is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view and is therefore, not likely to produce such annihilation. Annihilation cannot take place of its own accord, for in that case all Buddhistic instructions, the disciplines and methods of meditation for the attainment of salvation will be useless.
The Buddhists do not recognise the existence of Akasa. They regard Akasa as a non-entity. This is unreasonable. Akasa has the quality of sound. It is also a distinct entity like earth, water, etc. If Akasa be a non-entity, then the entire world would become destitute of space. Scriptural passages declare "Akasa sprang from Atman." Hence Akasa is a real thing. It is a Vastu (existing object) and not non-existence.
If everything is momentary, the experiencer of something must also be momentary. But the experiencer is not momentary because people have the memory of past experiences. Memory can take place in a man who has previously experienced it. He is connected with at least two moments. This certainly refutes the theory of momentari-ness.
A non-entity has not been observed to produce entity. Therefore it does not stand to reason to suppose non-entity to be the cause. The world which is a reality is stated by the Buddhists to have arisen out of non-entity. This is absurd. A pot is never found to be produced without clay. If existence can come out of non-existence, then anything may come out of anything, because non-entity is one and the same in all cases. A jack tree may come out of a mango seed. If an existing thing can arise out of nothing, then an indifferent and lazy man may also attain salvation without efforts. Emancipation may be attained like a windfall. Rice will grow even if the farmer does not cultivate his field.
The Vijnanavadins say that the external things have no objective reality. Everything is an idea without any reality corresponding to it. This is not correct. The external objects are actually perceived by senses of perception. The external world cannot be non-existent like the horns of a hare.
The Buddhist Idealists say that perception of the external world is like the dream. This is wrong. The consciousness in dream depends on the previous consciousness in the wakeful state, but the consciousness in the wakeful state does not depend on anything else but on the actual perception by the sense. Further, the dream experiences become false as soon as one wakes up.
The Buddhist Idealists hold that though an external thing does not actually exist, yet its impressions do exist, and from these impressions diversities of perception and ideas like chair, tree arise. This is not possible, as there can be no perception of an external thing which is itself non-existent. If there be no perception of an external thing, how can it leave an impression?
The mental impressions cannot exist because the ego which receives impressions is itself momentary in their view.
The Sunyavada or Nihilism of the Buddhists which asserts that nothing exists is fallacious, because it goes against every method of proof, viz., perception, inference, testimony or scripture and analogy.
Sutras 33 to 36 refute the Jaina theory. According to the Jaina theory, everything is at once existing and non-existing. Now this view cannot be accepted, because in one substance it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold at the same time. Simultaneous existence of light and darkness in one place is impossible.
According to the Jaina doctrine heaven and liberation may exist or may not exist. We cannot arrive at any definite knowledge. There is no certainty about anything.
The Jainas hold that the soul is of the size of the body. As the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different sizes, the soul of a man taking the body of an elephant on account of his past deeds will not be able to fill up the body of an elephant. The soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space in the body of an ant. The stability of the dimensions of the soul is impaired. The Jaina theory itself falls to the ground.
Sutras 37 to 41 refute the theory of the followers of the Pasupata system. The followers of this school recognise God as the efficient or the operative cause. They recognise the primordial matter as the material cause of the world. This view is contrary to the view of the Sruti or Vedanta where Brahman is stated to be both the efficient and the material cause of the world. Hence, the theory of Pasupatas cannot be accepted.
God, in their view, is pure, without attributes, and activity. Hence there can be no connection between Him and the inert primordial matter. He cannot urge and regulate matter to work. To say that God becomes the efficient cause of the world by putting on a body is also fallacious because all bodies are perishable. God is eternal according to the Pasupatas, and so cannot have a perishable body and become dependent on this physical instrument.
If it be said that the Lord rules the Pradhana, etc., just as the Jiva rules the senses which are also not perceived, this cannot be; because the Lord also would experience pleasure and pain, hence would forfeit His Godhead. He would be subject to births and deaths, and devoid of Omniscience. He will lose all His supremacy. This sort of God is not admitted by the Pasupatas.
Sutras 42 to 45 refute the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or the Pancharatra doctrine. According to this school, the Lord is the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe. This is in quite agreement with the Srutis. Another part of the system is open to objection. The doctrine that Sankarshana or the Jiva is born of Vaasudeva, Pradyumna or mind from Sankarshana, Aniruddha or Ahamkara from Pradyumna is incorrect. Such creation is not possible. If there is such birth, if the soul be created it would be subject to destruction and hence there could be no liberation.
The Bhagavatas may say that all the Vyuhas or forms are Vaasudeva, the Lord having intelligence, Lordship, strength, power, etc., and are free from faults and imperfections. In this case there will be more than one Isvara or Lord. This goes against their own doctrine according to which there is only one real essence, the holy Vaasudeva. Further, there are also inconsistencies or manifold contradictions in the system. There are passages which are contradictory to the Vedas. It contains words of depreciation of the Vedas. Hence, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted.

Rachananupapattyadhikaranam: Topic 1 (Sutras 1-10)
Refutation of the Sankhyan theory of the Pradhana as the cause of the world
Rachananupapattescha nanumanam                        11.2.1 (172)
That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz., the Pradhana), cannot be the cause (of the world) because (in that case it is) not possible (to account for the) design or orderly arrangement (found in the creation).
Rachana: construction, the design in creation; Anupapatteh: on account of the impossibility; Cha: and; Na: not; Anumanam: that which is inferred, what is arrived at by inference, i.e., the Pradhana of the Sankhyas.
An argument is brought forward to the effect that the Pradhana of the Sankhyas is not the cause of the world.
The main object of the Vedanta Sutras is to show the purpose of the revelation of truth in the Vedas. They aim also at refuting the wrong doctrines in the other systems of philosophy. In the previous portion the doctrine of the Sankhyas has been refuted here and there on the authority of the scriptures. Sutras 1-10 refute it through logical reasoning.
Pradhana or blind matter is inert. It is an insentient entity. It does not possess the intelligence that is needed for creating such a multifarious, elaborate, wonderful, orderly, methodical and well-designed universe as this. It cannot bring into being the manifold orderliness of the cosmos. No one has ever seen a beautiful palace constructed by the fortuitous coming together of bricks, mortar, etc., without the active cooperation of intelligent agents like the architects, masons and the rest. Hence, Pradhana cannot be the cause of this world.
Clay cannot change itself into a pot.
The reasoning that Pradhana is the cause of the world because it has in it pleasure, pain, dullness, which are found in the world is not valid, because it is not possible for an insentient entity to create the wonderful, orderly universe. Moreover, how do you say that pleasure and pain and dullness are found in the outside world? The external objects are a factor in pleasure and pain which are internal experiences. Moreover, there can be pleasure and pain even irrespective of the external objects. How can you ascribe them to an insentient entity (Achetana)?
Physical objects like flowers, fruits, etc., no doubt have the presence in them of the quality of producing pleasure. But the feeling of pleasure is altogether an internal feeling. We cannot say that flowers and fruits have the nature of pleasure in them, though they excite pleasure in man. Pleasure is altogether an attribute of the soul and not of matter or Pradhana. Hence, matter or Pradhana cannot be said to have the quality of pleasure, etc.
Pravrittescha                                                            11.2.2(173)
And on account of the (impossibility of) activity.
Pravritteh: because of the activity, of a tendency; Cha: and (it has the force of 'only' here).
This is an argument in support of Sutra 1.
Pradhana (blind matter) cannot be the cause of the world, because it is also impossible for it to have an inclination for creation.
How does Pradhana in a state of equilibrium of its three Gunas become dynamic and creative? It cannot disturb its own equipoise. The desire or tendency to create cannot be ascribed to the inert Pradhana. The inert chariot cannot move by itself. It is only the intelligent charioteer who moves the chariot by directing the movements of the horse. Mud by itself is never seen to create a jar without the agency of an intelligent potter. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. We proceed from the known to the unknown. How then do you prove that Pradhana which is insentient is self-moving? Hence the inert Pradhana cannot be the cause of the universe, because the activity that is necessary for the creation of the universe would be impossible in that case. There must be a directive intelligent Being or Entity for that purpose.
The activity must be attributed to the directive intelligence rather than to the inert matter or Pradhana. That which sets Pradhana or matter in motion is the real agent. Every activity is seen as the result of an intelligent agent. Inert matter or Pradhana therefore has no agency. Matter or Pradhana has no self-initiated activity of its own.
The objector may say "I do not see Chetana (soul) active and that I see only the activity of the body." We reply that there is no activity without the soul.
He may again say that the soul, being pure consciousness, cannot have activity. We reply that the soul can induce activity, though not self-active, just as a lodestone or magnet though unmoving can make iron move. A material object though fixed causes activity in our senses.
The objector may again say that as the soul is one and infinite, there is no possibility of causation of activity. We reply that it causes activity in the names and forms created by Maya owing to Avidya.
Hence, motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an intelligent First Cause but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause (Pradhana of the Sankhyas).
Payo'mbuvacchet tatra'pi                                        11.2.3 (174)
If it be said (that the Pradhana moves or spontaneously modifies herself into the various products) like milk or water (without the guidance of any intelligence), (we reply that) there also (it is due to intelligence).
Payo'mbuvat: like milk and water; Chet: if; Tatra: there, in those cases; Api: even, also. (Payah: milk; Ambuvat: like water.)
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
If the objector says that there could be self-activity of nature as in milk or water, we reply that even then there is the operation of an intelligent agent.
The Sankhya says that the inert Pradhana may become active of its own accord and undergo modification into intellect, egoism, mind, Tanmatra, etc., just as water flows in rivers spontaneously, rain from the clouds or milk from the udder to the calf.
This is refuted by the latter part of Sutra 'Tatra Apt, even there. Even the flowing of water or milk is directed by the intelligence of the Supreme Lord. This we infer from the example of chariot, etc. We may not see the intelligent driver of the chariot, but we infer his existence from the motion of the car.
The scriptures also say, "He who dwells in the water, who rules the water from within" (Bri. Up. III.7.4). "By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi! some rivers flow to the east" (Bri. Up. 111.8.9). Everything in this world is directed by the Lord.
Further the cow is an intelligent creature. She loves her calf, and makes her milk flow by her wish. The milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. The flow of water depends on the downward sloping of the earth.
Vyatirekanavasthiteschanapekshatvat                      11.2.4 (175)
And because (the Pradhana) is not dependent (on anything), there being no external agent besides it (it cannot be active).
Vyatirekanavasthiteh: There being no external agency besides it; Cha: and also; Anapekshatvat: because it is not dependent. (Vyatireka: an external agent; Anavasthiteh: from non-existence, as it does not exist.)
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
According to the Sankhyas, there is no external agent to urge Pradhana into activity, or restrain from activity. Their Purusha is indifferent, neither moves to, nor restrains from, action. He is not an agent. He is unresponsive to the first stimulus for starting the process of creation. Hence, there is no agency to disturb the primordial equilibrium. Therefore, the Pradhana of the Sankhyas cannot be the First Cause of the world.
The state in which the three Gunas are in a state of equipoise is called Pradhana by the Sankhyas. According to the Sankhyas, no controlling sentient power operates on the Pradhana. Purusha is static and quiescent.
Therefore, Pradhana may evolve in one way now and in another way afterwards or may not evolve at all, as it is not controlled by any directing and ruling Intelligence. But the Supreme Lord is Omniscient and Omnipotent. He has perfect control over Maya. He can create or not create as He pleases.
The Pradhana of the Sankhyas is inert, so it cannot of itself start to be active; or when it is set in motion it can hardly stop to be active of itself. Hence, the Sankhyas cannot explain creation and dissolution when there is no directing or ruling intelligence. All other principles are only effects of the Pradhana. Therefore, they cannot exercise any influence on it. Hence, the theory of the Sankhyas is self-contradictory.
Anyatrabhavaccha na trinadivat                                 II.2.5 (176)
And (it can) not (be said that the Pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, etc., (which turn into milk), because of its absence elsewhere (than in the female animals).
Anyatra: elsewhere, in the other case, elsewhere than in cows; Abhavat: because of the absence; Cha: and, also; Na: not; Trinadivat: like the grass etc.
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
The word 'cha', and, has the force of 'only'.
The objector says that as grass becomes milk, so Pradhana may evolve into the world. But does grass become milk of its own power? No. If so, try to produce milk from grass. A cow alone converts grass into milk. Does a bull do so?
The spontaneous modification of the Pradhana is not possible. Grass is not changed into milk spontaneously. It is converted into milk only when eaten by cows but not by the bulls. Here also it is the will of the Supreme Lord that brings about the change, not because the cow has eaten it.
The illustration or analogy is useless. It cannot stand. The argument of the Sankhyas is not sound. Hence, the Pradhana's undergoing modification of itself cannot be accepted. The spontaneous modification of Pradhana cannot be proved from the instances of grass and the like.
Abhyupagame'pyarthabhavat                                    II.2.6 (177)
Even if we admit (the Sankhya position with regard to the spontaneous modification of the Pradhana, it cannot be the cause of the universe) because of the absence of any purpose.
Abhyupagame: accepting, admitting, taking for granted; Api: even; Art ha: purpose; Abhavat: because of the absence.
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
Even though we admit for the sake of argument that the Pradhana is spontaneously active, it will lead to a contradiction in their philosophy. If the Pradhana is spontaneously active, if it is capable of an inherent tendency for modification, motion or change, its activity cannot have any purpose. This will contradict the view of the Sankhyas that the modification of the Pradhana is for the experience or enjoyment (Bhoga) and release of the soul (Moksha).
There is no enjoyment to be enjoyed by the ever-perfect Purusha (or Soul). If he could enjoy, how could he ever become free from enjoyment? He is already free. He is already in a state of beatitude. As He is perfect, He can have no desire.
The insentient Pradhana cannot have a desire to evolve. So the satisfaction of a desire cannot be considered as the purpose of activity of the Pradhana. If you say that evolution must be postulated because creative power would become inoperative otherwise, we reply that in that case creative power will be always operative and there could be no attainment of freedom from it by the attainment of beatitude.
It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the Pradhana becomes active for the purpose of the soul. It cannot be the cause of the universe.
Purushasmavaditi chet tathapi                                11.2.7 (178)
If it be said (that the Purusha or Soul can direct or move the Pradhana) as the (lame) man can direct a blind man, or as the magnet (moves the iron), even then (the difficulty cannot be overcome).
Purusha: a person; Asma: a lodestone, a magnet; Vat: like; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Tathapi: even then, still.
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
The Sankhyas say that Purusha can direct the Pradhana or inspire activity in Pradhana, though He has no activity, just as a lame man can move by sitting on the shoulders of a blind man and direct his movements or just as a magnet attracts iron. But these illustrations are not apt. A lame man speaks and directs the blind man. The blind man, though incapable of seeing, has the capacity of understanding those instructions given by the lame man and acting upon them. But Purusha is perfectly indifferent. He has no kind of activity at all. Hence, He cannot do that with regard to the Pradhana.
Moreover, the lame and the blind are both conscious entities and the iron and the magnet are both insentient matter. Consequently, the instances given are not to the point. According to the Sankhyas the Pradhana is independent. Hence, it is not right to say that it depends on the proximity of the Purusha for its activity, just as the iron depends on the magnet for its motion. A magnet attracts when the iron is brought near. The proximity of the magnet to the iron is not permanent. It depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position. But no one brings the Purusha near Pradhana. If Purusha is always near, then creation will be eternal. There will be no liberation at all.
The Purusha and the Pradhana are altogether separate and independent. Pradhana is non-intelligent, inert and independent. Purusha is intelligent and indifferent. No one else (a third principle) exists to bring them together. Hence there can be no connection between them.
There could be no creative activity at all according to the doctrine of the Sankhyas. If there could be such activity, there could be no final release as the cause of creation could never cease.
In Vedanta, Brahman which is the cause of the universe is indifferent but He is endowed with attributes and activity through Maya. He is characterised by non-activity inherent in His own nature and at the same time by moving power inherent in Maya. So He becomes the Creator. He is indifferent by nature and active by Maya. Hence, His creative power is well explained. He is superior to the Purusha of the Sankhyas.
Angitvanupapattescha                                              11.2.8(179)
And again (the Pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three Gunas).
Angitvanupapatteh: on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate); Cha: and, also. (Angitva: the relation of being the principal, being preponderant; Anupapatteh: on account of the impossibility and unreasonableness).
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
The Pradhana has been defined to be the equilibrium of the three Gunas. The Pradhana consists of three Gunas, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Three Gunas are independent of each other. They are in a state of equipoise before creation. In the state of Pradhana no Guna is superior or inferior to the other. Every one of them is equal to the other and consequently the relation of subordinate and principal could not exist then. The Purusha is altogether indifferent. He has no interest in bringing about the disturbance of equilibrium of the Pradhana. Creation starts when the equipoise is upset and one Guna becomes more predominant than the other two. As there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the Gunas, the production of the Great Principle and the other effects which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the Gunas is impossible. Equipoise cannot be disturbed without any external force. The Gunas are absolutely independent when they are in a state of equilibrium. They cannot take of themselves a subsidiary position to another Guna without losing their independence. Hence, creation would be impossible.
This Sutra says that such preponderance is not possible. The Sankhyas cannot explain why should one Guna preponderate over the other. Hence, on account of the impossibility of such preponderance of one over the other Gunas, Pradhana cannot be accepted to be the cause of the world.
Anyathanumitau cha jnasaktiviyogat                             II.2.9 (180)
Even if it be inferred otherwise on account of the Pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence (the other objections to the Pradhana being the cause of the universe remain in force).
Anyatha: otherwise, in other ways; Anumitau: if it be inferred, in case of inference; Cha: even, and; Jnasakti: power of intelligence; Viyogat: because of being destitute of, because of dissociation.
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is continued.
Even if the objector postulates such power of modification as being inherent in Pradhana, the inappropriateness will continue because of the insentiency or non-intelligence of the Pradhana.
The Sankhya says: We do not acknowledge the Gunas to be characterised by absolute independence, irrelativity and unchangeableness. We infer the characteristics of the Gunas from those of their effects. We presume that their nature must be such as to make the production of the effects possible. The Gunas have some characteristics, different attributes and mysterious powers inherent in them like unstability. Consequently the Gunas themselves are able to enter into a state of inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise. Even in that case we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, etc., remain in force on account of the Pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. As Pradhana is insentient it has not the power of self-consciousness. Being thus destitute of it, it has not the idea of any plan or design. It cannot say as an intelligent entity would say, "Let me create the world in such and such a way." A house can never be built by mere bricks and mortar without the supervision and active agency of the architect and masons. Even so, creation never proceeds from dead matter or Pradhana. Without the directive action of intelligence, the Gunas, however wonderful in their powers and attributes, cannot of themselves create the universe.
On account of lack of intelligence the objections, founded on design etc., in the universe and that it would lead to continuous creation, come in the way of accepting the Pradhana as the cause of the universe (Vide Sutras 1, 4 and 7).
Vipratishedhacchasamanjasam                              11.2.10 (181)
And morever (the Sankhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.
Vipratishedhat: because of contradiction; Cha: also, and; Asamanjasam: inconsistent, objectionable, not harmonious, untenable.
The argument in support of Sutra 1 is concluded.
Further, the Sankhya doctrine is inconsistent because there are various contradictions in the Sankhya philosophy. Sometimes the senses are said to be eleven and again they are said to be seven. It sometimes says that the Tanmatras come from Mahat and sometimes that they come from Ahamkara. Sometimes it says that there are three Antahkaranas. Sometimes it says that there is only one Antahkarana.
Moreover, their doctrine contradicts Sruti which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the universe, and Smriti based on Sruti. For these reasons also the Sankhya system is objectionable. It cannot be accepted.
Here the Sankhya again brings a counter-charge. He says "You also have got such inappropriateness in your doctrine." He asks whether if Brahman is cause and effect, there could be any liberation from effects and whether scripture affirming liberation will not become useless. He argues "fire cannot become free from heat and light or water free from waves. Only when there is separateness of cause and effect, there can be any meaning in liberation."
We reply that even the objector must admit that Purusha being by nature pure, cannot be disturbed and that disturbance is due to Avidya and is not absolutely real. That is our position too. But you give Avidya a state of permanence. Consequently even if Purusha gets free from it, there is no surety that such separation will be permanent. We postulate only one Being. All effects are only relative and cannot, therefore, affect the absolute reality.
Mahaddirghadhikaranam: Topic 2
Refutation of the Vaiseshika view
Mahaddirghavadva hrasvaparimandalabhyam          11.2.11 (182)
(The world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.
Mahat dirghavat: like the great and the long; Va: or; Hrasvaparimandalabhyam: from the short and the atomic.
The atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas that formless, indivisible atoms enter into the composition of the world is now refuted.
The sage Kanada is the founder of the Vaiseshika philosophy. He holds all objects which have any shape or form as perishable and they are all made of minute, indivisible, formless and immutable particles known as atoms (Anu). These atoms are considered to be the cause of the world. The atoms are of four kinds, viz., the atoms of earth, the atoms of water, the atoms of fire and the atoms of air. These atoms exist distinct from one another without any shape or form. At the beginning of creation, one atom (a monad) unites with another and forms a dyad, an aggregate of two atoms. The dyad (dvyanu) unites with another atom and forms a triad, an aggregate of three atoms, and so on. Thus a visible universe is formed.
The Vaiseshikas argue thus: The qualities which inhere in the substance which constitutes the cause produces qualities of the same kind in the substance which forms the effect. White cloth is produced from a cloth of a different colour. Consequently, when the intelligent Brahman is taken as the cause of the universe, we should find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz., the universe. But this is not so. Hence, the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe.
The Sutrakara or the author of the Sutras shows that this reasoning is fallacious on the ground of the system of Vaiseshikas themselves.
The Sankhya philosophy has been refuted in Sutras 1-10. Now the Vaiseshika system is taken up in Sutras 11-17 and refuted. The inconsistency in the origination of an aggregate of the three and of four atoms from the union of monads and of dyads of the Vaiseshika is like the inconsistency in the origination of the world from the insentient Pradhana of Sankhya. If the atom has any parts of an appreciable magnitude, then it cannot be an atom. Then it can be further divisible. If they are without parts of any appreciable magnitude, as they are so described in Vaiseshika philosophy, it is not possible for such two partless atoms to produce by their union a substance having any magnitude. The same is the case with three atoms and so on. Hence, compound substances can never be formed by the combination of atoms. Therefore, the Vaiseshika theory of origination of the world upon indivisible atoms is untenable.
According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, two ultimate atoms (Parimandalas or Paramanus) become a double atom (Dvyanuka or Hrasva) on account of Adrishta, etc. But the atomic nature of the ultimate atom is not found in the Dvyanuka which is small. Two Dvyanukas form a Chaturanuka (quadruple atom) which has not the characteristics of smallness but becomes longer and bigger. If the ultimate atom can create something which is contrary to the atom, what is the inappropriateness in Brahman which is Knowledge and Bliss creating the insentient and non-intelligent world full of misery? Just as the atomic nature of the ultimate atom is not found in the later combinations which have other traits, so also the Chaitanya or intelligence of Brahman is not found in the world.
The ultimate condition of the world is atomic, according to the Vaiseshika system. The atoms are eternal. They are the ultimate cause of the universe. The universe exists in the atomic state in the state of Pralaya or dissolution. An atom is infinitesimal. A dyad is minute and short. Chaturanuka or quadruple atom is great, and long.
If two atoms which are spherical can produce a dyad which is minute and short but which has not got the spherical nature of the atom, if the dyads which are short and minute can produce a Chaturanuka which is great and long but which has not got the minuteness and shortness of the dyad, it is quite obvious that all the qualities of the cause are not found in the effect. So it is quite possible that the intelligent, blissful Brahman can be the cause of a world which is non-intelligent and full of suffering.
Paramanujagadakaranatvadhikaranam: Topic 3 (Sutras 12-17)
Refutation of the atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas
The objection against the view of Vedanta has been answered in the previous Sutra. Now the Vaiseshika system is refuted.
Ubhayathapi na karmatastadabhavah                     11.2.12 (183)
In both cases also (in the cases of the Adrishta, the unseen principle inhering either in the atoms or the soul) the activity (of the atoms) is not possible; hence negation of that (viz., creation through the union of the atoms).
Ubhayatha: in either case, in both ways, on both assumptions or hypotheses; Api: also; Na: not; Karma: action, activity, motion; Atah: therefore; Tadabhavah: absence of that, negation of that, i.e., negation of the creation of the world by union of atoms.
The argument against the Vaiseshika system commenced in Sutra 11 is continued.
What is the cause that first operates on the ultimate atoms? Vaiseshikas hold that the motion which is due to the unseen principle (Adrishta) joins the atom in which it resides, to another atom. Thus binary compounds, etc. are produced and finally the element of air. Similarly fire, water, earth, the body with its organs are produced. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. The qualities of the binary compounds are produced from the qualities inhering in the atoms, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads. Such is the teaching of the Vaiseshika system of philosophy.
The motion in the atoms cannot be brought about by the Adrishta residing in the atoms, because the Adrishta which is the resultant of the good and bad actions of the soul cannot reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. The Adrishta residing in the soul cannot produce motion in the atom. The motion of the atom is not explained on both these views. As Adrishta is insentient it cannot act. As Adrishta is in the soul, how can it operate in the atoms? If it can, such operation will go on for ever as there is no agency to control it. When two atoms combine do they unite perfectly or not? If they unite totally, if there is total interpenetration, the atomic state will continue as there will be no increase in bulk. If in part, then atoms will have parts. This is against the theory of the Vaiseshikas. Moreover, if they combine once, there cannot be separation or dissolution. Adrishta will be active to bring about creation for the enjoyment of the fruits of actions. For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
The Vaiseshikas may argue that the motion originates in the atoms as soon as they come in the proximity of the souls charged with any definite Adrishta. This also is untenable. Because there can be no proximity or contact between the souls which are partless and the atoms which also are partless.
An insentient object cannot move another as it is inert. All motion of objects are initiated, guided and directed by intelligence and intelligent beings.
The soul cannot be the cause of the primal motion of the atoms at the beginning of creation. Because in dissolution, according to the Vaiseshikas, the soul itself lies dormant without possessing any intelligence and hence is in no way superior to the atom.
It cannot be said also that the primal motion of the atom is caused by the will of the Lord in conformity with the Adrishta of the souls, because the Adrishtas of the souls do not mature and are not awakened. Hence the will of the Lord is not active.
As there is thus no motion in the atoms in the beginning of the creation, they cannot come together and form an aggregate. Consequently, there can be no creation as the binary compounds cannot be produced.
According to the Vaiseshikas, the universe is created by the union of the atoms. Now what causes this union? If it is a seen cause, it is not possible before the creation of the body. A seen cause can be an endeavour or an impact. There can be no endeavour on the part of the soul if there is no connection of the soul with mind. As there is neither body nor mind before creation, there cannot be any endeavour. Similar is the case with impact or the like.
What causes the union of the atoms? Adrishta or the unseen principle cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms because the Adrishta is non-intelligent. There is no intelligence to guide the Adrishta. Hence it cannot act by itself.
Does the Adrishta inhere in the soul or the atoms? If it is inherent in the soul, there is no intelligence to direct the Adrishta as the soul is then inert. Moreover, the soul is partless like the atoms. Consequently, there cannot be any connection between the soul and the atoms. Hence, if the Adrishta inheres in the soul, it cannot produce motion in the atoms which are not connected with the soul.
If the Adrishta is inherent in the atoms, there would be no dissolution because the atoms will ever be active as the Adrishta is always present.
Therefore there is no possibility for original motion in the atoms and so combination of atoms is not possible.
Hence the theory of Vaiseshikas that the universe is caused by the combination of atoms is untenable.
Samavayabhyupagamaccha samyadanavasthiteh 11.2.13 (184) And because in consequence of Samavaya being admitted, a regresssus ad infinitum results on similar reasoning (hence the Vaiseshika theory is untenable).
Samavayabhyupagamat: Samavaya being admitted; Cha: and, also; Samyat: because of equality of reasoning; Anavasthiteh: regressus ad infinitum would result.
The argument against the Vaiseshika philosophy commenced in Sutra 11 is continued.
Samavaya is inseparable inherence or concomitant cause or combining force. It is one of the seven categories of the Vaiseshika philosophy. It is the affinity which brings about the union of the atoms.
The Vaiseshikas say that two Paramanus become a Dvyanuka on account of the operation of the combining force (Samavaya) and that the Samavaya connects the dyad with its constituents, the two atoms, as the dyad and the atoms are of different qualities. Samavaya is different from the ultimate atoms and dyads which it connects. Why should it operate unless there be another Samavaya to make it operate? That new Samavaya will require another Samavaya to connect it with the first and so on. Thus their theory is vitiated by the fault of Anavastha Dosha or regressus ad infinitum.
The argument is faulty. Hence the atomic doctrine which admits Samavaya relationship for the union of the atoms is not admissible. It must be rejected as it is useless and as it is an incongruous assumption.
Nityameva cha bhavat                                             11.2.14(185)
And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity, the atomic theory is not admissible).
Nityam: eternal; Eva: certainly, even; Cha: and, also; Bhavat: because of the existence, from the possibility.
The argument against the Vaiseshika commencing in Sutra 11 is continued.
The atomic theory involves another difficulty. If the atoms are by nature active, then creation would be permanent. No Pralaya or dissolution could take place. If they are by nature inactive, no creation could take place. The dissolution would be permanent. Their nature cannot be both activity and inactivity because they are self-contradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to depend on an operative or efficient cause like Adrishta. As the Adrishta is in permanent proximity to the atoms, as the Adrishta is always connected with the atoms, they will be ever active. Consequently, creation would be permanent. If there is no efficient or operative cause, there will be no activity of the atoms. Consequently, there would be no creation.
For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable and inadmissible.
Rupadimatvaccha viparyayo darsanat                      11.2.15 (186)
And on account of the atoms possessing colour, etc., the opposite (of which the Vaiseshikas hold would take place), because it is seen or observed.
Rupadimatvat: because of possessing colour, etc.; Cha: and, also; Viparyayah: the reverse, the opposite; Darsanat: because it is seen or observed, from common experience.
The argument against Vaiseshika commencing in Sutra 11 is continued.
According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, the atoms are said to have colour, etc. If this is not the case, the effects will not possess these qualities, as the qualities of the cause only are found in the effects. Then the atoms would no longer be atomic and permanent. Because that which has form, colour, etc., is gross, ephemeral and impermanent. Consequently the atoms, etc., which are endowed with colour etc., must be gross and inpermanent. This contradicts the theory of the Vaiseshikas that they are minute and permanent.
Hence the atomic theory, being thus self-contradictory, cannot be accepted. The atoms cannot be the ultimate cause of the universe. There would result from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, etc., the opposite of which the Vaiseshikas mean.
Ubhayatha cha doshat                                                  11.2.16 (187)
And because of defects in both cases (the atomic theory cannot be accepted).
Ubhayatha: in both ways, on either side, in either case; Cha: also, and; Doshat: because of defects (or difficulties).
The argument against Vaiseshikas is continued.
Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour and is gross. Water has colour.-taste and touch and is fine. Fire has colour and touch and is finer still. Air is the finest of all and has the quality of touch only. The four gross elements earth, water, fire and air are produced from atoms.
If we suppose that the respective atoms of the elements also possess the same number of qualities as the gross elements, then the atom of air will have one quality, an atom of earth will have four qualities. Hence an atom of earth which possesses four qualities will be bigger in size. It would not be an atom any longer. It will not satisfy the definition of an atom.
If we suppose them all to possess the same number of qualities, in that case there cannot be any difference in the qualities of the effects, the gross elements because the attributes of the cause (the atoms) are reproduced in its effects (the gross elements).
If the atom is one and the same and has only one quality, then more than one quality should not be found. Fire should not have form in addition to touch as so on.
Hence, in either case the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas is defective and therefore untenable. It cannot be logically maintained.
Aparigrahacchatyantamanapeksha                         11.2.17 (188)
And because (the atomic theory) is not accepted (by authoritative sages like Manu and others) it is to be totally rejected.
Aparigrahat: because it is not accepted; Cha: and; Atyantam: altogether, totally, completely; Anapeksha: to be rejected.
The argument against Vaiseshika is concluded.
At least the Sankhya doctrine of Pradhana was accepted to some extent by Manu and other knowers of the Veda but the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any person of authority in any of its parts. Therefore, it is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.
Further, there are other objections to the Vaiseshika doctrine. The Vaiseshikas assume six categories or Padarthas viz., Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Karma (action), Samanya (generality), Visesha (particularity) and Samavaya (inherence). They maintain that the six categories are absolutely different from each other and possess different characteristics just as a man, a horse and a hare differ from one another. They say that the categories are independent and yet they hold that on Dravya the other five categories depend. This contradicts the former one. This is quite inappropriate. Just as animals, grass, trees and the like, being absolutely different from each other, do not depend on each other, so also the qualities etc., also being absolutely different from substance cannot depend on the latter.
The Vaiseshikas say that Dravya (substance) and Guna (quality) are inseparably connected. At the same time they say that each begins its activity. The threads bring the cloth into existence and the whiteness in the threads produces the whiteness in the cloth. "Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality" (Vaiseshika Sutras 1.1.10). If the thread and its quality occupy the same space and are inseparably united, how can this take place? If the substance and the quality are inseparably together with reference to time, the two horns of a cow would have to grow together. If there is inseparability in the nature of the substance and its quality, why can you not say that both are one and identical? Hence the theory that the quality depends upon substance and that the quality and substance are inseparable, is untenable and inadmissible.
Further, the Vaiseshikas make distinction between Samyoga (conjunction) and Samavaya (inherence). They say that Samyoga is the connection of things which exists separately and Samavaya is the connection of things which are incapable of separate existence. This distinction is not tenable as the cause which exists before the effect cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. What is the proof of the existence of Samyoga or Samavaya apart from cause and effect? Nor is there any Samyoga or Samavaya apart from the things which become connected. The same man although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relation to others. Thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahmana, learned in the Veda, generous boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, etc. The same digit connotes different numbers, ten or hundred or thousand, according to its place.
Moreover, we have not seen Samyoga except as between things which occupy space. But mind is Anu and does not occupy space according to you. You cannot say that you will imagine some space for it. If you make such a supposition, there is no end to such suppositions. There is no reason why you should not assume a further hundred or thousand things in addition to the six categories assumed by the Vaiseshikas.
Moreover, two Paramanus which have no form cannot be united with a Dvyanuka which has form. There does not exist that kind of intimate connection between ether and earth which exists between wood and varnish.
Nor is the theory of Samavaya necessary to explain which, out of cause and effect, depends on the other. There is mutual dependence. Vedantins do not accept any difference between cause and effect. Effect is only cause in another form. The Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and the thing abiding. According to the Vedanta doctrine, the effect is only a certain state of the cause.
Moreover, Paramanus are finite and so they will have form. What has form must be liable to destruction.
Thus it is quite clear that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments. It is opposed to those scriptural texts which declare the Lord to be the general cause. It is not also accepted by sages like Manu and others. Therefore, it should be totally disregarded by wise men.
Samudayadhikaranam: Topic 4 (Sutras 18-27)
Refutation of the Bauddha Realists
Samudaya ubhayahetuke'pi tadapraptih                  11.2.18 (189)
Even if the (two kinds of) aggregates proceed from their two causes, there would take place non-establishment (of the two aggregates).
Samudaya: the aggregate; Ubhayahetuke: having two causes; Api: also, even; Tadapraptih: it will not take place, it cannot be established.
After refuting the atomic theory of Vaiseshika, the Buddhistic theories are now refuted.
Lord Buddha had four disciples who founded four systems of philosophy, called respectively Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogachara and Madhyamika. The Vaibhashikas are the Realists (Sarvastitvavadins) who accept the reality of both the outside and the inside world consisting respectively of external objects and thought (also consciousness, feelings, etc.). The Sautrantikas are the Idealists (Vijnanavadins). They hold that thought alone is real. They maintain that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not, the ideas only exist and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhashikas hold that the external objects are directly perceived while the Sautrantikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third class, the Yogacharas hold that ideas alone are real and there is no external world corresponding to these ideas. The outward objects are unreal like dream objects.
The Madhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal and there is nothing that exists except the void (Sunyam). They are the Nihilists or Sunyavadins who hold that everything is void and unreal. All of them agree that everything is momentary. Nothing lasts beyond a moment. Things of the previous moment do not exist in the next moment. One appears and the next moment it is replaced by another. There is no connection between the one and the other. Everything is like a scene in a cinema which is produced by the successive appearance and disappearance of several isolated pictures.
The Realists recognise two aggregates, viz., the external material world and the internal mental world, which together make up the universe. The external world is made up of the aggregate of atoms, which are of four kinds, viz., atoms of earth which are solid, atoms of water which are viscid, atoms of fire which are hot and atoms of air which are mobile.
The five Skandhas or groups are the cause for the internal world. They are Rupa Skandha, Vijnana Skandha, Vedana Skandha, Samjna Skandha and Samskara Skandha. The senses and their objects form the Rupa Skandha. Vijnana Skandha is the stream of consciousness which gives the notion of egoism or T. The Vedana Skandha comprises the feeling of pleasure and pain. The Samjna Skandha consists of names such as Ramakrishna, etc. All words thus constitute the Samjna Skandha. The fifth Skandha called Samskara Skandha consists of the attributes of the mind such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit (Dharma), demerit (Adharma), etc. All internal objects belong to any one of the last four Skandhas. The four last Skandhas form the internal objects. All activities depend upon the internal objects. The internal objects constitute the inner motive of everything. All external objects belong to one Skandha namely the Rupa Skandha. Thus the whole universe consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. The internal aggregate or the mental world is formed by the aggregate of the last four Skandhas. These are the two internal and external aggregates referred to in the Sutra.
The theory of the Bauddhas which classifies all objects under two heads, one aggregate being called the external, the other internal, is not sufficient to explain the world order; because all aggregates are unintelligent and there is no permanent intelligence admitted by the Bauddhas which can bring about this aggregation. Everything is momentary in its existence according to the Bauddhas. There is no permanent intelligent being who brings about the conjunction of these Skandhas. The continuation is not possible for these external atoms and internal sensations without the intervention of an intelligent guide. If it be said they come together of their own internal motion, then the world becomes eternal; because the Skandhas will be constantly bringing about creation as they are eternal and as they possess motion of their own. Thus this theory is untenable.
It cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about, because the parts that constitute the material aggregates are destitute of intelligence. The Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being such as enjoying soul or a ruling lord, which could effect the aggregation of atoms.
How are the aggregates formed? Is there any intelligent principle behind the aggregates as the Cause, the Guide, the Controller or the Director? Or does it take place spontaneously? If you say that there is an intelligent principle, is it permanent or momentary? If it is permanent, then the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness is opposed. If it is momentary, it must come into existence first and then unite the atoms. Then the cause should last more than one moment. If there is no intelligent principle as director or controller, how can non-intelligent atoms and the Skandhas aggregate in an orderly manner? Further, the creation would continue for ever. There would be no dissolution.
For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be properly explained. Without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of earthly existence which presupposes those aggregates. Therefore, the doctrine of this school of Bauddhas is untenable and inadmissible.
Itaretarapratyayatvaditi
chennotpattimatranimittatvat                              11.2.19 (190)
If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (nescience) standing in the relation of mutual causality, we say 'no'; they merely are the efficient cause of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links and not of the aggregation).
Itara-itara: mutual, one another; Pratyayatvat: because of being the cause, one being the cause of the other; Iti: thus; Chet: if; (Iti chet: if it be said); Na: no; Utpattimatranimittatvat: because they are merely the efficient cause of the origin.
An objection against Sutra 18 is raised and refuted.
The series beginning with nescience comprise the following members: Nescience, Samskara or impression, Vijnana (knowledge), name and form, the abode of the six (i.e., the body and the senses, contact, experience of pleasure and pain, desire, activity, merit, demerit, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, mental affliction and the like).
Nescience is the error of considering that what is momentary, impure, etc., to be permanent, pure, etc. Impression, (affection, Samskara) comprises desire, aversion, etc., and the activity caused by them. Knowledge (Vijnana) is the self-consciousness (Aham iti alayavijnanasya vrittilabhah) springing up in the embryo. Name and form is the rudimentary flake or bubble-like condition of the embryo. The abode of the six (Sadayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses. Touch (Sparsa) is the sensation of cold, warmth, etc., on the embryo's part. Feeling (Vedana) is the sensation of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom. Desire (Trishna) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. Activity (Upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. Birth is the passing out from the uterus. Species (Jati) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs. Decay (Jara), death (Marana) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (Mumursha). Grief (Soka) is the frustration of wishes connected therewith. Lament (Parivedana): the lamentations on that account. Pain (Duhkha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. Durmanas is mental affliction. The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.
The Buddhistic realist says: Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord of an enjoying soul under whose influence the formation of the aggregates could take place, yet the course of earthly existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality of nescience (ignorance) and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.
Nescience, Samskara, etc., constitute an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect. In the above series the immediately preceding item is the cause of the next. The wheel of cause and effect revolves unceasingly like the water-wheel and this cannot take place without aggregates. Hence aggregates are a reality.
We reply: Though in the series the preceding one is the cause of the subsequent one, there is nothing which can be the cause of the aggregates. It may be argued that the union of atom and the continuous flow of sensations are proved by the mutual interdependence existing among them. But the argument cannot stand, as this mutual interdependence cannot be the cause of their cohesion. Of two things one may produce the other, but that is no reason why they should unite together.
Even if Avidya (nescience), Samskara, Vijnana, Nama, and Rupa, etc., may without a sentient or intelligent agency pass from the stage of cause to the stage of effect, yet how can the totality of all these simultaneously exist without the will of a coordinating mind?
If you say that this aggregate or the world is formed by the mutual causation of Avidya and the rest, we say it is not so, because your link of causation explains only the origin of the subsequent from the previous. It only explains how Vijnana arises from Samskara, etc. It does not explain how the aggregate is brought about. An aggregate called Sanghata always shows a design and is brought about for the purpose of enjoyment. A Sanghata like a house may be explained to have been produced by putting together of bricks, mortar, etc., but they do not explain the design. You say that there is no permanent At-man. Your Atman is momentary only. You are a Kshanikatvavadin. There can be no enjoyment or experiencing for such a momentary soul; because the enjoying soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose fruits it has to enjoy. It was produced by another momentary soul. You cannot say that the momentary soul suffers the fruits of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul must be held to be permanent and not momentary. If you hold any soul to be permanent, it will contradict your theory of the momentariness of everything. But if you hold everything to be impermanent, your theory is open to the objection already made. Hence the doctrine of the Sanghatas (Buddhists) is untenable. It is not based on reason.
The atoms cannot combine by themselves even when they are assumed to be permanent and eternal. We have already shown this when examining the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas. Their combination is much more impossible when they are momentary.
The Bauddhas say that a combining principle of the atoms is not necessary if the atoms stand in a relation of causality. The atoms would combine by themselves. This is incorrect. The causality will explain only the production of atoms at different moments. It cannot certainly explain the union of the atom into an aggregate. The combination of an aggregate can take place only if there is an intelligent agent behind. Otherwise it is impossible to explain the union of inert and momentary atoms.
You will say that in the eternal Samsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain and hence also Nescience and so on which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that it may produce either a like or an unlike one without any settled or definite rule. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions as like will go on producing like; in the latter case a man might in an instant become an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.
The individual soul for whose enjoyment this aggregate of body etc., exists is also evanescent or momentary. It cannot therefore be an enjoyer. As the individual soul is momentary, whose is liberation? As there is no permanent enjoyer, there is no necessity for these aggregates. There may exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, etc., but in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is not possible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates. Hence the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhist school of Realists cannot stand.
Uttarotpade cha purvanirodhat                              11.2.20 (191)
(Nor can there be a causal relation between nescience, etc.) because on the origination of the subsequent thing the preceding one ceases to be.
Uttarotpade: at the time of the production of the subsequent thing; Cha: and; Purvanirodhat: because the antecedent one has ceased to exist, because of the destruction of the previous thing. (Uttara: in the next, in the subsequent; Utpade: on the origination, on the production.)
The argument against the Buddhistic theory, commenced in Sutra 18, is continued.
We have hitherto argued that nescience and so on stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of the aggregates. We are now going to prove that they cannot even be regarded as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.
According to the Buddhistic theory everything is momentary. A thing of the present moment vanishes in the next moment when its successor manifests. At the time of the appearance of a subsequent thing, the previous thing vanishes. Hence it is impossible for the previous thing to be the cause of the subsequent thing. Consequently the theory is untenable and inadmissible. It cannot stand to reason.
We always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect as the thread subsists in the cloth. But the Buddhists hold that existence originates from non-existence because they maintain that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause, the tree cannot appear until the seed is destroyed.
Even the passing of cause into effect in a series of successive states like nescience, etc., cannot take place, unless there is a coordinating intelligence. You say that everything has only a momentary existence. Your School cannot bring about the simultaneous existence of two successive moments. If the cause exists till it passes into the stage of effect, the theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) will vanish.
You may say that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence. That also is impossible, because even that will require a successive or second moment for operation. This contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.
The theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) cannot stand. The gold that exists at the time the ornament is made is alone the cause of the ornament and not that which existed before and has ceased to exist then. If it be still held to be the cause, then existence will come out of non-existence. This is not possible. The theory of momentariness will contradict the doctrine that the effect is the cause in a new form. This doctrine indicates that the cause exists in the effect. This shows that it is not momentary. Further, origination and destruction will be the same owing to momentariness. If it is said that there is difference between origination and destruction, then we will have to say that the thing lasts for more than one moment. Hence we have again to declare the doctrine of momentariness to be untenable.
Asati pratijnoparodho yaugapadyamanyatha           11.2.21 (192)
If non-existence (of cause) be assumed, (while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle or proposition. Otherwise there would result simultaneity (of cause and effect).
Asati: in the case of non-existence of cause, if it be admitted that an effect is produced without a cause; Pratijna: proposition, admitted principle; Uparodhah: contradiction, denial; Yaugapadyam: simultaneity, simultaneous existence; Anyatha: otherwise.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
If the Buddhists say that an effect is produced without a cause then they would contradict their own proposition that every effect has a cause. The proposition admitted by Buddhists that the consciousness of blue, etc., arises when mind, eye, light and object act in union as cause will fail. All sorts of effects can co-exist.
If a cause be assumed then we have to accept that the cause and effect exist simultaneously at the next moment. The cause exists for more than one moment. The cause exists till the state of effect is reached. Then the doctrine of momentariness will fail.
Pratisankhyapratisankhyanirodha
praptiravicchedat                                                 11.2.22(193)
Conscious and unconscious destruction would be impossible on account of non-interruption.
Pratisankhya nirodha: conscious destruction, destruction due to some cause or agency; causal destruction, destruction depending upon the volition of conscious entity; Apratisankhya nirodha: unconscious destruction, destruction not depending upon any voluntary agency; Apraptih: non-attainment, impossibility; Avicchedat: because of non-interruption, because it goes on without interruption.
The argument against the theory of the Buddhists is continued.
The Buddhists hold that universal destruction is ever going on and that this destruction or cessation is of two kinds, viz., conscious and unconscious. Conscious destruction depends upon an act of thought as when a man breaks a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so. Unconscious destruction is the natural decay of objects.
The flow of cause and effect goes on without interruption and therefore cannot be subject to either kind of destruction. Nor can any individual antecedent of a series be said to be totally destroyed, as it is recognised in its immediate consequence.
Both kinds of destruction or cessation are impossible because it must refer either to the series of momentary existences or to the single members constituting the series.
The former alternative is not possible because in all series of momentary existences the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted. The latter alternative is similarly not admissible, because it is not possible to hold that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected with the previous state of existence, as we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence. When an earthen jar is destroyed we find the existence of the clay in the potsherds or fragments into which the jar is broken or in the powder into which the potsherds are ground. We infer that even though what seems to vanish altogether such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continues to exist in some other form, viz., as steam.
The series of momentary existence forming a chain of causes and effect is continuous and can never be stopped, because the last momentary existence before its annihilation must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. If it does, then the series is continued and will not be destroyed. If it does not produce the effect, the last link does not really exist as the Bauddhas define Satta of a thing as its causal efficiency and the non-existence of the last link would lead backward to the non-existence of the whole series.
We cannot have then two kinds of destruction in the individual members of the series also. Conscious destruction is not possible on account of the momentary existence of each member. There cannot be unconscious destruction as the individual member is not totally annihilated. Destruction of a thing really means only change of condition of the substance.
You cannot say that when a candle is burnt out, it is totally annihilated. When a candle burns out, it is not lost but undergoes a change of condition. We do not certainly perceive the candle when it is burnt out, but the materials of which it consisted continue to exist in a very subtle state and hence they are imperceptible.
For these reasons the two kinds of destruction which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
Ubhayatha cha doshat                                                   11.2.23 (194)
And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
Ubhayatha: in either case; Cha: and, also; Doshat: because of objections.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
There is a fallacy in either view, i.e., that Avidya or ignorance is destroyed by right knowledge or self-destroyed.
According to the Buddhistic view, emancipation is the annihilation of ignorance. Salvation or freedom is attained when ignorance is destroyed. Ignorance (Avidya or nescience) is the false idea of permanency in things which are momentary.
The ignorance can be annihilated by the adoption of some means such as penance, knowledge, etc., (conscious destruction); or it may destroy itself (spontaneity). But both the alternatives are defective. Because this annihilation of ignorance cannot be attained by the adoption of penance or the like; for the mean like every other thing, is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view and is, therefore, not likely to produce such annihilation; annihilation cannot take place of its own accord, for in that case all Buddhistic instructions, the disciplines and methods of meditation for the attainment of emancipation will be useless.
According to the Buddhistic theory, there can be no voluntary exertion on the part of the aspirant for the breaking asunder of his continued worldly experiences or nescience. There is no hope of their ever coming to an end by mere exhaustion as the causes continue to generate their effects which again continue to generate their own effects and so on and there is no occasion left for practices for attaining release.
Thus in the Buddhistic system release or freedom can never be established. The teaching of the Buddhists cannot stand the test of reasoning.
Aakase chaviseshat                                                       11.2.24 (195)
The cause of Akasa (ether) also not being different (from the two other kinds of destruction it also cannot be a non-entity.)
Akase: in the case of Akasa or ether; Cha: also, and; Aviseshat: because of no specific difference.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
We have shown in Sutras 22-23 that the two kinds of destruction (cessation) are not totally destitute of all positive characteristics and so cannot be non-entities. We now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, Akasa).
The Buddhists do not recognise the existence of Akasa. They regard Akasa as a non-entity. Akasa is nothing but the absence of covering or occupying body (Avaranabhava). This is un-reasonable. Akasa has the quality of sound, just as earth has smell, water taste, fire form, air touch. Akasa also is a distinct entity like earth, water, etc. Hence there is no reason why Akasa also should be rejected as a non-entity, while earth, water, etc., are recognised as being entities.
Just as earth, air, etc., are regarded as entities on account of their being the substratum of attributes like smell, etc., so also Akasa should be considered as an entity on account of its being the substratum of sound. Earth, water, etc., are experienced through their respective qualities, viz., smell, taste, form, touch. The existence of Akasa is experienced through its quality, sound. Hence Akasa also must be an entity.
Space is inferred from its attribute of sound, just as earth is inferred from smell. Where there is relation of substance and attribute there must be an object. The Buddhists hold that space is mere non-existence of matter (Avaranabhavamatram). If so, a bird may fall down as there is no obstructive matter, but how can it fly up? Non-existence of matter is space which is a positive object and not mere negation or non-entity.
The doctrine that Akasa is an absolute non-entity is not tenable. Why do you say so? Aviseshat, because there is no difference in the case of Akasa from any other kind of substance which is an object of perception. We perceive space when we say, "the crow flies in space." The space, therefore, is as much a real substance as the earth, etc. As we know the earth by its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste, and so on, so we know from the quality of being the abode of objects, the existence of space, and that it has the quality of sound. Thus Akasa is a real substance and not a non-entity.
If Akasa be a non-entity, then the entire world would become destitute of space.
Scriptural passages declare "Space sprang from the Atman" (Atmana akasassambhutah). So Akasa is a real thing. It is a Vastu (existing object) and not non-existence.
O Buddhists! You say that air exists in Akasa. In the Bauddha scriptures, a series of questions and answers beginning "On which, O revered Sir, is the earth founded?" in which the following question occurs, "On which is the air founded?" to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. If Akasa was totally non-existent, what would be the receptacle of air?
You cannot say that space is nothing but the absence of any occupying object. This also cannot stand to reason. If you say that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering or occupying body, then when one bird is flying, whereby space is occupied, there would be no room for a second bird which wishes to fly at the same time. You may give an answer that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body. But we declare that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz., space in our sense and not the mere non-existing of covering bodies.
Moreover, there is a self-contradiction in the statements of Buddhists with reference to the three kinds of negative entities (Nirupakhya). They say that the negative entities are not positively definable, and also are eternal. It is absurd to talk of a non-being as being eternal or evanescent. The distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution totally rests on real things. Where there is such distinction, there exists the real thing such as pot, etc., which is not a mere undefinable negation or non-entity.
Anusmritescha                                                               11.2.25(196)
And on account of memory the things are not momentary. Anusmriteh: on account of memory; Cha: and.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
The theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is refuted here. If everything is momentary the experiencer of something must also be momentary. But the experiencer is not momentary, because people have the memory of past experiences. Memory can take place only in a man who has previously experienced it, because we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. It is not that the experience is that one sees and another remembers. Our experience is "I saw and I now remember what I saw." He who experiences and remembers is the same. He is connected with at least two moments. This certainly refutes the theory of momentariness.
The Buddhists may say that memory is due to similarity. But unless there be one permanent knowing subject, who can perceive the similarity in the past with the present. One cannot say "This is the pot, this is the chair which was in the past." So long there is not the same soul which saw and which now remembers, how can mere similarity bring about such a consciousness as "I saw and I now remember (Pratyabhijna)?" The knowing subject must be permanent and not momentary.
Doubt may arise with reference to an external object. You may not be able to say whether it is identically the same object which was perceived in the past or something similar to it. But with reference to the Self, the cognising subject, there can never arise any such doubt whether I am the same who was in the past, for it is impossible that the memory of a thing perceived by another should exist in one's own Self.
If you say that this, the thing remembered, is like that, the thing seen, in that case also two things are connected by one agent. If the thing perceived was separate and ceased totally, it cannot be referred at all. Moreover the experience is not that "this is like that" but that "this is that."
We admit that sometimes with reference to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; because mistake may occur concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself. It is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and remembers that sensation today. Does any one doubt whether he who remembers is the same as he who saw?
For this reason also the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is to be rejected.
We do not perceive objects coming into existence in a moment or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of momentariness of all things is refuted.
Nasato'drishtatvat                                                     11.2.26 (197)
(Existence or entity does) not (spring) from non-existence or non-entity, because it is not seen.
Na: not; Asatah: from non-existence, of the unreal, of a non-entity; Adrishtatvat: because it is not seen.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
A non-entity has not been observed to produce entity. Therefore it does not stand to reason to suppose non-entity to be the cause.
The Bauddhas (Vainasikas) assert that no effect can be produced from anything that is unchanging and eternal, because an unchanging thing cannot produce an effect. So they declare that the cause perishes before the effect is produced. They say from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a pot. So existence comes out of non-existence.
According to the view of the Buddhists, a real thing, i.e., the world has come into existence out of nothing. But experience shows that this theory is false. A pot for instance is never found to be produced without clay. Such a hypothetical production can only exist in the imagination, for example, the child of a barren woman. Hence the view of the Buddhists is untenable and inadmissible.
If existence can come out of non-existence, if being can proceed from non-being, then the assumption of special causes would have no meaning at all. Then anything may come out of anything, be cause non-entity is one and the same in all cases. There is no difference between the non-entity of a mango seed and that of a jack-seed. Hence a jack tree may come out of a mango seed. Sprouts also may originate from the horns of hares. If there are different kinds of non-existence, having special distinctions just as for instance, blue-ness and the like are the special qualities of lotuses and so on, the non-existence of a mango seed will differ from that of a jack-seed, and then this would turn non-entities into entities.
Moreover if existence springs from non-existence all effects would be affected with non-existence, but they are seen to be positive entities with their various special characteristics.
The horn of a hare is non-existent. What can come out from that horn? We see only being emerging from being, e.g., ornament from gold, etc.
According to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four Skandhas and all material aggregates from the atoms. And yet they say at the same time that entity is born of non-entity. This is certainly quite inconsistent and self-contradictory. They stultify their own doctrine and needlessly confuse the minds of every one.
Udasinanamapi chaivam siddhih                            11.2.27 (198)
And thus (if existence should spring from non-existence, there would result) the attainment of the goal by the indifferent and non-active people also.
Udasianam: of the indifferent and non-active; Api: even, also; Cha: and; Evam: thus; Siddih: success accomplishment, and attainment of the goal.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
If it were admitted that existence or entity springs from non-existence or non-entity, lazy inactive people also would attain their purpose. Rice will grow even if the farmer does not cultivate his field. Jars will shape themselves even if the potter does not fashion the clay. The weaver too will have finished pieces of cloth without weaving. Nobody will have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for attaining final emancipation. All this is absurd and not maintained by anybody.
Thus the doctrine of the origination of existence or entity from non-existence or non-entity is untenable or inadmissible.

Nabhavadhikaranam: Topic 5 (Sutras 28-32)
Refutation of the Bauddha Idealist
Nabhava upalabdheh                                                     11.2.28 (199)
The non-existence (of eternal things) cannot be maintained; on account of (our) consciousness (of them). Na: not; Abhavah: non-existence; Upalabdheh: because they are perceived, because of perception, because we are conscious of them on account of their being experienced.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued. From this Sutra begins the refutation of Buddhistic Idealists.
The doctrine of the Buddhist which affirms the momentary existence of external objects has been refuted. The Sutrakara or the author of the Sutras now proceeds to refute the doctrine of the Buddhistic school which affirms the momentariness of thought, which declares that only ideas exist and nothing else.
According to the Buddhistic Idealists (Vijnanavadins), the external world is non-existent. They maintain that every phenomenon resolves itself into consciousness and idea without any reality corresponding to it. This is not correct. The external phenomena are not non-existent as they are actually witnessed by our senses of perception. The external world is an object of experience through the senses. It cannot therefore, be non-existent like the horns of a hare.
The Vijnanavadins say: No external object exists apart from consciousness. There is impossibility for the existence of outward things. Because if outward objects are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as chairs, pots, etc. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of chair, etc. It is not possible for cognition to represent things as minute as atoms. There is no recognition of atoms and so the objects could not be atoms. They could not be atomic combinations because we cannot affirm if such combinations are one with atoms or separate therefrom.
According to the Vijnanavadins or the Yogachara system the Vijnana Skandha or idea alone is real. An object like pot or chair which is perceived outside is nothing more than ideas. The Vijnana or idea modifies itself into the form of an object. All worldly activities can go on with mere ideas, just as in dream all activities are performed with the thought objects. Ideas only exist. It is useless to assume that the object is something different from the idea. It is possible to have practical thought and intercourse without external objects, just as it is done in dream. All practical purposes are well rendered possible by admitting the reality of ideas only, because no good purpose is served by additional assumption of external objects corresponding to internal ideas.
The mind assumes different shapes owing to the different Vasanas or desire-impressions submerged in it. Just as these Vasanas create the dream world, so the external world in the waking state is also the result of Vasanas. The assumption of an external object is unnecessary. We do not see any separation of cognition and object. In dream we cognise without objects. Even so in the waking state there could be cognition without objects. Our manifoldness of Vasanas can account for such cognitions.
Perception in the waking state is like a dream. The ideas that are present during a dream appear in the form of subject and object, although there is no external object. Hence, the ideas of chair, pot, which occur in our waking state are likewise independent of external objects, because they also imply ideas.
This argument is fallacious. When you see a chair or a pot how can you deny it? When you eat, your hunger is appeased. How can you doubt the hunger or the food? You say that there is no object apart from your cognition on account of your capriciousness. Why do you not see a chair as a pot? If an object is a mere mental creation like a dream why should the mind locate it outside?
The Buddhist may say "I do not affirm that I have no consciousness of an object. I also feel that the object appears as an external thing, but what I affirm is this that I am always conscious of nothing directly save my own ideas. My idea alone shines as something external. Consequently the appearance of the external things is the result of my own ideas."
We reply that the very fact of your consciousness proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality. That the external object exists apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. No one when perceiving a chair or a pot is conscious of his perception only, but all are conscious of chair or a pot and the like as objects of perception.
You (Vijnanavadins) say that the internal consciousness or idea appears as something external. This already indicates that the external world is real. If it were not real, your saying like something external would be meaningless. The word 'like' shows that you admit the reality of the external objects. Otherwise you would not have used this word. Because no one makes a comparison with a thing which is an absolute unreality. No one says that Ramakrishna is like the son of a barren woman.
An idea like a lamp requires an ulterior intellectual principle or illuminer to render it manifest. Vijnana has a beginning and an end. It also belongs to the category of the known. The knower is as indispensable of cognitions as of objects.
The Buddhist idealist, while contending that there is nothing outside the mind, forgets the fallacy of the argument. If the world, as they argue, were only an outward expression of internal ideas, then the world also would be just mind. But the Buddhists argue that the mind, which is ostensibly in the individual, is also the world outside. Here the question arises: How does the idea of there being nothing outside arise without the mind itself being outside? The consciousness that nothing exists outside cannot arise if there is really nothing outside. Hence the Buddhist Vijnanavada doctrine is defective.
When the Buddhists came to know of the illogicality of their concept, they modified their doctrine saying that the mind referred to here is not the individual mind but the cosmic mind, known as Alaya-Vijnana, which is the repository of all individual minds in a potential form. Here the Buddhist stumbles on the Vedanta doctrine that the world is a manifestation of the Universal Mind.
Vaidharmyaccha na svapnadivat                            11.2.29 (200)
And on account of the difference in nature (in consciousness between the waking and the dreaming state, the experience of the waking state) is not like dreams, etc., etc.
Vaidharmyat: on account of difference of nature, because of dissimilarity; Cha: and, also; Na: not; Svapnadivat: like dreams etc.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
The waking state is not like dream, etc., because of dissimilarity. The ideas of the waking state are not like those of a dream on account of their difference of nature.
The Buddhists say: The perception of the external world is like the dream. There are no external objects in a dream and yet the ideas manifest as subject and object. Even so the appearance of the external universe is independent of any objective reality.
The analogy of dream phenomena to the phenomena of the waking world is wrong. The consciousness in a dream and that in a wakeful state are dissimilar. The consciousness in a dream depends on the previous consciousness in the wakeful state, but the consciousness in the wakeful state does not depend on anything else, but on the actual perception by senses. Further the dream experience become false as soon as one wakes up. The dreaming man says as soon as he wakes up, "I wrongly dreamt that I had a meeting with the collector. No such meeting took place. My mind was dulled by sleep and so the false ideas arose." Those things on the contrary, of which we are conscious in our waking state such as post and the like, are never negated in any state. They stand unchallenged and uncontra-dicted. Even after hundreds of years they will have the same appearance as now.
Moreover dream phenomena are mere memories whereas the phenomena of the waking state are experienced as realities. The distinction between remembrance and experience or immediate consciousness is directly realised by everyone as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly meet him. Simply because there is similarity between dream state and waking state we cannot say that they have the same nature. If a characteristic is not the nature of an object it will not become its inherent nature simply by being similar to an object which has that nature. You cannot say that fire which burns is cold because it has characteristics in common with water.
Hence the dreaming state and the waking state are totally dissimilar in their inherent nature.
Na bhavo'nupalabdheh                                         11.2.30 (201)
The existence (of Samskaras or mental impressions) is not possible (according to the Bauddhas), on account of the absence of perception (of external things).
Na: not; Bhavah: existence (of impressions or Samskaras); Anupalabdheh: because they are not perceived, because (external things) are not experienced.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
According to your doctrine there could be no existence of Vasanas or mental impressions as you deny the existence of objects.
You say that though an external thing does not actually exist, yet its impressions do exist, and from these impressions diversities of perception and ideas like chair, tree arise. This is not possible, as there can be no perception of an external thing which is itself non-existent. If there be no perception of an external thing, how can it leave an impression?
If you say that the Vasanas or the mental impressions are Anadi (beginningless, or causeless), this will land you in the logical fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. This would in no way establish your position. Vasanas are Samskaras or impressions and imply a cause and basis or substratum, but for you there is no cause or basis for Vasanas or mental impressions, as you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.
Kshanikatvaccha                                                   11.2.31 (202)
And on account of the momentariness (of the Alayavijnana or ego-consciousness it cannot be the abode of the Samskaras or mental impressions). Kshanikatvat: on account of the momentariness; Cha: and.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
The mental impressions cannot exist without a receptacle or abode. Even the Alayavijnana or ego-consciousness cannot be the abode of mental impressions as it is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view.
Unless there exists one continuous permanent principle equally connected with the past, the present and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable Self which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause. If you say that Alayavijnana is something permanent then that would contradict your doctrine of momentariness.
We have thus refuted the doctrine of the Buddhists which holds the momentary reality of the external world and the doctrine which declares that ideas only exist.
Sarvathanupapattescha                                           II.2.32 (203)
And (as the Bauddha system is) illogical in every way (it cannot be accepted).
Sarvatha: in every way; Anupapatteh: because of its not being proved illogical; Cha: and, also.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is concluded here.
The Sunyavada or Nihilism of the Buddhist which asserts that nothing exists is fallacious because it goes against every method of proof, viz., perception, inference, testimony and analogy. It goes against the Sruti and every means of right knowledge. Hence it has to be totally ignored by those who care for their own happiness and welfare. It need not be discussed in detail as it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has no foundation whatever to rest upon. Any endeavour to use this system as a guide in the practical concerns of life is mere folly.
O Sunyavadins! You must admit yourself to be a being and your reasoning also to be something and not nothing. This contradicts your theory that all is nothing.
Further, the means of knowledge by which Sunyata is to be proved must at least be real and must be acknowledged to be true, because if such means of knowledge and arguments be themselves nothing, then the theory of nothingness cannot be established. If these means and arguments be true, then something certainly is proved. Then also the theory of nothingness is disproved.
Ekasminnasambhavadhikaranam: Topic 6 (Sutras 33-36)
Refutation of the Jaina Doctrine
Naikasminnasambhavat                                            11.2.33 (204)
On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one and the same thing at the same time (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
Na: not; Ekasmin: in one; Asambhavat: on account of the impossibility.
After the refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness, Vijnanavada and Nihilism, the Jaina doctrine is taken up for discussion and refutation.
The Jainas acknowledge seven categories or Tattvas, viz., soul(Jiva), non-soul (Ajiva), the issuing outward(Asrava), restraint (Samvara), destruction (Nirjara), bondage (Bandha), and release (Moksha). These categories can be mainly divided into two groups, the soul and the non-soul. The Jainas say also that there are five Astikayas viz., Jiva or soul, Pudgala (body, matter), Dharma (merit), Adharma (demerit) and Akasa (space).
Their chief doctrine is the Saptabhanginyaya. They predicate seven different views with reference to the reality of everything, i.e., it may exist, may not exist, may exist and may not exist, may be inexpressible, may exist and may be inexpressible, may not exist and may be inexpressible and may exist and may not exist and may be inexpressible.
Now this view about things cannot be accepted, because in one substance it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold at the same time. Simultaneous existence of light and darkness in one place is impossible.
According to the Jaina doctrine, heaven and liberation may exist or may not exist. This world, heaven and even liberation will become doubtful. We cannot arrive at any definite knowledge. It would be useless to lay down rules of practice for the attainment of heaven, for the avoidance of hell or for emancipation because there is no certainty about anything. The heaven may as well be hell and final freedom not different from these. As everything is ambiguous, there would be nothing to distinguish heaven, hell and final liberation from each other.
Confusion will arise not only with regard to the object of the world, but of the world also. If things are indefinite, and if everything is "somehow it is, somehow it is not," then a man who wants water will take fire to quench his thirst and so on with everything else, because it may be that fire is hot, it may be that fire is cold.
If there is such doubt how can true knowledge result? How can the Jaina teachers teach anything with certainty if everything is doubtful? How can their followers act at all, learning such teachings?
Applying this Saptabhanginyaya to their five Astikayas, the five may become four or even less. If they are inexpressible, why do they talk about it?
We have already refuted the atomic theory on which is based the Jaina doctrine that Pudgala (matter) is due to atomic combination.
Hence the Jaina doctrine is untenable and inadmissible. Their logic is fragile as the thread of a spider and cannot stand the strain of reasoning.
Evam chatmakartsnyam                                          11.2.34 (205)
And in the same way (there results from the Jaina doctrine) the non-universality of the soul.
Evam: thus, in the same way, as it is suggested by the Jaina theory; Cha: also, and; Atma-akartsnyam: non-universality of the soul.
Other defects of the Jaina theory are shown.
We have hitherto spoken about the objection resulting from the Syadvada of the Jainas, viz., that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual soul is not universal, i.e., not omnipresent.
The Jainas hold that the soul is of the size of the body. In that case it would be limited and with parts. Hence it cannot be eternal and omnipresent.
Moreover, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different sizes, the soul of a man taking the body of an elephant on account of its past deeds will not be able to fill up that body. The soul of an ant also will not be able to fill up the body of an elephant. The soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space in the body of an ant. A large portion of it will have to be outside that body. The soul of a child or a youth being smaller in size will not be able to fill completely the body of a grown-up man.
The stability of the dimensions of the soul is impaired. The Jaina theory itself falls to the ground.
The Jainas may give an answer that a Jiva has infinite limbs and therefore could expand or contract. But could those infinite limbs be in the same place or not? If they could not, how could they be compressed in a small space? If they could, then all the limbs must be in the same place and cannot expand into a big body. Moreover they have no right to assume that a Jiva has infinite limbs. What is there to justify the view that a body of limited size contains an infinite number of soul particles?
Well then, the Jainas may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the soul enters a big body, some particles accede to it, while some withdraw from it, whenever it enters a small body.
To this hypothesis, the next Sutra gives a suitable answer.
Na cha paryayadapyavirodho vikaradibhyah            11.2.35 (206)
Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts according to and departing from the soul to such different bodies) on account of the change, etc., (of the soul).
Na: not; Cha: also, and; Paryayat: in turn, because of assuming by succession; Api: even; Avirodhah: no inconsistency; Vikaradibhyah: on account of change, etc.
Further defects of the Jaina doctrine are shown in this Sutra.
The Jaina may say that the soul is really indefinite in its size. Therefore when it animates the bodies of an infant or a youth it has that size, and when it occupies the bodies of horses or elephants it expands itself to that size. By successive expansion and dilation like the gas it fully occupies the entire body which animates for the time being. Then there is no objection to our theory that the soul is of the size of the body.
Even if you say that the limbs of the soul keep out or come in according as the body is small or big, you cannot get over the objection that in such a case the soul will be liable to change and consequently will not be eternal. Then any talk of bondage and emancipation would be meaningless. The futility of the question of release and of the philosophy that deals with it would result.
If the soul's limbs can come and go, how could it be different in nature from the body? So one of these limbs only can be the Atman. Who can fix it? Whence do the limbs of the soul come? Where do they take rest? They cannot spring from the material elements and re-en-. ter the elements because the soul is immortal. The limbs come and go. The soul will be of an indefinite nature and stature.
The Jaina may say that although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent. Just as the stream of water is permanent although the water continually changes.
Then the same objection as that urged against the Buddhists will arise. If such a continuity is not real but is only apparent, there will be no Atman at all. We are led back to the doctrine of a general void. If it is something real, the soul will be liable to change and hence not eternal. This will render the view of the Jaina impossible.
Antyavasthiteschobhayanityatvadavisesah             11.2.36 (207)
And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul on release) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes), there is no difference (of size of the soul, at any time).
Antyavasthiteh: because of the permanency of the size at the end; Cha: and; Ubhayanityatvat: as both are permanent; Aviseshah: because there being no difference.
Discussion on the defects of the Jaina doctrine is concluded.
Further the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size of the soul, which it has in the stage of release. From this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening size must be permanent. Therefore there is no difference between the three sizes. What is the speciality of the state of release? There is no peculiarity of difference, according to the Jainas, between the state of release and the mundane state. The different bodies of the soul have one and the same size and the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies. The soul must be regarded as being always of the same size, whether minute or infinite and not of the varying sizes of the bodies.
Therefore the Jaina doctrine that the soul varies according to the size of the body is untenable and inadmissible. It must be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of the Bauddhas.
Patyadhikaranam: Topic 7 (Sutras 37-41)
Refutation of the Pasupata System
Patyurasamanjasyat                                                II.2.37 (208)
The Lord (cannot be the efficient or the operative cause of the world) on account of the inconsistency (of that doctrine).
Patyuh: of the Lord, of Pasupati, of the Lord of animals; Asamanjasyat: on account of inconsistency, on account of untenableness, inappropriateness.
The Pasupatas or the Mahesvaras are divided into four classes, viz., Kapala, Kalamukha, Pasupata and Saiva. Their scripture describes five categories, viz., Cause (Karana), Effect (Karya), Union (Yoga by the practice of meditation), Ritual (Vidhi) and the end of pain or sorrow (Duhkhanta), i.e., the final emancipation. Their categories were revealed by the great Lord Pasupati Himself in order to break the bonds of the soul called herein Pasu or animal.
In this system Pasupati is the operative or the efficient cause (Nimitta Karana). Mahat and the rest are the effects. Union means union with Pasupati, their God, through abstract meditation. Their rituals consist of bathing thrice a day, smearing the forehead with ashes, interturning the fingers in religious worship (Mudra), wearing Rudraksha on the neck and arms, taking food in a human skull, smearing the body with ashes of a burnt human body, worshipping the deity immersed in a wine-vessel. By worshipping the Pasupati the soul attains proximity with the Lord, and there accrues a state of cessation of all desires and all pains which is Moksha.
The followers of this school recognise God as the efficient or the operative cause. They recognise the primordial matter as the material cause of the world. This theory is contrary to the view of the Sruti where Brahman is stated to be both the efficient and the material cause of the world. Hence the theory of Pasupatas cannot be accepted.
According to Vedanta, the Lord is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. The Naiyayikas, Vaiseshikas, Yogins and Mahesvaras say that the Lord is the efficient cause only and the material cause is either the atoms, according to the Naiyayikas and Vaiseshikas, or the Pradhana, according to the Yogins and Mahesvaras. He is the ruler of the Pradhana and the souls which are different from Him.
This view is wrong and inconsistent. Because God will be partial to some and prejudiced against others. Because some are prosperous, while others are miserable in this universe. You cannot explain this saying that such difference is due to diversity of Karma, for if the Lord directs Karma, they will become mutually dependent. You cannot explain this on the ground of beginninglessness, for the defect of mutual dependence will persist.
Your doctrine is inappropriate because you hold the Lord to be a special kind of soul. From this it follows that He must be devoid of all activity.
The Sutrakara himself has proved in the previous Section of this book that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world (efficient or the operative cause).
It is impossible that the Lord should be the mere efficient cause of the world, because His connection with the world cannot be established. In ordinary worldly life we see that a potter who is merely the efficient cause of the pot has a certain connection with the clay with which he fashions the pot.
The Srutis emphatically declare 'I will become many' (Tait. Up. 11.6). This indicates that the Lord is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.
Sambandhanupapattescha                                    11.2.38 (209)
And because relation (between the Lord and the Pradhana or the souls) is not possible.
Sambandha: relation; Anupapatteh: because of the impossibility; Cha: and.
The argument against the Pasupata view is continued.
A Lord who is distinct from the Pradhana and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. It cannot be conjunction (Samyoga), because the Lord, the Pradhana and the souls are of infinite extent and destitute of parts. Hence they cannot be ruled by Him.
There could not be Samavaya-sambandha (inherence) which subsists between entities inseparably connected as whole and part, substance and attributes etc., (as in the case of Tantu-pata, thread and cloth), because it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing.
The difficulty does not arise in the case of the Vedantins. They say that Brahman is Abhinna-Nimitta-Upadana, the efficient cause and the material cause of the world. They affirm Tadatmya-sambandha (relation of identity). Further they depend on the Srutis for their authority. They define the nature of the cause and so on, on the basis of Sruti. They are, therefore, not obliged to render their tenets entirely conformable to observation as the opponents have to.
The Pasupatas cannot say that they have the support of the Agama (Tantras) for affirming Omniscience about God. Such a statement suffers from the defect of a logical see-saw (petitio principii), because the omniscience of the Lord is established on the doctrine of the scripture and the authority of the scripture is again established on the omniscience of the Lord.
For all these reasons, such doctrines of Sankhyayoga about the Lord is devoid of foundation and is incorrect. Other similar doctrines which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.
Adhishthananupapattescha                                          11.2.39 (210)
And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).
Adhisthana: rulership; Anupapatteh: because of the impossibility;
Cha: and.
The argument against the Pasupata view is continued.
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers, such as Naiyayikas, etc., is untenable hypothesis. There is another logical fallacy in the Nyaya conception of Isvara. They say that the Lord creates the world with the help of Pradhana, etc., just as a potter makes pots with the mud.
But this cannot be admitted, because the Pradhana which is devoid of colour and other qualities and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account of an entirely different nature from clay and the like. Therefore, it cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action. The Lord cannot direct the Pradhana.
There is another meaning also for this Sutra. In this world we see a king with a body and never a king without a body. Therefore, the Lord also must have a body which will serve as the substratum of his organs. How can we ascribe a body to the Lord, because a body is only posterior to creation?
The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because he is devoid of a material substratum, because experience teaches us that action needs a material substratum. If we assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body which serves as a substratum for his organs prior to creation, this assumption also will not do, because if the Lord has a body He is subject to the sensations of the ordinary souls and thus no longer is the Lord.
The Lord's putting on a body also cannot be established. So the Lord of animals (Pasupati) cannot be the ruler of matter (Pradhana). That by putting on a body the Lord becomes the efficient cause of the world is also fallacious. In the world it is observed that a potter having a bodily form fashions a pot with the clay. If from this analogy the Lord is inferred to be the efficient cause of the world, He is to be admitted to have a bodily form. But all bodies are perishable. Even the Pasupatas admit that the Lord is eternal. It is untenable that the eternal Lord resides in a perishable body and so becomes dependent on another additional cause. Hence it cannot be inferred that the Lord has any bodily form.
There is still another meaning. Further, there is in his case the impossibility (absence) of place. For an agent like the potter etc., stands on the ground and does his work. He has a place to stand upon. Pasupati does not possess that.
Karanavacchenna bhogadibhyah                            11.2.40 (211)
If it be said (that the Lord rules the Pradhana etc.,) just as (the Jiva rules) the senses (which are also not perceived), (we say) no, because of the enjoyment, etc.
Karanavat: like the senses; Chet: if, if it be conceived. Na: not (no it cannot be accepted); Bhogadibhyah: because of enjoyment, etc.
An objection against Sutra 38 is raised and refuted.
The Sutra consists of two parts, namely an argument and its reply. The argument is 'Karanavacchet and the reply is 'A/a bhogadibhyah'.
The opponent says: Just as the individual soul rules the sense organs which are not perceived, so also the Lord rules the Pradhana, etc.
The analogy is not correct, because the individual soul feels pleasure and pain. If the analogy be true, the Lord also would experience pleasure and pain, caused by the Pradhana etc., and hence would forfeit His Godhead.
Antavattvamasarvajnata va                                       11.2.41(212)
(There would follow from their doctrine the Lord's) being subject to destruction or His non-omniscience.
Antavattvam: finiteness, terminableness, subject to destruction; Asarvajnata: absence of Omniscience; Va: or.
The argument raised in Sutra 40 is further refuted and thus the Pasupata doctrine is refuted.
According to these schools (Nyaya, Pasupata, the Mahesvara, etc.), the Lord is Omniscient and eternal. The Lord, the Pradhana and the souls are infinite and separate. Does the Omniscient Lord know the measure of the Pradhana, soul and Himself or not? If the Lord knows their measure, they all are limited. Therefore a time will come when they will all cease to exist. If Samsara ends and thus there is no more Pradhana, of what can God be the basis or His lordship? Or, over what is His Omniscience to extend? If nature and souls are finite, they must have a beginning. If they have a beginning and end, there will be scope for Sunyavada, the doctrine of nothingness. If He does not know them, then he would no longer be Omniscient. In either case the doctrine of the Lord's being the mere efficient cause of the world is untenable, inconsistent and unacceptable.
If God be admitted to have organs of senses and so to be subject to pleasure and pain, as stated in Sutra 40, He is subject to birth and death like an ordinary man. He becomes devoid of Omniscience. This sort of God is not accepted by the Pasupatas even. Hence the doctrine of the Pasupatas, that God is not the material cause of the world cannot be accepted.
Utpattyasambhavadhikaranam: Topic 8 (Sutras 42-45)
Refutation of the Bhagavata or the Pancharatra school
Utpattyasambhavat                                                      11.2.42(213)
On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the Highest Lord), (the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or the Pancharatra doctrine cannot be accepted). Utpatti: causation, origination, creation; Asambhavat: on account of the impossibility.
The Pancharatra doctrine or the doctrine of the Bhagavatas is now refuted.
According to this school, the Lord is the efficient cause as well as the material cause of the universe. This is in quite agreement with the scripture or the Sruti and so it is authoritative. A part of their system agrees with the Vedanta system. We accept this. Another part of the system, however, is open to objection.
The Bhagavatas say that Vaasudeva whose nature is pure knowledge is what really exists. He divides Himself fourfold and appears in four forms (Vyuhas) as Vaasudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vaasudeva denotes the Supreme Self, Sankarshana the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind, and Aniruddha the principle of egoism, or Ahamkara. Of these four, Vaasudeva constitutes the Ultimate Cause, of which the three others are the effects.
They say that by devotion for a long period to Vaasudeva through Abhigamana (going to the temple with devotion), Upadana (securing the accessories of worship), Ijya (oblation, worship), Svadhyaya (study of holy scripture and recitation of Mantras) and Yoga (devout meditation) we can pass beyond all afflictions, pains and sorrows, attain Liberation and reach the Supreme Being. We accept this doctrine.
But we controvert the doctrine that Sankarshana (the Jiva) is born from Vaasudeva and so on. Such creation is not possible. If there is such birth, if the soul be created it would be subject to destruction and hence there could be no Liberation. That the soul is not created will be shown in Sutra 11.3.17.
For this reason the Pancharatra doctrine is not acceptable.
Na cha kartuh karanam                                                  II.2.43 (214)
And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument (is produced) from the agent.
Na:   not;   Cha:   and;   Kartuh:   from the agent;   Karanam:   the instrument.
The argument against the Pancharatra doctrine is continued.
An instalment such as a hatchet and the like is not seen to be produced from the agent, the woodcutter. But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz., the individual soul termed Sankarshana, there springs its internal instrument or mind (Pradyumna) and from the mind, the ego or Ahamkara (Aniruddha).
The mind is the instrument of the soul. Nowhere do we see the instrument being born from the doer. Nor can we accept that Ahamkara issues from the mind. This doctrine cannot be accepted. Such doctrine cannot be settled without observed instances. We do not meet with any scriptural passage in its favour. The scripture declares that everything takes its origin from Brahman.
Vijnanadibhave va tadapratishedhah                      11.2.44 (215)
Or if the (four Vyuhas are said to) possess infinite knowledge, etc., yet there is no denial of that (viz., the objection raised in Sutra 42).
Vijnanadibhave: if intelligence etc. exist; Va: or, on the other hand; Tat: that (Tasya iti); Apratishedhah: no denial (of)- (Vijnana: knowledge; Adi: and the rest; Bhave: of the nature (of).)
The argument against the Pancharatra doctrine is continued.
The error of the doctrine will persist even if they say that all the Vyuhas are gods having intelligence, etc.
The Bhagavatas may say, that all the forms are Vaasudeva, the Lord, and that all of them equally possess Knowledge, Lordship, Strength, Power, etc., and are free from faults and imperfections.
In this case there will be more than one Isvara. This goes against your own doctrine according to which there is only one real essence, viz., the holy Vaasudeva. All the work can be done by only One Lord. Why should there be four Isvaras?
Moreover, there could be no birth of one from another, because they are equal according to the Bhagavatas, whereas a cause is always greater than the effect. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause, as for instance, in the case of the clay and the pot, where the cause is more extensive than the effect and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. The Bhagavatas do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, etc., between Vaasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they are all forms of Vaasudeva without any special distinction.
Then again, the forms of Vaasudeva cannot be limited to four only, as the whole world from Brahma down to a blade of grass is a form or manifestation of the Supreme Being. The whole world is the Vyuha of Vaasudeva.
Vipratishedhaccha                                                         11.2.45 (216)
And because of contradictions (the Pancharatra doctrine is untenable).
Vipratishedhat: because of contradiction; Cha: and.
The argument against the doctrine of the Bhagavatas is concluded here.
There are also other inconsistencies, or manifold contradictions in the Pancharatra doctrine. Jnana, Aisvarya, or ruling capacity, Sakti (creative power), Bala (strength), Virya (valour) and Tejas (glory) are enumerated as qualities and they are again in some other place spoken of as selfs, holy Vaasudevas and so on. It says that Vaasudeva is different from Sankarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Yet it says that these are the same as Vaasudeva. Sometimes it speaks of the four forms as qualities of the Atman and sometimes as the Atman itself.
Further we meet with passages contradictory to the Vedas. It contains words of depreciation of the Vedas. It says that Sandilya got the Pancharatra doctrine after finding that the Vedas did not contain the means of perfection. Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas, Sandilya studied this Sastra.
For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted. As this system is opposed to and condemned by all the Srutis and abhored by the wise, it is not worthy of regard.
Thus in this Pada has been shown that the paths of Sankhyas, Vaiseshikas and the rest down to the Pancharatra doctrine are strewn with thorns and are full of difficulties, while the path of Vedanta is free from all these defects and should be trodden by everyone who wishes his final beatitude and salvation.
Thus ends the Second Pada (Section 2) of the Second Adhyaya (Chapter II) of the Brahmasutras or the Vedanta Philosophy.

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Chapter II, Section 3

Introduction

In the previous Section the inconsistency of the doctrines of the various non-Vedantic schools has been shown. After showing the untenability and unreliability of other systems, Sri Vyasa, the author of Vedanta Sutras now proceeds to explain the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the Sruti system because there appear to be diversities of doctrines with reference to the origin of the elements, the senses, etc.

We now clearly understand that other philosophical doctrines are worthless on account of their mutual contradictions. Now a suspicion may arise that the Vedantic doctrine also is equally worthless on account of its intrinsic contradictions. Therefore a new discussion is begun in order to remove all doubts in the Vedanta passages which refer to creation and thus to remove the suspicion in the minds of the readers. Here we have to consider first the question whether ether (Akasa) has an origin or not.

In Sections III and IV the apparent contradictions in Sruti texts are beautifully harmonised and reconciled. The arguments of the opponent (Purvapakshin) who attempts to prove the Self-contradiction of the scriptural texts are given first. Then comes the refutation by the Siddhantin.

Synopsis

The Third Section of Chapter II deals with the order of creation as it is taught in Sruti, of the five primal elements namely Akasa, air, fire, water and earth. It discusses the question whether the elements have an origin or not, whether they are co-eternal with Brahman or issue from it and are withdrawn into it at stated intervals. The essential characteristics of the individual is also ascertained.

The first seven Adhikaranas deal with the five elementary substances.

Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman but originates from it as its first effect. Though there is no mention of Akasa in the Chhandogya Upanisad, the inclusion of Akasa is implied.

Adhikarana II: (Sutra 8) shows that air originates from ether.

Adhikarana III: (Sutra 9) teaches that there is no origin of that which is (i.e., Brahman) on account of the impossibility of there being an origin of Brahman, and as it does not stand to reason.

Adhikarana IV, V, VI: (Sutras, 10, 11, 12) teach that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.

Adhikarana VII: (Sutra 13) teaches that the origination of one element from another is due not to the latter in itself but to Brahman acting in it. Brahman who is their Indweller has actually evolved these successive elements.

Adhikarana VIII: (Sutra 14) shows that the absorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their creation.

Adhikarana IX: (Sutra 15) teaches that the order in which the creation and the re-absorption of the elements takes place is not interfered with by the creation and re-absorption of Prana, mind and the senses, because they also are the creations of Brahman, and are of elemental nature and therefore are created and absorbed together with the elements of which they consist.

The remaining portion of this Section is devoted to the special characteristics of the individual soul by comparing different Srutis bearing on this point.

Adhikarana X: (Sutra 16) shows that expressions such as Ramakrishna is born Ramakrishna has died, strictly apply to the body only and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhikarana XI: (Sutra 17) teaches that the individual soul is according to the Srutis permanent, eternal. Therefore it is not like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation. The Jiva is in reality identical with Brahman. What originates is merely the soul's connection with its limiting adjuncts such as mind, body, senses, etc. This connection is moreover illusory.

Adhikarana XII: (Sutra 18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that intelligence is the very essence of the soul.

Adhikarana XIII: (Sutras 19-32) deals with the question whether the individual soul is Anu, i.e., of very minute size or omnipresent, all-pervading. The Sutras 19-28 represent the view of the Purvapakshin according to which the individual soul is Anu, while Sutra 29 formulates the Siddhanta viz., the individual soul is in reality all-pervading; it is spoken of as Anu in some scriptural passages because the qualities of the internal organ itself are Anu which constitute the essence of the Jiva so long as he is involved in the Samsara.

Sutra 30 explains that the soul may be called Anu as it is connected with the Buddhi as long as it is implicated in the Samsara.

Sutra 31 intimates that in the state of deep sleep the soul is potentially connected with the Buddhi while in the waking state that connection becomes actually manifest.

Sutra 32 intimates that if no intellect existed there would result constant perception or constant non-perception.

Adhikaranas XIV and XV: (Sutras 33-39 and 40) refer to the Kartritva of the individual soul, whether the soul is an agent or not.

Sutras 33-39 declare that the soul is an agent. The soul is an agent when he is connected with the instruments of action, Buddhi, etc. Sutra 40 intimates that he ceases to be an agent when he is dissociated from them, just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments and rests after having laid them aside.

Adhikarana XVI: (Sutras 41-42) teaches that the agentship of the individual soul is verily subordinate to and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The Lord always directs the soul according to his good or bad actions done in previous births.

Adhikarana XVII (Sutras 43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman.

Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (Amsa) of Brahman. This Sutra propounds Avacchedavada i.e., the doctrine of limitation i.e., the doctrine that the soul is the Supreme Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.

The following Sutras intimate that the Supreme Lord is not affected by pleasure and pain like the individual soul, just as light is unaffected by the shaking of its reflections.

According to Sankara, `Amsa' must be understood to mean `Amsa iva', a part as it were. The one universal indivisible Brahman has no real parts but appears to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.

Sutra 47 teaches that the individual souls are required to follow the different injunctions and prohibitions laid down in the scriptures, when they are connected with bodies, high and low. Fire is one only but the fire of a funeral pyre is rejected and that of the sacrifice is accepted. Similar is the case with the Atman. When the soul is attached to the body, ethical rules, ideas of purity and impurity have full application.

Sutra 49 shows that there is no confusion of actions or faults of actions. The individual soul has no connection with all the bodies at the same time. He is connected with one body only and he is affected by the peculiar properties of that one alone.

Sutra 50 propounds the doctrine of reflection (Abhasavada) or Pratibimbavada, the doctrine that the individual soul is a mere reflection of the Supreme Brahman in the Buddhi or intellect.

In the Sankhya philosophy the individual soul has been stated to be all-pervading. If this view be accepted there would be confusion of works and their effects. This view of the Sankhyas is, therefore, an unfair conclusion.

VIYADADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 1 (SUTRAS 1-7)

ETHER IS NOT ETERNAL BUT CREATED

Na viyadasruteh II.3.1 (217)

(The Purvapakshin, i.e., the objector says that) ether (Akasa) (does) not (originate), as Sruti does not say so.

Na: not; Viyat: ether, space, Akasa; Asruteh: as Sruti does not say so.

The opponent raises a contention that Akasa is uncreated and as such not produced out of Brahman. This prima facie view is set aside in the next Sutra.

To begin with the texts which treat of creation are taken up. Akasa (ether) is first dealt with. The Purvapakshin says that Akasa is not caused or created because there is no Sruti to that effect. Akasa is eternal and is not caused because the Sruti does not call it caused, while it refers to the creation of fire. Tadaikshata bahu syam prajayeyeti tattejo'srijata It thought `May I become many, may I grow forth'It sent forth fire. (Chh. Up. VI.2.3). Here there is no mention of Akasa being produced by Brahman. As scriptural sentence is our only authority in the origination of knowledge of supersensuous things, and as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of ether, ether must be considered to have no origin. Therefore Akasa has no origin. It is eternal.

In the Vedantic texts, we come across in different places different statements regarding the origin of various things. Some texts say that the ether and air originated; some do not. Some other texts again make similar statements regarding the individual soul and the Pranas (vital airs). In some places the Sruti texts contradict one another regarding order of succession and the like.

Deeqmle leg~

Asti tu II.3.2 (218)

But there is (a Sruti text which states that Akasa is created).

Asti: there is; Tu: but.

The contradiction raised in Sutra 1 is partially met here.

The word `but' (tu) is used in this Sutra in order to remove the doubt raised in the preceding Sutra.

But there is a Sruti which expressly says so. Though there is no statement in the Chhandogya Upanishad regarding the causation of Akasa, yet there is a passage in the Taittiriya Sruti on its causation. Tasmad va etasmadatmana akasah sambhutah From the Self (Brahman) sprang Akasa, from Akasa the air, from air the fire, from fire the water, from water the earth (Tait. Up. II.1).

Gaunyasambhavat II.3.3 (219)

(The Sruti text concerning the origination of Akasa) has a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of the origination of the Akasa).

Gauni: used in a secondary sense, having a metaphorical sense; Asambhavat: because of the impossibility.

Here is an objection against Sutra 20.

The opponent says: The Taittiriya text referred to in the previous Sutra which declares the origination of the Akasa should be taken in a secondary sense (figurative), as Akasa cannot be created. It has no parts. Therefore it cannot be created.

The Vaiseshikas deny that Akasa was caused. They say that causation implies three factors, viz., Samavayikarana (inherent causesmany and similar factors), Asamavayikarana (non- inherent causes, their combination) and Nimittakarana (operative causes, a human agency). To make a cloth threads and their combination and a weaver are needed. Such causal factors do not exist in the case of Akasa.

We cannot predicate of space a spaceless state, just as we can predicate of fire an antecedent state without brightness.

Further unlike earth, etc., Akasa is all-pervading and hence could not have been caused or created. It is eternal. It is without origin.

The word `Akasa' is used in a secondary sense in such phrases as `make room', `there is room'. Although space is only one it is designated as being of different kinds when we speak of the space of a pot, the space of a house. Even in Vedic passages a form of expression such as `He is to place the wild animals in the spaces (Akaseshu)' is seen. Hence we conclude that those Sruti texts also which speak of the origination of Akasa must be taken to have a secondary sense or figurative meaning.

Sabdacca II.3.4 (220)

Also from the Sruti texts (we find that Akasa is eternal).

Sabdat: from the Sruti texts, because Sruti says so; Cha: also, and.

Here is an objection against Sutra 2.

In the previous Sutra Akasa was inferred to be eternal. In this Sutra the opponent cites a Sruti text to show that it is eternal. He points out that Sruti describes Akasa as uncaused and uncreated. Vayuschantariksham chaitadamritamThe air and the Akasa are immortal (Br Up. II.3.3). What is immortal cannot have an origin.

Another scriptural passage, Omnipresent and eternal like etherAkasavat sarvagato nityah, indicates that those two qualities of Brahman belong to the ether also. Hence an origin cannot be attributed to the Akasa.

Other scriptural passages are: As this Akasa is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite. Brahman has the ether for its body, the Akasa is the Self. If the Akasa had a beginning it could not be predicated of Brahman as we predicate blueness of a lotus (lotus is blue).

Therefore the eternal Brahman is of the same nature as Akasa. (This is the view of the opponentPurvapakshin).

Syaccaikasya Brahmasabdavat II.3.5 (221)

It is possible that the one word (`sprang'Sambhutah) may be used in a secondary and primary sense like the word Brahman.

Syat: is possible; Cha: also, and; Ekasya: of the one and the same word; Brahmasabdavat: like the word Brahman.

An argument in support of the above objection is now advanced by the opponent (Purvapakshin).

The opponent says that the same word `sprang' (Sambhutah) in the Taittiriya text (II.1)From that Brahman sprang Akasa, from Akasa sprang air, from air sprang fire.can be used in a secondary sense with respect to Akasa and in the primary sense with respect to air, fire, etc. He supports his statement by making reference to other Sruti texts where the word `Brahman' is so used. Try to know Brahman by penance, because, penance is Brahman (Tait. Up. III.2). Here Brahman is used both in a primary and in a secondary sense in the same text.

The same word Brahman is in the way of figurative identification (Bhakti) applied to penance which is only the means of knowing Brahman and again directly to Brahman as the object of knowledge.

Also Food is BrahmanAnnam Brahma (Tait. Up. III.2), and Bliss is BrahmanAnando Brahma (Tait. Up. III.6). Here Brahman is used in a secondary and primary sense respectively in two complementary texts.

The Vedantin says: But how can we uphold now the validity of the statement made in the clause, Brahman is one only without a secondEkameva Advitiyam Brahma. Because if Akasa is a second entity co-existing with Brahman from eternity, it follows that Brahman has a second. If it is so, how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything is known? (Chh. Up. VI.1.3).

The opponent replies that the words Ekamevaone only are used with reference to the effects. Just as when a man sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel and so on today and on the following day a number of pots and says that clay alone existed on the previous day, he means only that the effects, i.e., the pots did not exist and does not deny the wheel or the stick of the potter, even so the passage means only that there is no other cause for Brahman which is the material cause of the world. The term `without a second' does not exclude the existence from eternity of ether but excludes the existence of any other superintending Being but Brahman. There is a superintending potter in addition to the material cause of the vessels, i.e., the clay. But there is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the material cause of the universe.

The opponent further adds that the existence of Akasa will not bring about the existence of two things, for number comes in only when there are diverse things. Brahman and Akasa have no such diverseness before creation as both are all-pervading and infinite and are indistinguishable like milk and water mixed together. Therefore the Sruti says: Akasasariram BrahmaBrahman has the ether for its body. It follows that the two are identical.

Moreover all created things are one with Akasa which is one with Brahman. Therefore if Brahman is known with its effects, Akasa also is known.

The case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured into a cup of milk. These drops are taken when the milk is taken. The taking of the drops does not form something additional to the taking of the milk. Similarly the Akasa which is non-separate in place and time from Brahman, and its effects, is comprised within Brahman. Therefore, we have to understand the passages about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.

Thus the opponent (Purvapakshin) tries to establish that Akasa is uncreated and is not an effect and that the Sruti text calls it `Sambhuta' (created) only in a secondary sense.

Pratijna'haniravyatirekacchabdebhyah II.3.6 (222)

The non-abandonment of the proposition (viz., by the knowledge of one everything else becomes known, can result only) from the non-difference (of the entire world from Brahman) according to the words of the Veda or the Sruti texts (which declare the non-difference of the cause and its effects).

Pratijna ahanih: non-abandonment of the proposition; Avyatirekat: from non distinction, on account of non-difference, because of absence of exclusion; Sabdebhyah: from the words namely from the Srutis.

The objection raised in Sutra 1 and continued in Sutras 3, 4 and 5 is now replied to.

The Sutrakara refutes the Purvapakshin's (objector's) view and establishes his position. The scriptural assertion that from the knowledge of One (Brahman) everything else is known can be true only if everything in the world is an effect of Brahman. Because the Sruti says that the effects are not different from the cause. Therefore if the cause (Brahman) is known, the effects also will be known. If Akasa does not originate from Brahman, then by knowing Brahman we cannot know Akasa. Therefore the above assertion will not come true. Akasa still remains to be known as it is not an effect of Brahman. But if Akasa is created then there will be no such difficulty at all. Therefore Akasa is an effect. It is created. If it is not created the authoritativeness of the Vedas will disappear.

The opponent is entirely wrong in imagining that the Taittiriya Sruti is in conflict with Chhandogya Upanishad. You will have to add in the Chhandogya Sruti After creating Akasa and Vayu. Then the text would mean that after creating Akasa and Vayu Brahman created fire. Now there will be no conflict at all.

Moreover, the explanation that as Brahman and Akasa are one like milk and water and that as Akasa is one with all things it will be known by knowing Brahman and its effects is entirely wrong, because the knowledge of milk and water which are one is not a correct knowledge. The analogy given in the Sruti text is not milk and water, but clay and jars to indicate that all effects are not separate from the cause and because the word `eva' in Ekameva Advitiyam excludes two combined things like milk and water and says that only one entity is the cause.

The knowledge of everything through the knowledge of one thing of which the Sruti speaks cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed with water, for we understand from the parallel instance of a piece of clay being brought forward, (Chh. Up. VI.1.4), that the knowledge of everything has to be experienced through the relation of the material cause and the material effect. The knowledge of the cause implies the knowledge of the effect. Further, the knowledge of everything, if taken to be similar to the case of knowledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect knowledge (Samyag-Vijnana), because the water which is apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk with which it is mixed is not grasped by perfect knowledge, because the water although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it.

That nothing has an independent existence apart from Brahman is corroborated by statements in Sruti: Sarvam khalvidam BrahmaIdam sarvam yadayamatma. That Self is all that is (Bri. Up. II.4.6).

Yavadvikaram tu vibhago lokavat II.3.7 (223)

But wherever there are effects, there are separateness as is seen in the world (as in ordinary life).

Yavat vikaram: so far as all modifications go, wherever there is an effect; Tu: but; Vibhagah: division, separateness, distinction, specification; Lokavat: as in the world. (Yavat: whatever; Vikaram: transformation.)

The argument begun in Sutra 6 is concluded here.

The word `tu' (but) refutes the idea that Akasa is not created. It shows that the doubt raised in the last Sutra is being removed.

The Chhandogya Upanishad purposely omits Akasa and Vayu from the list enumerated, because it keeps in view the process of Trivritkarana, combination of the three visible elements (Murta, i.e., with form), instead of Panchikarana, combination of five elements which is elsewhere developed.

It is to be noted here that though all the elements originate from Brahman, yet Akasa and air are not mentioned by name in the Sruti, Chhandogya Upanishad, whereas fire, water and earth are distinctly stated therein to have originated from Brahman. The specification is like that found in similar cases of ordinary experience in the world, for instance, to mean all the sons of a particular person, Ramakrishna, only a few of them are named.

This is just like what we find in the ordinary world. If a man says all these are sons of Narayana and then he gives certain particulars about the birth of one of them, he implies thereby that it applies to the birth of all the rest. Even so when the Upanishad says that all this has its self in Brahman and then it goes on to give the origin of some of them from Brahman such as fire, water and earth, it does not mean that others have not their origin in Him, but it only means that it was not thought necessary to give a detailed account of their origin. Therefore, though there is no express text in the Chhandogya Upanishad as to the origin of Akasa, yet we infer from the universal proposition therein that everything has its self in Brahman, that Akasa has its self in Brahman, and so is produced from Brahman.

Akasa is an element like fire and air. Therefore it must have an origin. It is the substratum of impermanent quality like the sound, and so it must be impermanent. This is the direct argument to prove the origin and destruction of Akasa. The indirect argument to prove it is, whatever has no origin is eternal as Brahman and whatever has permanent qualities is eternal as the soul, but Akasa not being like Brahman in these respects, cannot be eternal.

Akasa takes its origin from Brahman, though we cannot conceive how space can have any origin.

We see in this universe that all created things are different from each other. Whatever we observe: effects or modifications of a substance such as jars, pots, bracelets, armlets, and ear-rings, needles, arrows, and swords we observe division or separateness. Whatever is divided or separate is an effect, as jars, pots, etc. Whatever is not an effect is not divided as the Atman or Brahman. A pot is different from a piece of cloth and so on. Everything that is divided or separate is created. It cannot be eternal. You cannot think of a thing as separate from others and yet eternal.

Akasa is separate from earth, etc. Hence Akasa also must be an effect. It cannot be eternal. It must be a created thing.

If you say that Atman also, being apparently separate from Akasa etc., must be an effect we reply that it is not so, because Akasa itself has originated from Atman. The Sruti declares that Akasa sprang from the Atman (Tait. Up. II.1). If Atman also is an effect, Akasa etc., will be without an Atman i.e., Svarupa. The result will be Sunyavada or the doctrine of nothingness. Atman is Being, therefore it cannot be negatived. Atmatvacchatmano nirakaranasankanupapattih. It is self-existent. Na hyatma- gantukah kasyachit, svayam siddhatvat. It is self-evident. Na hyatma atmanah pramanapekshaya siddhyati.

Akasa etc., are not stated by any one to be self-existent. Hence no one can deny the Atman, because the denier is himself, Atman. Atman exists and is eternal.

The All-pervasiveness and eternity of Akasa are only relatively true. Akasa is created. It is an effect of Brahman.

In the clauses, I know at the present moment whatever is present, I knew at former moments, the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know in the future, the nearer and remoter future the object of knowledge changes according as it is something past or something future or something present. But the knowing agent does not change at all as his nature is eternal presence. As the nature of the Atman is eternal presence it cannot be annihilated even when the body is burnt to ashes. You cannot even think that it ever should become something different from what it is. Hence the Atman or Brahman is not an effect. The Akasa, on the contrary, comes under the category of effects.

Moreover, you say that there must be many and similar causal factors before an effect can be produced. This argument is not correct. Threads are Dravya (substance). Their combination (Samyoga) is a Guna (attribute) and yet both are factors in the production of an effect. Even if you say that the need for many and similar causal factors applies only to Samavayikarana, this sort of explanation is not correct, for a rope or a carpet is spun out of thread, wool, etc.

Moreover, why do you say that many causal factors are needed? In the case of Paramanu or ultimate atom or mind, the initial activity is admittedly not due to many causal factors. Nor can you say that only for a Dravya (substance) many causal factors are necessary. That would be so, if combination causes the effect as in the case of threads and cloth. But in many instances, (e.g., milk becomes curd) the same substance changes into another substance. It is not the Lord's law that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide on the authority of the Sruti that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman, Akasa being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession (Vide II.1.24).

It is not right to say that with reference to the origin of Akasa we could not find out any difference between its pre-causal state and its post-causal state (the time before and after the origination of ether). Brahman is described as not gross and not subtle (Asthulam na anu) in the Sruti. The Sruti refers to an Anakasa state, a state devoid of Akasa.

Brahman does not participate in the nature of Akasa as we understand from the passage. It is without Akasa (Bri. Up. III.8.8). Therefore it is a settled conclusion that, before Akasa was produced, Brahman existed without Akasa.

Moreover, you (Purvapakshin or opponent) are certainly wrong in saying that Akasa is different in its nature from earth, etc. The Sruti is against the uncreatedness of Akasa. Hence there is no good in such inference.

The inference drawn by you that Akasa has no beginning because it differs in nature from these substances which have a beginning such as earth, etc., is without any value, because it must be considered fallacious as it is contradicted by the Sruti. We have brought forward cogent, convincing and strong arguments showing that Akasa is an originated thing.

Akasa has Anitya-guna (non-eternal attribute). Therefore it also is Anitya (non-eternal). Akasa is non-eternal because it is the substratum of a non-eternal quality, viz., sound, just as jars and other things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities are themselves non-eternal. The Vedantin who takes his stand on the Upanishads does not admit that the Atman is the substratum of non-eternal qualities.

You cannot say that Atman also may be Anitya (non-eternal) for Sruti declares that Atman is eternal (Nitya).

The Sruti texts which describe Akasa as eternal (Amrita) describe it so in a secondary sense only (Gauna), just as it calls heaven-dwelling gods as eternal (Amrita). The origin and destruction of Akasa has been shown to be possible.

Even in the Sruti text, Akasavat sarvagatacha nityah which describes Atman as similar to Akasa in being all-pervading and eternal, these words are used only in a secondary and figurative sense (Gauna).

The words are used only to indicate infiniteness or super-eminent greatness of Atman and not to say that Atman and Akasa are equal. The use is as when the sun is said to go like an arrow. When we say that the sun moves with the speed of an arrow, we simply mean that he moves fast, not that he moves at the same rate as an arrow.

Such passages as Brahman is greater or vaster than Akasa prove that the extent of Akasa is less than that of Brahman. Passages like There is no image of Him. There is nothing like BrahmanNa tasya pratimasti (Svet. Up. IV.19) show that there is nothing to compare Brahman to. Passages like Everything else is of evil (Bri. Up. III.4.2) show that everything different from Brahman such as Akasa is of evil. All but Brahman is small. Hence Akasa is an effect of Brahman.

Srutis and reasoning show that Akasa has an origin. Therefore the final settled conclusion is that Akasa is an effect of Brahman.

MATARISVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 2

AIR ORIGINATES FROM ETHER

Etena matarisva vyakhyatah II.3.8 (224)

By this i.e., the foregoing explanation about Akasa being a product, (the fact of) air (also being an effect) is explained.

Etena: by this, i.e., the foregoing explanation about Akasa being a production, by this parity of reasoning; Matarisva: the air, the mover in mother, space; Vyakhyatah: is explained.

This Sutra states that air also, like Akasa, has been created by and from Brahman.

The present Sutra extends the reasoning concerning Akasa to the air of which the Akasa is the abode. The Purvapakshin maintains that the air is not a product, because it is not mentioned in the chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad which treats of the origination of things. The Purvapakshin says that the birth of air mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad is figurative only, because air is said to be one of the immortal along with Akasa.

Vayu (the air) is the deity that never sets (Bri. Up. I.5.22). The denial of Vayu's never setting refers to the lower knowledge or Apara Vidya in which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under the form of Vayu and is merely a relative one.

The glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of worship. The Sruti says Vayu never sets. Some dull type of men may think that Vayu (air) is eternal. To remove this doubt there is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to air also.

Vayu is called deathless or immortal only in a figurative sense. Vayu (air) also has origin like Akasa.

ASAMBHAVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 3

BRAHMAN (SAT) HAS NO ORIGIN

Asambhavstu sato'nupapatteh II.3.9 (225)

But there is no origin of that which is (i.e., Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).

Asambhavah: no origination, no creation; Tu: but; Satah: of the Sat, of the true one, eternally existing, of Brahman; Anupapatteh: as it does not stand to reason, on account of the impossibility of there being an origin of Brahman.

This Sutra states that Brahman has no origin as it is, neither proved by reasoning nor directly stated by Sruti.

The word `tu' (but) is used in order to remove the doubt.

The opponent says that Svetasvatara Upanishad declares that Brahman is born, Thou art born with Thy face turned to all directions (Svet. Up. 4.3).

We cannot, as in the case of Akasa and Vayu, attribute origin to Brahman also. Brahman is not an effect like Akasa, etc. Origination of Brahman cannot be established by any method of proof.

Brahman is existence itself. It cannot be an effect, as It can have no cause. The Sruti text expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor. He is the cause, the Lord of the Lords of the organs and there is of Him neither progenitor nor Lord (Svet. Up. VI.9).

Moreover it is not separated from anything else.

Neither can Sat come from Asat, as Asat has no being, for that which is not (Asat) is without a self and cannot therefore constitute a cause, because a cause is the self of its effects. The Sruti says How can existence come out of non-existence? (Chh. Up. VI.2.2).

You cannot say that Sat comes from Sat as the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain superiority on the part of the cause. The effect must have some speciality not possessed by the cause. Brahman is mere existence without any destruction.

Brahman cannot spring from that which is something particular, as this would be contrary to experience. Because we observe that particular forms are produced from what is general, as for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that which is general is produced from particulars. Hence Brahman which is existence in general, cannot be the effect of any particular thing.

If there is no eternal First Cause, the logical fallacy of Anavastha Dosha (regressus ad infinitum) is inevitable. The non-admission of a fundamental cause (substance) would drive us to a retrogressus ad infinitum. Sruti says, That great birthless Self is undecaying (Bri. Up. IV.4.25).

Brahman is without any origin. According to Sruti, He alone is the True one, who exists eternally. On the supposition of the origin of Brahman, He cannot be said to be eternal. Hence such a supposition is against Sruti. It is also against reasoning, because by admitting such an origin the question of source of that origin arises; then again another source of that source and so on. Thus an argument may be continued ad infinitum without coming to a definite conclusion.

That fundamental causesubstancewhich is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our Brahman.

Therefore Brahman is not an effect but is eternal.

TEJO'DHIKARANAM: TOPIC 4

FIRE ORIGINATES FROM AIR

Tejo'tah tatha hyaha II.3.10 (226)

Fire (is produced) from this (i.e., air), so verily (declares the Sruti).

Tejah: fire; Atah: from this, namely from air which has been just spoken of in Sutra 8; Tatha: thus, so; Hi: because, verily; Aha: says (Sruti).

Taittiriya Upanishad declares that fire was born of air VayoragnihFrom air is produced fire (Tait. Up. II.1). Chhandogya Upanishad declares That (Brahman) created fire (Chh. Up. IV.2.3).

The consistency of the two Srutis is shown in Sutra 13.

There is thus a conflict of scriptural passages with regard to the origin of fire. The Purvapakshin maintains that fire has Brahman for its source. Why? Because the text declares in the beginning that there existed only that which is. It sent forth fire. The assertion that everything can be known through Brahman is possible only if everything is produced from Brahman. The scriptural statement Tajjalan (Chh. Up. III.14.1) specifies no difference. The Mundaka text (II.1.3) declares that everything without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriya Upanishad speaks about the entire universe without any exception After having brooded, sent forth all whatever there is (Tait. Up. II.6). Therefore, the statement that `Fire was produced from air' (Tait. Up. II.1) teaches the order of succession only. Fire was produced subsequently to air.

The Purvapakshin says: The above two Upanishadic passages can be reconciled by interpreting the Taittiriya text to mean the order of sequenceBrahman after creating air, created fire.

This Sutra refutes this and says that Fire is produced from Vayu or air. This does not at all contradict the Chhandogya text. It means that Air is a product of Brahman and that fire is produced from Brahman, which has assumed the form of air. Fire sprang from Brahman only through intermediate links, not directly. We may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow.

The general assertion that everything springs from Brahman requires that all things should ultimately be traced to that cause, and not that they should be its immediate effects. Thus there is no contradiction. There remains no difficulty.

It is not right to say that Brahman directly created Fire after creating Air, because the Taittiriya expressly says that fire was born of Air. No doubt Brahman is the root cause.

ABADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 5

WATER IS PRODUCED FROM FIRE

Apah lI.3.11 (227)

Water (is produced from fire).

Apah: water.

(Atah: from it; Tatha: thus; Hi: because; Aha: says the Sruti.)

The same thing may be said of water.

We have to supply from the preceding Sutra the words thence and for thus the text declares.

The author of the Sutras explained the creation of fire in the previous Sutra. He explains creation of earth in the next Sutra. He propounds the Sutra in order to insert water and thus to point out its position in the Srishtikrama or order of creation.

AgnerapahFrom fire sprang water (Tait. Up. II.1). Tatteja aiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tadapo'srijataThe fire thought `May I be many, may I grow forth.' It created water. (Chh. Up. VI.2.3).

Doubt: Does water come out directly from fire or from Brahman?

The Purvapakshin says: Water comes out directly from Brahman as the Chhandyoga text teaches.

Siddhanta: There is no such conflict. From fire is produced water, for thus says the scripture.

Here also it means that as fire is a product of Brahman, it is from Brahman which has assumed the form of fire, that water is produced. There is no room for interpretation regarding a text which is express and unambiguous.

In the Chhandogya Upanishad is given the reason why water comes out of fire. And, therefore, whenever anybody anywhere is hot and perspires water is produced on him from fire alone. Similarly, when a man suffers grief and is hot with sorrow, he weeps and thus water is also produced from fire.

These explicit statements leave no doubt that water is created from fire.

PRITHIVYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 6

EARTH IS CREATED FROM WATER

Prithivi adhikararupasabdantarebhya II.3.12 (228)

The earth (is meant by the word `Anna') because of the subject matter, colour and other Sruti texts.

Prithivi: earth; Adhikara: because of the context, because of the subject matter; Rupa: colour; Sabdantarebhyah: on account of other texts (Sruti).

The same thing may be said of earth.

From water sprang earth (Tait. Up. II.1). It (water) produced Anna (literally food) (Chh. Up. VI.2.4). The two Sruti texts are apparently contradictory, because in one text water is said to produce earth and in another food.

The Sutra says that `Anna' in the Chhandogya text means not food but earth. Why? On account of the subject matter, on account of the colour, and on account of other passages. The subject matter in the first place is clearly connected with the elements, as we see from the preceding passages. It sent forth fire; it sent forth water. In describing the creative order we cannot jump from water to cereals without having the earth. The creative order referred to is in regard to the elements. Therefore `Anna' should refer to an element and not food.

Again we find in a complementary passage, The black colour in fire is the colour of Anna (Chh. Up. VI.4.1). Here, the reference to colour expressly indicates that the earth is meant by `Anna'. Black colour agrees with earth. The predominant colour of earth is black. Eatable things such as cooked dishes, rice, barley and the like are not necessarily black. The Pauranikas also designate the colour of the earth by the term `night'. The night is black. We, therefore, conclude that black is the colour of earth, also.

Other Sruti texts like What was there as the froth of the water, that was hardened and became the earth. (Bri. Up I.2.2), clearly indicate that from water earth is produced.

On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like were produced from the earth, From earth sprang herbs, from herbs food (Tait. Up. II.1.2).

The complementary passage also, whenever it rains etc., pointing out that owing to the earthly nature of food (rice, barley, etc.), earth itself immediately springs from water.

Therefore, for all these reasons the word `Anna' denotes this earth. There is really no contradiction between the Chhandogya and Taittiriya texts.

TADABHIDHYANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 7

BRAHMAN ABIDING WITHIN THE ELEMENT IS THE CREATIVE PRINCIPLE

Tadabhidhyanadeva tu tallingat sah II.3.13 (229)

But on account of the indicating mark supplied by their reflecting, i.e., by the reflection attributed to the elements, He (i.e., the Lord is the creative principle abiding within the elements).

Tat (Tasya): His (of Brahman); Abhidhynat: because of the volition, reflection; Eva: even, only; Tu: but; Tat lingat: because of His indicating marks; Sah: He.

The contention raised in Sutra 10 is now refuted.

The word `tu' (but) is used in order to remove the doubt.

The Purvapakshin or the objector says: The Srutis declare that Brahman is the creator of everything. But the Taittiriya Upanishad says From Akasa sprang air (Tait. Up. II.1). This indicates that certain elements produce certain effects independently. There is contradiction in the Sruti passages. This Sutra refutes this objection.

Creation of Akasa, fire, wind, water is done solely to God's will. One element cannot create another element out of its own power. It is God in the form of one element that creates another element therefrom by His will.

The elements are inert. They have no power to create. Brahman Himself acting from within the elements was the real creator of all those elements. You will find in Brihadaranyka Upanishad He who dwells within the fire, who is different from fire, whom fire does not know, whose body is fire, who rules the fire from within, is Thy Immortal Atman, the Inner Ruler within (Bri. Up. III.7.5).

This Sruti text indicates that the Supreme Lord is the sole Ruler and denies all independence to the elements.

Though it is stated in the Chhandogya Upanishad that the elements have created each one, the other next of it, yet the Supreme Lord is indeed the creator of everything because Sruti declares that Brahman has created this world by the exercise of His will.

Texts such as He wished may I become many, may I grow forth (Tait. Up. II.6) and It made itself its Self, i.e., the Self of everything which exists (II.7)indicates that the Supreme Lord is the Self of everything. The passage There is no other seer (thinker) but He denies there being any other seer (thinker), that which is (i.e., Brahman) in the character of seer or thinker constitutes the subject matter of the whole Chapter, as we conclude from the introductory passage It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth (Chh. Up. VI.2.3).

In the Chhandogya Upanishad it is stated That fire thought. That water thought. Reflection is not possible for the inert elements. The Supreme Lord, the Inner Ruler of all elements, the Indweller within the elements reflected and produced the effects. This is the real meaning. The elements became causes only through the agency of the Supreme Lord who abides within them and rules them from within. Therefore there is no contradiction at all between the two texts.

For a wise man who reflects and cogitates there is no contradiction. The Sruti texts are infallible and authoritative. Remember this point well always. The Sruti texts have come out from the hearts of realised sages who had direct intuitive experience in Nirvikalpa Samadhi. They are neither fictitious novels nor products of the intellect.

VIPARYAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 8

THE PROCESS OF DISSOLUTION OF THE ELEMENTS IS

in the reverse order from that of creation

Viparyayena tu kramo'tah upapadyate cha II.3.14 (230)

The order (in which the elements are indeed withdrawn into Brahman during Pralaya or dissolution) is the reverse of that (i.e., the order in which they are created) and this is reasonable.

Viparyayena: in the reverse order; Tu: indeed, but; Kramah: order, the process of dissolution; Atah: from that (the order of creation); Cha: and; Upapadyate: is reasonable.

The process of dissolution of the element is described in this Sutra.

The word `tu' (but) has the force of `only' here. The question here is whether at the time of cosmic dissolution or Pralaya the elements are withdrawn into Brahman in an indefinite order, or in the order of creation or in the reverse order.

In creation the order is from above and in dissolution the order is from below. The order of involution is in the inverse of the order of evolution. It alone is quite appropriate and reasonable. Because we see in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has in descending to take the steps in the reverse order.

Further, we observe that things made of clay such as jars, dishes, etc., on being destroyed pass back into clay and that things which have originated from water such as snow and hail-stones again dissolve into water, the cause.

The gross becomes resolved into the subtle, the subtle into the subtler and so on till the whole manifestation attains its final First Cause, viz., Brahman. Each element is withdrawn into its immediate cause, in the reverse order till Akasa is reached, which in turn gets merged in Brahman.

Smriti also declares O Divine Rishi; the earth, the basis of the universe is dissolved into water, water into fire, fire into air.

Those which are produced first in creation are more powerful. Consequently they have longer existence. Therefore, it follows logically that the latest in creation, being of feeble essence, should first become absorbed in those of higher powers. The higher powers should later on take their turn. Vamana Purana declares: The earlier a thing happens to be in creation, the more it becomes the receptacle of the Lord's glory. Consequently those that are earlier in creation are more powerful and are withdrawn only later. And for the same reason undoubtedly their pervasion is also greater.

ANTARAVIJNANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 9

THE MENTION OF THE MIND AND INTELLECT DOES NOT INTERFERE

with the order of creation and reabsorption

as they are the products of the elements

Antara vijnanamanasi kramena tallingaditi

chet na aviseshat II.3.15 (231)

If it be said that between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and the mind (are mentioned, and that therefore their origination and re-absorption are to be placed) somewhere in the series on account of their being inferential signs (whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken), we say, not so on account of the non-difference (of the intellect and the mind from the elements).

Antara: intervening between, in between; Vijnanamanasi: the intellect and the mind; Kramena: in the order of succession, according to the successive order; Tat lingat: owing to indication of that, as there is indication in Sruti to that effect, because of an inferential mark of this; Iti: thus, this; Chet: if; Na: not, no, not so, the objection cannot stand; Aviseshat: because of no speciality, as there is no speciality mentioned in Sruti about the causation of the elements, because there being no particular difference, on account of non-difference.

A further objection to the causation of the primary elements from Brahman is raised and refuted.

The Sutra consists of two parts namely an objection and its refutation. The objection is Antara vijnanamanasi kramena tallingat iti chet. The refutation portion is Na aviseshat.

In the Atharvana (Mundaka Upanishad) in the chapter which treats of the creation occurs the following text: From this (Brahman) are born Prana, mind, the senses, ether, air, fire, water and earth, the support of all (II.1.3).

The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: The order of creation which is described in the Mundaka Upanishad contradicts the order of creation of elements described in the Chhandogya Upanishad VI.2.3, and other Srutis.

To this we reply: This is only a serial enumeration of the organs and the elements. It is not certainly a statement as to the order of their origination. The Mundaka text only states that all these are produced from Brahman.

In the Atharva Veda (Mundaka) mind, intellect and the senses are mentioned in the middle of the enumeration of the elements. This does not affect the evolutionary order, because the mind, the intellect and the senses are the effects, of the elements and their involution is included in the involution of the elements.

The intellect, the mind and the senses are products of the elements. Therefore, they can come into being only after the elements are created. The origination and reabsorption of the mind, intellect and the senses are the same as those of the elements as there is no difference between the senses and the elements.

Even if the mind, the intellect and the senses are separate from the elements, the evolutionary order is either the mind and the senses followed by the elements or the elements followed by the mind and the senses. Anyhow they have an orderly evolution.

That the mind, intellect and the organs are modifications of the elements and are of the nature of the elements is proved by Sruti texts like For the mind, my child, consists of earth, breath or vital force of water, speech of fire (Chh. Up. VI.6.5).

Hence the Mundaka text which treats of creation does not contradict the order of creation mentioned in the Chhandogya and Taittiriya Upanishads. The origination of the organs does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the elements.

The Purvapakshin again says: that as there is mention in Sruti of the mind and the senses, Akasa and the other elements should not be considered to be created out of Brahman and to dissolve in Brahman but to be created out of and to dissolve in the mind and the senses according to the order of succession, as there is indication in the Mundaka to that effect.

This argument is untenable as there is no speciality mentioned in Sruti about the creation of the elements. The mind, the intellect and the senses have all without exception been stated therein as created out of Brahman.

The word `Etasmat' of that text is to be read along with every one of these i.e., Prana, mind, etc. Thus from Him is born Prana, from Him is born mind, from Him are born the senses etc.Etasmat Pranah, Etasmat Manah, etc.

CHARACHARAVYAPASRAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 10

BIRTHS AND DEATHS ARE NOT OF THE SOUL

Characharavyapasrayastu syat tadvyapadeso bhaktah

tadbhavabhavitvat II.3.16 (232)

But the mention of that (viz., birth and death of the individual soul) is apt only with reference to the bodies of beings moving and non-moving. It is secondary or metaphorical if applied to the soul, as the existence of those terms depends on the existence of that (i.e., the body).

Characharavyapasrayah: in connection with the bodies fixed and movable; Tu: but, indeed; Syat: may be, becomes; Tadvyapadesah: mention of that, that expression, i.e., to popular expressions of births and deaths of the soul; Bhaktah: secondary, metaphorical, not literal; Tadbhavabhavitvat: on account of (those terms) depending on the existence of that. (Tadbhave: on the existence of that, i.e., the body; Bhavitvat: depending.)

The essential nature or character of the individual soul is discussed now.

A doubt may arise that the individual soul also has births and deaths because people use such expressions as Ramakrishna is born, Ramakrishna is dead and because certain ceremonies such as the Jatakarma etc., are prescribed by the scriptures at the birth and death of people.

This Sutra refutes such a doubt, and declares that the individual soul has neither birth nor death. Birth and death pertain to the body with which the soul is connected but not to the soul. If the individual soul perishes there would be no sense in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant things in another body (another birth).

The connection of the body with the soul is popularly called birth, and the disconnection of the soul from the body is called death in the common parlance. Scripture says, This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the living soul does not die (Chh. Up. VI.11.3). Hence birth and death are spoken primarily of the bodies of moving and non-moving beings and only metaphorically of the soul.

That the words `birth' and `death' have reference to the conjunction with and separation from a body merely is also shown by the following Sruti text, On being born that person assuming his body, when he passes out of the body and dies etc. (Bri. Up. IV.3.8).

The Jatakarma ceremony also has reference to the manifestation of the body only because the soul is not manifested.

Hence the birth and death belong to the body only but not to the soul.

ATMADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 11

THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS ETERNAL. `IT IS NOT PRODUCED'

Natma, asruternityatvat cha tabhyah II.3.17 (233)

The individual soul is not (produced), (because) it is not (so) mentioned by the scriptures, and as it is eternal according to them (the Sruti texts).

Na: not (produced); Atma: the individual soul; Asruteh: because of no mention in Sruti, as it is not found in Sruti; Nityatvat: because of its permanence, as it is eternal; Cha: also, and; Tabhyah: from them (Srutis), according to the Srutis.

The discussion on the essential characteristics of the individual soul is being continued.

Aitareya Upanishad declares: At the beginning of creation there was only One Brahman without a second (I.1). Therefore it is not reasonable to say that the individual soul is not born, because then there was nothing but Brahman.

Again the Sruti says, As small sparks come forth from fire, thus from that Atman all Pranas, all worlds, all gods emanate (Bri. Up. II.1.20). As from a blazing fire sparks, being of the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my friend, and return thither also, (Mun. Up. II.1.1). Therefore the Purvapakshin or the objector argues that the individual soul is born at the beginning of the cycle, just as Akasa and other elements are born.

This Sutra refutes it and says that the individual soul is not born. Why? on account of the absence of scriptural statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation the Sruti texts expressly deny birth to the individual soul.

We know from scriptural passages that the soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging, that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman, and that the soul has its self rooted in Brahman. A being of such a nature cannot be produced.

The scriptural passages to which we are alluding are the following: The great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman (Bri. Up. IV.4.25). The knowing self is not born, it dies not (Katha Up. I.2.18). The ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting (Katha Up. I.2.18).

It is the one Brahman without a second that enters the intellect and appears as the individual soul Having sent forth that entered into it (Tait. Up. II.6). Let me now enter those with this living self and let me then evolve names and forms (Chh. Up. VI.3.2). He entered thither to the very tips of finger-nails (Bri. Up. I.4.7).

Thou art That (Chh. Up. VI.8.7). I am Brahman (Bri. Up. I.4.10). This self is Brahman, knowing all (Bri. Up. II.5.19). All these texts declare the eternity of the soul and thus contend against the view of its having been produced.

Therefore there is in reality no difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Jiva is not created. It is not a product. It is not born just as Akasa and other elements are born. The fact of the individual soul's being non-created does not contradict the Sruti passage At the beginning there was only the Atman the one without a second (Ait. Up. I.1).

The mention of creation of souls in the other Sruti passages cited is only in a secondary sense. It does not therefore contradict the Sruti passage Having created it, It entered into it.

The doctrine that souls are born from Brahman is not correct. Those who propound this doctrine declare that if souls are born from Brahman, the scriptural statement that by knowing Brahman everything can become true, because Brahman is the cause and the knowledge of the cause will lead to the knowledge of all the objects. They say further that Brahman cannot be identified with the individual souls, because He is sinless and pure, whereas they are not so. They further say that all that is separate is an effect and that as the souls are separate they must be effects.

The souls are not separate. The Sruti declares, There is one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings (Svet. Up. VI.11). It only appears divided owing to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just as the ether appears divided by its connection with jars and the like. It is His connection with the intellect that leads to his being called a Jiva, or the individual soul. Ether in a pot is identical with the ether in space. All the above objections cannot stand because of the actual identity of the individual soul and Brahman. Therefore there is no contradiction of the declaration of the Sruti that by knowing Brahman we can know everything. Origination of souls has reference only to the body.

JNADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 12

THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS INTELLIGENCE

Jno'ta eva II.3 18 (234)

For this very reason (viz., that it is not created), (the individual soul is) intelligence (itself).

Jnah: intelligent, intelligence, knower; Ata eva: for this very reason, therefore.

The discussion on the essential characteristics of the individual soul is continued.

The Sankhya doctrine is that the soul is always Chaitanya or pure consciousness in its own nature.

The Vaiseshikas declare that the individual soul is not intelligent by nature, because it is not found to be intelligent in the state of deep sleep or swoon. It becomes intelligent when the soul comes to the waking state and unites with the mind. The intelligence of the soul is adventitious and is produced by the conjunction of the soul with the mind, just as for instance the quality of redness is produced in an iron rod by the conjunction of the iron rod with fire.

If the soul were eternal, essential intelligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep sleep, swoon etc. Those who wake up from sleep say that they were not conscious of anything. Therefore, as intelligence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the intelligence of the soul is adventitious only.

To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence. Intelligence constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. This we know from Sruti texts such as Brahman is knowledge and Bliss (Bri. Up. III.9.28.7). Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite (Tait. Up. II.1). Having neither inside nor outside but being altogether a mass of knowledge (Bri. Up. IV.5.13). Now if the individual soul is nothing but that Supreme Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's essential nature, just as light and heat constitute the nature of fire.

The intelligent Brahman Itself being limited by the Upadhis or limiting adjuncts such as body, mind etc., manifests as the individual soul or Jiva. Therefore, intelligence is the very nature of Jiva and is never altogether destroyed, nor even in the state of deep sleep or swoon.

Sruti texts directly declare that the individual soul is of the nature of self-luminous intelligence. He not asleep, himself looks down upon the sleeping senses (Bri. Up. IV.3.11). That person is self-illuminated (Bri. Up. IV.3.14). For there is no intermission of the knowing of the knower (Bri. Up. IV.3.30).

That the soul's nature is intelligence follows moreover from the passage (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4) where it is stated as connected with knowledge through all sense organs. He who knows let me smell this, he is the self.

You may ask, what is the use of the senses if the Atman itself is of the nature of knowledge. The senses are needed to bring about the differentiated sensations and ideas (Vrittijnana).

From the soul's essential nature being intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless; because they serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense, such as smell and so on. Sruti expressly declares: Smell (organ of smell) is for the purpose of perceiving odour (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4).

The objection that sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in deep sleep, And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing though he does not see. Because there is no intermission of the seeing of the seer for it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see (Bri. Up. IV.3.23).

The non-sentiency in deep sleep is not due to absence of Chaitanya but absence of Vishaya (objects). The Jiva does not lose its power of seeing. It does not see, because there is no object to see. It has not lost its intelligence, for it is impossible. The absence of actual intellectuality is due to the absence of objects, but not to the absence of intelligence, just as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.

If intelligence did not exist in deep sleep, etc., then who would be there to say that it did not exist? How could it be known? The man after waking from deep sleep says, I slept soundly. I enjoyed perfect rest. I did not know anything. He who says, I did not know anything. I enjoyed perfect rest must have been existent at that time. If it is not so how could he remember the condition of that state?

Therefore, the intelligence of the individual soul or Jiva is never lost under any condition. The reasoning of the Vaiseshikas and others is merely fallacious. It contradicts the Srutis. We therefore conclude and decide that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.

UTKRANTIGATYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 13 (SUTRAS 19-32)

THE SIZE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

Utkrantigatyagatinam II.3.19 (235)

(On account of the scriptural declarations) of (the soul's) passing out, going, and returning (the soul is not infinite in size; it is of atomic size).

Utkranti: passing out, coming out; Gati: going; Agatinam: returning.

The discussion on the character of the individual soul is continued.

From this up to Sutra 32 the question of the size of the soul, whether it is atomic, medium-sized or infinite is discussed. The first ten Sutras (19-28) state the arguments for the view that the individual soul is Anu (atomic). The next four Sutras give the reply.

Svetasvatara Upanishad declares He is the one God, all-pervading (VI.11). Mundaka Sruti says, This Atman is atomic (III.1.9). The two texts contradict each other and we have to arrive at a decision on the point.

It has been shown above that the soul is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes its nature. Therefore it follows that it is identical with the Supreme Brahman. The infinity of the Supreme Brahman is expressly declared in the Srutis. What need then is there of a discussion of the size of the soul? True, we reply. But Sruti texts which speak of the soul's passing out from the body (Utkranti), going (Gati) and returning (Agati), establish the prima facie view that the soul is of limited size. Further, the Sruti clearly declares in some places that the soul is of atomic size. The present discussion is therefore begun in order to clear this doubt.

The opponent or Purvapakshin holds that the soul must be of limited atomic size owing to its being said to pass out, go and return. Its passing out is mentioned in Kaushitaki Upanishad (III.3), And when he passes out of this body he passes out together with all these. Its going is said in Kaushitaki Upanishad (I.2), All who depart from this world go to the moon. Its returning is seen in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (IV.4.6), From that world he returns again to this world of action. From these statements as to the soul's passing out from the body, going to heaven, etc., and returning from there to this world, it follows that it is of limited size. Because motion is not possible in the case of an all-pervading being. If the soul is infinite, how can it rise, or go or come? Therefore the soul is atomic.

Svatmana chottarayoh II.3.20 (236)

And on account of the latter two (i.e., going and returning) being connected with their soul (i.e., agent), (the soul is of atomic size).

Svatmana: (being connected) directly with the agent, the soul; Cha: and, only, also; Uttarayoh: of the latter two, namely, of Gati and Agati, of the going away and coming back, as stated in the previous Sutra.

An argument in support of Sutra 19 is given in this Sutra.

Even if it can be said that `passing out' means only disconnection with the body, how can they who say that the soul is infinite explain its going to the moon or returning from there?

Even if the soul is infinite still it can be spoken of as passing out, out of the body, if by that term is meant ceasing to be the ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its former actions having become exhausted, just as somebody, when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said to `go out'. The passing away from the body may mean only cessation of the exercise of a definite function just as in the case of a man no longer retained in office.

But the two latter activities viz., going to the moon, returning from there to the world, are impossible for an all-pervading soul.

Hence the soul is atomic in size.

Nanuratacchruteriti chet, na, itaradhikarat II.3.21 (237)

If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise, (i.e., all-pervading), (we say) not so, because (the one) other than the individual soul (i.e., the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self) is the subject matter (of those passages).

Na: not; Anu: minute, atomic; Atat: not that, otherwise, namely opposite of Anu; Sruteh: as it is stated in Sruti, because of a Sruti or scriptural text; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Itara: other than the individual soul, i.e., the Supreme Self; Adhikarat: because of the context or topic, from the subject matter of the portion in the Chapter.

An objection to Sutra 19 is raised and refuted.

The Sutra consists of an objection and its answer. The objection-portion is Nanuratacchruteriti chet and the answer- portion is Na itaradhikarat.

The passages which describe the soul and infinite apply only to Supreme Brahman and not to the individual soul.

Sruti passages like He is the one God, who is hidden in all beings, all-pervading, etc. (Svet. Up. VI.11), He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the Pranas, the ether within the heart. (Bri. Up. IV.4.22), Like the ether He is Omnipresent, eternal, Truth, Knowledge, Infinite is Brahman (Tait. Up. II.1)refer not to the Jiva or the individual soul with its limitations, but to the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self, who is other than the individual soul, and forms the chief subject matter of all the Vedanta texts, because Brahman is the one thing that is to be known or realised intuitively and is therefore propounded by all the Vedanta passages.

Svasabdonmanabhyam cha II.3.22 (238)

And on account of direct statements (of the Sruti texts as to the atomic size) and infinitesimal measure (the soul is atomic).

Svasabdonmanabhyam: from direct statements (of Sruti texts) and infinitesimal measure; Cha: and. (Svasabda: the word itself; the word directly denoting `minute'; Unmanabhyam: on account of the measure of comparison; Ut: subtle; Mana: measure, hence subtle division; hence smaller even than the small. Svasabdonmanabhyam: as these are the words directly denoting `minute' and to expression denoting smaller than the small as measured by division.)

The argument in support of Sutra 19 is continued.

The soul must be atomic because the Sruti expressly says so and calls him infinitely small.

Mundaka Sruti declares, This Atma is atomic (III.1.9). Svetasvatara Upanishad says, The individual is of the size of the hundredth part of a part, which itself is one hundredth part of the point of a hair (V.9); That lower one also is seen small even like the point of a goad.

Therefore the soul is atomic in size.

But an objection may here be raised. If the soul is of atomic size, it will occupy a point of the body only. Then the sensation which extends over the whole body would appear contrary to reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that those who take bath in the Ganga experience the sensation of cold all over their whole bodies. In summer people feel hot all over the body. The following Sutra gives a suitable answer to the objection.

Avirodhaschandanavat II.3.23 (239)

There is no contradiction as in the case of sandal paste.

Avirodhah: non-conflict, no contradiction, no incongruity, it is not incongruous; Chandanavat: like the sandal paste.

The argument in support of Sutra 19 is continued.

Just as one drop of sandal-wood paste, smeared on one part of the body makes the whole body thrill with joy, so also the individual soul, though naturally minute, manifests itself throughout the whole body and experiences all the sensations of pleasure and pain. Though the soul is atomic it may experience pleasure and pain extending over the whole body. Though the soul is atomic still it is possible that it pervades the entire body, just as a drop of sandal paste although in actual contact with one particular spot of the body only pervades, i.e., causes refreshing sensation all over the body.

As the soul is connected with the skin which is the seat of feeling, the assumption that the soul's sensations should extend over the whole body is not contrary to reason because the connection of the soul and the skin abides in the entire skin and the skin extends over the entire body.

Avasthitivaiseshyaditi chenna,

adhyupagamaddhridi hi II.3.24 (240)

If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul), we deny that, on account of the acknowledgement (by scripture, of a special place of the soul), viz., within the heart.

Avasthiti: existence, residence, abode; Vaiseshyat: because of the speciality, on account of specialisation; Iti: thus, this; Chet: if (if it be argued); Na: not (so), no, the argument cannot stand; Adhyupagamat: on account of the admission, or acknowledgment; Hridi: in the heart; Hi: indeed.

An objection to Sutra 23 is raised and refuted by the opponent or Purvapakshin.

The Sutra consists of two parts namely, an objection, and its reply. The objection-portion is: `Avasthitivaiseshyaditi chet', and the reply portion is: `Nabhyupagamaddhridi hi'.

The Purvapakshin or the objector raises an objection against his own view. The argumentation relied upon in the last Sutra is not admissible, because the two cases compared are not parallel. The similarity is not exact. The analogy is faulty or inappropriate. In the case of the sandal paste, it occupies a particular point of the body and refreshes the entire body. But in the case of the soul it does not exist in any particular locality but is percipient of all sensations throughout the entire body. We do not know that it has a particular abode or special seat. When there is no special seat, for the soul, we cannot infer that it must have a particular abode in the body like the sandal paste and therefore be atomic. Because, even an all-pervading soul like ether, or a soul pervading the entire body like the skin may produce the same result.

We cannot reason like this: the soul is atomic because it causes effects extending over the entire body like a drop of sandal ointment, because that reasoning would apply to the sense of touch, the skin also, which we know not to be of atomic size. Therefore it is not easy to decide the size of the soul when there is no positive proof.

The opponent refutes the above objection by quoting such Sruti texts as: The soul abides within the heart (Pras. Up. III.6), The self is in the heart (Chh. Up. VIII.3.3), The Self abides in the heart (Bri. Up. IV.3.7), Who is that self? He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge, expressly declare that the soul has a special abode or particular seat in the body, viz., the heart. Therefore it is atomic.

The analogy is not faulty. It is quite appropriate. The two cases are parallel. Hence the argumentation resorted to in Sutra 23 is not objectionable.

Gunadva alokavat II.3.25 (241)

Or on account of (its) quality (viz., intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience (such as in the case of a lamp by its light).

Gunat: on account of its quality (of intelligence); Va: or (a further example is given); Alokavat: like a light. (Or Lokavat: as in the world, as in cases of ordinary experience).

The argument in support of Sutra 23 is continued.

Or it is like a small light which, by its own virtue, illuminates the whole house. The soul, though atomic and occupies a particular portion of the body, may pervade the whole body by its quality of intelligence as the flame pervades the whole room by its rays and thus experiences pleasure and pain throughout the whole body.

A further example is given by way of comparison to show how an atomic soul can have experience throughout the entire body.

Vyatireko gandhavat II.3.26 (242)

The extension (of the quality of intelligence) beyond (the soul in which it inheres) is like the odour (which extends beyond the fragrant object).

Vyatirekah: expansion, extension beyond (the object i.e., soul); Gandhavat: like the odour.

Sutra 23 is further elucidated by this Sutra.

Just as the sweet fragrance of flowers extends beyond them and diffuses throughout a larger space, so also the intelligence of the soul, which is atomic, extends beyond the soul and pervades the entire body.

If it be said that even the analogy in the above Sutra is not appropriate, because a quality cannot be apart from the substance, and hence the light of a lamp is only the lamp in its tenuous form, the analogy of perfume will apply. Just as though a flower is far away its scent is felt around, so though the soul is atomic its cognition of the entire body is possible. This analogy cannot be objected on the ground that even the fragrance of a flower is only the subtle particles of the flower, because our experience is that we feel the fragrance and not any particles.

Tatha cha darsayati II.3.27 (243)

Thus also, (the Sruti) shows or declares.

Tatha: thus, in the same way; Cha: also; Darsayati: (the Sruti) declares.

The Sruti also, after having signified the soul's abiding in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such passages as Upto the hairs, upto the tips of the nails (Kau. Up. IV.20, Bri. Up. I.4.7), that the soul pervades the whole body by means of intelligence, which is its quality.

Prithagupadesat II.3.28 (244)

On account of the separate teaching (of the Sruti) (that the soul pervades the body on account of its quality of intelligence).

Prithak: separate, different; Upadesat: because of teaching or statement.

This Sutra is a defence in favour of the preceding Sutra where intelligence is used as an attribute of the individual soul and so separate from it.

A further argument is given here to establish the proposition of the previous Sutra. Kaushitaki Upanishad declares Having by Prajna, (intelligence, knowledge,) taken possession of the body (III.6). This indicates that intelligence is different from the soul being related as instrument and agent and the soul pervades the entire body with this quality of intelligence.

Again the text Thou the intelligent person having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence (Bri. Up. II.1.17) shows intelligence to be different from the agent, i.e., the Jiva or the individual soul and so likewise confirms our views.

Though there is no fundamental difference between the individual soul and his intelligence, they are different in the sense that intelligence is the attribute of the individual soul which is the substance. The individual soul is the possessor of that attribute, because the Sruti states a difference between the two.

Tadgunasaratvat tu tadvyapadesah prajnavat II.3.29 (245)

But that declaration (as to the atomic size of the soul) is on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (viz., the Buddhi), as in the case of the intelligent Lord (Saguna Brahman).

Tadgunasaratvat: on account of its possessing for its essence the qualities of that (viz., the Buddhi); Tu: but; Tadvyapadesah: that declaration (as to its atomic size); Prajnavat: as in the case of the Intelligent Lord.

The discussion on the true character of the individual soul, commenced in Sutra 16 is continued.

The word `tu' (but), refutes all that has been said in Sutras 19-28 and decides that the soul is all-pervading.

The next four Sutras are the Siddhanta Sutras which lay down the correct doctrine.

The soul is not of atomic size as the Sruti does not declare it to have had an origin. The scripture declares that the Supreme Brahman entered the universe as the individual soul and that the individual soul is identical with Brahman, and that the individual soul is nothing else but the Supreme Brahman. If the soul is the Supreme Brahman, it must be of the same extent as Brahman. The scripture states Brahman to be all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.

Your argument is that though the soul is Anu, it can cognise all that goes on in the body because of its contact with the skin. But that argument is untenable because when a thorn pricks we feel pain only in the pricked spot. Moreover, your analogy of the lamp and its light and of the flower and its fragrance has no real applicability, because a Guna (quality) can never be apart from the substance (Guna). The light and the perfume are only subtle portions of the flame and the flower. Further, as Chaitanya is the nature or Svarupa of the soul, the soul also must be of the size of the body if there is cognition of the whole body. This latter doctrine has been already refuted. Therefore the soul must be infinite.

The Jiva is declared to be atomic by reason of its identification with the Buddhi.

According to the extent of intellect, the size of the individual soul has been fixed. It is imagined that the soul is connected with the Buddhi or intellect and bound. Passing out, going and coming are qualities of the intellect and are superimposed on the Jiva or the individual soul. The soul is considered to be atomic on account of the limitation of the intellect. That the non-transmigrating eternally free Atman, which neither acts nor enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the Buddhi is due only to its having the qualities of the Buddhi (intellect) for its essence, viz., as long as it is in fictitious connection with the Buddhi. It is similar to imagining the all-pervading Lord as limited for the sake of Upasana or worship.

Svetasvatara Upanishad (V.9) says, That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times and yet it is to be infinite. This Sruti text at first states the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite. This is appropriate only if the atomicity of the soul is metaphorical and its infinity is real, because both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at the same time. The infinity certainly cannot be understood in a metaphorical sense, as all the Upanishads aim at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.

The other passage (Svet. Up. V.8) which treats of the measure of the soul The lower one endowed with the quality of mind and the quality of the body, is seen small even like the point of a goad teaches the soul's small size to depend on its connection with the qualities of the Buddhi, not upon its own Self.

Mundaka Upanishad declares, That small (Anu) Self is to be known by thought (III.1.9). This Upanishad does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, as the subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be fathomed by the eye, etc., but to be realised by the light of knowledge. Further, the soul cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word.

Therefore the statement about Anutva (smallness, subtlety) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts.

The Buddhi abides in the heart. So it is said that the soul abides in the heart. Really the soul is all-pervading.

As the soul is involved in the Samsara and as it has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjunct viz., Buddhi, it is spoken of as minute.

Yavadatmabhavitvacca na doshastaddarsanat II.3.30 (246)

And there is no defect or fault in what has been said in the previous Sutra (as the conjunction of the soul with the intellect exists) so long as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists; because it is so seen (in the scriptures).

Yavat: so long as; Atmabhavitvat: as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists; Cha: also, and; Na doshah: there is no defect or fault; Taddarsanat: because it is so seen (in the scriptures), as Sruti also shows that.

An additional reason is given in support of Sutra 29.

The Purvapakshin or the opponent raises an objection. Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory condition of the soul is due to the qualities of the intellect forming its essence. It will follow from this that, as the conjunction of the intellect and soul which are different entities must necessarily come to an end, the soul when disjoined from the intellect will either cease to exist altogether or at least cease to be a Samsarin (individual soul).

To this objection this Sutra gives a reply. There can be no such defect in the argument of the previous Sutra, because this connection with the Buddhi (intellect) lasts so long as the soul's state of Samsara is not brought to an end by means of perfect knowledge. As long as the soul's connection with the Buddhi, its limiting adjunct lasts, so long the individual soul remains individual soul, involved in transmigratory existence.

There is no Jiva or individual soul without identification with intellect. The connection of the soul with the intellect will cease only by right knowledge. The scripture declares I know that Person of sunlike lustre beyond darkness. A man who knows Him passes over death, there is no other path to go (Svet. Up. III.8).

How is it known that the soul is connected with the Buddhi as long as it exists? We reply, because that is seen, viz., in scripture. It is known from the Srutis that this connection is not severed even at death. The scripture declares, He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, surrounded by Pranas, the person of light, he remaining the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving (Bri. Up. IV.3.7). Here the term consisting of knowledge means `consisting of Buddhi'. The passage He remaining in the same wanders along the two worlds declares that the Self, even when going to another world, is not separated from the Buddhi etc. The term as if thinking, as if moving mean that the individual soul does not think and move on its own account, but only through its association with the Buddhi. The individual soul thinks as it were, and moves as it were, because the intellect to which it is joined really moves and thinks.

The connection of the individual soul with the intellect, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge. Wrong knowledge (Mithyajnana) cannot cease except through perfect knowledge. Therefore, as long as there does not arise the realisation of Brahman or Brahmajnana, so long the connection of the soul with the intellect and its other limiting adjuncts does not come to an end.

Pumstvadivat tvasya sato'bhivyaktiyogat II.3.31 (247)

On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that (connection) which exists (potentially) like virile power, etc.

Pumstvadivat: like the virile power etc.; Tu: verily, but; Asya: its, i.e., of the connection with the intellect; Satah: existing; Abhivyaktiyogat: on account of the manifestation being possible, because of appropriateness of the manifestation.

A proof is now given in support of Sutra 29 by showing the perpetual connection between the individual soul and the intellect. The word `tu' (but), is used in order to set aside the objection raised above.

An objection is raised that in Sushupti or deep sleep and Pralaya there can be no connection with the intellect, as the scripture declares, Then he becomes united with the True; he is gone to his own (Chh. Up. VI.8.1). How then can it be said that the connection with the intellect lasts so long as the individual soul exists?

The Sutra refutes it and says that this connection exists in a subtle or potential form even in deep sleep. Had it not been for this, it could not have become manifest in the waking state. Such connection is clear from the appropriateness of such connection becoming manifest during creation, after dissolution and during the waking state after sleep, as in the case of virility dormant in boyhood and manifest in manhood.

The connection of the soul with the intellect exists potentially during deep sleep and the period of dissolution and again becomes manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.

Virile power becomes manifest in manhood only if it exists in a fine or potential state in the body. Hence this connection with the intellect lasts so long as the soul exists in its Samsara-state.

Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasango'nyataraniyamo

va'nyatha II.3.32 (248)

Otherwise (if no intellect existed) there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e., of the soul or of the senses).

Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasangat: there would result perpetual perception or non-perception; Anyatara: otherwise, either of the two; Niyamah: restrictive rule; Va: or; Anyatha: otherwise. (Upalabdhi: perception, consciousness; Anupalabdhi: non-perception, non-consciousness.)

The internal organ (Antahkarana) which constitutes the limiting adjunct of the soul is called in different places by different names such as Manas (mind), Buddhi (intellect), Vijnana (knowledge), and Chitta (thought) etc. When it is in a state of doubt it is called Manas; when it is in a state of determination it is called Buddhi. Now we must necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal organ, because otherwise there would result either perpetual perception or perpetual non-perception. There would be perpetual perception whenever there is a conjunction of the soul, and senses and the objects of senses, the three together forming the instruments of perception. Or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect did not follow, there would be perpetual non-perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually observed.

Or else we will have to accept the limitation of the power either of the soul or of the senses. But the limiting of power is not possible, as the Atman is changeless. It cannot be said that the power of the senses which is not obstructed either in the previous moment or in the subsequent moment is limited in the middle.

Therefore we have to acknowledge the existence of an internal organ (Antahkarana) through whose connection and disconnection perception and non-perception take place. The scripture declares, My mind was elsewhere, I did not see, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for a man sees with his mind and hears with the mind (Bri. Up. I.5.3). The scripture further shows that desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.

Therefore there exists an internal organ, the Antahkarana, and the connection of the soul with the internal organ causes the Atman to appear as the individual soul or as the soul its Samsara state as explained in Sutra 29. The explanation given in Sutra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.

KARTRADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 14 (SUTRAS 38-39)

THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS AN AGENT

Karta sastrarthavattvat II.3.33 (249)

(The soul is) an agent on account of the scripture having a purport thereby.

Karta: agent; Sastrarthavattvat: in order that the scriptures may have a meaning, on account of the scriptures having a purport.

Another characteristic of the individual soul is being stated.

The question as regards the size of the soul has been stated. Now another characteristic of the soul is taken up for discussion. The Jiva is a doer or an agent, for otherwise the scriptural injunctions will be useless. On that assumption scriptural injunctions such as He is to sacrifice, He is to make an oblation into the fire, He is to give, etc., have a purport, otherwise they would be purportless. The scriptures enjoin certain acts to be done by the agent. If the soul be not an agent these injunctions would become meaningless. On that supposition there is meaning to the following passage also, For, it is he who sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he is the person whose self is knowledge (Pras. Up. IV.9). He who desires to attain heaven, has to perform sacrifices; and he, who desires to attain salvation, has to worship Brahman in meditation.

Viharopadesat II.3.34 (250)

And on account of (the Sruti) teaching (its) wandering about.

Vihara: wandering at will, play, sporting about; Upadesat: on account of declaration, as Sruti declares.

An argument in support of Sutra 33 is given.

The Sruti declares The immortal one goes wherever he likes (Bri. Up. IV.3.12), and again He taking the senses along with him moves about according to his pleasure, within his own body (Bri. Up. II.1.18). These passages which give a description of the wandering of the soul in the dream indicate clearly that the soul is an agent.

Upadanat II.3.35 (251)

(Also it is a doer) on account of its taking the organs.

Upadanat: on account of its taking (the organs).

Another argument in support of Sutra 33 is given.

The text quoted in the last Sutra also indicates that the soul in dream state takes the organs with it. Having taken through the intelligence of the senses, intelligence, and having taken the senses (Bri. Up. II.1.18, 19). This clearly shows that the soul is an agent.

It is a doer or an agent because it is said to use the senses. The individual soul is to be admitted as the agent, because he is described in Sruti to take the senses along with him as instruments of his work, while roaming within his own body during the dream state. Thus, he taking the senses along with him, moves about within his own body, just as he pleases. (Bri. Up. II.1.18).

In the Gita also we find when the soul acquires a body and when he abandons it, he seizes these and goes with them, as the wind takes fragrance from the flowers (Gita. XV.8).

Vyapadesaccha kriyayam na chennirdesaviparyayah II.3.36 (252)

(The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not so, there would be a change of designation.

Vyapadesat: on account of mention, from a statement of Sruti; Cha: also, and; Kriyayam: in respect of performance of rites; Na chet: if it were not so, or else, otherwise; Nirdesaviparyayah: reversal of the statement, change of designation.

The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.

In the passage Vijnanam yajnam tanute, Karmani tanute'pi chaIntelligence (i.e., the intelligent person, Jiva) performs sacrifices, and it also performs all acts (Tait. Up.II.5), by `Intelligence' the soul is meant and not the Buddhi. This clearly shows that the soul is an agent.

Vijnana refers to Jiva and not to Buddhi, because if Buddhi is referred to, the word would be `Vijnanena'. The nominative case in `Vijnanam yajnam tanute', should be instrumental case, `Vijnanena', `by intelligence' meaning through its instrumentality.

We see that in another text where the Buddhi is meant the word `intelligence' is exhibited in the instrumental case Having through the intelligence of these senses it takes all understanding (Bri.Up. II.1.17). In the passage under discussion, on the contrary, the word `intelligence' is given in the characteristic of the agent, viz., nominative case and therefore indicates the soul which is distinct from the Buddhi.

Upalabdhivadaniyamah II.3.37 (253)

As in the case of perception (there is) no rule (here also).

Upalabdhivat: as in the case of perception; Aniyamah: (there is) no rule.

The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.

An objection is raised that if the soul were a free agent, then why should he do any act productive of harmful effects? He would have done only what is beneficial to him and not both good and evil actions.

This objection is refuted in this Sutra. Just as the soul, although he is free, perceives both pleasant and unpleasant things, so also he performs both good and evil actions. There is no rule that he should perform only what is beneficial and avoid what is bad or harmful.

In the performance of actions, the soul is not absolutely free as he depends on differences of place, time and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he is in need of assistance. A cook remains the agent in action of cooking, although he needs fuel, water, etc. His function as a cook exists at all times.

Saktiviparyayat II.3.38 (254)

On account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi).

Saktiviparyayat: on account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi).

The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.

If the Buddhi which is an instrument becomes the agent and ceases to function as an instrument there would take place a reversal of power, i.e., the instrumental power which pertains to the Buddhi would have to be set aside and to be replaced by the power of an agent.

If the Buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-consciousness (Aham-pratyaya), as we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness: I go, I come, I eat, I drink, I do, I enjoy.

If the Buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and affects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it affects everything, because every doer needs an instrument. Hence the whole dispute is about a name only. There is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent. In either case an agent different from the instrument has to be admitted.

Samadhyabhavaccha II.3.39 (255)

And on account of the impossibility of Samadhi.

Samadhyabhavat: on account of the impossibility of Samadhi; Cha: and, also. (Samadhi: superconscious state; Abhavat: for want, for impossibility, as it becomes an impossible thing).

The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.

If the soul is not a doer, there will be non-existence of attainment of liberation. If the Jiva or soul is not an agent, then the realisation prescribed by Sruti texts like The Atman is to be realised (Bri. Up. II.4.5.) through Samadhi would be impossible. The meditation taught in the Vedanta texts is possible only if the soul is the agent. Verily, the Atman is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be searched. The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1.) Meditate on the Self as OM (Mun. Up. II.2.6). Therefrom also it follows that the soul is an agent.

The soul will not be capable of practising hearing, reasoning, reflection, and meditation which lead to Samadhi and the attainment of Knowledge of the Imperishable. Hence there will be no emancipation for the soul. Therefore it is established that the soul alone is the agent, but not the Buddhi.

TAKSHADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 15

THE SOUL IS AN AGENT AS LONG AS IT IS LIMITED BY THE ADJUNCTS

Yatha cha takshobhayatha II.3.40 (256)

And as the carpenter is both.

Yatha: as; Cha: also, and; Taksha: the carpenter; Ubhayatha: in both ways, is both.

The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.

That the individual soul is an agent has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sutras 33 to 39. We now have to consider whether this agency is its real nature or only a superimposition due to its limiting adjuncts. The Nyaya School maintains that it is its very nature.

This Sutra refutes it and declares that it is superimposed on the soul and not real. Such doership is not the soul's nature, because if it is so, there could be no liberation, just as fire, being hot in its nature, can never be free from heat. Doing is essentially of the nature of pain. You cannot say that even if there is the power of doing, emancipation can come when there is nothing to do, because the power of doing will result in doing at some time or other. The Sruti calls the Atman as having an eternally pure conscious and free nature. How could that be if doership is its nature? Hence, its doership is due to its identification with a limiting function. So there is no soul as doer or enjoyer apart from Para-Brahman. You cannot say that in that case God will become a Samsarin, because doership and enjoyment are due only to Avidya.

The body of the carpenter is not the cause of his function. His tools are the cause. Even so the soul is a doer only through the mind and the senses. The scriptural injunctions do not command doing but command acts to be done on the basis of such doership which is due to Avidya.

The Sruti declares This Atman is non-attached (Bri. Up. IV.3.15). Just as in ordinary life, a carpenter suffers when he is working with his tools and is happy when he leaves his work, so does the Atman suffer when he is active in the waking and dream states through his connection with the intellect, etc., and is blissful when he ceases to be an agent as in the state of deep sleep.

The scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts refer to the conditioned state of the self. By nature the soul is inactive. It becomes active through connection with its Upadhis or limiting adjuncts, the intellect, etc. Doership really belongs to the intellect. Eternal Upalabdhi or Consciousness is in the soul. Doership implies Ahamkara or ego-consciousness. Hence such doership does not belong to the soul as its nature but belongs to the intellect.

The scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose an agentship established somehow on account of Avidya or ignorance, but do not themselves aim at establishing the direct agentship of the Self. The agentship of the Self does not constitute its real nature because scripture teaches that its true Self is Brahman. We, therefore, conclude that the Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agentship of the soul which is due to Avidya.

Nor can you infer doership from the description of Vihara (play or activity) in dreams, because the connection with the mind or intellect continues in dreams. Even in the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not altogether at rest; because scripture declares that even then it is connected with the Buddhi. Having become a dream, together with Buddhi, it passes beyond this world. Smriti also says, when the senses being at rest, the mind not being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know to be a dream.

It is clearly established that the agentship of the soul is due to its limiting adjunct Buddhi only.

PARAYATTADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 16 (SUTRAS 41-42)

THE SOUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE LORD, WHEN HE WORKS

Parattu tat sruteh II.3.41 (257)

But (even) that (agency of the soul) is from the Supreme Lord, so declares the Sruti.

Parat: from the Supreme Lord; Tu: but, indeed; Tat: agency, agentship; Sruteh: from Sruti, so declares the Sruti.

A limitation to Sutra 33 is stated.

We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship characterising the individual soul in the state of ignorance on account of its limiting adjuncts is independent of the Lord or dependent on Him.

The Purvapakshin maintains that the soul as far as it is an agent does not depend on the Lord.

The word `tu' (but), is employed in order to remove the doubt raised by the Purvapakshin. The view that the soul's doership is due to its desires and its possession of the senses as instruments and not to the Lord is wrong, because the Sruti declares that Lord is the cause.

The agency of the soul is also due to the Supreme Lord. It can be understood from Sruti that the agentship of the individual soul is verily subordinate to and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The soul does good and bad deeds being so directed by the Lord.

Sruti declares, He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do good deeds; He makes him, whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds. (Kau. Up. III.8) and, again, He who dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within (Sat. Br. XIV.6.7.30). The Universal Soul entering within, governs the individual soulsAntah pravishtah sasta jivanam The Lord is within all, the Ruler of all creatures.

You cannot say that that will cause the attribution of partiality (Vaishamya) and cruelty (Nairghrinya) to the Lord, because He acts according to Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit). You may reply that these are due to doership and if doership is due to the Lord, how can the Lord act according to Dharma and Adharma?

We reply that the Sruti says that the soul is the doer and declares as cause of doership the Supreme Lord who is the bestower of the fruits of actions, who is immanent in all, who is the witness of all actions, and who is the inspirer and guider of all.

Kritaprayatnapekshastu

vihitapratishiddhavaiyarthyadibhyah II.3.42 (258)

But (the Lord's making the soul act) depends on the works done (by it), for otherwise there will be uselessness of the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions.

Kritaprayatnapekshah: depends on works done; Tu: but; Vihita-pratishiddha-avaiyarthyadibhyah: so that the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions may not be meaningless. (Vihita: ordained; Pratishiddha: prohibited; Avaiyarthyadibhyah: on account of non-meaninglessness.)

This Sutra proceeds to narrow the scope of Sutra 41 within certain limits.

If causal agency belongs to the Lord, it follows that He must be cruel and unjust and that the soul has to undergo consequences of what it has not done. He must be cruel and whimsical too as He makes some persons do good acts and others evil deeds. This Sutra refutes this doubt.

The word `tu' (but), removes the objections. The Lord always directs the soul according to its good or bad actions done in previous births. He bestows good and bad fruits according to the soul's good and bad actions. He is the rain which always causes each seed to fructify according to its power. Though doership is dependent on the Lord, doing is the soul's act. What the soul does the Lord causes to be done. Such doing is due to deeds done in previous birth and Vasanas which, again, are due to previous Karmas and so on, Samsara being without beginning (Anadi). As Samsara is beginningless there will always be previous births with actions performed in those births for the guidance of the Lord. Hence He cannot be accused of being cruel, unjust and whimsical. To give fruits the Lord depends on the soul's actions. If this were not so, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be meaningless. If Lord does not depend on the soul's actions for giving fruit, effort or exertion (Purushartha) will have no place at all. The soul will gain nothing by following these injunctions.

Moreover, time, place and causation will be capriciously operative and not according to the law of cause and effect, if our Karma is not the instrumental cause, and the Lord the Supervising Cause.

AMSADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 17 (SUTRAS 43-53)

RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL TO BRAHMAN

Amso nanavyapadesad anyatha chapi

dasakitavaditvamadhiyata eke II.3.43 (259)

(The soul is) a part of the Lord on account of difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise also (i.e., as non-different from Brahman); because in some (Vedic texts) (Brahman) is spoken of as being fishermen, knaves, etc.

Amsah: part; Nanavyapadesat: on account of difference being declared; Anyatha: otherwise; Cha: and; Api: also; Dasakitavaditvam: being fisher-men, knaves, etc.; Adhiyata: read; Eke: some (Srutis, Sakhas of the Vedas).

This Sutra shows that the individual soul is different from as well as the same with Brahman.

In the last topic it has been shown that the Lord rules the soul. Now the question of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman is taken up. Is it that of master and servant or as between fire and its sparks?

The Purvapakshin holds that the relation is like that of master and servant, because that connection only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and ruled (subject).

To this the Sutra says that the soul must be considered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire. But then the soul is not actually a part, but a part as it were. It is an imagined part only, because Brahman cannot have any parts. Brahman is Nishkala, without parts. He is Akhanda (indivisible). He is Niravayava (without limbs).

Why then should it be taken as a part and not identical with the Lord? Because the scriptures declare a difference between them in texts like That self it is which we must search out, that it is we must try to understand (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). He who knows Him becomes a Muni (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). He who dwelling within the self, pulls the self from within (Bri. Up. III.7.23). The Atman is to be seen? (Bri. Up. II.4.5). This difference is spoken of from the relative viewpoint. They are identical from the absolute viewpoint.

The text Brahman is the fishermen, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers etc., indicate that even such low persons are in reality Brahman and that all individual souls, men, women and children are all Brahman.

The same viewpoint is set forth in other passages such as Thou art woman, Thou art man, Thou art the youth, Thou art the maiden; Thou as an old man totters along on Thy staff, Thou art born with Thy face turned everywhere (Svet. Up. IV.3). Texts like There is no other but He and similar ones establish the same truth. Non-differentiated intelligence belongs to the soul and the Lord alike, just as heat belongs to the sparks as well as the fire.

From these two views of difference, and non-difference, there results the comprehensive view of the soul being a part of the Lord.

Mantravarnaccha II.3.44 (260)

Also from the words of the Mantra (it is known that the soul is a part of the Lord).

Mantravarnat: from the words of the Mantra, from the letters in sacred verses, because of description given in the sacred Mantras; Cha: also, and.

An argument in support of Sutra 43, that the individual soul is a part of Brahman is given.

A further reason is given to show that the soul is a part of the Lord. Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person. One foot of It are all these beings, three feet of It are the immortal in heaven, (Chh. Up. III.12.6) where beings including souls are said to be a foot or part of the Lord.

(One foot, i.e., the fourth part of Him are all beings, the whole creation covers only a fraction of Him). Purusha Sukta: Rigveda: X.90.3, declares the same thing. All the beings are but a foot of Him.

The word `pada' and `amsa' are identical. Both mean part or a portion.

Hence we conclude that the individual soul is a part of the Lord, and again from the following reason.

Api cha smaryate II.3.45 (261)

And it is so stated in the Smriti.

Api: also; Cha: and; Smaryate: it is (so) stated in the Smriti.

The argument that the individual soul is a part of Brahman is concluded here.

The Smriti also says sothat the individual soul is a part of Brahman. An eternal portion of Myself becomes the individual soul in the world of life (Bhagavad Gita: XV.7).

Prakasadivannaivam parah II.3.46 (262)

The Supreme Lord is not (affected by pleasure and pain) like this (individual soul) just as light (is unaffected by the shaking of its reflections).

Prakasadivat: like light, etc.; Na: is not; Evam: thus, like this, like the individual soul; Parah: the Supreme Lord.

The speciality of the Supreme Lord is shown in this Sutra.

Here the Purvapakshin raises another objection. If the soul is a part of the Lord, the Lord also must experience pleasure and pain like the soul. We see in ordinary life that the entire Ramakrishna suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some other limb. Hence attainment of God would mean maximum grief and pain, and the old limited pain of individual soul would be far better.

This Sutra refutes it. The Lord does not experience pleasure and pain like the individual soul. The individual soul identifies itself with the body, the senses and the mind, on account of ignorance, and therefore experiences pleasure and pain. The Supreme Lord neither identifies himself with a body, nor imagines himself to be afflicted by pain.

The pain of the individual soul also is not real but imaginary only. It is due to non-discrimination of the Self from the body, senses and mind which are the products of Avidya or ignorance.

Just as a man feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so also he feels the pain which affects others such as sons or friends, by erroneously identifying himself with them. He enters as it were into them through Moha or love and imagines I am the son, I am the friend. This clearly shows that the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagination.

Some men and women are sitting together and talking. If then somebody calls out the son has died, grief is produced in the minds of those who have Moha or love for sons on account of erroneous imagination, identification, and connection, but not in the minds of religious ascetics or Sannyasins who have freed themselves from that imagination. If even a man of right knowledge who has become an ascetic has no pain or grief consequent on death of relations or friends, God who is Supreme and alone, who is pure consciousness, who is eternal pure intelligence, who sees nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects, can have no pain at all.

To illustrate this view the Sutra introduces a comparison like light etc. Just as the light of the sun which is all-pervading becomes straight or bent by coming in contact with particular objects, but does not really become so, or the ether of a pot seems to move when the pot is moved, but does not really move, or as the sun does not tremble although its image which is reflected in water trembles, so also the Lord is not affected by pleasure, pain or grief although pleasure and pain etc., are felt by that part of Him, which is called the individual soul which is a product of ignorance and is limited by Buddhi, etc.

Just as the sun does not become contaminated by its touch through its parts, the rays with the impurities of the earth, so also the Supreme Lord does not become affected by the enjoyment and suffering of the individual soul, though latter is part and parcel of the former.

When the soul's individual state due to ignorance is sublated, it becomes Brahman, Thou art That etc. Thus the Supreme Lord is not affected by the pain of the individual soul.

Smaranti Cha II.3.47 (263)

The Smritis also state (that).

Smaranti: the Smritis state; Cha: and, also.

Of the two, the Supreme Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities. It is not touched by the fruits of actions, any more than a lotus leaf by water. The Smriti texts like these state that the Supreme Lord does not experience pleasure and pain.

Anujnapariharau dehasambandhajjyotiradivat II.3.48 (264)

Injunctions and prohibitions (are possible) on account of the connection (of the Self) with the body, as in the case of light, etc.

Anujnapariharau: injunctions and prohibitions; Dehasamban- dhat: on account of connection with the body; Jyotiradivat: like light etc.

The necessity for observance of mandatory and prohibitory rules is explained.

The Atman or the Supreme Self is one. There can be no injunctions and prohibitions with regard to the Atman. But injunctions and prohibitions are possible when it is connected with a body. What are those permissions and injunctions? He is to approach his wife at the proper time. He is not to approach the wife of his Guru. He is to kill the animal devoted to Agnistoma. and He is not to hurt any being.

Fire is one only but the fire of the funeral pyre is rejected and that of a sacrifice is accepted. Some things consisting of earth, like diamonds, are desired; other things consisting of earth, like dead bodies, are shunned. The urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as such; those of other animals are rejected. Water poured from a clean vessel or offered by a clean person is to be accepted; that contained in an unclean vessel or offered by an unclean man is to be rejected. Similar is the case with the Atman.

When the soul is in a state of attachment to the body, ethical ideas of purity and impurity have full application.

Asantateschavyatikarah II.3.49 (265)

And on account of the non-extension (of the soul beyond its own body) there is no confusion (of results of actions).

Asantateh: on account of non-extension (beyond its own body); Cha: and; Avyatikarah: there is no confusion (of results of actions).

The discussion on the special characteristic of the individual soul is continued.

An objection is raised that on account of the unity of the self there would result a confusion of the results of actions, there being only one master, i.e., one soul to enjoy the fruits of actions. This Sutra refutes such a possibility.

This is not so, because there is no extension of the acting and enjoying self, i.e., no connection on its part with all bodies. The individual soul depends on its adjuncts, and there is also non-extension of the soul on account of the non-extension of those adjuncts. The individual souls are different from each other. Each soul is connected with a particular body, mind, etc.

The individual soul has no connection with all the bodies at the same time. He is connected with one body only and he is affected by the peculiar properties of that one alone. Therefore the effects of works done by the soul in one body belongs to him in respect of that body only and not of any other body. All the individuals are not affected by the works done by a particular individual.

There will be no possibility for the Atman, as it is one, to experience all the pleasures and all the pains of all the bodies, because the bodies are disconnected.

Therefore there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions.

Abhasa eva cha II.3.50 (266)

And (the individual soul is) only a reflection (of Paramatman or the Supreme Lord).

Abhasa: a reflection; Eva: only; Cha: and.

According to Vedanta, the individual soul is only a reflection of Brahman or the Supreme Soul in the mind like the reflection of the sun in the water. Just as the reflections of the sun in different pots of water are different, so also the reflections of the Supreme Soul in different minds are different. Just as, when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also, so also when a particular soul experiences fruits of his actions, viz., pleasure and pain, it is not shared by other souls. When the individual soul in one body is undergoing the effects of his actions, the soul in any other body is not affected on that account.

For those, such as the Sankhyas, the Vaiseshikas and the Naiyayikas on the contrary, who maintain that there are many souls and all of them all-pervading, it follows that there must be a confusion of actions and results, because each soul is present everywhere near to those causes which produce pleasure and pain.

According to the opinion of the Sankhya,s there exist many all-pervading selfs, whose nature is pure intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable excellence. For the common purpose of all of them there exists the Pradhana through which the souls obtain enjoyment and release.

In the Sankhya philosophy the individual soul has been stated to be all-pervading. If this view be accepted there would be confusion of works and their effects. This view of Sankhyas is therefore an unfair conclusion.

Therefore there can be no confusion of the results of action.

Adrishtaniyamat II.3.51 (267)

There being no fixity about the unseen principle (there would result confusion of works and their effects for those who believe in many souls, each all-pervading).

Adrishtaniyamat: There being no fixity about the unseen principle. (Adrishta: the fate, the accumulated stock of previous actions, waiting as a latent force to bring forth fruits in future, merit or demerit acquired by the souls by thoughts, words and actions; Aniyamat: for want of any binding rule, on account of non-determinateness.)

The discussion begun in Sutra 50 is continued.

Sutras 51 to 53 refute the doctrine of the Sankhyas and other schools about the plurality of souls, each of which is all-pervading. It leads to absurdities.

This confusion cannot be avoided by bringing the Adrishta or unseen principle, because if all the souls equally are all-pervading, there cannot be any binding rule as to upon which of them the force will act.

According to the Sankhyas, the Adrishta does not inhere in the soul but in the Pradhana which is common to all souls. Hence there is nothing to fix that a particular Adrishta operates in a particular soul.

The doctrine of the other two schools is open to the same objection. According to the Nyaya and Vaiseshika schools, the unseen principle is created by the conjunction of the soul with the mind. Here also there is nothing to fix that a particular Adrishta belongs to a particular soul, as every soul is all-pervading and therefore equally connected with all minds.

Therefore the confusion of results is unavoidable.

Abhisandhyadishu api chaivam II.3.52 (268)

And this is also the case in resolutions, etc.

Abhisandhyadishu: in resolutions, etc.; Api: even; Cha: and; Evam: thus, like this, in the like manner.

The discussion begun in Sutra 50 is continued.

The same logical defect will apply also to the resolve to do actions. There will be no orderliness of resolves to do actions. That is want of order also in matters of personal determination, etc., if the individual soul be admitted to be all-pervading.

If it be held that the resolution which one makes to get something or to avoid something will allot the Adrishta to particular souls, even then there will be this confusion of results of actions, because resolutions are formed by the conjunction of the soul and the mind. Therefore the same argument applies here also.

If the individual soul is all-pervading, there cannot be any order in motives or matters of personal determination such as I will do a certain thing or I will not do a certain thing because in such a case, everyone becomes conscious of the determination of every other. Therefore no order of determination and its putting it into action can be maintained. Moreover collision between wills cannot be avoided. But order is found in this world everywhere.

Therefore it is established that the soul is not all-pervading.

Pradesaditi chenna antarbhavat II.3.53 (269)

If it be said (that the distinction of pleasure and pain etc., results) from (the difference of) place, (we say) not so, on account of the self being in all bodies.

Pradesat: on account of particular locality or environment, from (difference of) place; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not so, the argument cannot stand; Antarbhavat: on account of the self being in all bodies.

An objection to Sutra 52 is raised and refuted. This Sutra consists of two parts, viz., an objection and its reply. The objection portion is `Pradesaditi chet' and the reply portion is `Na antarbhavat.'

The Naiyayikas and others try to get over the difficulty shown in the previous Sutra by giving the following argument. Though each soul is all-pervading, yet, confusion of results of actions will not occur if we take its connection with the mind to take place in that part of it which is limited by its body.

Even this cannot stand. This also is not possible on account of its being within all. Because, as being equally infinite all selfs are within all bodies. Every soul is all-pervading and therefore permeates all bodies. There is nothing to fix that a particular body belongs to a particular soul.

Moreover, on account of the doctrine of limitation due to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain may effect their fruition by one and the same way, as it may happen that the unseen principle of two selfs occupies the same place.

Further, from the doctrine that the unseen principles occupy fixed places it would follow that no enjoyment of heaven can take place, because the Adrishta is effected in definite places such as, e.g., the body of a Brahmana and the enjoyment of heaven is bound to a definite different place.

There cannot be more than one all-pervading entity. If there were many all-pervading entities they would limit each other and therefore cease to be all-pervading or infinite.

Therefore there is only one Atman and not many. The Vedanta doctrine of one Atman is the only faultless doctrine. The only doctrine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity of the self. The plurality of selfs in Vedanta is only a product of Avidya, nescience or ignorance and not a reality.

Thus ends the Third Pada (Section 3) of the Second Adhyaya (Chapter II) of the Brahmasutras or the Vedanta Philosophy.

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Chapter II, Section 4

Hari Om! Salutations to Sri Vyasa, the Avatara of Vishnu, the wise Badarayana and Sri Krishna Dvaipayana.

Vedas consist of three portions viz., the Karma Kanda which deals with sacrifices or ceremonial rites, the Upasana Kanda which treats of Upasana (worship) and the Jnana Kanda which deals with knowledge of Brahman. Karma Kanda represents the feet of a man, Upasana Kanda the heart, and the Jnana Kanda the head. Just as the head is the most important portion of a man, so also the Upanishads which treat of the knowledge portion of the Vedas is the head of the Vedas. Hence it is said to be the Siras (head) of Vedas.

Mimamsa means the investigation or enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts. Of this Mimamsa two branches have been recognised, the Purva Mimamsa (earlier) and the Uttara Mimamsa (the latter). The former systematises the Karma Kandathe portion of the Veda which pertains to action and sacrifices and which comprises Samhitas and the Brahmanas; the latter systematises the Jnana Kanda i.e., that part of the Vedas which includes the Aranyaka portion of the Brahmanas and the Upanishads. Jaimini is the author of the Purva Mimamsa. Sri Vyasa (Badarayana or Krishna Dvaipayana) the Guru of Jaimini is the author of the Brahma Sutras otherwise known as Vedanta Sutras. The study of Brahma Sutras is a synthetic study of the Upanishads. It treats of the Vedanta philosophy.

The Vedas are eternal. They were not written by any individual. They came out from the breath of Hiranyagarbha (Lord Brahma). Vedanta is the end or gist of the Vedas. It deals with the knowledge portion. Vedanta is not mere speculation. It is the authentic record of transcendental experiences or direct and actual realisation of the great Hindu Rishis or seers. Brahma Sutras is the Science of the Soul.

Sutras are concise aphorisms. They give the essence of the arguments on a topic. Maximum of thought is compressed or condensed into these Sutras in as few words as possible. It is easy to remember them. Great intellectual people only, with realisation, can compose Sutras. They are clues or aids to memory. They cannot be understood without a lucid commentary (Bhashya). The commentary also is in need of further elaborate explanation. Thus the interpretations of the Sutras gave rise to various kinds of literary writings such as Vrittis (gloss) and Karikas. The different Acharyas (founders of different schools of thought) have given their own interpretations of the Sutras to establish their own doctrines. The Bhashya of Sri Sankara on Brahma Sutras is known as Sariraka Bhashya. His school of thought is Kevala Advaita. The Bhashya of Sri Ramanuja who founded the Visishtadvaita School is called Sri Bhashya. The commentary of Sri Nimbarkacharya is known as Vedanta- parijata-saurabha. Sri Vallabhacharya expounded his system of philosophy of Suddhadvaita (pure monism) and his commentary on the Brahma Sutras is known as Anu Bhashya.

Sanskrit is very elastic. It is like Kamadhenu or Kalpataru. You can milk out of it various kinds of Rasas according to your intellectual calibre and spiritual experiences. Therefore different Acharyas have built different systems of thought or cults by interpreting the Sutras in their own ways and became founders of sects. Madhva founded his own system of Dvaita. The cults of Vishnu known as Bhagavata or Pancharatra and those of Siva, Pasupata or Mahesvara have interpreted Brahma Sutras in accordance with their own tenets. Nimbarkacharya interpreted the Vedanta system from the standpoint of Bhedabheda-Dvaitadvaita. He was largely influenced by the teachings of Bhaskara who flourished in the first half of the ninth century. The theory held by Bhaskara and Nimbarka was held by the ancient teacher Audulomi. Badarayana himself refers to this theory in his Brahma Sutras.

There are more than fourteen commentaries on the Brahma Sutras. Sri Appaya Dikshita rendered the commentary of Sri Sankara more clear by his Parimala, Sri Vachaspati Misra by his work Bhamati and Sri Amalananda Sarasvati by his Kalpataru.

The erroneous identification of the body with the pure Atman is the root cause for human sufferings and miseries and for births and deaths. You identify yourself with the body and say, `I am fair, dark, stout or thin. I am a Brahmin, I am a Kshatriya, I am a doctor'. You identify yourself with the senses and say, `I am blind, I am dumb'. You identify yourself with the mind and say, `I know nothing. I know everything. I became angry. I enjoyed a good meal. I am suffering from this disease'. The entire object of the Brahma Sutras is to remove this erroneous identification of the Soul with the body which is the root cause of your sufferings and miseries, which is the product of Avidya (ignorance) and help you in the attainment of the final emancipation through knowledge of Brahman.

The Upanishads seem to be full of contradictions at first. They do not contain consistent system of thought. Sri Vyasa systematised the thoughts or philosophy of the Upanishads in his Brahma Sutras. The Sutras reconcile the conflicting statements of the Upanishads. In reality there are no conflicts for the thinker. Audulomi and Asmarathya also did this work in their own way and founded their own schools of thought.

Those who wish to study the philosophy of Vedanta should study the Ten Classical Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras. All Acharyas have commented on Brahma Sutras. This is a great authority for every philosophical school in India. If any Acharya wishes to establish his own cult or sect or school of thought he will have to write a commentary of his own on Brahma Sutras. Then only it will be recognised.

The five great Acharyas: Sri Sankara the exponent of Kevala Advaita or uncompromising monism, Sri Ramanuja the exponent of Visishtadvaita or qualified monism, Sri Nimbarka the exponent of Bhedabheda-vada, Sri Madhva the exponent of strict Dvaitism or Dvaita-vada and Sri Vallabha the exponent of Suddhadvaita-vada or pure monism agree that Brahman is the cause of this world and that knowledge of Brahman leads to Moksha or the final emancipation, which is the goal of life. They also emphatically declared that Brahman can be known only through the scriptures and not through mere reasoning. But they differ amongst themselves as to the nature of this Brahman, the relation of the individual soul to Brahman, the state of the soul in the state of final emancipation, the means of attaining It and Its causality with reference to this universe.

According to Sri Sankara, there is one Absolute Brahman who is Sat-chit-ananda, who is of an absolutely homogeneous nature. The appearance of this world is due to Mayathe illusory power of Brahman which is neither Sat nor Asat. This world is unreal. This world is a Vivarta or apparent modification through Maya. Brahman appears as this universe through Maya. Brahman is the only reality. The individual soul has limited himself through Avidya and identification with the body and other vehicles. Through his selfish actions he enjoys the fruits of his actions. He becomes the actor and enjoyer. He regards himself as atomic and as an agent on account of Avidya or the limiting Antahkarana. The individual soul becomes identical with Brahman when his Avidya is destroyed. In reality Jiva is all-pervading and identical with Brahman. Isvara or Saguna Brahman is a product of Maya. Worship of Isvara leads to Krama Mukti. The pious devotees (the knowers of Saguna Brahman) go to Brahmaloka and attain final release through highest knowledge. They do not return to this world. They attain the Nirguna Brahman at the end of the cycle. Knowledge of Nirguna Brahman is the only means of liberation. The knowers of Nirguna Brahman attain immediate final release or Sadyomukti. They need not go by the path of gods or the path of Devayana. They merge themselves in Para Brahman. They do not go to any Loka or world. Sri Sankara's Brahman is Nirvisesha Brahman (Impersonal Absolute) without attributes.

According to Sri Ramanuja, Brahman is with attributes (Savisesha). He is endowed with all auspicious qualities. He is not intelligence itself. Intelligence is his chief attribute. He contains within Himself whatever exists. World and individual souls are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter (Achit) and soul (Chit) form the body of the Lord, Lord Narayana who is the Inner Ruler (Antaryamin). Matter and souls are called modes of Him (Prakara). The individual souls will never be entirely resolved in Brahman. According to Ramanuja, Brahman is not absolutely one and homogeneous. The individual souls undergo a state of Sankocha (contraction) during Pralaya. They expand (Vikasa) during creation. Sri Ramanuja's Brahman is a Personal God with attributes. The individual soul of Ramanuja is really individual. It will remain a personality for ever. The soul remains in Vaikuntha for ever in a state of bliss and enjoys the divine Aisvarya of Lord Narayana. Bhakti is the chief means to final emancipation and not Jnana. Sri Ramanuja follows in his Bhashya the authority of Bodhayana.

According to Sri Nimbarkacharya, Brahman is considered as both the efficient and material cause of the world. Brahman is both Nirguna and Saguna. The universe is not unreal or illusory but is a true manifestation or Parinama of Brahman. (Sri Ramanuja also holds this view. He says Just as milk is transformed into curd, so also Brahman has transformed Himself as this universe). This world is identical with and at the same time different from Brahman just as the wave or bubble is the same and at the same time different from water. The individual souls are parts of the Supreme Self. They are controlled by the Supreme Being. The final salvation lies in realising the true nature of one's own soul. This can be achieved by Bhakti (devotion). The individuality of the finite self (Jivatman) is not dissolved even in the state of final emancipation. Sri Ramanuja also holds that the Jiva assumes the divine body of Sri Narayana with four hands and enjoys in Vaikuntha the divine Aisvarya of the Lord.

You may ask why do such great realised souls hold different views, why have they started different cults or systems. The highest philosophy of Sri Sankara which bespeaks of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul cannot be understood by the vast majority of persons. Therefore Sri Madhva and Sri Ramanuja started their Bhakti cult. The different schools are different rungs in the ladder of Yoga. The student must place his foot step by step and finally reach the highest peak of perfectionthe Kevaladvaita realisation of Sri Sankara. As temperaments are different, different schools are also necessary to suit the taste, capacity, and stage of evolution of the aspirant. Therefore all schools and cults are necessary. They have got their own place and scope.

The views of various Acharyas are all true in respect of the particular aspect of Brahman dealt with by them each in his own way. Sankara has taken Brahman in His transcendental aspect, while Sri Ramanuja has taken Him chiefly in His immanent aspect. People were following blindly the rituals during the time of Sri Sankara. When he was preparing his commentary he had in view the purpose of combating the baneful effects which blind ritualism produced. He never condemned selfless service or Nishkama Karma Yoga. He condemned the performance of rituals with selfish motives.

Sankara Bhashya is the oldest of all commentaries. It upholds Suddha-Para-Brahman or the Supreme Self of the Upanishads as something superior to other divine beings. It propounds a very bold philosophy and declares emphatically that the individual soul is identical with the Supreme Self. Sankara's philosophical view accurately represents the meaning of Badarayana. His explanations only faithfully render the intended meaning of Sri Vyasa. This is beyond doubt and dispute.

Students of Kevaladvaita School of Philosophy should study the Sariraka Bhashya of Sri Sankara which is profound, subtle and unique. It is an authority which leads to the right understanding of the Brahma Sutras. The best thinkers of India, Germany, America and England belong to this school. It occupies a high rank in books on philosophy. Advaita philosophy is the most sublime and the grandest philosophy of the Hindus.

You can understand the Brahma Sutras if you have a knowledge of the twelve classical Upanishads. You can understand the second chapter if you have a knowledge of Sankhya, Nyaya, Yoga, Mimamsa, Vaiseshika Darsana and Buddhistic school, too. All these schools are refuted here by Sri Sankara. Sri Sankara's commentary is the best commentary. Dr. Thibaut has translated this commentary into English. Brahma Sutras is one of the books of Prasthanatraya. This is an authoritative book on Hindu Philosophy. The work consists of 4 Adhyayas (chapters), 16 Padas (sections), 223 Adhikaranas (topics) and 555 Sutras (aphorisms). The first chapter (Samanvayadhyaya) unifies Brahman, the second (Avirodhadhyaya) refutes other philosophies, the third (Sadhanadhyaya) deals with practice (Sadhana) to attain Brahman and the fourth (Phaladhyaya) treats of fruits of Self-realisation. Each chapter contains four Padas. Each Pada contains Adhikaranas. Each Adhikarana has separate question to discuss. The first five Adhikaranas of the first chapter are very, very important.

Glory to Sri Vyasa Bhagavan, son of Parasara, the mighty sage, a Chiranjivi who has written all Puranas and also divided the Vedas. May his blessings be upon you all!

Guruji

வெள்ளி, 2 செப்டம்பர், 2016

BRAHMA SUTRAS - PART 1 (அத்தியாயம் 1 & 2 )

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I, Section 1

Chapter I, Section 2

Chapter I, Section 3

Chapter I, Section 4

CHAPTER II - AVIRODHA-ADHYAYA

INTRODUCTION

Chapter II, Section 3

Chapter II, Section 4

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